



Parahyangan Catholic University
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Department of International Relations

Accredited A

SK BAN –PT NO: 451/SK/BAN-PT/Akred/S/XI/2014

**At the Core of Engagement: Explaining the United States Foreign
Policy towards North Korea (2001-2008)**

Thesis

Department of International Relations

By

Ichsan Hafiz Loeksmanto

2014330091

Bandung

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Supervisor

Adrianus Harsawaskita, S.IP., M.A.

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Thesis Validation

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Title : At the Core of Engagement: Explaining the United States Foreign Policy towards North Korea (2001-2008)

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
Chairperson and member of examiner

Idil Syawfi, S.IP., M.Si.

: 

Secretary

Adrianus Harsawaskita, S.IP., M.A.

: 

Member

Dr. I Nyoman Sudira

: 

Validated by,
Dean of Faculty of Social and Political Sciences



Dr. Pius Sugeng Prasetyo, M.Si



Statement

I, the undersigned,

Name : Ichsan Hafiz Loeksmanto

Student ID : 2014330091

Department : International Relations

Title : At the Core of Engagement: Explaining the United States
Foreign Policy towards North Korea (2001-2008)

Hereby assert that this thesis is the product of my own work, and it has not been previously proposed by any other parties in order to attain an academic degree. Any idea and information gained from other parties are officially cited in accordance to the valid scientific writing method.

I declare this statement with full responsibility and I am willing to take any consequences given by the prevailing rules if this statement was found to be untrue.

Bandung, August 10th 2018



Ichsan Hafiz Loeksmanto

ABSTRACT

Name : Ichsan Hafiz Loeksmanto
Student ID : 2014330091
Title : At the Core of Engagement: Explaining the United States Foreign Policy towards North Korea (2001-2008)

Typical analysts often assessed the behavior of states as intendedly rational. However, for the specific case of the United States foreign policy towards North Korea during Bush's Administration, the significance of activities of organizations and individuals in government reveals that in order to completely comprehend U.S. policy of diplomatic engagement towards North Korea, it requires more than a state-centric explanation.

North Korea posed a credible nuclear threat for the U.S., but despite this credible threat, the United States opted towards negotiating and giving North Korea concessions rather than utilizing coercive means to achieve its denuclearization. Although engaging North Korea reflected some rationality, the U.S. ultimate implementation of diplomatic engagement were much more than just the result of rational calculations—rather, it was also the result of routine activities of organizations, and the political conflict among 'men in jobs'.

Keywords: Engagement, United States, North Korea, Foreign Policy, Organizations, Individuals, Six-Party Talks, Denuclearization

ABSTRAK

Nama : Ichsan Hafiz Loeksmanto
NPM : 2014330091
Judul : At the Core of Engagement: Explaining the United States Foreign Policy towards North Korea (2001-2008)

Analisis pada umumnya seringkali menilai tindakan negara sebagai tindakan yang rasional secara sengaja. Namun, untuk kasus spesifik kebijakan luar negeri Amerika Serikat terhadap Korea Utara pada zaman Administrasi Bush, pentingnya aktivitas organisasi dan individu dalam pemerintahan telah mengungkapkan bahwa untuk menemukan alasan dibalik tindakan Amerika Serikat untuk pada akhirnya mengimplementasikan kebijakan 'engagement' terhadap Korea Utara, diperlukan penjelasan yang tidak hanya berpusat pada negara.

Korea Utara merupakan ancaman nuklir yang kredibel bagi Amerika Serikat. Akan tetapi, meskipun Korea Utara adalah ancaman yang kredibel, Amerika Serikat memilih untuk melakukan negosiasi dan memberikan konsesi bagi Korea Utara daripada menggunakan cara-cara koersif untuk mencapai denuklirisasi. Meskipun 'engagement' berupa konsesi dan dialog merefleksikan suatu rasionalitas, akan tetapi, tindakan AS untuk pada akhirnya melakukan 'engagement' memperlihatkan sesuatu yang lebih dari hasil kalkulasi rasional—yaitu merupakan hasil dari aktivitas rutin organisasi, dan konflik politik antara individu.

