

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

To conclude, from the Author's preceding analysis using Allison's model II and III, the rationality of the United States as a state actor becomes questionable. It would seem that as the Author delved deeper into analyzing the intranational occurrences which took place, the contributions and importance of organizations and specific individuals on U.S.' policy towards North Korea have become more apparent, either in the context of the policy's formulation, or its implementation.

By taking the standpoint of both; organizations and individuals, the Author have identified that activities of both classification of actors: the regularized activities of organizations; and political conflicts which occurred among key individuals—and the results it yielded, were far from the result of rational calculations. Rather, from this perspective, U.S.' diplomatic engagement towards the DPRK were the results of activities of actors in both levels that were dependent with each actors' distinct characteristics. In turn, characteristics of these specific actors defined the extent of significance it brought towards U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea.

Within this context, the Author was able to answer the research question: "*Why did the government of the United States opt towards the implementation of the policy of engagement towards North Korea?*" The Author concluded that the reason behind the implementation of diplomatic engagement lies on the routine activities of organizations, and the political conflict which occurred among individuals throughout Bush's presidency.

For the specific case of organizations, the output produced by the programmed characteristics of the State Department (goals, SOPs, and programs) were not based on how it viewed the disadvantages and disadvantages of engagement or other options available for the U.S. (e.g. economic or military measures as preemptive actions). Although the Author have previously argued that the calculated costs of both of these options outweighed the benefits, and engagement was the option which would brought the best benefits for the U.S., it is not within the DoS character to advocate for conducting military strikes or to topple the DPRK's regime through economic pressure. Thus, the State Department did what it does best, in accordance with its programmed character, to pursue engagement. In parallel, by advocating engagement and implementing it, the DoS can maintain its organizational performance and health because engagement was embedded within its organizational goal.

The State Department's efforts in achieving its goals are represented by its SOPs and programs. Both of these characterization of organizational activities—although just mere pre-established routines, have contributed largely towards the implementation of engagement. As previously analyzed, the State Department's SOP to gather information on the policy preferences of the North's regional neighbors and presents it in Congressional hearings have been proven as vital for the implementation of engagement. This research have also identified that all of the available DoS programs established for the purpose of tackling the proliferation of WMDs each demanded the DoS to implement engagement. This were done either through bilateral measures, reaching multilateral agreements, or maintaining WMD

verification and compliance through diplomacy—all embodied within agreements produced through the SPT.

U.S. engagement policy was also the result of organizational actions originated from activities of Congress and the NSC. The implementation of engagement was the output interagency process and the formulation of consensus-based policy recommendations of the NSC. Although engagement was obstructed during Bush's first-term due to the Vice President's office and the DoD dominating the NSC, PC meetings discussing the North's nuclear program have become more frequent after the DPRK's nuclear test. Moreover, both influence of the Vice President's office and the DoD had waned, and the DoS emboldened. This, have resulted to the continuation of engagement along with U.S. demands for verification as a form of consensus-based policy that weren't possible if not for the activities of the NSC.

In the case of the U.S. Congress, the Author argues that authorization of energy assistance to Pyongyang would not be possible if Congress had not given the President waiver authority enacted within the FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations Act. Similarly, DPRK's removal from the SST list would not also be possible if Congress had procedurally blocked the President's proposal to remove the DPRK from the list. The enactment of the President's waiver authority in the FY2008 Supplemental act, and the absence of Congress' obstruction towards the President's proposal in regards to the SST list removal was possible due to Congress' available SOPs. These available SOPs have enabled Congress to coordinate with the Executive Branch in regards to the necessity of funds for assistance, and also enabled the DoS to express (through hearings) the importance

of removing the DPRK from the SST list to maintain engagement and fulfill U.S.' obligation substantiated in the February 13 and October 3 Agreements of the SPT.

By utilizing Allison's third theoretical model, the main actor is no longer a unitary, rational state actor, nor a constellation of organizations, but individuals as political 'players' became the prominent factor behind U.S. implementation of engagement. These individuals interacted with one another through political conflicts and their activities did not necessarily reflect rationality. It would seem that although the DPRK have previously engaged with the U.S. in bad-faith, and have misled the U.S. by not providing a complete list of its nuclear program. Individuals from the 'negotiators' camp continue to advocate for engagement and somehow disregard the probability that the DPRK may yet again intend to deceive the U.S. Although they have been met with considerable opposition, their perseverance in political conflicts have yielded the result of removing the DPRK from the SST list, and providing it with energy assistance.

First-term State Secretary Colin Powell's political maneuvering in seeking direct authorization by the President before the third round of the SPT was what made the implementation of engagement possible. Because of this, pressure from officials of the "warriors" camp such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and John Bolton were undermined by Powell. After Secretary Powell was replaced by Condoleezza Rice, the "negotiators" pursuance of engagement was continued by Rice and Christopher Hill. Rice and Hill continue to conduct political maneuvers and disregard the concerns of others to achieve cutting any deal with Pyongyang

and ultimately provided it with concessions even though the DPRK was showing little signs of denuclearization.

Positions of individuals in government greatly influenced each individuals' perception towards North Korea and what steps the U.S. must take to achieve DPRK's denuclearization. It also appeared that for the specific case of individuals such as Powell, Rice, and Hill, their continued efforts in advocating for the implementation of engagement were the result of *parochial perceptions* generated by their positions in the State Department to maintain dialogue through the SPT.

The Author also discovered that the waning influence of the "warriors" after some of its key hard-line members have been replaced also served as one of the key factors of how the "negotiators" were able to achieve the implementation of engagement. Although this was the case, influence of individuals from the "warriors" camp still ensued reflected by U.S.' demands for strict verification of DPRK's nuclear program. Because other parties of the SPT had opposed U.S. verification proposal, demands for strict verification was a form of U.S. unilateral action towards the DPRK. Thus, core arguments from both political 'camps' expressed in political conflicts which occurred, were embodied in U.S.' engagement.

Lastly, the Author acknowledged that the U.S. involvements in Iraq during Bush's presidency, to some extent, have influenced the preferences of individuals to opt for the implementation of engagement. But nevertheless, it must be underlined that for the purpose of this research, further elaborations were exempted.

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