

Chapter 4

Conclusion

This chapter will conclude all findings made in the previous chapters and combine them. In this chapter, every finding found from the earlier chapters before this one will be served in a brief yet most explanatory way possible. It will be concluded holding to the Research Questions and data used to write the analysis.

The event of Crimea takes over is pretty brief and quick. It starts at the peak of strain between pro-Russian and pro-European citizen of Ukraine in 2013. Yanukovych decided not to sign a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DDCTFA) with the European Union in the sake of keeping close relationship with Russia, this decision sparked protest that later put Yanukovych down from his position as president. The clashes become more severe and reach it peaks on February 20 where hundreds of people were shot by snipers under Yanukovych order. Yanukovych and several people of importance escaped Ukraine on 22nd of February. Deeming that there's no point for them to 'protect' their relationship with Ukraine any longer, Russian government created a referendum whether if the people of Crimea are in favor to the reunification or

not. The Moscow claims that a 97.6% vote, which was held in March 16, were in favor. The reunification itself is officially done in March 18 2014, condemned by most part of the world.

The first conclusion to be made that Russia did occupy Crimea instead of just annexing it. It is said on Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations that a “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of hostile army,” and Russia had allegedly send in 150,000 soldiers to Crimea in the beginning of the take-over, which allegedly turns it into occupation and added more later in the event. The proof that soldiers had come marching into Crimea from the Russia comes from NATO.

The second conclusion is that NATO did not balance of power Russia, as there is no anarchical system in the East Europe. The disagreement and lack of trust between Russia and NATO shows us that Russia views the current East Europe security structure is incapable and not effective, it fails to resolve problems but instead creates new ones. The lack of response coming from NATO also seems to be the key point to as why Putin sees that Russia needs to be the one who rules in the Eastern Europe. It shows that instead of anarchical system, Russia wants a hierarchal system where they stand above Eastern Europe states. In this case, balance of power fails to be used to explain the situation, sure Russia takes Crimea as their own for their fear of NATO extending their power, but it also shows that they see NATO as below them, as incapable to ‘protect’ East Europe as they promise.

While Russia outright takes Crimea over in a mean to show their domination and hegemonic power, NATO, as a collective security organization, had taken a rather softer approach. Marsheimer once argued that the more powerful a state is compared to their competitor, which in this case is NATO to Russia, the less likely they would be attacked. His argument is proved right as US Secretary of State John Kerry had said that NATO's preference over this matter was for them to take the diplomatic route and to not attack in anyway. The fact that Russia's troop had not withdrawn from Ukrainian border also further proof that this take over is out of force, not the will of Crimean.

The last conclusion is that NATO fails to balance of power not only because there is no anarchical system, the way they responded to Russia occupation shows that they actually understand that Russia is the hegemon and therefore they would not do much against them. Even with all the concern showed by NATO, it seems as if they are not taking any actual movement in fighting for their belief other than simply helping Ukraine to shape up their military. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) however straighten up by saying that none of NATO's members is attacked by Russia and that they will seek a peaceful resolution and urged the Russian Federation to de-escalate the situation instead, in which Putin is set in escalating dominance. NATO also claims that they will delay a series of cooperation with Russia, which seems rather unnecessary as they miss their strategic purpose. The lack of reaction from NATO pushes Russia to continue on building up their power and even threatens to move into Eastern Europe.

Their fear of losing Crimea to NATO makes them to decide thing on their own, further strengthening Marsheimer argument of state refusing to have collective security and prefer to pursue the steps that leads them into becoming the region hegemon. Even if in the future NATO ever had the chance to recruit Ukraine, they would not be able to place their naval power around Crimea, further proving the point that Russia had successfully become the hegemony of East Europe.

Bibliography

Books

- Emmers, Ralf. (2012). *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in the ASEAN and the ARF*. London and New York: Taylor & Francis Group
- Kolstoe, Paul. (1995). *Russians in the Former Soviet Republics*. London: Hunts and Co.
- Mearsheimer, John J. (2013). "Structural Realism," in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)
- Merriam, Sharan B. (2009). "What is Qualitative Research?" *Qualitative Research a Guide to Design and Implementation*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
- Waltz, Kenneth. (2010). "Anarchic Structures and Balance of Power." *Theory of International Politics*. Illionis: Waveland Press Incorporated
- Wood, Elizabeth A. Wiliam E. Pomeranz, E. Wayne Merry, and Maxim Trudolyubov. (2016). "Introduction." *Roots of Russia War in Ukraine*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Documents