Kata Kunci: *Engagement, Amerika Serikat, Korea Utara, Kebijakan Luar Negeri, Organisasi, Individu, Six-Party Talks, Denuklirisasi*

FOREWORD

In the name of God, the almighty. After a relatively lengthy and challenging process in the making of this research, the thesis titled “**At the Core of Engagement: Explaining the United States Foreign Policy towards North Korea**” has been completed. This thesis was done for the purpose of obtaining a bachelor degree in political science in the Department of International Relations, Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung.

In short, the aim of this research is to to explain the phenomena that was the United States foreign policy of diplomatic engagement towards North Korea. Specifically, the Author will put more emphasis on the foreign policy process behind the enactment of this policy in order to understand its anatomy and explain why such policy was ultimately enacted. The Author acknowledges that this research is still far from perfect. Therefore, the Author sincerely apologizes if there is any error, inaccuracy, and misinterpretation within this research. Lastly, the Author would like to give the highest gratitude to Adrianus Harsawaskita, S.IP., M.A.—the Author’s distinguished supervisor. With his guidance throughout the process of this research, the Author was able to complete this research in time.

Bandung, August 10th 2018

Ichsan Hafiz Loeksmanto

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My highest and deepest gratitude for

My mother, father, and beloved sister.

All of your kindness, patience, and affection you have for me
are beyond unpayable.

I'll make you proud.

For my dearest friends, near and far, old and new.

No list of names needed. If you're reading this, you know who you are.

My most sincere thank you for all of your immense support,
understanding, and guidance you've given me in my time of need.
May each steps you take brings you closer to everlasting happiness.

May your good deeds be requited.

For my thesis supervisor, Adrianus Harsawaskita, S.IP., M.A.

Thank you for reminding me that there's a lot more beneath all things, and
for encouraging me to keep my thinking processes structured.

It is an honor and a blessing to have been guided by a person of such brilliance.

*For a lot of others, whom had helped me directly or indirectly
throughout this journey,*

I thank you.

"Even in our sleep, pain which cannot forget falls drop by drop upon the heart, until, in our own despair, against our will, comes wisdom through the awful grace of God."- Aeschylus, cited by John F. Kennedy.

"We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality — judiciously, as you will — we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do."- Karl Rove.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

SPT	: Six-Party Talks
HFO	: Heavy Fuel Oil
CVID	: Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Disarmament
SST	: State Sponsors of Terrorism
DPRK	: Democratic People's Republic of Korea
U.S.	: United States
UN	: United Nations
IAEA	: International Atomic Energy Agency
WMDs	: Weapons of Mass Destruction
SOPs	: Standard Operating Procedures
HEU	: Highly Enriched Uranium
LWR	: Light Water Reactors
NSS	: National Security Strategy
ROK	: Republic of Korea
KEDO	: Korean Energy Development Organization
NPT	: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
MW	: Megawatt
NSPD-1	: National Security Presidential Directive-1
NSC	: National Security Council
DC	: Deputies Committee
PC	: Principals Committee
ISN	: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

VCI	: Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation
NDF	: National Disarmament Fund
DoS	: Department of State
DoD	: Department of Defense
USAID	: United States Agency for International Development
BDA	: Banco Delta Asia
UNSC	: United National Security Council
FY	: Fiscal Year
USSR	: Soviet Union
KGB	: Soviet Committee for State Security

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Issues surrounding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been lengthy and problematic for the United States. North Korea's assertion of its nuclear weapons possession, its "intimidation tactics" in diplomacy, expansion of its nuclear capabilities, persistent nuclear and ballistic missile tests, agreement violations, and other criminal acts done by North Korea posed a grave threat to the United States and its regional allies in East Asia.

North Korea possesses the industrial capability to acquire plutonium 239 or highly enriched uranium (HEU), this material is key in nuclear weapons development.¹ The threat of DPRK's nuclear development capability wasn't initially proven until late 2002 when in October the North confirmed U.S. allegations that the North was engaging in a covert uranium enrichment program. This declaration confirmed U.S. security concerns of North Korea's nuclear weapons development.² Pyongyang's declaration revealed that the Agreed Framework (1994) was lacking effective enforcement. U.S.-DPRK growing distrust was inescapable and consequently led to confrontations over Pyongyang's suspicious activities. This subsequently resulted in both U.S. and North Korea inability to fulfill both ends of their bargain mainly due to the North Korean'

¹ Mary Beth Nikitin, *North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues*, Congressional Research Service, 2013, page 3.

