BETWEEN SECULARISATION AND ISLAMISATION:
INDONESIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE MUSLIM WORLD IN THE SOEHARTO ERA

BY

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To the late Sunardi Wiriaatmadja, who first introduced me to the study of foreign policy; and Kasumayanthi, Kaka, and Wika: loves of my life.
For Sukarmini Raka, Anak Agung Gede Raka, Ariani Siadja, and the late W. G Siadja.
"The 21st century does not permit the redrawing of borders either in the name of religion or on the strength of the sword"

Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Indian Prime Minister
(Time Magazine, 28 August 2000)
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Abstract

This study explores the position of Islam as one of the domestic political variables in Indonesia's foreign policy during the Soeharto era and elucidates the level of Indonesia's involvement with international issues pertinent to the Muslim world. The issues covered in this study embrace Indonesia's behavior toward the Organization of the Islamic Conferences (OIC), the Middle East, the role of Indonesia in facilitating a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the Government of the Republic of Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and Indonesia's policy toward the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In order to understand Indonesian policies toward the Muslim world, this study focuses on explanation of the linkage and the interactive processes between the 'State' (government) and 'Society' (Islamic community). The significance of the relationship between the State and Society in foreign policy is based on the proposition that the conduct of foreign policy of any state is primarily a function of its current internal political dynamics. This study was conducted by utilizing interviews with senior diplomats, other government officials and prominent researchers. It was also based on various selected official and non-official documents.

The interaction of the State and Society in foreign policy issues toward the Muslim world, as in domestic politics, has been colored by tensions. This has been demonstrated by different perceptions of and attitudes towards some issues pertinent to Islamic sentiments. As a consequence, there were competing interests between the State and Islamic community in influencing foreign policy toward the Muslim world.

This study argues that the foreign policy of Indonesia toward the Muslim world under Soeharto was increasingly the result of domestic political struggles between domestic actors, particularly the Muslim community and the State with conflicting interests in the international issues pertinent to Islamic sentiments, and thus different foreign policy preferences.

Even though the role of the 'State' in foreign policy making remained dominant, the inputs — more precisely, the demands — of the Muslim community have indeed helped to shape the tone and direction to Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Muslim world. To a certain extent, Indonesia's Muslim community has provided the context for the state foreign policy decision making toward the Muslim world.
The growing interests and demands of the Muslim community on the international issues pertinent to the Islamic sentiments have been manipulated by Soeharto as a political tool to maintain his domestic legitimacy, while internationally, it has been used as a diplomatic tool to justify its foreign policy toward the Muslim world. As a result, Indonesia's attitude to the Muslim world was reactive in nature. This study also demonstrates that the state has a 'domestic agential power' or ability to shape domestic realm and construct foreign policy (relatively) free of domestic social structural constraints.
Declaration

"I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by any person except where due reference is made in the text"

[Signature]

Anak Agung Banyu Perwita
July 2002
"Why bother to write a thesis on Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy", asked a friend of mine, "when there is nothing much to write?". My response to that precarious question is that although at first glance, there would seem nothing to much to write, the 'revival' of Islam in Indonesia's domestic politics as well as in world politics in the late 1980s has marked the reposition of religious factors in International Relations. Moreover, the topic did not invite wider attention by foreign policy scholars, especially Indonesians. In addition, this topic has also become one of the 'political mysteries' of the Soeharto era.

My effort to uncover this 'mystery' began in the middle of 1998 or just a month after the resignation of President Soeharto which was then followed by the mushrooming of Islamic political parties in Indonesia. This phenomenon was believed to be one of the crucial indicators of dramatic changes in Indonesia's domestic political map and of the re-emergence of Islam as a major political force in Indonesian politics.

This changing domestic political architecture, then, became a prime motive for me to write this thesis, which assumes that foreign policy begins at home. The other motive was the scarcity of studies of Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy. Even though many studies have been conducted on Indonesia's foreign policy, the State-Society (Muslim community) perspectives in Indonesia's foreign policy remain scarce.

