



**Parahyangan Catholic University**  
**Faculty of Social and Political Sciences**  
**Department of International Relations**

*Accredited A*

*SK BAN-PT NO. 451 / SK / BAN-PT / AKRED / S / XI / 2014*

***European Union's (EU) Information Sharing Policy in Response to  
Terrorism; Case Study of Paris and Brussels Attacks***

Thesis

By

Maria Angelia Panjaitan

2013 330 118

Bandung

2017



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Hereby assert that this thesis is my own scientific writing and has not been submitted to attain other academic titles. Any work or opinion of other party excerpted is written in accordance to the valid scientific writing method.

This statement is made within a full responsibility and I am willing to accept any consequences given by Universitas Katolik Parahyangan if proven otherwise.

Bandung, 07<sup>th</sup> August 2017



Maria Angelia Panjaitan

## ABSTRACT

Name : Maria Angelia Panjaitan  
Student Number : 2013330118  
Title : European Union's (EU) Information Sharing Policy;  
Case Study of Paris and Brussels Attacks

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This thesis sought to examine factors constituting EU member-states' restraint on the use of information sharing policy in the case of Brussels attack on 22<sup>nd</sup> March 2016. It looks at the two of its existing platform in conducting information-sharing which are Europol and through State-to-state relations and thus assesses the performance of each in facilitating better information sharing for member-states specifically in the case of Paris and Brussels attacks.

With its binding common policies, including Schengen Area, EU member-states are facing similar security threats both internally and externally. As the terrorist attacks on 13<sup>th</sup> November 2015 in Paris happened, it heightened the necessity for EU member-states to cooperate better. As a response on 14<sup>th</sup> November 2014 EU leaders then issued a Joint Statement advocating their commitment in countering terrorism especially through information sharing. However, despite of its commitment, terrorist attack in Brussels was proven to be caused by EU's lack of information sharing. To better understand and analyze this issue, the author uses the Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation theory by Bjorn Fagersten as theoretical framework and applies Quantitative research using secondary analysis data as research methodology. The author finds factors such as mistrust, power asymmetric and differences on states' capacity as the elements which hinder EU Member-states' use on information sharing.

Key Words: European Union (EU), information-sharing, Paris attack, Brussels attack, terrorism

## ABSTRAK

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Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis faktor-faktor yang membentuk pengendalian penggunaan kebijakan berbagi-informasi oleh Anggota Uni Eropa setelah serangan Brussels pada Maret 2016. Penelitian kemudian meneliti dua platform Uni Eropa (UE) dalam berbagi informasi yaitu Europol dan melalui hubungan negara ke negara dan menilai kinerja dari masing-masing platform dalam memfasilitasi pembagian informasi antara negara anggota UE khususnya dalam kasus serangan Paris dan Brussels.

Adanya kebijakan bersama UE yang mengikat seperti *Schengen Area*, ini menjadikan setiap anggotanya menghadapi ancaman keamanan yang sama baik secara internal maupun eksternal. Serangan di Paris pada 13 November 2015 menunjukkan dibutuhkannya kerja sama antar anggota UE yang lebih baik. Sebagai tanggapan terhadap serangan tersebut, para pemimpin UE mengeluarkan sebuah Pernyataan Bersama (*Joint Statement*) pada 14 November 2015 yang menyatakan komitmennya dalam melawan terorisme terutama melalui berbagi informasi. Namun terlepas dari komitmen tersebut, serangan yang selanjutnya terjadi di Brussels terbukti sebagai kegagalan UE dalam berbagi informasi. Untuk lebih memahami permasalahan ini, teori *Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation* oleh Bjorn Fagersten digunakan sebagai kerangka teoritis dan metode penelitian kuantitatif dengan menggunakan analisa data sekunder diterapkan sebagai metode penelitian. Penulis menemukan faktor-faktor seperti ketidakpercayaan, ketiadaan asimetris dan perbedaan kapasitas negara sebagai elemen yang menghalangi negara anggota UE pada kegiatan berbagi informasi.