² James Cotton, *The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis*, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.57, no.2, 2010, page 261.

violations. Failure to resolve the dispute of compliance to the Agreed Framework ultimately led to DPRK's announcement of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and it restarted operations at its nuclear facilities.³ The resumption of North Korea's nuclear operations enables it to resume the production of plutonium and openly work on attaining an atomic bomb.⁴ This chain of events were highly renowned as what makes up the second Korean nuclear crisis.

North Korea's ability to produce nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear blackmail targeting the U.S. Pyongyang might believe that more nuclear weapons mean greater coercive leverage for making demands on concessions from the U.S. and neighboring countries. Undeniably, North Koreans have employed "intimidation tactics" in its diplomacy including threatening to test its long-range missiles and to step up its efforts of spreading nuclear weapons to other countries.⁵ The latter seems apparent, resumption of nuclear weapons production increases the risk of nuclear proliferation originating from North Korea, due to the possibility of the North selling fissile material, nuclear technology, or nuclear weapons to any state or non-state actors in return for money, which it is in desperate need of.⁶ Consequences of attainment of nuclear weapons by these actors could be disastrous for the United States. The U.S. also viewed that DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT have undermined the nuclear proliferation regime, due to the possibility of regional

³ Dong Sun Lee, *U.S. Preventive War Against North Korea*, Asian Security vol.2, no.1, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006, page 3.

⁴ *Document 22: Untitled*, Central Intelligence Agency, 2002, retrieved from: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB87/>.

⁵ Larry A. Niksch, *North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program*, Congressional Research Service, 2003, page 2.

⁶ Morton I. Abramowitz, James T. Laney, *Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge*, Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, 2003, page 8.

neighbors such as South Korea and Japan feeling less secure and might consider a change in nuclear policy,⁷ ultimately, this would result in more nuclear weapons proliferation and a further increase of military and diplomatic tensions.

The U.S. have assessed that North Korea had already produced one or two nuclear weapons, but allegations on whether not nuclear weapons were in the DPRK's possession was belatedly settled when North Korea decided to conduct its first nuclear test in 2006. North Korea received worldwide condemnations as a result of its nuclear test, and United Nations Security Council unanimously approved punitive sanctions. Although this action resulted in the worldwide condemnation of the regime, North Korea remained persistent with its aggressive behavior. Tensions also escalated when North Korea declared that further pressure on the regime would be regarded as an act of war. Analysts viewed that this nuclear test may result in a more potent nuclear threat from Pyongyang, increased concerns of nuclear weapons transfer, and undermined the global nonproliferation regime.⁸ Furthermore, Pyongyang's nuclear test has yet again proved that the U.S. was faced with an imminent nuclear threat.

Another issue is North Korea's missile capability or 'delivery systems,' this also pose a threat towards the U.S. and its allies considering that these delivery systems could be armed with nuclear payload. According to cited intelligence U.S. findings, the DPRK's prototype Taepo Dong-1 missiles have the ability to reach Alaska and Guam. North Korea used these type of missiles in its 1998 ballistic missile test when

⁷ Op.Cit., *Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge*, page 8.

⁸ Emma Chanlett-Avery, *North Korea's Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options*, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2006, page 3-12.

these missiles were launched over Japan's northern island.⁹ U.S. intelligence also said that North Korea wants to become the first rogue state that is able to strike the U.S. mainland with a missile.¹⁰

In addition to all of Pyongyang's available threats listed above, DPRK's aggressive military conduct has resulted in several military incidents. Naval clashes between South Korea and North Korea occurred in 1999, 2002, 2009, and 2010—all of these naval clashes occurred in Korean Peninsula's West Sea.¹¹ In addition, DPRK's regime have also conducted activities that were commonly considered as highly illegal in order to support its nuclear program. To mention a few, types of activities includes: abductions of Japanese citizens; drug production and trafficking, currency counterfeiting; money laundering; human trafficking, hijacking, and terrorism.¹²

North Korea's efforts related to its nuclear program have repeatedly tested the resilience of the U.S. and its allies.¹³ Some analysts or practitioners may believe that aggressive behaviors are best treated with punitive actions that deter or deny the opposition from causing further harm. But for North Korea, this was not the

⁹ *World: Asia-Pacific Anger at North Korean Missile Launch*, BBC News, 1998, retrieved from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/161513.stm>.

