

Chapter 8: Summary and Concluding Remarks

8.1 Introduction

In this thesis we have discussed the changing nature of economic policymaking in Indonesia during the period 1999-2003, the period after the political and economic changes of 1997-1998 or the fall of the Soeharto regime. In particular, we focused on changes in the relations between the government and the business sector. We analyzed these changes by looking at the role of Kadin, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industries, in shaping economic policymaking. As we have made clear in this thesis, Kadin – being an organization encompassing many business associations at the sectoral level – was expected to represent private businesses and to defend their interests. In this position it had a role to play in the process of policymaking in Indonesia, at least potentially. We argued, however, that this role depends to a large extent on the political regime and the way the regime handles state-business relations. During the Soeharto regime, when a strong corporatist model prevailed and the government played a dominant role in policymaking, Kadin's role was described in the literature as fairly marginal; it was simply not allowed playing a major role in the policy game, a view to which we largely subscribe. Kadin had been subdued simply as an instrument of Soeharto's government to get legitimacy from the business sector. Kadin's position before 1997-1998 has been discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

Yet, as we have argued, the economic and political reforms starting from 1997-1998 provided a new and challenging environment, allowing Kadin to – at least potentially – increase its influence on policymaking. Our analysis of the three case studies in Chapters 5-7 aimed at illustrating whether and to what extent Kadin's efforts to influence policymaking have been successful in the post-Soeharto period. As our discussions of the three case studies showed, the efforts of Kadin to become a more important player in the policymaking process were only marginally successful. One main reason for this is that Kadin remained to have the image of being an institution under the control of the big businesses in Indonesia. This image may have hampered Kadin's attempts to devise a strong anti monopoly law in Indonesia because it had to face public resistance against monopoly (chapter 5). Second, Kadin suffered from internal fragmentation: opposition from its own members (next to opposition from some government agencies) made its attempt to monopolize the organization of government procurements failed (chapter 6). Third, at times Kadin's efforts to influence policy making was also constrained by the inconsistency of government's policy directions. This was particularly obvious in case of the

process of creating and implementing labor legislation. In the process of developing new legislation, the government switched its position several times from being pro-labor to being pro-business back to being pro-labor again. This put Kadin in an awkward position. (chapter 7). A final main reason for the marginal success of Kadin was that in the post-Soeharto era Kadin was not the only organization that represented specific interests. The economic and political reforms had given room to many other representatives of societal interests to raise their voice. Moreover, in comparison to the Soeharto period, the government and parliament had become much more open to demands from society.

In this final chapter, in Section 8.2 we summarize the main issues and findings of the different chapters of this thesis. In Section 8.3 we draw conclusions regarding the role of Kadin in policymaking during the first five years after 1997-1998, substantiated by the results from our research on the three case studies. Finally, in Section 8.4 we briefly put the results of our analysis into perspective by discussing the role of Kadin in policymaking processes at the end of the first decennium of the 21st century.

8.2 A brief summary of the main findings

In Chapter 1 we briefly discussed the political economic reality of Indonesia before and after the regime switch of 1998, with a specific interest in the relationship between the government and the business sector. In this chapter, we also broadly described Kadin as the organization encompassing many business associations at the sectoral level. This description was instrumental to develop our main research question for the thesis, which focused on the changing nature of state-business relations due to the political-economic reforms Indonesia went through during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, the research question central to this thesis was defined as follows:

Did the political and economic changes of 1997-1998 lead to a change in Kadin's role in influencing economic policymaking by the state? If yes, what did change, how did it change, and why did it change?

In Chapter 2 we developed the theoretical framework we used throughout the thesis to analyze the changing nature of the state-business relationships in Indonesia for the Soeharto as compared to the post-Soeharto period. This framework consisted of two main components. First, we discussed the nature of state-business relationships based on the corporatist model. Second, we discussed three main determinants of the success of interest group representation within a corporatist model. The determinants on which we

develop against the New Order regime in general and the dominant position of President Soeharto and his family in economic life in particular. Protests were raised increasingly, and people demanded political openness and democratization. Public outrage reached its peak in 1997 when general elections were held. The period of the election campaign turned violent as several people got killed or seriously injured during protests that were precipitated by police forces. Most importantly, the public seemed outraged by the fact that the government had tried to incapacitate PDI, the political party of which Megawati Soekarnoputri was the leader. Megawati was seen as a major threat to Soeharto's position.

The breakdown of the Soeharto regime was expedited due to the Asian crisis at the end of the 1990s. This crisis also severely hit Indonesia. Within a short period of time the economic situation in the country became disastrous. This led to strong calls from society for the resignation of Soeharto. After the President resigned in May 1998, de-concentration of Indonesian political power began. Several political changes were set into motion. First of all, parliament became more independent from the country's leadership when the constitution was amended in 1999 (followed by further amendments in 2000, 2001, and 2004), granting parliament more political power. Second, new laws were introduced in 1999 which aimed at effectively increasing the autonomy of local government and parliamentary councils. Third, another set of new laws opened possibilities to establish political parties, trade unions and NGOs, resulting in the emergence of many political parties, mass organizations, and NGOs. Finally, new laws substantially reduced the role of the military forces in politics. Thus, policymaking was no longer monopolized by the government; instead, democratization was introduced as different societal groups and organizations were allowed to participate in and have an influence on the policymaking process.

In Chapter 4 we discussed how Kadin developed since its official establishment in 1968. During the New Order regime within the corporatist structure, the government allowed Kadin to represent business. In practice this meant that in most cases the organization did not play an independent role in policymaking, even though it was formally recognized (or, formally *legitimized* in the terminology of the model discussed in Chapter 2) by the government with the establishment of Law No. 1/1987, it had close connections with Golkar – the main political party before 1998 – and it had direct access to the People's Consultative Assembly through its seat in the Utusan Golongan Ekonomi, i.e. its relationships with the state were at least to some extent *institutionalized* (again using the terminology of the model in Chapter 2).

When after 1998 a new political reality emerged, Kadin had to reposition itself. On the one hand, the political changes increased the organization's possibilities of influencing political decisions and serving business interests. The fact that Kadin's role as a peak business representative was legitimized in

Law 1/1987, in combination with the fact that its relationship with the state was institutionalized through direct and indirect contacts with Golkar and parliament, positively contributed to the possibilities of influencing decision making. At the same time, however, Kadin also had to compete with various other parties, all lobbying for political support of the specific interests of societal groups they represented.