Kata Kunci: Uni Eropa (UE), berbagi informasi, serangan di Paris, serangan di Brussel, terorisme

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

CTG	Counter Terrorism Group
ECRIS	European Criminal Records Information System
ECTC	European Counter Terrorism Centre
EU PNR	European Union Passenger Name Records
EU	European Union
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
Europol	European Police Officer
EUSC	European Union Satellite Centre
INTCEN	Intelligence and Situation Centre
ISIS	Islamic State of Syria
JIT	Joint Investigation Teams
MI6	Military Intelligence, Section 6
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SIENA	Secure Information Exchange Network Application
SIS	Schengen Information System

TFTP	Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
US	United States
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTIONS

#### 1.1 Research Background

Since the rise of ISIS (or known for ISIL or Islamic State in Iraq and Levant), Europe became one of the subject to its violent attacks. The infliction of fear and terror created by the attacks has violated the fundamental values of human rights including the rights on freedom of expression, pluralism, democracy, tolerance and human dignity.<sup>1</sup> Its recent attack successfully instilled terror among Europeans and polarized Islamophobia among European citizen.<sup>2</sup> Subsequently European Union (EU) heightened its borders and increased its counter-terrorism policies.

Since the 9/11 attacks in United States (US) countries around the world had improved their counterterrorism acts.<sup>3</sup> EU has also acknowledged the importance of further acts in preventing terrorism. With the rising power which ISIS continually gained, further revision and addition to the previous policies are essential to counter possible and current threat of ISIS. One of the measures that are considered

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<sup>1</sup> "Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government Brussels, 12 February 2015 - Statement by the members of the European Council," *Consilium Europe*. February 12<sup>th</sup>, 2015, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/02/150212-european-council-statement-fight-against-terrorism/>. (accessed October 21<sup>st</sup>, 2016)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>3</sup> "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe- A global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy," *European Union*. (2016): 8.

paramount to be further improved is the idea of information sharing between the members of EU and other European countries.

In a world where the borders of nations have become vaguely defined and the rise of technology that has created the notion of a borderless world, intelligence and information appear to be more crucial than ever.<sup>4</sup> New threats such as cybercrime and cyber-terrorism put the realm of information intelligence to be more significant. Thus the necessity to determine the threshold to which intelligence, information, data and knowledge shared among EU member states become crucial.<sup>5</sup>

EU as a regional giant with its 28 member of states is bound with the same visions and values in which allow them to create a supranational body that relatively govern each of its members.<sup>6</sup> EU is a politico-economic union whereas its bond and ties make them prone to interdependency in comparison to other supranational organizations. Interdependency between EU member states includes sectors such as economy, politics, security and even socio-culture.<sup>7</sup> Schengen area, Eurozone and the establishments of European Council, Council of EU and European Parliament are proofs on how EU member states are mutually interconnected with each other.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Henry Kissinger. *Technology, Equilibrium and Human Consciousness* (2014). p.330

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Müller-Wille, B. *The effect of international terrorism on EU intelligence co-operation* (2008) p.49-73.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Bjorn Fagersten. *For EU eyes only? Intelligence and European Security* (2016) p.2

Though having closer bonds between its members is a great advantage for EU, it also has its downsides especially on the aspect of collective security of its region. Collective security is a form of alliance that is built by cooperation of several countries in order to strengthen the security inside of each state. The narrative of collective security has always been the main priorities of EU especially with the Schengen area policy which allows free movement inside Europe. The efforts to create a safe environment that simultaneously guarantee freedom and security have become even more critical.<sup>9</sup> With the escalating concerns over illegal immigration, refugee influx and the increasing amount of terrorist attacks, collective security becomes a major challenge for EU as it is become even more important to carefully analyze policy that still promote national sovereignty but also preserve collective security.

To preserve peace and order, EU collectively with other nations in the region formed European Police Office (Europol) as a form of security agency for Europe. Its mission is to support EU's member states and countries in the region in preventing all forms of serious international crime and terrorism with the cooperation between each law enforcer. One of the goals of Europol is in providing an EU criminal information hub in which this will provide information sharing capabilities to law enforcement authorities in the region<sup>10</sup>. This particular function of Europol is crucial in preventing terrorism. Exchange of information helps in tracking movement and also past records

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.,p.4

<sup>10</sup> "What we do?," *Europol Europa*. 2016, europol.europa.eu. (accessed August 30<sup>th</sup>, 2016)



of possible terrorist perpetrators in which these can be useful data to prevent any possible terrorist attacks.

In comparison to other organizations in the world, EU's cooperation upon defense as well as security is considered to be the most sophisticated among all organizations. As mentioned above, EU has already had several institutions established in managing information and the act of information sharing. The existence of Europol, INTCEN, EUMS (E.U. Military Staff) and EUSC (E.U. Satellite Centre) demonstrates EU's commitment upon putting Information Sharing as the first defense towards terrorism.