- Belkin, Paul, Derek E. Mix, Steven Woehrel. (2014). *NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe*. Accessed on February 11 2017. From <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43478.pdf>
- Bikova, Veronika. (2015). The use of Force by the Russian Federation in Crimea. *Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht*. From http://www.zaoerv.de/75_2015/75_2015_1_a_27_50.pdf

- Dagdeverenis, Dimitirios. NATO RESPONSE TO RUSSIA AFTER CRIMEA: Consequences and Challenges the European and International Security. *Bridging Europe*.
- NATO. (2014). NATO Security General: Ukraine Crisis is ‘Gravest Threat to European Security’ Since Cold War. March 6 2014. Accessed on February 10 2017
- Granholm, Niklas, Johannes Malmien and Gudrun Persson. (2014) “The Crimea Operation: Implications For Future Russian Military Interventions,” *A Rude Awakening*.
- Roberts, Adam. (1985). What is a Military Occupation?. *British Yearbook of International Law*. Volume 55, Issue 1. Accessed August 30 2017. From <https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/Roberts%20What%20is%20Military%20Occupation.pdf>
- Tziampiris, A. (2015). Balance of Power and Soft Balancing. *The emergence of Israel-Greek Cooperation*. Springer. Accessed on November 1 2017
- United Nation Security Council, Report of the Practice of the Security Council , “Complain by Ukraine regarding the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation concerning Sevastopol,” Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, page 957-959

Journals

- Aleksovski, Stefan, Oliver Bakreski, Biljana Avramovska. (2014). Collective Security – The Role if International Organization – Implications in International Security Order. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol 5 (Rome: MCSER Publishing. Pdf
- Bebler, Anton. (2015). Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict. *Romanian Journal of Europe Affairs*. Accessed on September 18 2017. Pdf

Gillich, Ines. (2015). Illegally evading attribution? Russia's use of unmarked troops in Crimea and international humanitarian law. *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*. InfoTrac Educational Database 2017, accessed on February 8 2017. Pdf

Salushev, Sergey. (2014). Annexation of Crimea: Causes, Analysis and Global Implications. *Global Societies Journal*. From http://www.global.ucsb.edu/globalsocieties/sites/secure.lsit.ucsb.edu.gisp.d7_gs-2/files/sitefiles/Salushev.pdf

Schwartz, Paul N. (2014). Crimea's Strategic Value to Russia. *Center for Strategic & International Studies*. Accessed November 9 2017

Website

Baggiani, Gregorio. (2016). The increased strategic importance of the Black Sea in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis 1. *Osservatorio Analitico*. Accessed on September 28 2017. From <http://www.osservatorioanalitico.com/?p=6497>

Baggiani, Gregorio. (2016). The increased strategic importance of the Black Sea in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis 2. *Osservatorio Analitico*. Accessed on September 28 2017. From <http://www.osservatorioanalitico.com/?p=6549>

BBC. (2015). Putin reveals secrets of Russia's Crimea takeover plot. Accessed on September 18 2017. From <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31796226>

Blank, Stephen J. (2015). Imperial ambitions: Russia's military buildup," *World Affairs*. Accessed on February 8 2017. From <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/imperial-ambitions-russia%E2%80%99s-military-buildup>

- Champion, March. (1993). Russian Parliament Claims Sevastopol. *The Moscow Time*. Accessed on October 21 2017
- Euractiv. (2014). NATO flexes its muscle in response to Crimea crisis,” *Euractiv*. Accessed November 3 2017. From <http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/nato-flexes-its-muscle-in-response-to-crimea-crisis/>
- Gramer, Robbie. (2016). Changing Tides. *Foreign Affair*. Accessed on 9 February 2017 from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2016-02-08/changing-tides>
- Gressel, Gustav. (2015). Russia’s military options in Ukraine. *European Council on Foreign Relations*. Accessed September 16 2017. From http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russias_military_options_in_ukraine3010
- Klimentyev, Mikhail. (2014). Putin signs laws on reunification of Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia. March 21 2014, accessed on February 10 2017 from <http://tass.com/russia/724785>
- Kramer, David J. (2015). The Ukraine Invasion: One Year Later. *World Affairs*. Accessed on February 10 2017. From <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/ukraine-invasion-one-year-later>
- Lally, Kathy. (2014). Putin’s remarks raise fears of future moves against Ukraine. *The Washington Post*. Accessed on September 16 2017. From https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-changes-course-admits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-before-vote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c617-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html?utm_term=.67e9e229323d
- Miller, Chris. (2017). Why the Black Sea?. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. Accessed on September 29 2017. From <https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/01/why-the-black-sea/>
- Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Black Sea Fleet. Accessed on February 8 2017 from http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/navy/associations/structure/forces/type/navy/black_sea/history.htm