Next to the limited role Kadin was allowed to play in policymaking during the New Order regime, conflicts within the organization itself reduced its effectiveness of being the representative of business interests. In Chapter 4 we have shown that since its establishment, Kadin had to deal with several internal conflicts of interest and power struggles. In particular, conflicts arose between Indonesian and Chinese businessmen, as well as between small and large business enterprises. These conflicts of interest made Kadin's role as the peak business organization a difficult one. The Indonesian business sector was characterized by a fragmentation of interests, i.e. different parts or segments of the national business sector had different interests, all of which competed for attention when state policies were being shaped. These internal conflicts remained strong, also after 1998 when major political changes took place. The fragmentation of interests and the resulting internal conflicts weakened Kadin's *credibility* (again referring to the terminology used in Chapter 2) as a representative of business interest, both with the government as well as with society at large, reducing its impact on economic policymaking.

In Chapters 5, 6 and 7 we illustrated the difficulties of Kadin to effectively represent business interests after the political changes in 1998: we discussed in detail three case studies of economic policymaking during 1999-2003. In particular, we focused on the role Kadin played in shaping economic policies and on its interaction with the state and state organizations, as well as with other societal organizations.

Chapter 5 provided a detailed discussion of the process that led to the anti-monopoly law of 1999 and the role Kadin played in this process. One of the major reforms of the Indonesian economy after 1998 concerned the creation of a more liberal economic environment, in which competition between companies was encouraged. During the New Order, the Indonesian economy was characterized by monopolistic behavior, cartel practices, collusion, exclusive licensing and market allocation by government-supported conglomerate companies and/or companies that were directly linked to the Soeharto family. The analysis first of all confirmed the idea that during the New Order regime Kadin was not very influential in the policymaking process. Although it had raised its voice against the monopolistic practices of conglomerates, the government did not really listen to what the business organization had to say. After 1998 this situation changed: the government and the political parties in parliament were now willing to listen to the demands from society. Liberalizing the market was one of these demands, because the dominant position of the

conglomerates and companies related to the Soeharto family in the economy was seen as one of the main causes why Indonesia was so severely hit by the crisis. As the representative of the business society Kadin was one of the societal parties that became involved in discussions on how to reform the economy. One of the main issues in the debates was the drafting of a new anti-monopoly law.

Initially, Kadin's position in the debate was half-hearted. On the one hand, it supported the drawing up of a new anti-monopoly law; on the other hand, it did not support the demands for high restrictions on the maximum percentage of market shares companies were allowed to obtain under the new law. Here, as we argued, the conflicts of interests of the different types of business Kadin had to represent became more prominent. Although small business was clearly in favor of breaking down the market power of large companies, large companies obviously tried to defend their positions as much as possible. On the issue of the maximum percentage of market shares, Kadin seemed to be inclined to support the interests of the large companies. At least to some extent, the conflicts of interests related to the contents of the anti-monopoly law were also reflecting the differences between Indonesian and Chinese businessmen. The largest conglomerates were owned by Chinese businessmen; Indonesians in most cases owned large, but smaller conglomerates. We suggested that Kadin's involvement in the drafting of the law contributed to lowering the restrictions on the maximum market share the new law allowed companies to hold (50 instead 30 per cent). After the law was finally ratified in parliament, Kadin also played an important role in the implementation. Most importantly, it was actively involved in a commission that was to monitor the implementation. Moreover, it introduced the law within the business sector by setting up information programs and seminars. To conclude, Kadin seemed to have been successful in shaping the contents of the new anti-monopoly law at least to a certain extent. Yet, in doing so it mainly supported the interests of only a small part of the Indonesian business sector. Kadin's way of acting on this issue may have further sharpened the fragmentation of interests and views within the Indonesian business sector, especially between small and large business.

In Chapter 6 we discussed the case of the rules and regulations concerning the procurement of government projects. These rules and regulations established how companies could be involved in delivering goods and services to the government. Again, this was a hot issue in the debate related to how the Indonesian economy should be reformed after 1998. And again, as with the anti-monopoly law, it was extremely important to the business sector, as many of these government projects involved large sums of money. During the Soeharto regime government projects were assigned in ways that were not transparent in many cases. Consequently, many businessmen were not satisfied with the existing system and they were in favor of changing it to make it more

transparent and open. Since demands for changing the system were widely supported by society as a whole and the business community in particular, a new Presidential decree was established in 2000.

Soon after this establishment, however, controversy developed with respect to the implementation of the new procurement rules. An important aspect of the new rules was the obligation for businesses that wanted to tender for government projects to be a member of an accredited association and to obtain a quality certification. Kadin was supposed to play a crucial role in the issuing of these certificates. However, Bappenas – the state institution that also played an important role in the process of the procurement of government projects – objected to Kadin's involvement in issuing certificates. Many business associations supported Bappenas in this. The controversy between Kadin and Bappenas built up until finally President Megawati had to intervene, after which the tension faded away. The intervention effectively meant that Kadin's role in the process of the procurement of government projects was reduced. The most important message of our case study is that Kadin was not seen as a strong institution by the business community, the government and society at large; Kadin was not really accepted as the peak business organization representing business interests. Instead, Kadin's way of acting with respect to the implementation of the decree on the procurement of government projects raised a lot of criticism.

Finally, in Chapter 7 we discussed the case of the creation and implementation of a new labor law. As discussed, the Soeharto regime was rather oppressive regarding labor. In line with the corporatist model, labor representation was organized through a state-controlled labor union. The marginalization of labor before 1998 did put business in a favorable position as it effectively had a very weak opponent in discussions concerning labor contracts and conflicts.

It was no surprise then that after the step-down of Soeharto demands for better labor rights were raised fairly quickly. The changing political landscape was conducive to reforming the legislation of labor rights. On the one hand, the government was more willing to listen to demands from society; on the other hand, many different interest groups, among which there were labor unions as well, were established directly after the fall of the New Order. Consequently, pressure from society as well as from foreign sources (in particular ILO) caused the government to draw up legislation in which labor rights were improved and more protected.