Many people have contributed their assistance, sincere encouragement and warm support to the completion of my thesis for which I am so indebted. First of all, my study was financially supported by the AusAID through the ADS (Australian Development Scholarship) 1998-2002.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABRI</td>
<td><em>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</em>, the Indonesian Armed Forces, now TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) or Indonesian national Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Philippine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN Free Trade Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economy Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asia Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abangan</td>
<td>Nominal Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAIS</td>
<td>Badan Intelijen dan Strategis, or Intelligence and Strategic Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKIN</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Nasional, or National Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASMI</td>
<td><em>Barisan Sukarela Muslim Indonesia</em>, or the Brigade of Indonesian Muslim Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bebas-Aktif</td>
<td>Independent/ Free and active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMA</td>
<td>Bangsa Moro Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPUPKI</td>
<td>Badan Penyelidikan Untuk Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDES</td>
<td>Center for Information and Development Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGI</td>
<td>Consultative Group on Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCEC</td>
<td>Committee for Economic and Trade Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONEFO</td>
<td>Conference of Emerging Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-8</td>
<td>Developing Eight (8), consists of 8 OIC members (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Darul Islam: 'House/Abode of Islam

DDII: Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, or Indonesian Council for Islamic Preaching

DEPLU: Departemen Luar Negeri, or Department of Foreign Affairs

DMI: Dewan Masjid Indonesia, or the Council of Indonesia's Mosque

DOP: Declaration of Principles; series of agreement between PLO and Israel which was signed in Washington on 13 September 1993

DPR: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or House of Representatives

EU: European Union

FUI: Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah, or Forum of Islamic Fraternity

GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council

GOLKAR: Golongan Karya, or the Functional Group (the ruling party during the New Order)

GRP: Government of the Republic of Philippines

Hisbullah: Lexically, defender of Allah (God), the name of Islamic militia during the era of Indonesia's revolution

ICFM: Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers

ICKI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Kebangsaan Indonesia, or the Association of Indonesian Intellectuals

ICM: Islamic Common Market

ICMI: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals

IDB: Islamic Development Bank

IFTA: Intra-Islamic Free Trade Area

IGGI: International Governmental Group on Indonesia

IINA: International Islamic News Agency

IPTA: Intra-Islamic Preferential Trade Area
IPNU  
_Ikatan Putra Nadhlatul Ulama_, or the Association of sons of Nadhlatul Ulama

IRC  
Intra- Islamic Regional Cooperation

ISBO  
Islamic States Broadcasting Organization

*KADIN*  
*Kamar Dagang dan Industri_, or Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry

*KISDI*  
*Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam_, or Indonesia’s Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World

LIPI  
*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia_, or Indonesian Council of Sciences

MIM  
Muslim Independence Movement

MILF  
Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MNLF  
Moro National Liberation Front

MUI  
*Majelis Ulama Indonesia_, or the Council of Indonesian Ulama

*Muhammadiyah*  
The modernist Islam organization

NAM  
Non Aligned Movement

New Order  
The Soeharto era, 1966-1998

*NU*  
*Negara Islam Indonesia_ or Indonesian Islamic State

NU  
*Nadhalatul Ulama_ or the Revival Ulama. Traditional Muslim Organization. Founded in 1926.

NEFOS  
New Emerging Forces

OIC  
Organization of Islamic Conference

OLDEFOS  
Old Emerging Forces

Old Order  
The Sukarno era, 1959-1966

OPEC  
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

*P4SB*  
*Pemuda Pendukung Pengiriman Pasukan dan Sukarelawan ke Bosnia_, or Youth in Support the Sending of Troops and Volunteers to Bosnia

Pancasila  
Five Principles, or the Indonesia’s State Ideology
PCPP  Persatuan Cendekiawan Pembangunan Pancasila, or the Intellectuals' Association for the Advancement of Pancasila

PMII  Pergerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia, or the Indonesian Association of Muslim Students

PKI  Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Indonesia Communist Party

PLO  Palestine Liberation Organization

PRC  Peoples' Republic of China

PRRI  Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, or the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia

PWJ  Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, or Indonesian Association of Journalists

Santri  The Devout Muslim

Sabilihilah  Lexically, struggle on the name of Allah, the name of Islamic militia during the era of Indonesia's revolution.