¹⁰ James I. Matray, *The Failure of the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy: A Critical Analysis*, International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol XVII, No.1, California State University, 2013, page 146.

¹¹ Nicholas Macfie, *Factbox: The Battles of the Korean West Sea*, Reuters, 2010, retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-clashes/factbox-the-battles-of-the-korean-west-sea-idU.S.TRE6AS1AL20101129>.

¹² For further details on North Korea's drug-related activities, counterfeiting, and other illicit activities, see "North Korean Crime-For-Profit Activities," August 25, 2008, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33885.pdf>. For details on other DPRK's crimes and violations mentioned above, see "North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007," April 20, 2007, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30004.pdf>.

¹³ For a full list of DPRK's provocative actions, see Hannah Fischer, *CRS Report for Congress: North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007*, Congressional Research Service, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30004.pdf>.

case. Apparently, although the threat was credible, the US resorted to diplomatic engagement through the Six-Party Talks. As Bush once stated in 2006 in regards to North Korea, that “we want to solve the [North Korean nuclear problem] diplomatically ... we want to deal with threats diplomatically ... that’s why we’ve got the Six-Party Talks.”¹⁴ From Bush official statement emphasizing heavily on the use of diplomatic means, the U.S. ultimately implemented a diplomatic engagement approach rather than using military means or work towards toppling DPRK’s regime to solve the North Korean nuclear issue.

1.2 Problem Identification

1.2.1 Problem Statement

The United States worked towards implementing the policy of diplomatic engagement in the form of frequent negotiations through bilateral and multilateral channels. Although the North Korean nuclear threat was credible for the U.S., it did not chose to conduct preventive military actions against Pyongyang or worked towards toppling the DPRK’s regime. On the contrary, the U.S. proceeded with implementing policy of diplomatic engagement which consisted of conducting dialogue in a multilateral and bilateral setting, and giving North Korea inducements in a form of political and economic incentives.

1.2.2. Research Scope

The Author immensely focuses on analyzing the foreign policy process of the United States’ foreign policy of engagement under the Bush Administration (2001-

¹⁴ “The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada”, The American Presidency Project, 2006, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=276>, accessed on 9 May 2018.

2008). Most importantly, this research also features in-depth analysis on chosen actors in the U.S. government including organizations and individuals that are central and most relevant to U.S. policy of engagement and the applied theoretical framework. As an essential supplement, the author will also elaborate on North Korea's behavior and possible intentions to establish a firm contextual setting.

1.2.3. Research Question

The author have identified the United States policy of engagement as the problem of this research. Therefore, the Author have formulated the research question as: **“Why the United States ultimately opted for engaging North Korea?”**

1.3 The Aim and Purpose of the Research

1.3.1 The Aim of the Research

The aim of this research is to explain the phenomena that was the United States diplomatic engagement towards North Korea. Specifically, the Author will put more emphasis on the foreign policy process behind the enactment of this policy in order to understand its anatomy and explain why such policy was ultimately enacted.

1.3.2. The purpose of the research

The purpose of this research is to explain the United States foreign policy of engagement through analysis using the theoretical framework that is most suitable to explain this phenomena.

1.4 Literature Review

Numerous literature that discussed the similar problem is available. Although they differ in terms of perspectives and arguments, they have shared some similarity and distinction with this research. Some of these literatures would be mentioned and briefly elaborated next. Firstly, this topic have been similarly examined by Kevin O’Driscoll, in his research titled “Bomb, Sanction, or Negotiate: Understanding U.S. Policy Towards North Korea.” In his research, he elaborated on why the U.S. shifted its foreign policy from the policy of ‘tailored containment’ towards the policy of ‘engagement’ beginning from 2003. Although he argued that the role of bureaucratic politics within the Bush Administration played a major role in the shift in U.S. policy, his research greatly emphasized on *how* the shift of policy occurred, and presented on *what* factors lie behind this policy shift.¹⁵

Secondly, Jun Simmers in his literature titled “U.S. Foreign Policy for North Korea: Flexibility is the Best Policy” also elaborated on U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea, mainly the hard-line approach adopted by the Bush Administration. He argued that the best policy for the United States contrary to the hard-line approach is a flexible strategy by the United States. This flexible strategy depends on the structure of U.S. diplomatic effort, this strategy involves the U.S. to seek a softer approach towards North Korea, mainly through the means of diplomacy other than solely depending on the method of carrots and sticks that constitutes its hard-line approach which Simmers considered as ineffective.¹⁶ Specifically, this flexible