For Indonesian business, the rise of labor representation created a completely new political reality. Unlike before 1998, they now had to deal with a stronger opponent in discussions on labor rights. The description of the creation of the new labor legislation showed that during the period 1999-2003 both business and labor were pressing the government to draw up new legislation that would favor their interests as much as possible. Kadin, and

business in general, underlined the negative consequences of the new legislation because it would make labor too expensive, which would ultimately hurt the Indonesian economy. Labor representatives on their part made it clear that better labor rights were fair after decades of having been ignored. As the government had become more susceptible to demands from society, it changed labor legislation several times, giving in to demands from both business and labor. Ultimately, the disagreement between labor and business representatives was settled by tripartite negotiations that also involved the government.

The most important message of the case study in Chapter 7 was that Kadin had to face a new reality in which it had to negotiate with labor unions over policymaking regarding labor issues. Before 1998 this had not been the case. The case study is an excellent illustration of one of the main findings in this thesis, i.e. while on the one hand Kadin's room for maneuvering with respect to influencing policymaking had increased due to the weaker position of the government, on the other hand influencing policymaking became more difficult because Kadin had to compete with other societal organizations (in our case study with labor unions) for state attention. We also remarked, however, that in our case study Kadin's role as the representative of business interests was never seriously challenged by the business sector. There appeared to be no serious fragmentation of interests and views among Kadin business members. We argued that the main reason for this was that in this particular case the interests of all business people were more or less similar. For all business people, labor costs were an important factor in their total costs of production; rising labor costs would therefore seriously hurt their performance and competitiveness.

8.3 Conclusions: From Strong State Corporatism to Societal Corporatism

After having discussed the main findings of the thesis, we come back to the research question, which we discussed in Chapter 1 and which we repeated at the beginning of Chapter 8. The research question was defined as:

Did the political and economic changes of 1997-1998 lead to a change of Kadin's role in influencing economic policymaking by the state? If yes, what did change, how did it change, and why did it change?

Based upon our analysis in this thesis, we formulate the answer to this research question as follows. To start with: yes, the political economic changes of 1997-1998 did lead to a change of Kadin's role in influencing policymaking by the state. Before 1998, the Indonesian political economy model was characterized by strong state corporatism. The state played a dominant role in the

policymaking process and controlled societal demands by organizing and controlling interest groups. Business demands were organized by legitimizing Kadin as the formal representative of the business sector. In practice, this meant that Kadin would play a very limited role in policymaking. And even though it was formally legitimized and it had direct links to government officials and policymakers, the fact that it was the only recognized representative of business also meant that it had to take into account many different interests (e.g. small versus large business, Chinese versus Indonesian businessmen), which caused internal fragmentation and conflicts of interests.

After 1998, the political changes led to the breakdown of the model of state corporatism. The state stopped dominating the policy making process. New interest groups were established and were more independent from the state in recommending policies and representing interests. Still, some form of corporatism remained, also after the political changes of the late 1990s, as representation of interests was – at least to some extent – centralized in all-encompassing organizations, such as Kadin. Moreover, at least in the case of Kadin it was still strongly influenced by elites, as representatives of big businesses dominated the executive board, reflecting a weak ‘bottom-up’ process.

The Indonesian political economy model changed into what has been called a model of societal corporatism. According to the model of societal corporatism, interest groups and other organizations and institutions are more independent from the state and bargain with state institutions and/or with each other over allocating resources. The tripartite discussions as described in Chapter 7 of this thesis fit well into the model of societal corporatism.

Now Kadin had more room for making independent recommendations on issues regarding business interests. As compared to the new interest groups, Kadin had the advantage of being formally recognized by the government by way of Law 1/1987. Moreover, it had institutionalized contacts with government officials that were established during the New Order regime. Yet, it also experienced fierce competition from other, mainly newly established interest groups (such as labor unions; see Chapter 7), and from government institutions like Bappenas; see Chapter 6) with respect to influencing the policymaking process. Moreover, its fragmental internal nature continued to exist, even after 1998. Conflicts of interest between small and large enterprises and between Indonesian and Chinese businessmen continued to be present.

The new political economy model, in which there are more possibilities for representing interests but in which there is also more competition between interest groups with respect to influencing state policy decisions, has certainly changed the role of Kadin as a representative of business interests. Yet, it has not necessarily made it easier for Kadin to be more successful in demanding policies favoring these interests. The case studies in our thesis have provided evidence for this latter statement. At the same time, the case studies also

showed that Kadin was able to shape policymaking at least to some extent (see e.g. the contents of the anti-monopoly law and the legislation on labor rights) and that Kadin promoted the implementation of new laws by introducing them within the business sector by setting up information programs and seminars.

Based upon the discussions and analyses of the case studies in this thesis, the most important recommendations for Kadin we can offer are the following. First, the organization should accept the new political reality and should therefore focus on developing good working relations with representatives of the government, labor and other interest groups so as to ensure that business interests are taken seriously in policy discussions. In this respect, developing well-functioning frameworks for tripartite or multi-partite negotiations should receive attention from all parties involved. Second, Kadin should pay attention to reducing internal frictions as much as possible as this would increase its credibility in discussions on economic policymaking. Promoting the interests of small and medium-sized business, harmonizing the relations between Indonesian and Chinese businessmen, and offering more and better services to its members (databases, issuing of certificates, networking, organizing seminars, etc.) would certainly contribute to reducing these internal frictions.

8.4 Epilogue: Kadin and Indonesian Policymaking After 2003

As discussed in section 8.3 the analysis of the three case studies discussed in chapters 5-7 deal with Kadin's role as a business representative during the first years after the step-down of Soeharto in 1998 until 2003. The question remains what happened after 2003? How did Kadin's position as a business representative evolve during the remainder of the decade? Did they cope with internal frictions effectively? How did they deal with the competition between interest groups with respect to influencing state policy decisions? Events in the post-2003 indicate that, in line with the model of societal corporatism – in which interest groups and other organizations and institutions are more independent from the state and bargain with state institutions and/or with each other over allocating resources –, Kadin has been able to further develop its independent position vis-à-vis the Indonesian government. In particular, during the past few years, Kadin has come up with several policy recommendations that were not in line with proposals made by the government. Several cases can illustrate these observations; we will discuss three of them shortly below.

Revitalizing Indonesia's industrial sector

The first case is concerned with the role of Kadin in preparing the so-called "industrial road map" for Indonesia. In 2004, Kadin – in cooperation with BI (the Indonesian Central Bank), business associations, the American Chamber of Commerce, and the Japanese Chamber of Industry, developed this industrial

road-map for Indonesia. This road-map was a comprehensive plan containing proposals on how the performance of Indonesian industry in general, and of some high-potential sectors in particular, could be stimulated. Among other things, it put forward detailed suggestions to reform the tax system so as to promote investments in general, and investment in sectors of specific interest for foreign investors in particular.