Information sharing is playing a major role in helping law enforcers of each state in Europe in countering terrorists.<sup>11</sup> Information sharing provides data or knowledge in which helps states to detect, identify and possibly prevent suspected terrorists before they commit crimes.<sup>12</sup> It also helps law enforcers recognizing patterns and tracking perpetrators. The function of EU's institutions is crucial and has a huge role in counter-terrorism.

## **1.2 Problem Identification**

Several terrorist attacks have occurred in Europe in which the attacks were affiliated to ISIS. On May 2014, ISIS attacked Brussels, Belgium, reportedly four

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<sup>11</sup> Bjorn Fagersten. Op,cit., p.5

<sup>12</sup> Roger Z. George and James B.Bruce. "Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles and Innovations," *Georgetown University Press*. (2008): 1-2

people died from the Jewish museum shooting. Another attack occurred on January 2015, the insurgence happened to Charlie Hebdo, a French satirical weekly, where the incidents cause 11 people died and 11 injured. However the incident that really captured Europe attention and provoked reevaluation of counter-terrorism measures was the Paris Attack on November 2015. The attack caused 130 people to die and 368 people injured. This particular attack of ISIS has further pushed the European Parliament to strengthen and also improved its counterterrorism act.<sup>13</sup>

With the increasing fear coming from civilian of European states towards refugees and also Muslim, this has just amplified the situation of Islamophobia in Europe. As recently seen in the news, France has decided to ban burkini for muslim women to wear.<sup>14</sup> The decision itself has grown into a huge international attention and further created gaps on how differences become even more difficult to compromise. This act alone and possibly other acts that discriminate muslims in Europe can impose greater mistrust between the west towards the muslims. As the continuance of Islamophobia in Europe that seems unlikely to slow down, the need for involvement coming from high officials of each state and EU's council in tackling this problem become even more crucial.<sup>15</sup> And with distrust that's already widening, this will only perpetuate hatred in which in the end will only provoke conflicts and

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<sup>13</sup> Nic Robertson, "How 'glaring' intelligence failures allowed a second bout of terror in Paris," *CNN*. November 8, 2015, <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/18/europe/paris-terror-attacks-intelligence-failures-robertson/>. (accessed October 21<sup>st</sup>, 2016)

<sup>14</sup> "5 things to know about French burkini bans," *USA Today*. [www.USAtoday.com](http://www.USAtoday.com). (accessed August 30<sup>th</sup>, 2016)

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*,

disputes. The controversy of terrorism and on how it spreads Islamophobia among European need to be straighten out. One of the solutions is by having the government officials provide better system in preventing terrorists attacks.

In response to the Paris attack in November 2015, the EU officials came up with a resolution in which it was called 'Prevention of Radicalization and Recruitment of European Citizens by Terrorist Organizations'. On the matter of sharing information, the resolution stated upon the effort of improving exchange of information on terrorist radicalization in Europe. The efforts include further discourse upon EU PNR and Europol ECTC (Europe Counter Terrorism Centre).

One of the responses which was highlighted was the EU PNR (Passenger Name Records) directive. The EU PNR itself is a platform which consists of information of passenger who travels by air within the region. Information shared includes travel dates, travel itinerary, ticket information, contact details, baggage information and payment information.<sup>16</sup> The PNR directive would become a database in which utilized as a tracking device of movement and behavioral of suspected terrorists. The PNR directive would also be utilized to identify persons that were previously suspected due to their previous involvement in serious crime or terrorism, and who could therefore become a subject for further examination. The PNR directive

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<sup>16</sup> "EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive: an overview," *Europarl*. 2016, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20150123BKG12902/eu-passenger-name-record-\(pnr\)-directive-an-overview](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20150123BKG12902/eu-passenger-name-record-(pnr)-directive-an-overview). (accessed September 19<sup>th</sup>, 2016)

and other forms of exchange information acts are hoped to bring better analysis in preventing acts of terrorism in the region.<sup>17</sup>

However when another strikes of terrorist attack occurred on March 2016 in Brussels, Belgium, the European countries and also EU officials was once again devastated due to its incapability of preserving a safe place to its citizen. When investigated, the report showed on how the attack itself supposedly could have been prevented. Claims coming from the Turkish and Dutch authorities that they had transmitted data of intelligence regarding the suspicious persons that has become the main suspects for the Brussels attack. According to the Belgian authorities, the data transmitted was not utilized due to the lapses between government authorities and security services in which made the bureaucracy become a major challenge in exchanging information.<sup>18</sup>

In conclusions, although EU has the highest level of cooperation within defense and security compare to any other organizations, it is not impenetrable to external threats. Furthermore the existing institutions and methods can be stated to still remain insufficient in properly countering terrorist attacks. Especially with the growing concurrent terrorist attacks within Europe and the high frequency of foreign fighters in capitalizing EU's Schengen policy, the sense of urgency in utilizing every measures of counter terrorism specifically on information sharing has to be done.

