

Chapter 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

This thesis has described the role of AU in conflict resolution in Madagascar during the political conflict in 2009-2014. The research question is “What role did African Union play in resolving political conflict in Madagascar in 2009-2014?”. From the researches made in this memory, it has been proved that the African Union played a key role in the resolution of the political conflict in Madagascar in 2009, they played as an arena for the conflict resolution but they were also the main actors during the peace process due to the fact that they are the mediators. This thesis used theory of Institutional Liberalism which encompasses the concept of International Organization, and Conflict Resolution.

This thesis discovers several findings. The first finding concerned the lesson that can be learned from the conflict resolution in Madagascar in 2009-2014. The peace processes adopted on the basis of economic and financial sanctions for a country dependent on external aid such as Madagascar cannot bring about a lasting peace. Four years after the 2014 elections, a new crisis and popular uprising took place in Madagascar. The second findings is about the contribution of this thesis to the Study of international relations. It highlighted than even if sometimes the role of an

international organization is not effectively accepted by the people of the country in non-armed conflict, international organization has the full right to get involved in the conflict resolution. This research contributes then to demonstrate the essence of the role of international organization in a non-armed conflict.

AU has been involved in resolving conflict in Madagascar at various stages. The AU-led peace process in Madagascar was delegated to SADEC and COMESA after the religious elites vainly tried to put the protagonist on a round table. The main reason of African Union to be involved in resolution conflict in Madagascar is that this is the role it as Regional Organization according to Clive Archer. Liberalism claims about interdependence, cooperation between States, and this is all about what Madagascar and African Union has. The process of resolving the crisis followed the four stages of Schellenberg, the first step of which is to take coercive measures, in other words, to punish. After negotiations and mediations began, the signing of the Charter of Transition to which the President of the HAT refused to apply the letter and having marked the biggest obstacle to the end of the conflict.

A road map, predicting the dates and electoral calendar, signed by the protagonists, was not respected. A problem that the International Contact Group Madagascar had to face in arbitrating and imposing a condition of non-eligibility or "ni .., ni, ..." of all the former head of State. This condition led to the organization of the elections and to the end of the

crisis and was taken as a success for the mediators. Deep analysis, however, shows gaps and a part of failure in the resolution of the conflict in Madagascar. Even if the elections were organized, the voice of the people and their fundamental right to choose who they want to govern them could not be realized while the first objective of the mediation of the AU is to enforce the respect of the people by the election. Moreover, some shortcomings in relation to the principles of neutrality and subjectivity in the management of the crisis from the beginning are also noted. Failures that this research work to suggest conditions bringing improvements in the world of conflict resolution.

The objective of the work is to make known the role that African Union has played in the management of the Malagasy conflict. It has been demonstrated the progress of this process of peace, and of course the flaws and successes of the work of mediation, without forgetting to give recommendations to always improve the work in the future. The success of a conflict resolution, especially when it is internal and managed by a regional organization, is not necessarily guaranteed. It engages both sides of the bargain and a lot of delicacy on the part of the mediators and other actors as well. Neutrality, interference, unjust sanctions and the interest of the common people play a great deal on mediations. In order to achieve the objectives and to resolve as precisely as possible a conflict, it is good to overcome these problems.

This research also disclosed that neutrality of AU at high state during the conflict resolution in Madagascar on 2009. The subjectivity of African Union and the pressure from the Western States such as United States and France cause a lack and was the source of the failures highlighted in this thesis.

5.2 Recommendations

The management of conflicts in Africa is most resolved by negotiation (Ikiase, Olisah: 2014, 188). Negotiations are simply defined by their differences, Fisher (2000: 115). The resolution of conflicts, however, is not always straightforward for the mediators or the parties concerned, nor for the population concerned. Conflict management in Madagascar is not a failure, the results for the end of the crisis were conclusive. It should still give some recommendations.