SDSB  Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah, National Sports Lottery

SPCPD  The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development

Syariah  Islamic law/principles

Ulama  Islamic Scholar or teacher

Ummat  Islamic Society or community

UN  United Nations

UNHCR  United Nations High Commission for Refugee

UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force

US  United States

USSR  Union Soviet Socialist Republic, now Russia

Wanhan Kamnas  Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional, or the National Security and Defence Council
Chapter I
Introduction

1.1. Research Background

One of the crucial and challenging issues in foreign policy is the study of how foreign policy is developed and conducted and why a particular state takes a specific foreign policy decision and action\(^1\). This is due to the complexity of the structure and the process of foreign policy-making\(^2\). It involves not only the interplay of both internal/domestic and external/international stimuli\(^3\) but also the psychological environment – ‘existing circumstances as they are perceived by decision makers’ – and operational environment – ‘the conditions of world politics as they exist at any moment in time’\(^4\). This complexity is also due to the difficulties in identifying the factors which determine foreign policy making and the foreign policy makers, particularly in third world countries.

This study is not intended to be a general examination of the factors which determine Indonesia’s foreign policy, but rather a look at the position of societal factors – Islam and the Muslim community – in Indonesia’s foreign policy and the degree to which Islam influences Indonesia’s foreign policy.

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4 Rosenau, James N (1976). ‘The study of foreign policy’. In Rosenau, James N et al. World Politics:
In this context, the major hypothesis in this study is that "foreign policies are also influenced by the religious views and beliefs of policymakers and their constituents". More specifically, it examines whether Indonesia as a country with a substantial Muslim population, has taken Islam into consideration when formulating and implementing its foreign policy. By testing the above hypothesis, this study shows the relationship and linkage between Society (Islam and the Muslim community) and the State in the foreign policy of Soeharto's Indonesia toward the Muslim world.

The extent to which the Islamic factor played a crucial role in Indonesia’s foreign policy has been subject to debate. Suryadinata, for example, argued, "Islam has not been a major consideration in Soeharto's foreign policy". Other scholars, such as Sihbudi, maintained that

Indonesia’s relations with Middle East countries, and also Indonesia’s attitude toward certain issues in the region, can not be separated from the influence of the ‘Islamic factor’.

Azyumardi Azra, a leading Islamic scholar, has also noted a similar view on the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. He argued

Even though Islam has formally not been a factor in Indonesia’s foreign policy, the Indonesian government seems to take careful consideration when issues relating to Islam and Muslims appear at front.

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Azra also pointed out that,

It is correct that Jakarta seems to consistently play down the Islamic factor in its foreign policy. But on the other hand, there are some cases where Islam seems to have been taken into serious account by the Indonesian government\textsuperscript{10}.

Another analyst of Indonesia’s foreign policy, argued

Islam, however, is not without influence in Indonesia’s foreign policy, but that influence has been expressed much more in the form of constraint than in positive motivation\textsuperscript{11}.

Meanwhile, a former foreign minister acknowledged “in certain issues, Islam has coloured the nuances of Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world”\textsuperscript{12}. The range of views alone clearly shows that the role of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy remains quite debatable.