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.,

Thus why the focus of this thesis is to analyze factors constitute EU member-states' restraint on the use of information sharing that leads to the case of Brussels Attack in January 2016.

### **1.2.1 Scope of Research**

This research will solely focus on analyzing factors which constitute EU member-states' restraint on the use of the information sharing policy. The scope of this analysis is specified through the case of Paris and Brussels attack. This research will start its analyses with the Joint Statement coming from EU in response to Paris Attack on November 2015 as the Joint Statement emphasized the importance of sharing information between EU's member. Which however, with the occurrence of Brussels attack on January 2016, the report showed on the attack itself was partly due to the failure of utilizing information sharing policy. Thus this research will try to identify factors which restraint the use of information sharing policy reflected to the case of Paris Attack in November 2015 to Brussels Attack in March 2016. Although it needs to be noted that the assessment and analysis for this thesis is limited to the materials that are publicly available through the open sources.

### **1.2.2 Research Question**

Based on the problem identification above, the research question of this thesis would be: *'What were the factors constituting EU member-states' restraint on the use*

*of the Information Sharing policy specifically in the Case of Paris and Brussels attack?’*

### **1.3 The Objective and the Contribution of Research**

#### **1.3.1 The Objective of Research**

The general objective of this thesis is to describe the status quo of EU’s information sharing policy as one of its counter-terrorism act and to specifically:

1. Analyze the institutional development of EU information sharing policy in response to the case of Paris Attack.
2. Measure the level of cooperation of EU state-to state relations and EU’s most prevalent institution: Europol in the case of information sharing.
3. Identify factors which constitute EU member-states’ restraint on the use of information sharing policy specifically in the case of Paris and Brussels.

#### **1.3.2 The Contribution of Research**

This thesis can be utilized for:

1. Reference for students studying counter terrorism measures implemented in the European region specifically on the matter of Information Sharing policy.
2. Graduation requirement for acquiring a bachelor degree in the Universitas Katolik Parahyangan

### 3. A deeper analysis towards the case of Paris and Brussels attacks

#### **1.4 Literature Review**

In pursue of a better understanding and also a deeper analysis upon factors and deficiencies contributing to EU member-states' restraint on the use of information sharing policy within the case of Paris and Brussels attacks, the author will use three different perspectives as references. These three studies are Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough and The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, both are written by James I.Walsh and the third is The EU and the 2016 Terrorist Attacks in Brussels: Better Instead of more Information Sharing by Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Valsamis Mitsilegas. Three of these studies represent three different perspectives which highlight factors constituting why the limitation in cooperating in the context of information sharing exists.

Under the Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough, James I.Walsh highlights Mistrust as key barriers in creating an effective cooperation of information sharing. He explained on despite the creation of institutions e.g. Berne Group, Europol, and the European Union Military Staff to build a diffusion of intelligence among national authorities these institutions are not enough to tackle mistrust inhibited in each nation. Although EU member states inherently shares the same burden in facing internal and external security threats, the

engagement towards enhancing cooperation for a central institution still remains in a great distance.<sup>19</sup>

James I. Walsh further concludes that regardless of level of integration within EU, intelligence will remain heavily on the side of nation's autonomy. The unknown and divergent of interests' of states will always outweigh the necessity of information sharing specifically cooperation within institutions. The different degree of capacity and power of states made expectation on equal distribution of information within institutions would not likely to happen. Thus rather than to reform the capacity of institutions as medium for information sharing, the author advocates a secure sharing within smaller groups of member states. The author recognized the inability of eliminating mistrust in cooperating in the context of information sharing. This therefore made in order to make state cooperate with each other a same interest should be the primer drive. Only under this reasoning thus the level of mistrust is lessened and information sharing can be done.<sup>20</sup>

In differentiation with his previous article on Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough, James I.Walsh then describes another prominent factor in identifying states reluctance in information sharing through institutions. He believes that to centrally distribute an equal amount of information to all members of Europol for example is an impossible task which bigger state would refuse to comply. As aforementioned EU member states which also members of

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<sup>19</sup> James Igoe Walsh," The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing", *Columbia University Press*. 1893.p. 5

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*,



Europol have different level of contribution in the information shared. States with better capacity and capability in intelligence would definitely produce bigger amount of information as well as better quality of information compare to less capable states.