5.1.1 More neutrality and objectivity of mediators

As already pointed out earlier in this research, the objectivity of mediators is still in most cases questioned in the case of conflict management. It is very difficult for mediators to remain neutral even if all factors and the whole aspect of mediation require unequivocal impartiality on the part of these mediators.

In the case of conflict resolution in Madagascar, it has also been mentioned in the preceding chapters that some subjectivities having

disturbed the good progress of the mediation were remarked by the impartial experts and observers of the mediation. According to Tidwel (1998, p.153), if a process is neutral, then to be able to receive information from parts in conflict and generate a result, free from any ethical, belief or value judgment. In other words, it is safe to have a mediation and a fair negotiation between the two parties when the mediators do not undergo any pressure or information coming from other actors of the outside. Alan C. Tidwel goes on to argue that the expected neutrality of conflict resolution is that of a third party in the outcome of an intervention. The third party would be in the outcome. A very important point not respected during the Malagasy crisis. It was SADEC and COMESA, two African entities, who were fervent collaborators of the former head of state Marc Ravalomanana, who lead the negotiation process. It would have been more biased to leave another entity, having no obvious interest, nor any international prestige to safeguard concerning the economy of Madagascar, to manage the crisis of 2009 even if "no third party is neutral in every sense of the word, in as much as any third party carries its own set of values "(Tidwell: 1998, p.154). Subjectivity would be more moral than material, and could be very useful in the process of conflict resolution.

5.1.2 Solution with consultation of the population concerned

A conflict in general is always generated by several or two opposing parties. The latter are also key to resolving the conflict. Mediators are

facilitators of dialogue, although in many cases they also play an arbitration role. Bush and Folger (1994) have written an important book, *The Promise of Mediation*, which outlines the views of what mediation is and what its value is. The authors argue that there are four primary objectives, or stories, found in mediation broadly. But it is referring only to the first point of view. That first is the satisfaction story, the mediation serves to satisfy human needs (Tidwel:1998, p. 156). In other words, a mediation serves first and foremost to satisfy the personal interests of the opposing parties. Mediation is a concept for playing for both parties in conflict at first sight. Then follow the other interests that will push mediation or that have conflict. This concept raises questions about the value of mediation, however. In the case of a national conflict like the conflict in Madagascar, the scene was played between Andry Rajoelina and Marc Ravalomanana, but the interest of the nation was also at stake, the sovereignty, the economy, politics, society and the population, etc.

A mediation concerning a whole State sometimes does not require any consultation of the people in question, only the protagonists sit on the negotiating table and decide on the solution adopted. An opinion of the population, having been martyred for a year or even three years as the case of the Malagasy population would be a fair question for the nation. Of course, the organization of the national conference or national symposium can in some way be a form of consultation with the little people. However, the question remains because major decisions are never taken at the national

meeting. In relation to the Malagasy crisis of 2009, the organization of the elections was the key point of the different mediations which took place during two years. A referendum questioning the people whether or not they want Marc Ravalomana and Andry Rajoelina to go to the presidential election would have been more than appreciating and would have solved the problem that the president of the HAT, Andry Rajoelina stubbornly refused the return of Marc Ravalomanana to the country.

5.1.3 Political or diplomatic sanction but not economical

During a political conflict, coercive measures are always used to deter the continuation of acts or to return the situation to normal. Coercive action is part of conflict resolution. On the other hand, in an international or regional organization, there are always sanctions and rules to follow, and the African Union does not accept this rule. In fact, the AU lays down in its Constitutive Act, the regulations and sanctions for a member country had the obligation to infringe the illegality. Madagascar, and many other countries with external or internal conflicts, were caught between the net of coercive measures of the negotiations and the sanctions of its organization. Of all kinds of sanction, political or diplomatic, the economic sanctions are distorted. The entire population is the target of economic sanctions, especially for an underdeveloped country dependent on aid and international markets like Madagascar. All the economy of the country with the daily of the population faces with the difficulties generated by an economic sanction. The country could recover only after very long years.