Demographically, Indonesia, with approximately 90 percent of its population Muslim, contains the largest Muslim population in the world. However, Indonesian politics, to borrow Hefner’s words, is non-confessional or not based on any one religion\textsuperscript{13}. Indonesia is also not a secular state\textsuperscript{14}. Tarmizi Thafer says that “Indonesia is not a secular state, neither is it a theocratic one. Some countries lie between the two categories...and

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Interview with a former foreign minister, 30 November 1999.
\textsuperscript{14} According to John L. Esposito, there are three general orientations in the governments of Muslim countries: Secular, Islamic and Muslim. In secular, it separates Islam from the state and restricts religion to private life. Turkey is the appropriate example of it. In Islamic, the state proclaims Islam as the character of the government and the law. It is used not only to legitimate domestic rule but also to strengthen state’s foreign policy, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In the Muslim orientation, Islam is declared as state religion and the shariah is believed to be source of law. It requires that the head of state must be a Muslim and state controls religious affairs, such as Malaysia, Tunisia, Iran, Egypt, Algeria and Jordan. See Esposito, John L (1987). \textit{Islam in Asia: religion, politics, and society}. New York: Oxford University press.p.24. See also Esposito, John L (1991). \textit{Islam and politics}. Third edition. New York: Syracuse University press. p.96.
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Indonesia is one of them"\textsuperscript{15}. In the words of Surbakti, Indonesia can be
categorized as a "religiously accommodating state"\textsuperscript{16} in which the nation-
state is regulated and managed according to national ideology. The cultural
and religious diversity of Indonesia has given Islam a 'unique' position in
Indonesia's political system. As Madjid noted, Islam has consistently played
the role of 'rallying ideology' in Indonesia's political system\textsuperscript{17} or 'an ideology
of re-building society on moral and healthier lines'\textsuperscript{18}.

I.2. Research Questions, the Purpose of the Study, and Theoretical
Framework

This study is about Indonesia's New Order foreign policy with special
reference to Indonesia's relations with the Muslim world including the
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and other Islamic related issues
on the World stage such as the Moro problem, the Palestinian issue, the
Gulf War, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict. This study explores the
impact of religion (Islam), particularly the religious groups (the Muslim
communities), on foreign policy issues. To borrow from the study conducted
by Surbakti, this study investigates the nature and the characteristic of
Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Muslim world using the typology of
"secularization of the polity" and "religionization of polity"\textsuperscript{19} or the influence
of religion (Islam) as articulated by the Muslim community on government

Jakarta:Censis. P.55-56.

\textsuperscript{16} Surbakti, Ramlan A (1991). Interrelation between religious and political power under the New
"responsive toward religious groups' demand and interests to both domestic and foreign policies as
long as they are not contrary to national ideology.

\textsuperscript{17} Nurcholish Madjid (1989). Islam: kenodernan dan keindonesian [Islam: modernity and
Indonesian]. Bandung: Mizan.p.89.

Books.p.150.

\textsuperscript{19} Surbakti, Ramlan A (1991).p.27-28. The above typology, according to Surbakti, is part of the
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(state) policies, particularly foreign policy. A number of questions, which serve as analytical devices to structure analysis and organized data, are raised in this study:

1. What was the position of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world? In other words to what extent did Islam provide direction and content for Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world?

2. Was there any correlation or linkage between the position of Islam in Indonesian politics and Indonesia’s engagement with the Muslim world? If so, how were these correlation/linkages manifest?

3. What was the level of Indonesia’s political, economic, and social involvement with the Muslim world?

The role of the societal factor is crucial in foreign policy making and behaviour. This factor at the domestic level motivates and influences the ruling elites (the policy makers) to manage foreign policy and external relations of states. However, its exact impact on foreign policy is not easily determined because it is only one determinant factor and perhaps not even the most important one. The impact of societal factors is often filtered through or influenced by other factors such as geopolitical and geo-strategic considerations, economic needs, and regime interests.