James I.Walsh acknowledged the power imbalance of cooperation between dominant states and the less capable states. Thus in his analysis, he advocates the theory of relational contracting as alternative in bridging the cooperation between this diverging states. The relational contracting describes on how states can structure their relationship through hierarchy to better realize mutual gains from cooperation. Under this analysis, the element of hierarchy become important as it becomes the bargaining power and leverage of dominant states over less capable states. This hierarchy would also mean control over information shared and lessening the chance for defection which has always been a major obstacle in cooperating in information sharing.

If James I.Walsh introduce the concept of hierarchy to decrease the chance of defection as the barrier of information sharing, another factor in which is important to identify the reluctance of states in information sharing lies in the structural and domestic incapacity within each states. The EU and the 2016 Terrorist Attacks in Brussels: Better Instead of more Information Sharing by Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Valsamis Mitsilegas highlights the importance to improve state's intelligence agency.<sup>21</sup>

Under their analysis, they found that most of the times an attacks happened, the chances for state to identify pattern or potential terror are already existed. The

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p 15

amount of information which states' had is considered enough to be processed into a product of intelligence. Unfortunately state's capacity in processing or identifying which information stating particular threats is still remain low especially for developing states. Many reported failings and lapses within government authorities are also the obstacles in performing a better information sharing. The authors stated on the importance facilitating a better information sharing where a targeted information is shared rather than only focusing on gathering or collecting information which eventually may or may not be used in the process. Furthermore better information sharing also put importance in the information that meets EU's rule of law this means that information shared should be able to be put as evidence in the eyes of law. Although this can be difficult as information in the context of intelligence does not necessarily put transparent process of acquiring information first, but the authors believe in the credibility of information shared can be a better drives for enhancing information sharing.<sup>22</sup>

In both of James I Walsh's analysis -Intelligence-Sharing in the European Union: Institutions Are Not Enough and The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing – he acknowledged upon the existence of hierarchy and mistrust in information sharing cooperation. Though he explained on how these obstacles should be seen as a natural response to cooperation in information sharing and should not hinders the development of the cooperation itself. However on The EU and the 2016 Terrorist Attacks in Brussels: Better Instead of more Information Sharing by Didier

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid.,

Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Valsamis Mitsilegas, he argues on the idea of introducing better targeted information sharing instead of cooperation in gathering and collecting information.

Based on these perspectives, the author found the idea of developing cooperation to be essential and should be elaborated and analyzed more. Three of these literature studies have accommodated the primary analysis of this thesis which therefore will be utilized as guidance in answering the inquiry of this thesis. Although these literature studies has provided the author with the basis, the author also founds that they have not analyzed the facilitators of EU member-states' tools in information sharing. In the attempt give deeper analysis of this issue, the author will analyze further on EU's existing tools on sharing information.

## **1.5 Theoretical Framework**

In this thesis, the author will use the Strategic theory and Institutional theory within the concept of Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation analyzed by Bjorn Fagersten. In brief, the theory used will describe the calculations within the decision-making of whether engaging in a cooperation or not and to identify the challenges of international cooperation within intelligence cooperation itself and how the matter in the end influenced the development of the institution's intelligence cooperation.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Bjorn Fagersten, "Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation," *Kennedy School of Government*, page 3.