¹⁵ Kevin O’Driscoll, *Bomb, Sanction, or Negotiate: Understanding U.S. Policy Towards North Korea*, Georgetown University, 2010, page 12-42.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, page 56.

strategy requires U.S. negotiators to explore a wide spectrum of possible solutions, this includes maintaining communications and engagement with a more open policy.¹⁷ Although Simmers focuses on what should be done by the United States in the context of foreign policy, it does not elaborate further on the process of policymaking, and the factors behind Bush' previously implemented foreign policy.

Juergen Kleiner, in his literature titled "The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea" argued from a state-centric point of view that the United States policy was somewhat inconsistent, this inconsistency was present due to many in officials within the Bush Administration welcomes the chance that the North Korean regime would collapse. This narrative was maintained by the United States by frequently adopting a hard-line stance towards North Korea reflected by naming it as a member of the 'Axis of Evil', initially refusing to hold bilateral talks directly with the DPRK, and often making statements that are considered insulting or aggressive by Pyongyang. U.S. hard-line stance was accompanied with its efforts to pursue the solutions of North Korea by diplomatic and peaceful means—while keeping the military option against Pyongyang on the table. Kleiner argued that the United States had adopted a diplomacy-by-insult approach by keeping its ambiguous stance. Moreover, he also concisely elaborated that some high-ranking officials within the Bush Administration played a major role in the ambiguity of its foreign policy, and how external factors often originating from North Korea, China, and South Korea have also played a role.¹⁸

¹⁷ Ibid., page 59.

¹⁸ Juergen Kleiner, *The Bush Administration and the Nuclear Challenges by North Korea*, Journal of Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol.16, Taylor & Francis, Inc., 2005, page 212-222.

The Author agreed with Kleiner's argument that the early Bush administration was ambiguous with its approach towards North Korea. Although, note that the Author take this only for granted. The Author distinctively argue that this ambiguity was largely caused by intranational factors—either by organizational activity and/or by politics within the state, this was also partly pointed out by O'Driscoll within his research. Nevertheless, while Kleiner and also O'Driscoll both focused on the change in U.S. foreign policy, this research solely focuses on the final foreign policy of the Bush Administration which was the policy of engagement— which both literatures did not extensively elaborate. Compared with other literatures mentioned above, this research constructively attempted to 'dissect' U.S.' policy of engagement from three perspectives laid out by Graham Allison rather than to elaborate on the shift in policy and decide on which policy is best for the United States.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

In order to readers with a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the problem, the Author chose to instrument three models of analysis brought by Graham Allison mainly in his book *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Those three models being: (1) Rational Policy model; (2) Organizational Process model; and (3) Governmental Politics model.

Each of these three models operates in three different levels of analysis, which produces three different perspectives of: who were really responsible for foreign policy decisions; what specific driving factors lie behind the implementation of such decision; and how different outcomes by different actors ultimately resulted

in the same foreign policy action implemented by a specific nation or government.¹⁹ Although at deeper levels explanations produced by the models focused on different specific occurrences, it is important to note that those occurrences analyzed by Graham Allison—and by the Author in this research are at best relevant and important to the main occurrence or final foreign policy action carried out by the government.

First and foremost, before delving deeper into the explanation of each of Allison's three models, several points that function as his general argument are worth mentioning, as it sets the stage for a complete comprehension of the framework of his theoretical models. One of the essentials of his main argument is that; when analysts are faced with a happening in foreign affairs, their puzzlement is typically sourced by a particular outcome (typically, States' specific action and/or constellation of actions).²⁰ Graham Allison stated that in the search for an explanation, 'typical' analysts put themselves in the place of the national government or the nation confronting a problem. These analysts typically came up with an explanation of which best represents on why the nation acts in such a way.²¹

In other words; mere factors that influence nations' foreign policy (the chosen "solution" of the strategic problem, or the objective of the nation) often becomes acceptable explanations for these analysts. Those "typical analysts" simplifies

¹⁹ Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Little, Brown & Company (Canada) Limited, 1971, Page 251.

²⁰ Op.Cit., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 2.