Nonetheless, this study argues that domestic politics provided the context for the role and influence of Islam on Indonesia’s foreign policy. This is because the state’s conduct of foreign policy is a function of its current

\footnote{pattern of relation between the State and society (religious community).}

\footnote{This framework has been borrowed from Dawisha (1983).}
internal political dynamics. The Indonesian Muslim community’s demands for greater participation in foreign policy making, particularly toward the Muslim world, can be seen as ‘a desire for recognition’ of the Muslim voice in Indonesia’s foreign policy which it perceived as part of the significant ‘public sphere’ in state-society relationship.

The theoretical framework for this study is provided by studies of the state-society relations in foreign policy analysis. Theoretically, there are three major alternative models of state-society relations in foreign policy analysis. The first model is Statist. This approach, which closely corresponds to Realist theory, assumes that “state decision makers formulate foreign policy largely autonomously of societal influences.” The state is assumed to be much stronger than the society so that the role and the influence of society in foreign policy can be neglected. This model argues that states have full authority (institutional autonomy) in managing their foreign relationships and tend to neglect societal factor in foreign policy making. In this context, the state demonstrates its role as ‘domestic agential power’ or its ability to shape the domestic realm and construct foreign policy relatively free of domestic social structural constraints.

The second approach is the Societal approach. In contrast to the first

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
approach, the Societal approach assumes that societal groups within the state play a dominant and continuing role in foreign policy. This approach consists of two models: the pluralist model and the Social Blocs model. The pluralist model is based on the assumption that “political leaders care most about maintaining a high level of domestic political support” which is “a prerequisite both for maintaining and for maximizing”\(^ {26}\) their influence on and effectiveness of foreign policy decisions. The latter model involves “a variety of alternatives to pluralism, including elite, Marxist, corporatist and sectoral blocs” of society\(^ {27}\). This approach emphasizes the role of press, non-government organizations and other groups in society as pressure groups in controlling and even directing the issues and contents of foreign policy making.

The last approach is the Transnational approach which emphasizes the existence of a global society. This approach assumes that “societal groups with similar interests (or even common interests) and objectives will form political coalitions which surpass national boundaries”\(^ {28}\). These networks of cooperation provide issues which foreign policy actors should take into account in foreign policy formulation. The goals of transnational society may vary from transformations of particular regimes (eg. to battle communist regimes), mediating and settling international conflict (eg. Arab-Israeli conflict), putting new issues on the global agenda (eg. environmental issue) and changing global values, standards and norms (eg. democratization and human rights).

\(^{24}\) Ibid.


\(^{27}\) Ibid.
In the context of Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world, it is argued that the role of the state is very dominant. This was indicated by the role of government (President, Military and Bureaucracy) in domestic as well as foreign policy, which was determinant and pivotal. Thus, the Statist approach is centrally important. Nonetheless, the role of societal and transnational approaches (the role of Muslim communities in domestic and in international arena) cannot be neglected in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world. This is because the societal groups and the existence of global society cannot be separated in the foreign policy analysis. In other words, there is a linkage between developments in the domestic and external environments and Indonesia’s foreign policy making process and implementation.

The theoretical framework of this study thus draws on all three approaches to state-society relations identified above. The linkage between the economical, social, political and cultural facets of Indonesia’s Islamic community and Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world is examined. This study uses the three above approaches in Indonesia’s foreign policy with special reference to the Muslim World.

In principle, the interactions and linkages between domestic and external environments may serve two types of domestic political objectives\(^{29}\) namely: building political coalitions and retaining political power. The first consequence assumed that foreign policy decision makers “need to build

\(^{28}\) Ibid., p. 14.

domestic support for any proposed policy initiative"\textsuperscript{30}. Building political coalitions played a very important role in many Third World foreign policies since the interaction between domestic support and foreign policy making is a primary value in domestic political standing. Foreign policy decisions become “political resultants” which reflect “the political strategies necessary to build agreement” with the domestic structure “to support implementation of policy” \textsuperscript{31}.