Michael Howard describes the definition of Strategic theory as the use of available resources in pursuing particular or certain objectives. The term ‘resource’ refers to the tangible and intangible power which is possessed by the decision maker. The unit of analysis of this theory consists from individual, state, sub-state entity or any other social actors. The notion strategy in understanding social and political phenomena means to comprehend the correlations of ends and means that are rationally considered by the actors themselves. The key assumptions of strategic theory lie within the actor’s value system and preferences and the comprehension on the environment of which the actor acts. Political actors will always try to examine their motivation, interests and objectives and to contemplate on means to achieve them. They will also include the assessment of social environment which they functions and appreciate the determinant variable of its environment of which they operate. Under this theory, the decisions that the actor’s made is a result of the actor’s rational calculations.<sup>24</sup>

Institutional theory has long discussed the existence of cooperation in the international system. Institutional theory shares several understandings with realism on how that the international system is anarchic in nature and therefore made state to behave as a unitary actor. Though what differentiate the two is on the concept of cooperation, while realism has a skeptic view towards cooperation, Institutionalism

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<sup>24</sup> Strategic Theory: What it is and just as importantly what it isn’t, *E-International Relations*. 08<sup>th</sup> April 2011, <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/04/28/strategic-theory-what-it-is%E2%80%A6and-just-as-importantly-what-it-isn%E2%80%99t/> (accessed on July, 08<sup>th</sup> 2017).

views that states will more likely to choose to be embedded in rules to decrease the unpredictable shadow of the future rather than to be cooped up on security dilemma.

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The Institutionalism theory was first introduced by John Meyer and Brian Rowan in 1977, which then further elaborated by Richard Scott in 1983 and Lynne Zucker in 1977.<sup>26</sup> An Institution is a collection of rules and organized practices where there are structures of meaning and structures of resources that empower as well as constrain actor's behavior.<sup>27</sup> The Institutionalism is a general approach to the study of Institutions characteristics. The core assumption of Institutionalism is that institutions create elements of order and predictability.<sup>28</sup> By this notion, the Institution created is an embodiment of identity, values, set of rules and procedures agreed upon actors involved.

Institutionalism has three key strands which are Rational Choice Institutionalism, Sociological Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism. Rational Choice Institutionalism focuses in understanding the context upon how actor's preference effect changes in institutional rules. Sociological Institutionalism emphasizes upon how general rules and broader norms then shape identities and also rules within an institution. Historical Institutionalism explains on how decisions made

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<sup>25</sup> Segbers,"Global Politics: How to Use and Apply Theories of International Relations," (2006): 15-16

<sup>26</sup> Walter W.Powell, "The New Institutionalism," *The International Encyclopedia of Organization Studies*, 2007: 1.

<sup>27</sup> James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "Elaborating the New Institutionalism," *Arena, Centre for European Studies, University of Ohio*, No.11 (2005): 4.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

within institutions were effected by past events and the decision became the outcome of the future of the institutions itself.<sup>29</sup> The key strands that will be used for this thesis is Rational Choice institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism that is integrated within the concept of Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation by Bjorn Fagersten.

The analysis of Bjorn Fagersten on Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation argues that the cooperation itself is based on four core interests: intelligence gains, policy gains, sovereignty costs, and risks. Thus these four interests will then shape on what institution will be established and what development the institution will have.<sup>30</sup> Though these four interests seem to limit the capacity and capability of the institution, it is however understandable as the issue of intelligence and information sharing is such a sensitive matter where the study itself is relevantly new and therefore underdeveloped.

According to the concept of multilateral intelligence cooperation, the way that cooperation is conducted is measured by two dimensions which are scope and depth. Scope is defined by the number of tasks subject to cooperation, which in this case would be the collection, dissemination, analysis and dissemination of data. Depth however is the measurement of density of the relation itself which it relies on the frequency of interactions happened between actors involved. Cooperation with high density would mean that there is a high frequency of interaction between member


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<sup>29</sup> Paul J.DiMaggio and Walter W.Powell, "Introduction to the New Institutionalism," *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, No.1 (1991): 2-5.

<sup>30</sup> Fagersten, page 4.

states and low density would be the opposite. With the two dimensions combine, the level of cooperation done can be measured.<sup>31</sup> With the figure below Graphic 1.1, we can see the scope and depth of a cooperation goes hand in hand as to how each of the aspects – number of tasks and density of cooperationn – correlated.

**Graphic 1.1 Development of Intelligence Cooperation**



*Source: Bjorn Fagersten, Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation, Kennedy School of Government Harvard University<sup>32</sup>*

To further analyze the nature of cooperation and how it effects institution’s development, Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation then describe what are state’s interests and what drive them. To explain both of them, Multilateral Intelligence Cooperation used rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism as guidance. In explaining what are state’s interest, rational choice as one of the branches of Institutionalism believes that the existence and survivability of an

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.page5.

institution is due to its capacity to fulfill state's trait in utility-maximization or acting out of self-interest. On that note, institution functions to what states' preferences are.