²¹ Valerie Hudson (2014) stated that states' "decision" in a form of inaction, action, or even indecision, whether it was a single decision or a constellation of decisions can be considered by analysts as a happening which is to be explained or understood, or in FPA terms; the Explanandum. Whereas explanations of those happening commonly in a form of factors that influence foreign policy decision making and foreign policy decision makers, that best represents why the nation acts in such a way are defined as the explanans.

governmental behavior as centrally coordinated and purposive, analogous to acts of individuals. This logic is best represented by Allison's first model: the Rational Actor or "Classical" Model. This simplification obscures the fact that the governmental decisions are not results of calculations done by a unitary actor, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors which make up the bureaucracy.²²

This method of analysis obtained from the first model can be supplemented or replaced by two other conceptual models,²³ which confronts the simplification of the first model.²⁴ Allison's two other conceptual models focuses on the organizations and political actors involved in the policy process each labeled Organizational Process Model (Model II), and Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model (Model III). These two models are classified as theoretical frameworks which emerged from the first period or classic FPA scholarship (1954-1993),²⁵ it was classified as such because this period saw the emergence of a strong research agenda which concluded that "rational" foreign policymaking can be upended by the process of how those foreign policies are the result of governmental groups working together.²⁶ It is within this context lies one of Graham Allison's

²² Op.cit., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 3.

²³ Ibid., page 5.

²⁴ As one of Graham Allison's main argument, there is a tendency not to treat human decision makers that operates within the government as a "black-box", and not see those actors as "interchangeable generic rational utility maximizers", but positioned them not as equal with the government or nation whom they serve. This main argument is aligned with the nature of FPA theory specified by Valerie Hudson (2014), which orientates itself towards an actor-specific theory.

²⁵ Graham Allison (1971) has stated that the discussion of the impact of "bureaucracy" on "policy" and the gap between the governmental actors' intentions and the result of governmental action back in 1966 have contributed largely towards the idea and the general argument of his book.

²⁶ Valerie M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Temporary Theory, Second Edition*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2014, Page. 20.

main argument of his three models. Next, each of Allison's models will be thoroughly explained.

The Rational Policy or "Classical" Model (Model I) derived from the logic of "letting analysts think about what would they do if they were the enemy".²⁷ This includes the assumption that the actor is a national government, and how the national actor perform actions that are the result of their strategic calculations to a strategic problem. With this, governmental actions are deemed rational or was a reasonable choice, thus the basic unit of analysis of this model is: *Governmental Action as Choice*.²⁸ *The decision, policy, and action* are all relevant to the concept of rationality, although each differs in specific definitions.²⁹ Both *decision* and *policy* identify phenomena as actions performed by purposeful agents—that is states behavior are "intendedly rational," and their activities are goal-directed.³⁰

Graham Allison constitutes several key concepts which serves as a foundation and to further serve as an explanation of his theoretical models, these concepts are; *national actor, the problem, and action as a rational choice*. The concept of *national actor* in the first model perceived national governments as a rational,

²⁷ Op.Cit., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 19.

²⁸ Additionally, Graham Allison (1971) pointed out that it is indeed one of the fundamental logic of FPA to explain an occurrence by showing how the national government could have rationally chosen that action, relative with the fundamental (and at times implicit) assumption that occurrences in foreign affairs are simply the acts of nations. With this method of thinking, typically we frame occurrences in foreign affairs simply as "the Soviet decision to abstain from an attack," "the Chinese policy concerning defense of the mainland," and "Japanese action in surrendering."

²⁹ Graham Allison (1971) define *Decision* and *policy* as: "Decision presupposes a decider and a choice among alternatives with reference to some goal. *Policy* means the realization in a number of particular instances of some agent's objectives." While Valerie Hudson (2014) makes further differentiation between foreign policy action and foreign policy decision: first, a decision may never result in action; second, a decision could be intended to conceal the true decision taken. See more in Valerie Hudson (2014)

³⁰ Op.Cit., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 28-31.

unitary decision maker that has a set of specified goals, one set of perceived options (or alternatives), and a single estimate of the consequences that comes with each alternative.