When drafting the road-map, Kadin invited many representatives of interest groups from inside and outside the organization (such as Kadin's committee for Small and Medium-sized enterprises and co-operatives as well as numerous business associations) to participate in the process. By letting these representatives participate, the development of the road-map did not raise a lot of criticism, and frictions between different interest groups were avoided. This suggests that, at least in this specific case, Kadin was able to cope with internal frictions effectively. At the same time, the development of the road-map allowed the organization to put forward their own ideas on how to revitalize the Indonesian business sector, independently from the government. The road-map was finally sent to various ministries responsible for developing the economy as an input for discussions about how to develop the real sector.

Next to providing input for the industrial road-map, Kadin also submitted another document to the various ministries entitled "Revitalization of the Industry and Investment" as an input for further developing the Indonesian industrial sector. In this document Kadin made suggestions with respect to improving business law and taxation policy, business-friendly manpower policies, further empowerment of the private sector, support of regional autonomy, and policies promoting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. These initiatives show that Kadin took its role as business representative seriously, being capable of offering practical solutions rather than simply criticizing government policies. Clearly, Kadin's intention was to be considered as an important partner for the government in revitalizing the economy with special emphasis on policies favoring the business sector. Perhaps, one of the strongest signals of the government taking Kadin seriously as a partner in its plans to improve the Indonesian economy after 2003 was the appointment of M.S. Hidayat, chairman of Kadin, as Minister of Industry during the second period of Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency.

Indonesia's oil price policies

The second case study discussed here concerns Kadin's reaction on the government's oil price policies. In 2006 and 2008, the government of President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono decided to raise the oil prices twice during a period of a global increase of oil prices. This was a very sensitive issue, since this was very likely to lead to inflation, which would be unfavorable for the economy as a whole, including most industrial sectors, but would particularly hurt the small and medium-sized enterprises. Not surprisingly then, these

policies were detrimental to the public support of the government. Indeed, as the price increases were announced, several political parties questioned this decision during several parliamentary meetings. At the same time, many societal groups, such as political parties, members of Parliament, non-governmental organizations, trade unions, professional associations, and so on, expressed their opposition in critical commentaries in the media, and in several cases also during mass rallies.

When the opposition against this government policy began to spread, Kadin joined the bandwagon by expressing their support to opposing the oil price policy. Kadin was particularly concerned with the adverse impact the policies would have on small and medium-sized enterprises. Therefore, in order to protect these smaller businesses, Kadin mobilized its special committees for these businesses to help them dealing with the possible adverse effects of the rising oil prices. Interestingly, Kadin changed its position on this issue after it had various meetings with government agencies involved in the oil price policies. It announced that it no longer opposed the oil price policy, apparently because it had become convinced that prices increases were inevitable and keeping prices fixed would even further hurt the economy as a whole. In particular, Kadin had become aware of the serious constraints the government budget would be confronted with if it would continue its policy of subsidizing the price of oil. A weak financial position of the government was seen as an important obstacle to economic success.

At the same time, however, Kadin requested that the adverse effects of oil price increases would be compensated by improving access to commercial bank credit for small and medium-sized enterprises, and by protecting the poor from adverse consequences as much as possible. So, Kadin decided to accept the government's oil price policies, despite continuing pressures from critical elements in society, especially the urban poor, NGO activists and others. This shift of position illustrates that in the post-2003 years Kadin sometimes deliberately took an independent position vis-à-vis other forces in society when this was necessary to support business interests.

The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement

The third case study we discuss here deals with Kadin's recent proposition to the government to delay the implementation of ACFTA, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, which was agreed upon in the year 2002 and was scheduled to commence early 2010. The business sector was shocked when at the beginning of 2010 the government rather suddenly announced that Indonesia – just as for any of the other ASEAN countries – was going to implement the trade liberalization agreement with China. Until then, the business sector had been under the impression that the implementation of the agreement had been postponed to an unspecified later date.

When the government announced the implementation of the free trade agreement, the Indonesian business sector heavily criticized the government for its failure to communicate this decision much earlier so as to allow the business sector to prepare for the consequences this would have for their activities. Actually, the business sector had already expressed its worries regarding the opening up of trade relations with China before the announcement that the trade liberalization agreement with China would be implemented. During the years before 2010, cheap Chinese products had increasingly invaded Indonesia's domestic markets, leading to the closing of several Indonesian businesses and contributing to an increase of unemployment. Therefore, the harsh criticism the Indonesian government had to face after its announcement regarding the free trade agreement with China was no surprise. Several societal groups such as NGOs, business associations, workers, and also Kadin, raised their voice in early 2010.

According to Kadin, there were at least 228 items (including steel, textile and textile products, machinery, electronics, organic chemicals, petrochemicals, furniture, cosmetics, herbals, footwear, maritime products, and so on) that needed to be protected and to be excluded from the agreement with China. It therefore demanded the Minister of Trade, Mari Pangestu, to bring up this concern during negotiations with the Chinese government officials and to propose postponement of the liberalization of trade regarding these 228 items. The Minister gave in to these demands from Kadin, but unfortunately, the proposal was rejected by the Chinese negotiating team on the ground that an exception could not be given exclusively to Indonesia; a comprehensive re-negotiation about an exemption of these items also with other ASEAN members would be too complicated. China, however, promised that it would reevaluate trade liberalization with Indonesia whenever it would lead to severe economic damage to the Indonesian economy. Although Kadin was clearly disappointed with the government's decision to continue the trade liberalization with China, it nevertheless decided to stop pushing the government to change its policy regarding trade relations with China.

Instead, Kadin started attempts to influence implementation of the free trade agreement its own way by involving Indonesian businessman of Chinese origin in negotiations with Chinese officials about the implementation of the agreement and its consequences for Indonesian business. In particular, Kadin mobilized Perpit, the Indonesia-China Association of Businessmen, an organization founded in 2009, to conduct direct negotiations with their Chinese counterparts regarding co-operation and stimulating Chinese investments in small and medium-sized enterprises and labor intensive industries in Indonesia. To conclude, this third case study shows that Kadin was actively trying to protect the interests of business, in particular those of the small and medium-sized enterprises. In their attempts to protect these interests, it operated

independently from the government, seeking for solutions outside the government-to-government diplomatic practices.