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2014). Interview of the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to ITAR-TASS, September 10 2014. Accessed on November 6 2014. From http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/671172
- Monaghan, Adrew. The Ukraine crisis and NATO-Russia relations.” *NATO review magazine*. Accessed on February 9 2017. From <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/Russia-Ukraine-Nato-crisis/Ukraine-crisis-NATO-Russia-relations/EN/index.htm>
- NATO. (2014). NATO defends accuracy of satellite images with additional proof. Accessed September 16 2017. From https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_109088.htm
- Orr, Robert. (2014) “Why Crimea Matters to Russia,” *Financial Times*. Accessed November 7 2017. From <https://www.ft.com/content/514abee5-c09b-34f6-9a3a-865a64540a65>
- Pike, John. (2017). The Russian Quest for Warm Water Port. *Global Security*. Accessed November 1 2017. From <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/warm-water-port.htm>
- President of Russia Official. (2014). Address by President of the Russian Federation. Accessed November 1 2017. From <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>
- President of Russia official. (2014). Executive order establishing the Ministry of Crimean Affairs and appointing Oleg Savelyev to the post of minister. Accessed on November 6 2017. From <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20665>
- Radyuhin, Vladimir. (2016). Why Russia needs Crimea. *The Hindu*. Accessed October 28 2017. From <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/why-russia-needs-crimea/article5792952.ece>
- Ruhle, Michael. (2014). NATO enlargement and Russia: myths and realities.

- NATO*. Accessed November 10 2017. From <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/Russia-Ukraine-Nato-crisis/Nato-enlargement-Russia/EN/index.htm>
- Schmemmann, Serge. (1993). Russia Parliament Votes a Claim to Ukrainian Port of Sevastopol. *New York Times*. Accessed on October 21 2017. From <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/10/world/russian-parliament-votes-a-claim-to-ukrainian-port-of-sevastopol.html>
- Sitkov, Konstantin. (2016). Analysis Russian Navy Black Sea Fleet Capabilities against NATO. Accessed on October 26 2017. From <http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/naval-technology/3570-analysis-russian-navy-black-seafleet-capabilities-in-case-of-conflict-against-nato.html>
- Smith, Matt and Alla Eschenko. (2014). Ukraine cries ‘robbery’ as Russia annexes Crimea. *CNN*. Accessed on 10 February 2017 from <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/18/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html>
- Somin, Ilya. (2014). Russian government agency reveals fraudulent nature of the Crimean referendum. *Washington Post*. Accessed on September 18 2017. From https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/06/russian-government-agency-reveals-fraudulent-nature-of-the-crimean-referendum-results/?utm_term=.232bd6a31b90
- Sun, Meicen. (2014). Balance of Power Theory in Today’s International System. Accessed on July 1 2017. From <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/12/balance-of-power-theory-in-todays-international-system/>
- Toucas, Boris. (2017). The Geostrategic Importance of Black Sea Region: A brief history. *CSIS*. Accessed on September 28 2017. From <https://www.csis.org/analysis/geostrategic-importance-black-sea-region-brief-history>
- Turkish Navy Official. (2013). The Turkish navy superior to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Accessed on October 21 2017. From <https://turkishnavy.net/2013/01/27/the-turkish-navy-superior-to-the-russian-black-sea-fleet/>

- Walker, Shaun. (2014). Ukraine Crisis: Emergency NATO, UN, and EU meetings after Russian invasion claim. *The Guardian*. Accessed on February 9 2017. From <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/28/ukraine-russia-emergency-un-nato-eu-meetings-invasion-claim>
- Volker, Kurt. (2014). Where's NATO's strong response to Russia's invasion of Crimea. *Foreign Policy*. Accessed October 28 2017. From <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/18/wheres-natos-strong-response-to-russias-invasion-of-crimea/>
- Washington Post. (2014). Russian's Black Sea Fleet. *Washington Post*. Accessed October 21 2017. From https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-black-sea-fleet/2014/03/13/fa40de64-ab1e-11e3-98f6-8e3c562f9996_graphic.html?utm_term=.3559325dbba3
- Yuhas, Alan and Raya Jalabi. (2014). Why Crimea Is So Valuable To Russia. *The Guardian*. Accessed November 1 2017. From <http://www.businessinsider.com/why-crimea-is-so-valuable-to-russia-2014-3/?IR=T>