Next, the concept of *problem* is defined as the strategic problem which the nation faces. Actions of national governments are driven by threats and opportunities that arise within the “strategic marketplace.” Because according to Model I national governments are considered as unitary, the various activities of governmental representatives are perceived as a whole sum instead of a number of partial choices in a dynamic environment.³¹

Lastly, the concept of *action as rational choice* constitutes of; Goals and objectives, alternatives, consequences, and choices of the government. In choosing its course of action, national governments are initially faced with several alternatives which it could take. Each of these alternatives comes with its own consequences, and each are available to fulfill governmental goals and objectives.³² National governments as a rational actor must choose a course of action available from those alternatives, and chose which of these alternatives serves well according to their calculation of the costs and benefits that come with it—therefore, it is a value-maximizing behavior. In sum, this can be concluded as action as rational choice.³³

³¹ Op.Cit., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 32-33.

³² Graham Allison (1971) stated that goals and objectives are conceived from national governments' perception of national interests and national security. He also stated that consequences are in a form of costs and benefits, thus the rational actor act accordingly to which of these alternatives have the highest consequences in terms of their goals and objectives.

³³ Op.Cit., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 33.

Organizational process model (model II) takes us a step deeper towards analyzing factors which affect governmental actions. In this model, Allison argued that governmental actions are outputs of organizations. Thus, framing its basic unit of analysis as; *governmental actions as organizational output*. This model requires analysts to first identify which organizations played a role in specific governmental decisions. This constellation of organizations is seen as actors of which constitutes the government. From the perspective of seeing the government as an association of several organizations, the government is no longer viewed as a unitary actor—the government as an actor is no longer the main focus. Rather, the emphasis is placed solely on the constellation of organizations and how it operates, in turn, resulted in organizational output that makes up actions of national governments.³⁴

Therefore, *governmental actions as organizational output* is the core concept of this model. Within this context, organizational outputs are results of organizational activities. Allison proposed that: what was characterized as organizational activities may also be defined as the programmed character of organizations, this organizational character is identified by; *goals: constraints defining acceptable performance, standard operating procedures (SOPs)* within the organizations; along with, *programs and repertoires* enacted by organizations.

Firstly, what Allison meant with *constraints defining acceptable performance* as goals is that; organizational goals set the limitations on how organizations operate and organizations must not surpass these limitations. The goal of organizations emerges from its efforts to fulfill expectations and demands of other

³⁴ Op.Cit., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 78-80.

organizations, citizens, and interest groups so that it could maintain its organizational health. The main indicators of organization's efforts in maintaining its health are shown by how much dollars appropriated for specific organizations.³⁵

In order to fulfill their goals, organizations have their own regular pattern of behavior in conducting their activities—this can be characterized as the SOPs of organizations.³⁶ Viewed from a general standpoint, numerous organizational SOPs constitutes of what is considered as organizations' *programs* (similar to the language of computers). The significant role of programs is to assure that organizations which comprised of hundreds of persons can perform reliably, and so that persons within that organizations act accordingly to a previously established set of maneuvers to handle specific situations.³⁷ Additionally, what was considered as organizational *repertoires* are sets of organizational programs that are regularly executed in order to deal with certain situations.³⁸

Last but certainly not least, *Governmental Politics (Model III)* served as one of (or even the most) important of all three theoretical models. It argued that states' actions are far from what was considered as rational, and was not the chosen solution of a problem—but rather actions and decisions of states are intranational political resultants. Thus, governmental politics model frame the unit of analysis: *Governmental Action as Political Resultant*.

³⁵ Op.Cit., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 82.

³⁶ Prime examples of organizational SOPs are; organizations attending to problem areas, monitoring information, preparing relevant responses, preparing budgets, producing reports, conducting public debates, enacting legislations, etc.

³⁷ Graham T. Allison, *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, *The American Political Science Review* Vol.63, no. 3, 1969, page 698.

³⁸ Op.Cit., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 83.

Actions of states are results of conflicts, compromise, and confusion of officials within the national government—with each officials having their own interests and sphere of influence. In the words of Allison; “Men share power. Men differ concerning what must be done. The differences matter. This milieu necessitates that policy be resolved by politics.”³⁹ This political character meant that; individual members of the government undergo bargaining activities in order to come up with decisions which emerge as the decision of its national government. Thus, decisions of governments are indeed a collection of relatively independent decisions and actions by groups or individual players, but it can also be a result of the combination of individuals and groups’ preferences and influences which emerged from bargaining activities.⁴⁰

Analysis using this model requires us to first determine which individual actors are involved in determining the actions and decisions of the government. Allison named these individual actors as ‘players’, and these players are each placed at its own positions. Players’ positions in an administration define what players may and must do, it also determines the advantages and handicaps that each player possess. Next, model III analysts need to take into account of what each player stand for, and what are their perceptions and interests towards certain issues.