To summarize, the three case studies in this section do seem to corroborate one of the central arguments of the thesis, i.e. after 1998 Kadin has become increasingly independent from the government, maintaining its own view with respect to business sector interests and proposing economic policies that are not necessarily in line with government policy. At the same time, as was illustrated with the first case study, Kadin has shown willingness to take into account interests of various stakeholders when deriving at policy recommendations, leading to carefully drafted programs, and reducing the potential for frictions between different interest groups. This is not to say, however, that Kadin has always shown to give in to demands from these different interest groups (as was shown with the oil price case). It seems, therefore, that Kadin has developed into an organization that has become able to serve the interests of business relatively independently from government and society at large, without being completely immune to these other interests. Our conclusion therefore is that since 1998, Kadin has gradually become in good shape to be accepted as a representative of the Indonesian business community and as a critical partner for the Indonesian government in deciding on business-related economic policies.

References

Handwritten notes in the right margin, including a vertical line of text and some illegible scribbles.

Main body of handwritten text, appearing as a list or series of entries, with some lines starting with a bullet point.

Handwritten notes in the left margin, including a vertical line of text and some illegible scribbles.

Books and Journals

- Almond, G.A. and Powell, G.B., Jr., 1966, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta.
- Almond, G.A., in: Verma, S. P., 1999, *Teori Politik Modern*, PT Raja Grafindo Persada, Jakarta.
- Amsden, A., 1982, *Asia's Next Giant : South Korea and Late Industrialization*, Oxford University Press., Oxford.
- Arrow, L. K., 1963, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Case", *American Economic Review* 50, 5.
- Aslund, A., 1992, "The Major Principles of the Market Economy", in Isachsen, A. J., Hamilton, C. B., and Gylfason, T., 1992, *Understanding the Market Economy*, Oxford University Press., Oxford.
- Baker, R. W., Soesastro, H., Kristiadi, J., and Ramage, D.E. (eds.), 1999, *Indonesia: The Challenge of Change*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, KITLV Press., Leiden.
- Bhagwati, J., 1982, "Directly-Unproductive Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities", *Journal of Political Economy* 90.
- Bourchier, D., 1994, "Indonesia's Emerging Proletariat: Workers and their Struggles", *Annual Indonesian lecture series no. 17*, Centre of Southeast Asia Studies Monash University, Clayton.
- Bourchier, D., 1996, *The Lineage of Integralist State in Indonesia*, PhD dissertation Monash University, Australia.
- Bourchier, D., and Legge, J.D. (eds.), 1996, "Democracy in Indonesia, 1950s and 1960s", *Monash Paper on South East Asia No. 31*, Centre of South East Studies, Clayton, Monash University.
- Brazier, et al. (eds.), 1999, "Undang-Undang Antimonopoli Indonesia dan Dampaknya terhadap Usaha Kecil dan Menengah", *the Asia Foundation*.
- Bresnan, J., 1993, *Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy*, Columbia University Press., New York.
- Caraway, T., 2004, "Protective Repression, International Pressure, and Institutional Design: Explaining Labor Reform in Indonesia", *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 39, 1.
- Chalmers, D. A., 1972, "Changing Latin America: New Interpretations of Its Politics and Society", *the Academic of Political Science*, Columbia University, Proceedings of the Academic of Political Science, 30, 4, New York.
- Chalmers, I. and Hadiz, V.R. (eds.), 1997, *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia*, Routledge, London.
- Claessens, S., Djankov, S., and Lang, L.H.P., 2000, "Separation of Ownership from Control of East Asian Firms", *Journal of Financial Economics* 58.

- Corrales, J., and Cisneros, I., 1999, "Corporatism, Trade Liberalisation and Sectoral Responses: the Case of Venezuela, 1989-1999", *World Development*, 27, 12.
- Crouch, H., 1978, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press., Ithaca.
- Crouch, H., 1984, *Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Cooperation*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
- Dahm, B., 1969, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesia Independence*, Cornell University Press., Ithaca.
- Dahm, B., 1971, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century*, Greenwood Publisher Group.
- Dowling, J.M., 2006, "Competition Policy in Indonesia, Economics & Statistics", *Working Paper Series*, Singapore Management University SMU, paper No. 08-2006.
- Duncan, R. and McLeod, R. H., 2007, "The State and the Market in Democratic Indonesia", in: McLeod et al., 2007, Chapter 5.
- Easton, D., 1964, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, University of Chicago.
- Easton, D., 1971, *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*, University of Chicago, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., New York.
- Easton, D., in: Verma, S.P., 1999, *Teori Politik Modern*, PT Raja Grafindo Persada, Jakarta.
- Eggi S., 2002, *Peraturan Pekerja Peraturan Buruh 2000-2002*, Durat Bahagia, Jakarta.
- Emmerson, D.K., 1983, "Understanding the New-Order: Bureaucratic Pluralism in Indonesia", *Asian Survey*, 23, 11.
- Emmerson, D.K. (ed.), 2001, *Indonesia Beyond Soeharto: Negara, Ekonomi, Transisi*, Gramedia and the Asia Foundation Indonesia, Jakarta.
- Emmerson, D.K., 2001, "Krismon dan Lengser: Kemelut Tahun 1997-1998", in Emmerson, D.K. (ed.), 2001, *Indonesia Beyond Soeharto: Negara, Ekonomi, Masyarakat, Transisi*, the Asia Foundation, PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta.
- Eng, Van der, P., 2004, "Business in Indonesia: Old Problems and New Challenges", in: P. van der Eng and M.C. Basri (eds.), 2004, *Business in Indonesia: New Challenges, Old Problems*, ISEAS Publication, Singapore.
- Eng, Van der, P., and Basri, M.C. (eds.), 2004, *Business in Indonesia: New Challenges, Old Problems*; ISEAS Publication, Singapore.
- Feith, H., 1962, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press., Ithaca.
- Feith, H., 1983, in Kantaprawira, R., *Sistem Politik Indonesia: Suatu Model Pengantar*, Penerbit Sinar Baru, Bandung.
- Ford, M., 2004, "A Challenge for Business? Developments in Indonesian Trade Unionism after Soeharto", in: P. van der Eng and M.C. Basri (eds.), 2004,