In the second domestic political objective, foreign policy decision “should be adjusted so that it imposes fewer domestic costs”\textsuperscript{32} in order for governments to retain political power. So in order to stay in the office, a national leader who faces significant domestic opposition from the wider domestic structure or who needs to increase domestic and international political legitimacy\textsuperscript{33}, needs to raise public perception of foreign policy issues. In many Third World foreign policies, retaining political power is a more dominant theme than coalition building. Yet many Third World countries might always be able to impose rational foreign policy initiatives without worrying about political opposition from the domestic political society.

I.3. Significance of the Study

There have been a number of studies of Indonesia’s foreign policy both at the macro\textsuperscript{34} and at the micro level\textsuperscript{35}. Previous studies focused on the

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid. p.122.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. p.124.
\textsuperscript{33} Fox, Jonathan (2001).p.59.
\textsuperscript{34} Anak Agung Gde Agung (1973), Franklin B. Weinstein (1976), Michael Leifer (1983). Leo
Introduction


Nonetheless, studies of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy, particularly the study of state-society relations in Indonesia’s foreign policy making under Soeharto, are scarce. In most literature on Indonesia’s foreign policy, state-society (Muslim community) relations have not been the primary focus of studies. This was mainly due, as MacIntyre argued, to the fact that the policy making under the Soeharto era was very heavily ‘state-centred’. As a result, the possibility for ‘extra-state actors’ (society, for example) to play a major role in (foreign) policy formulation was very little.36


36 Quoted from Philipott, Simon (2000). Rethinking Indonesia: postcolonial theory, authoritarianism
However, there have been two significant studies on the role of Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy. The first study was written by Michael Leifer (The Islamic Factor in Indonesia's Foreign Policy: A case of functional ambiguity) in a book compiled by Adeed Dawisha. Leifer's work examined the role of Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy during the Sukarno era and the early New Order era. The second study was a monograph written by Rizal Sukma which investigates the historical developments of the involvement of Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy from the Sukarno era to the Habibie era. This monograph also discusses the inability of Islam to significantly influence Indonesia's foreign policy due to its internal weaknesses. While, the present study utilises more specific case studies in order to examine the State-Society relations in Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Muslim world.

This present study is intended to help overcome the scarcity of studies on the role of society (Muslim community) in Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Muslim world. This study is conducted at both the macro and micro level of Indonesia's foreign policy. It is a macro study because it covers the overall aspects of Indonesia's foreign policy under Soeharto: the political, military, economical and cultural aspects. It is also a micro study, focusing on the study of the level of public participation, particularly from Indonesian Muslim community in the foreign policy formulation and implementation toward the Muslim world as specific topic and theme.

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37 In Dawisha, Adeed (1983).

I.4. Previous Studies in the Roles of Islam in Foreign Policy

Even though there have been few studies on the role of Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy, this does not imply, of course, that many studies have not been undertaken on the role of religion in foreign policy analysis. Several survey-based studies have found that religious affiliation influenced foreign policy decision makers in other countries. As Fox argued, foreign policy decision makers who are religious affiliated tend to be more politically conservative than those who are not\(^{39}\). Fox finds that Israeli foreign policy and the foreign policy of Arab states were largely based on religion\(^{40}\).

The importance of the role of Islam as a major factor in the foreign policies of many Muslim states has been explored by Dawisha. He argues that Islam "constitutes a part of the images and perceptions, even attitudes and value systems of decision-makers" in Islamic countries or countries with a Muslim majority\(^{41}\). He also explained that since Islam 'does not subscribe to the separation of religion from politics'\(^{42}\) or to the separation of religion and state (\textit{din wa dawla}) then Islam can "act as a force when it functions as an integrative force, creating consensus on foreign policy objectives when it provides l'esprit de corps and when it helps in mobilizing external resources in support to the state"\(^{43}\).


\(^{40}\) Ibid.p.62.

\(^{41}\) Dawisha, Aeed (1983),p.5.