In order to determine what exactly each player stands for, *parochial priorities and perceptions*, and *goals and interests* of players must be identified. What Allison meant from *parochial priorities and perceptions* stems from how the positions of

³⁹ Op.Cit., *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 35.

⁴⁰ Ibid., page 162-164.

each actor within the government exert some pressure towards players. Pressures cause players to have the tendency to stick to a certain perception of issues parallel with the orientation of their organizations. Therefore, by identifying players' tendencies and priorities that comes with its positions, analysts can determine players' stand.

Other determinants used in considering players' stand are their *goals and interest*. Goals and interests includes; national security interests, organizational interests, domestic interests, and personal interests.⁴¹ These goals and interests affect players' desired outcomes, and thus expose the players' stand. Additionally, players see quite different *faces of the issue*. This is also the result of different interests and goals of the players, and also the presence of deadlines.⁴²

What is equally important in Allison's elaboration of Model III, is that bargaining among players is defined by Allison as 'games'. He elaborated that these games occurred on specific *action-channels*; which are "regularized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue."⁴³ This regularized means are 'arenas' in which players undertake bargaining activities (games) through an established channel for producing governmental action. Action-channels determine which major players are involved within the game, the points of entrance of these players into the game, and establish particular advantages and disadvantages for

⁴¹ An example of U.S. national security interest is U.S. avoidance of foreign domination that resulted in the belief that the U.S. were to unilaterally disarm other nations with the use of military force. In most cases, officials would believe that U.S. military security interests would not be affected by other specific issues. Additionally, some officials viewed that their organizational health are critical to national security—this is the main essence of official's organizational interests. Meanwhile, domestic interests are leaders' consideration of how foreign policy could impact domestic politics.

⁴² Op.Cit., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 166-168.

⁴³ Ibid., page 169.

each game. In addition, what determines players' impact on results is political power, indicated by: bargaining advantages, skill, and will.⁴⁴

To conclude, different preferences and judgements of leaders that 'forced' these players to undergo bargaining activities in specific 'games' resulted in governmental *action as political resultant*.⁴⁵ In other words, the action of national governments are the result of conflicting stands of leaders that is determined by their positions and their preferences, in which this 'political conflict' is resolved through bargaining that ultimately resulted in the action of the nation.

1.6 Research Method and Data Gathering Technique

1.6.1 Research Method

The author will use qualitative research method by addressing a problem identified through formulating a research question and answering the question by using data as a basis for shaping the core argument of this research.⁴⁶

1.6.2. Data Gathering Technique

The Author will use the technique of 'literature studies' in the data gathering process of this research. The wide range of data presented in this research is acquired from secondary sources including literature such as books, memoirs, journals, official reports, declassified reports, dissertations, and electronic sources such as articles or websites of governments.

⁴⁴ Bargaining advantages stems from positions of players in the government, and their access to information, see: Op.Cit., *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, page 168-169.

⁴⁵ Ibid., page 169-173.

⁴⁶ Trisha Greenhalgh, Rod Taylor, *Education and Debate: How to read a paper: Papers that go beyond numbers (qualitative research)*, University College London Medical School, Page 1.

1.7 Research Structure

Chapter I: The first chapter of this research introduces the background of the topic of discussion, identification of the available problem, research scope, research question, aim and purpose of the research, literature review, the data gathering technique used, and research method.

Chapter II: The second chapter is divided into two subsections. In chronological order, the first subsection elaborates on: North Korea's past actions before the Six-Party Talks, possible intentions, available nuclear-related capabilities, and its actions and reactions towards the United States leading up to and throughout the Six-Party Talks. Next, the second subsection provides a general explanation on the foreign policy process of the United States, including its nature, and the role of governmental organizations involved.

Chapter III: The third Chapter is the section of which U.S. engagement towards North Korea as the problem is theoretically analyzed. The analysis is divided into three subsections each explaining the reason behind U.S. engagement viewed from three different angles: engagement as the choice of the state, engagement as the output of organizations, and engagement as the result of political conflict.

Chapter IV: Lastly, Chapter four is where the Author presented the research's findings and concluded the research.