- Business in Indonesia: New Challenges, Old Problems*; ISEAS Publication, Singapore.
- Hadiwinata, B.S., 2003, *The Politics of NGOs in Indonesia: Developing Democracy and Managing a Movement*, Routledge Curzon, London.
- Haggard, S., Sylvia, M., and Schneider, B.R., 1997, "Theories of Business and Business-State Relations", in Maxfield et al., 1997, Chapter 2.
- Haggard, S., Maxfield, S., Schneider, B.R. (eds.), 1997, *Business and State in Developing Countries*, Cornell University Press., Ithaca and London.
- Hermes, N., 1996, *Financial Markets and the Role of the Government in Chile*, Capelle a/d Ussel: Labyrinth.
- Hermes, N., 1997, "New Explanations of the Economic Success of East Asia: Lessons for Developing and Eastern European Countries", *CDS Research Memoranda*, 3, Centre for Development Studies, University of Groningen, Groningen.
- Hermes, N. and Schilder, A., "Setting Priorities: The IMF and World Bank and Structural Adjustment Programmes", in: Boorsma, P.B., Aarts, K. and Steenge, A.E. (eds.), 1997, *Public Priority Setting: Rules and Costs*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
- Higgot, R., and Robison, R. (eds.), 1985, *Southeast Asia: Essays in the Political Economy of Structural Change*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Hill, H., 1989, *Unity and Diversity: Regional Economic Development since 1970*, Oxford University Press., Oxford.
- Hill, H. (ed.), 1994, *Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Transformation*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney.
- Hill, H., 1996, *The Indonesian Economy Since 1966: Southeast Asia's Emerging Giant*, Cambridge University Press., Melbourne.
- Hill, H., 2000, *The Indonesian Economy*, University Press., Cambridge.
- Hill, H., 2001, "East Timor's Future: South East Asia or South Pacific?", *Southeast Asia Affairs*.
- Hill, H., 2002, "Old Policy Challenges for a New Administration: Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia", in: Harvie, C., and Boon-Chye Lee (eds.), *The Role of SMEs in National Economies in East Asia*, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
- Howlett, M., and Ramesh, M., 1995, *Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystem*, Oxford University Press., Oxford.
- Huntington, S.P., 1968, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Fredericksburg, Book Craftres, Inc., Virginia USA, quoted by J.Kristiadi, 2002, "Mewujudkan Profesionalisme TNI", in: *Merumuskan Kembali Kebangsaan Indonesia*, Piliang, I.J., Prasetyono, E., and Soesastro, H. (eds.), CSIS, Jakarta.
- Isachsen, A.J., Hamilton, C.B., and Gylfason, T., 1992, *Understanding the Market Economy*, Oxford University Press., Oxford.

- Islam, I., 2003, "Dealing with Spatial Dimensions of Inequality in Indonesia: Towards a Social Accord", paper for the Second Inequality and Pro-poor Growth Conference on the theme of "How Important is Horizontal Inequality"?, World Bank, Washington.
- Islam, I., and Shafiz, D., 2002, "Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection in a Period of Crisis: the Case of Indonesia", *World Development*, 30, 7.
- Iswandi, 1998, *Bisnis Militer Orde Baru*, Rosda Karya, Bandung.
- Juwana, H., 2002, "An Overview of Indonesia's Antimonopoly Law", *Washington University Global Studies*, 1.
- Kimura, F., 2007, "The Mechanism of Production Networks in Southeast Asia: the Fragmentation Theory Approach", *CEI Working Paper Series 2007-8*, Centre for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- King, D., 1983, "Indonesia's New Order as Bureaucratic Polity. A Neo-Patrimonial Regime or a Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime: What Difference does it Make?", in: Anderson, B., and Kahin (eds.), *Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate*, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca.
- Kingstone, P.R., 1998, "Corporatism, Neoliberalism, and the Failed Revolt of Big Business: Lessons from the Case of IEDI", *Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs*, 40, 4.
- Kristiadi, J., 2002, "Mewujudkan Profesionalisme TNI", in: *Merumuskan Kembali Kebangsaan Indonesia*, Piliang, I.J., Prasetyono, E., and Soesastro, H. (eds.), CSIS, Jakarta.
- Krueger, A.O., 1974, "The Political Economy of Rent-seeking Society", *American Economic Review*, 64.
- Krueger, A.O., 1990, "Government Failures in Development", *the Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 4, 3 (summer 1990).
- Krueger, A.O., 1993, *Economic Policies at Cross Purposes: The United States and Developing Countries*, Brookings Institution Press.
- Krueger, A.O., and Turan, I., 1993, "The Politics and Economics of Turkish Policy Reforms in the 1980s", in: Krueger, A.O., and Bates, R.H. (eds.), *Political and Economic Interaction in Economic Policy Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries*, Basil Blackwell.
- Kunio, Y., 1988, *The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Southeast Asia*, Oxford University Press., Singapore.
- Kwik Kian Gie, 2006, November, "Diktator, Oligarki, atau 'Vox Populi Vox De'?", in: Kwik Kian Gie, 2006, *Kebijakan Ekonomi Politik dan Hilangnya Nalar*, Kompas, Jakarta.
- Kwik Kian Gie, 2006, "Sekitar Pembentukan Kabinet: Koalisi Sehat atau Dagang Sapi?" in: Kwik Kian Gie, 2006, *Kebijakan Ekonomi Politik dan Hilangnya Nalar*, Kompas, Jakarta, November.