\(^{42}\) In Islam, this refers to 'Caeseropappism' or 'the indivisibility of religion and state' (\textit{din wa dawla}). See Eickelman, Dale F. Piscatori, James (1996). \textit{Muslim politics}. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.pp.46-56.

\(^{43}\) Dawisha, Aeed (1983),p.3-4.
In the foreign policy of Muslim states, James Piscatori argues\textsuperscript{44}, Islam tends to play one of three roles: confirming; contradicting or even obstructing the state’s foreign policy goals and facilitating the implementation of foreign policy. In other words, Islam can facilitate and support the making and implementation of foreign policy, and on the other hand, it can also constrain foreign policy.

The influence of Islam on foreign policy making in the Muslim world has become more visible since the Iranian revolution in 1979 when Ayatollah Khomeini took over Shah Reza Pahlevi’s power. The Iranian revolution has not only changed the structure of Iran’s domestic politics but also, dramatically, the behavior of Iran’s foreign policy which gave rise to fears in the Western bloc\textsuperscript{45}.

In Iran, for example, R.K Ramazani argued that Islam motivates commitment, strategies and the decisions of Iran’s foreign policy. In this case, Islam serves as a communicator and justifier of the foreign policy behavior of Iran. Khomeini proclaimed that he would export Islamic revolution to all Muslim countries and attempt to boost a revolutionary movement in other countries around the world. In the case of Iran, Islam has directed the substance of its foreign policy. He further argued that Iranian foreign policy was shaped by “a certain conception of an Islamic order”\textsuperscript{46}.


\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p.178.
A similar role of Islam can also be found in Malaysia’s foreign policy. Here, Islam serves not only a symbolic function but also as an identity in foreign policy under the Mahathir administration. In other words, Islam “has provided direction and content for the foreign policy of Malaysia”\textsuperscript{47}. Nair argues that Islam has played four major roles in Malaysian foreign policy. First, Islam has served as “a means of mobilizing support among the Malay community”. Second, it reduced the conflict between the government and Muslim opposition. Third, the government used Islam to help contain “the tide of international Islam flowing into Malaysia over the authority of government” and lastly, it has been utilized as a foreign policy tool to strengthen world Muslim solidarity\textsuperscript{48}.

In this context, Islam could serve as “a motivator, legitimator or even a justifier for a particular foreign policy”\textsuperscript{49}. The ruling elites and the governments, as Dawisha noted, use Islamic terms and symbols in foreign policy issues to mobilize political support among their people or to mitigate opposition\textsuperscript{50}. This is because as Dawisha argued “the historical, social, economical differences existing between the various Muslim countries have given Islam a different colouring, a different resonance”\textsuperscript{51} in the foreign policy of various Muslim countries. At this point, it is also the aim of the present study to decipher the similarities and differences in the influence of Islamic ideas in selected Muslim states with the role and position of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Muslim world.

\textsuperscript{47} See Nair, Shanti (1997). \textit{Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy}. London;Routledge, p.4-10.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49} Dawisha, Adeed (1983).p.1

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.p.180.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.p.4.
1.5. Limitation of Study

This study does not aim to measure all determinant factors of Indonesia's foreign policy. It explores only the position of Islam as a societal factor in influencing Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Muslim world under Soeharto. In other words, it explores the nature of the relationship between Islam, as a societal factor, and the State in terms of foreign policy formulation and implementation.

It is also not the intention of this study to further develop conceptual or even theoretical frameworks but it is rather an attempt to utilize an existing conceptual framework ('the interactive relationship between State and Society') as a tool of analysis in the study of foreign policy, particularly in Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Muslim world.