In addition to the basic premise of rational choice institutionalism, other branch of institutionalism that is the historical institutionalism also contributes to the concept of multilateral intelligence cooperation. Historical institutionalism argues that the institutional choices in the past can shape and constrain actors at a later time. Which to some degree, historical institutionalism can be said to explain the development within an institution. Under the concept of multilateral intelligence cooperation, both historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism plays a big role in defining and predicting states' behavior and thus the institution itself. The convergence between the rational choice and historical institutionalism allow further analysis on what constrain institutions and what available preferences that states can choose.<sup>33</sup>

How state choose their available preference can be analyzed through defining state's interests. According to Fagersten, state interest is conceptualized with how state sees its intelligence gains, policy gains, safeguarded sovereignty and risks towards the intelligence cooperation itself. When entering any form of cooperation, state essentially asses what intelligence gains that they can acquire. It means that states will see as to how much of intelligence capacity they may gain from the

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, page7.



cooperation which in the end is to achieve states' end goals whether to further securing its 'home' territory or to project power abroad. Policy gain however, is talking about on how sometimes the motivation for states to form cooperation can be for political reasons rather than the functionality of the cooperation itself. It means that states simply choose to be a part of the cooperation was merely to bolster political or military alliances for non-intelligence reasons.

The possibility of states to pursue both intelligence gains and policy gains however is the most likely scenario. With benefits, the cost of forming cooperation also exists. The idea of cooperation paralleled with interdependency between states member and thus this creation would cost the autonomy and value of sovereignty of state. With this mind, the likeliness for a state to join cooperation may be hindered, thus why in its decision making process, state should consider its cost and benefit of forming the cooperation since the beginning. Furthermore, multilateral intelligence cooperation indeed has its downside especially noting the nature of information itself. The dissemination of shared information especially with a large number of participants would cost an even bigger possibility of leaks or abuses. Which then this leads to a vulnerability of states' involved and thus decrease the power of each state as well as the institutions itself. Adding to that, the quality of cooperation will be measured by the least trusted member of the institution, which in the end the building of trust must exists in order to form any type of cooperation. Minimizing risks of

leaks or abuse thus become one of the obstacles that hindered institution development.<sup>34</sup>

Another aspect that needs to be taken into account when assessing what make states form cooperation is to analyze what drives them. Fagersten believes that circumstance can in the end influence states' decision whether to be more motivated in seeking cooperation or to be more willing to cooperate regardless of its cost and benefits. As mentioned above, the level of cooperation between states is measured by state's interest and what drives them which this would then shape the scope and depth of the cooperation itself.

## **1.6 Research Methods and Data Collection Technique**

In the process of analyzing this thesis, the author used the Quantitative data analysis as its research method. Qualitative research described as logical consequence of collection of data and its relations with theory exhibiting deductive approach. This approach allows the exploration of theory, ensuing hypothesis from theory, conducting data collection such case studies, surveys and experiments which eventually lead to the findings and conclusion of research. The type of method for this thesis is the *explaining case* method where the theory utilized will be tested in

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid, page 10.

accordance to data found which then will determine the validity of the research itself.<sup>35</sup>

The data collection technique for this research is the secondary data analysis. Secondary data analysis is a technique of utilizing works by previous researchers and official statistics retrieved from credible institutions relevant to the subject of research.<sup>36</sup>

### **1.7 Research Design**

This thesis sought to examine the factors constitute EU member-states' restraint on the use of information sharing policy in the case of Paris and Brussels Attack. This thesis consisted of four chapters. The first chapter aim to introduce research background of this thesis as well as to identify problem, objective and contribution of this research. Furthermore, it will also elaborate three of its literature studies, theoretical framework and the research's methods and data collection technique.

The second chapter is aimed to describe EU's institutional development specifically on information sharing policy post Paris attacks and its relevance to Brussels attack. The third chapter will examine factors which constitute EU member-states' restraint on the use of Information Sharing prior to the case of Brussels Attack.

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<sup>35</sup> Alan Bryman, "Social Research Methods 4<sup>TH</sup> Edition", *Oxford University Press*, p.161

<sup>36</sup> Stephen Van Evera, "Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science," *Cornel University Press*,p.75

These factors consist of Mistrust and Nature of Information, Power Asymmetric and Diverging Preferences and Domestic Bureaucracy and Resources.

The last chapter will conclude and present findings of this research.