- Lee, T., 2000, "The Nature and Future of Civil Military Relations in Indonesia", *Asian Survey*, 10, 4, (July/August 2000), referred to in: Vermonte, P.J., 2002, in: *Merumuskan Kembali Kebangsaan Indonesia*, Piliang, I.J., Prasetyono, E., and Soesastro, H. (eds.), CSIS, Jakarta.
- Leerdam, John van, 1999, *Verzelfstandiging en Politieke Economie*, Delft, Eburon.
- Legowo, T.A., 2002, "Otonomi Daerah dan Akomodasi Politik Lokal", in: *Merumuskan Kembali Kebangsaan Indonesia*, Piliang, I.J., Prasetyono, E., and Soesastro, H. (eds.), CSIS, Jakarta.
- Liddle, W., in: MacIntyre, A., 1991, *Business and Politics in Indonesia*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney.
- Lindsey, T., 2008, "Constitutional Reform in Indonesia: Muddling Towards Democracy", in: Lindsey, T. (ed.), 2008, *Indonesia: Law and Society* (2nd edition), the Federation Press., Australia.
- Loughlin, C., Marks, S., Shauki, A., and Sirait, N., 1999, "Report on Competition Policy in Indonesia", ELIPS project, USAID project 04970372.
- Maarif, S., 2001, March 28, "Competition Law and Policy in Indonesia", draft report produced as part of the ASEAN Competition Law Project, Jakarta.
- MacIntyre, A., 1991, *Business and Politics in Indonesia*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
- Manning, C., 2004, "Labour Regulation and the Business Environment: Time to take Stock", in: Eng, Van der, P., and Basri, M.C. (eds.), 2004, *Business in Indonesia: New Challenges, Old Problems*; ISEAS Publication, Singapore.
- Manning, C., 2008, *The Political Economy of Reform: Labour After Soeharto*, Indonesian Studies Working Paper No. 6, University of Sydney, Sydney.
- Manning, C. and K. Roesad, 2007, "The Manpower Law of 2003 and its Implementing Regulations: Genesis, Key Articles and Potential Impact," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, vol. 43, 1.
- Mans, D., 1996, "Indonesia: Industrial Technology Development for a Competitive Edge", World Bank, *Indonesia Discussion Paper Series*.
- Manzetti, L., 1993, *Institutions, Parties, and Coalitions in Argentine Politics*, University of Pittsburgh Press., USA.
- Maxfield, S., Schneider, B.R. (eds.), 1997, *Business and the State in Developing Countries*.
- McLeod, R.H. (ed.), 1994, *Indonesia Assessment 1994: Finance as a Key Sector in Indonesia's Development*, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
- McLeod, R.H., 2007, *Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance*, ISEAS, Singapore.

- McLeod, R.H., 2007, "Doing Business in Indonesia: Legal and Bureaucratic Constraints", Working Paper AED-EAL-2007-3, Research Program "Economic Attractiveness of the Law", Nanterre, Universite Paris 10.
- Mortimer, R. (ed.), 1973, *Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia's Accelerated Modernisation*, Angus and Robertson.
- Mortimer, R., 1974, *Indonesian Communism under Soekarno: Ideology and Politics 1959-1965*, Cornell University Press., Ithaca.
- Mosca, G., 1939, *The Ruling Class*, Livingstone, A. (ed.); Kahn, H.D. (translator), McGraw-Hill, New-York, Toronto, London.
- Mosca, G. in: Benewick, R. and Green, P. (eds.), 1998, *The Routledge Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Political Thinkers* (2nd edition), Routledge, UK.
- Muhaimin, Y.A., 1990, *Bisnis dan Politik: Kebijakan Ekonomi Indonesia 1950-1980*, LP3ES, Jakarta.
- Nuryanti, S., 2004, "Antara Uang dan Ketokohan: Kasus Medan dan Kabupaten Simalungun", in: Haris, S. (ed.), 2005, *Pemilu Langsung di Tengah Oligarki Partai: Proses Nominasi dan Seleksi Calon Legislatif Pemilu 2004*, PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama and Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI) and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD), Jakarta.
- Olson, M., 1965, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Harvard University Press., Cambridge.
- Pangestu, M., Aswicahyono, H, Anas, T, and Ardyanto, D., 2002, "The Evolution of Competition Policy in Indonesia", *Review of Industrial Organization* 21.
- Perez-Aleman, P., 2003, "A Learning-Centered View of Business Associations: Building Business-Government Relations for Development", *Business and Politics*, 5, 2.
- Piliang, I.J., Prasetyono, E., and Soesastro, H. (eds.), 2002, *Merumuskan Kembali Kebangsaan Indonesia*, CSIS, Jakarta.
- Rachbini, D. J., 1996, *Ekonomi Politik: Paradigma, Teori, dan Perspektif Baru*, CIDES.
- Rahayu, S.K., and Sumarto, S., 2003, March, "The Practice of Industrial Relations in Indonesia", SMERU Research Team.
- Reeve, D., 1985, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System*, Oxford University Press., Singapore.
- Ricklefs, M.C., 1993, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1300*, Stanford University Press.
- Robison, R.J., 1978, "Toward a Class Analysis of the Indonesian Military Bureaucratic State" (taken from: *Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State in Indonesia: 1965-1975*, Sidney Univerisity, 1978).
- Robison, R.J., 1982, "The Transformation of the State in Indonesia", *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 14.

- Robison, R.J., 1986, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney.
- Robison, R.J., 1990, "Power and Economy in Soeharto's Indonesia", *Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers*, Manila and Wollongong.
- Root, H.L., 2001, "Do Strong Governments Produce Strong Economies?", *Independent Review*, 4, Spring.
- Samiana, I Made, Retnaningsih, N., Pulungan, H. (eds.), 2006, *Etika Politik, Politik dan Demokrasi: Dinamika Politik Lokal di Indonesia*, Percik, Salatiga.
- Sanit, A., 2005, "Proses Nominasi dan Seleksi Calon Legislatif Pemilu 2004", in Haris, S. (ed.), 2005, *Pemilu Langsung di Tengah Oligarki Partai: Proses Nominasi dan Seleksi Calon Legislatif Pemilu 2004*, PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama and Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI) and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD), Jakarta.
- Sandler, T., 1992, *Collective Action: Theory and Applications*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
- Schilder, A., 1997, *Government Failures and Institution in Public Policy Evaluation: The Case of Dutch Technology Policy*, University of Twente.
- Schmitter, P., 1971, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil*, Stanford University Press.
- Schmitter, P., 1972, "Paths to Political Development in Latin America", *Academy of Political Science*, Proceedings 30, 4.
- Schmitter, P., 1974, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *Review of Politics*, 36.
- Schmitter, P., 1975, "Corporatism and Public Policy in Authoritarian Portugal", SAGE Professional Papers in *Contemporary Political Sociology* 1, 11.
- Schmitter, P., and Lehmbruch, G. (eds.), 1982, "Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making", *SAGE Modern Politics Series*, Volume 7, (no.19).
- Schmitter, P., and Lehmbruch, G. (eds.), 1979, "Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation", *Contemporary Political Sociology*, 1, 18.
- Schneider, B.R., 1998, "Organized Business Politics in Democratic Brazil", *Journal of Inter American Studies and World Affairs*, 39, 4.
- Schneider, B.R., 1998, September, "The State and Collective Action: Business Politics in Latin America", paper for the *Latin American Studies Association*, Chicago.
- Schneider, B.R., 2004, *Business Politics and the State in Twentieth-Century Latin America*, Cambridge University Press.
- Schwartz, A., 1994, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*, Boulder, Colo, Westview.
- Shauki, A., 1999, "The Role of the Commission for Fair Competition in the Anti-Monopoly Law & its Impact on Small and Medium Scale Enterprises", Brazier et al., Asia Foundation.
- Shafer, D.M., 1994, *Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape Development Prospects of States*, Cornell University Press., Ithaca.