The main culprits of a national conflict are the leaders of the movement or the main protagonists. It is therefore more advisable to impose political or diplomatic sanctions directly on the subjects directly concerned so that the entire population is not confronted with economic sanctions.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1 : CHRONOLOGIES OF MALAGASY POLITICAL CRISIS

2007

April 4: voters vote 75% for a constitutional reform that strengthens the presidential power, makes English the third official language (with French and Malagasy) and removes the term "secular state" from the Constitution.

23 September: With 106 out of 127 deputies, the Malagasy presidential party wins the legislative elections marked by an abstention close to 80%.

12 December: election of Andry Rajoelina at the town hall of Antananarivo.

2008

February: cyclone Ivan kills more than 90 people and leaves nearly 190,000 homeless.

March: Madagascar extracted its first barrels of oil as part of a prospecting project in Tsimiroro, 560 kilometers west of Antananarivo.

July: a contract has been signed with the Daewoo Group for the leasing of some 1.3 million hectares of agricultural land for ninety-nine years to

produce 4 million tons of maize and 500,000 tons of Palm oil. In March 2009, Andry Rajoelina will return to this agreement.

December 13: The government closes the television channel of the mayor of the capital, Andry Rajoelina, after the broadcast of an interview of the ex-president Didier Ratsiraka, in exile in France.

2009

24 January: Mayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, calls for a general strike against the "dictatorship" of President Ravalomanana. Several demonstrations against the president turn into a riot in the Malagasy capital, causing more than 80 victims.

February: Andry Rajoelina, who had filed the previous day a request for the removal of the president, is himself dismissed from his office as mayor by the Ministry of the Interior.

February 7: the presidential guard shoots at the crowd of supporters of the mayor, killing about 30 people.

February 11: opening of negotiations between the rival camps of the Malagasy president and Andry Rajoelina, under the leadership of representatives of the churches.

10 March: After having compelled the Minister of Defense to resign, the army issued an ultimatum to the civil authorities to get out of the crisis.

March 17: President Marc Ravalomanana handed over his powers to a military directorate, which immediately transferred them to Andry Rajoelina.

21 March: Induction ceremony of Andry Rajoelina. No foreign head of state or diplomat is present.

30 March: Madagascar is excluded from the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

End March-April: demonstrations, suppressed by the forces of order, of the partisans of Marc ravalomana, in exile in South Africa.

12 May: Andry Rajoelina, promises not to run for the next presidential election.

9 August: The main Malagasy political leaders, meeting in Maputo under the aegis of the Southern African Development Community, decide to set up a transitional government which will organize elections by the end of 2010.

November 6: the rival Malagasy camps agree on the formation of a government of national unity. Andry Rajoelina remains president but will

be flanked by two co-presidents from the mobility of Marc Ravalomanana and Albert Zafy.

December: Andry Rajoelina turns his back on the peace accords and appoints as prime minister a former officer, Albert Camille Vital.

2010

January: African Union Commission President Jean Ping presents a new "compromise" to Malagasy officials.

March 17: The ultimatum granted by the African Union for the implementation of the Maputo agreements expires. The AU imposes sanctions on 109 Malagasy personalities, including Andry Rajoelina.

12 May: Andry Rajoelina says he will not run for the next presidential election, which he will announce for the month of November.

11 August: a timetable has been drawn up to get out of the crisis. It provides for a constitutional referendum on 17 November and sets 4 May 2011 as the presidential election.

28 August: Former President Marc Ravalomanana is condemned in absentia to forced labor in perpetuity in the trial of the perpetrators of a massacre where the presidential guard shot at the crowd in 2009.

13 September: opening of a "national conference" in Antananarivo to resolve the political crisis.

17 November: the Malagasy are called to vote by referendum on a draft Constitution, the first electoral stage of the process of exit from the crisis.