Suprayitno (director of the organization department of Kadin Indonesia), 2003-2004, interviews.

Umar, S. (the secretary general of Kadin), 1999, interview.

Wirman (the head of SMEs department of Kadinda-DKI), 2003, July 7, interview.

Presentation and group discussion in Kadin Tower, Jakarta, July 1 2005; attended by: Suprayitno (director of the organization department of Kadin Indonesia); Tri Jayadi, T. (Data and Trade Division); Rachman, H. H. (Ketua Komite Tetap H.I); Mopangga, Y. (BUM-Kadin Indonesia), Rosidul (BUM Kadin Indonesia); Sutiyoso, T. (Member of the Organization Department of Kadin Indonesia), Tinanggo, A. E. (Kadin), Thaib, H. B. (Kadin Indusesia), Djimanto (the Secretary General of Apindo); Kajo, U. (Kadin); Saptadji, H. (PJS. DE), Adiseputra (Div. Pertimbang); Iesje S. Latief, I. S. (Ass DE); Taufik, M. (Komite Tetap Organisasi); Widiyanto, H. (Kadin Indonesia); Halim, M. (Kadin Indonesia); Sofan, A. (Chairman of the Association Department of Kadin, Ketua Komite Tetap); Siregar, L. R. (LB UKM), Ruwiyati SR (LB-UKM)

Interviews and Articles in Public Journals

Ardjanggi, S., 1998, in Antara, December 9, 1989.

Ardjanggi, S., 1992, in front of the Komisi APBN DPR-RI; "Kadin Minta Deregulasi Dilanjutkan", Angkatan Bersenjata, November 13, 1992;

Bakrie, A., 1997, "Aburizal Defends Dealings of Soeharto's Children", Jakarta Post, June 30, 1997.

Bakrie, A., 1993, "Pengurus Kadin Harus Benahi Pengusaha Kecil", Media Indonesia, November 10, 1993.

Bakrie, A., 1994, "Pemerintah Perlu Susun Jadwal Pengurangan Proteksi", Bisnis Indonesia November 22, 1994.

Bakrie, A., 1995, "Kadin Wants to See Collusion Stop", Jakarta Post, December 19, 1995.

Bakrie, A., 1995, "Cegah Pemilikan Industry Hulu Hingga Hilir" (Kadin confronted vertical business control), Bisnis Indonesia, July 15, 1995.

Bakrie, A., 1996, in Balai Sidang Jakarta toward the Rapim and Rapimnas Kadin, "Rakernas Kadin Bahas Peluang Usaha Menengah", Bisnis Indonesia, December 20, 1996.

Bakrie, A., 1996, "Campur Tangan Negara Harus Selalu Transparan dalam Mengatur Ekonomi Pasar", in Rapat Pleno Rakernas and Rapimnas Kadin in Jakarta, Kompas, December 23, 1996.

Bakrie, A., 1996, "Kadin Tolak Persaingan Bebas", Merdeka, December 28, 1996.

- Bakrie, A., 1996, in Halal Bihalal 1416 Hijriah Kadin for all parts of the institution in Jakarta, "Perlu Purifikasi Mekanisme Pasar di Indonesia", Kompas, March 7, 1996.
- Bakrie, A., 1996, "Kadin Himpun 150 Proyek Kemitraan", Bisnis Indonesia, May 20, 1996.
- Bakrie, A., 1997, "Aburizal Defends Dealings of Soeharto's Children", Jakarta Post, June 30, 1997.
- Bakrie, A., 1997, hearing session with parliament (Komisi VIII DPR-RI in Senayan), "Perlu Kebijakan Ekonomi Pro Pribumi", in Bisnis Indonesia, November 6, 1997.
- Bakrie, A., 1998, "Kini Saatnya Redistribusi Aset", "Bisnis Indonesia, February 10, 1998.
- Bakrie, A., 1998, "Pemerintah Harus Upayakan Pengusaha Non-pri Mau Kembali", in Suara Karya, July 3, 1998.
- Bakrie, A., 1995, "Kadin Wants to See Collusion Stop", Jakarta-Post, December 19, 1995.
- Bakrie, A., 1998, "Pemerintah Harus Upayakan Pengusaha Non-pri Mau Kembali", Suara Karya, July 3, 1998.
- Basri, F., 2002, in Tempo, August 11, 2002.
- Denny, J. A., 2002, interview on TV.
- Denny J.A., 2002, "Kasus Suap di DPR" (interview with Masduki, T. chairman of ICS; Soemantri, S. expert in "Hukum Tata Niaga"; Lie, A. F-PAN DPR-RI), (Talk Show October 13, 2002, Metro-TV), in: "Parliament Watch: Eksperimen Demokrasi: Dilema Indonesia", Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2006, Jakarta.
- Denny, J. A., 2003, January, interview on TV.
- Denny, J. A., 2003, November, interview on TV.
- Denny, J.A., 2003, November 22, "Politik Uang Calon Legislatif" (interview with Anung, P. from PDI-P, Nurwahid, H. from PKS, Rochijat, P. from KIPP Eropa), (Talk Show on November 22, 2003, Metro-TV), in "Parliament Watch: Eksperimen Demokrasi: Dilema Indonesia", Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2006, Jakarta.
- Denny J.A., 2003, January, "Kontroversi Akbar Tanjung Pasca Kalah Banding" (interview with Latifa, D. R. from F-PDI-P DPR-RI; Sinambela, M. (chairman of Golkar DPP); and Rauf, M. (political science expert), (Talk Show January 30 2003, Metro-TV), in: "Parliament Watch: Eksperimen Demokrasi: Dilema Indonesia", Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2006, Jakarta.
- Denny, J. A., 2004, interview on TV.
- Denny, J. A., 2004, January, interview on TV.
- Denny J.A, 2004, April, "Vonis Bebas Akbar Tanjung" (interview with Bomer Pasaribu, Wakasekjen DPP Partai Golkar), (Talk Show on April 12, 2004, Metro-TV), in "Election Watch: Meretas Jalan Demokrasi", Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 2006, Jakarta.