1.6. Research Methods

In order to answer the research questions, a combination of 'case-based, model-based and explanation-based' research methods is utilised in this study. The analytical model, which links the domestic structure and foreign policy behavior of Indonesia toward the Muslim World, of this study can be pictured as follow:\textsuperscript{52}:

The analytical model, as Hudson et al explain[^53], is designed to help explain how domestic politics, especially the growing demands of particular elements of society and the competing power and interests between the State and Society, affect foreign policy behavior. They further argue "the foreign policy behavior of the regime will, under certain circumstances, depend on the regime's response to domestic activities taken by a particular society at a given time"[^54]. The model also suggests that "the choice of regime response, in turn, depends on two clusters of variables", namely "the regime's agenda of needs" and "the capabilities of domestic societies/groups to disrupt the pursuit of this agenda"[^55]. This study utilises the above explanatory model in examining the case studies in order to see what they may tell about Indonesia's management of its foreign policy toward the Muslim world.

In conducting this study, a broad range of primary and secondary sources were utilized. An extensive range of both oral and written interviews was undertaken with government policy makers, both civilian and military.

[^53]: Ibid. p.55
[^54]: Ibid. p.55
[^55]: Ibid. p.55.
their advisors, observers and commentators on political matters, and foreign policy in particular. In this study nearly all interviewees are Muslims.

The interviews were conducted at least two or three times. This is because the first interview was usually devoted to introduce and to familiarise the interviewees with the research topic and objectives and to create the condition for a frank and comprehensive discussion. The duration of interviews was approximately one hour for each meeting. Most interviews were not tape-recorded which would have jeopardised the possibility of frank and open discussion. Thus, all interviews relied heavily on note taking, the contents of which were checked again with the respondents after the interviews. Most interviewees also preferred to remain anonymous so that they could be free in expressing their views. In addition to direct interviews, some interviewees agreed to continue communication through electronic correspondence. The information gathered from interviews has provided a significant part of the research for this study.

Interviewees can be divided into three main categories. The first category of respondents is high-ranking officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs, both retired and active. Most of them have directly participated in the formulation and the conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Muslim world. They included a former foreign minister, former ambassadors to some Muslim states, Indonesia's representatives to the OIC, and other high ranking officials in the Directorate General of Political Affairs, the Directorate General of International Organizations which is

55 Ibid.p.55.
charged with Indonesia’s policy to the OIC, Directorate of Middle East and the Directorate of Economic Relations among Developing Countries in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The second category consists of military officers involved in foreign policy making. All of them were retired generals who had served as ambassadors to various countries.

The third category comprises intellectuals and researchers, journalists working for such organizations as: the government’s centre of research at LIPI; CSIS – a private research and policy advisory body; CIDES – a think-tank of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals; and scholars from various universities in Jakarta and Bandung.

The other primary sources of this study included official and unofficial documents obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and other government institutions pertinent to the research topic. Most of the documents were open to the public, but some were confidential, including the reports of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the President. The secondary sources included newspapers, books, journals, magazines, and websites both in Indonesian and English.

I.7. Thesis Organisation

This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter One (Introduction) provides basic information about the present study. Chapter Two discusses the dynamics of interaction between Islam and the State in the Indonesian political system. The first section of this chapter elaborates the general
Introduction
discussion on Islamic attitudes towards the State. This discussion is
followed by the interpretations and attitudes of Indonesian Muslims in the
debates of State-Society relationship. The next section, which is the core of
this chapter, discusses the debates between 'religious-nationalists' and
'secular-nationalists' in Indonesian politics. The next subsection elaborates
the role of Islam in Indonesian politics during the 1950s and 1960s and is
followed by a discussion of the relationship of Islam and the Soeharto
regime, the relationship between Islam and the military during the New
Order and the development of Islamic political organization.

Chapter Three analyses the rapidly changing international system and
regional developments of the Muslim world with particular reference to the
Middle East, which represents the external environment of Indonesia's
foreign policy. This chapter also looks at the international politics of the
post cold war era in which Islam has been viewed as a new threat by the
Western world. The rapid changes in world politics and the development of
the Muslim World also serve as the foundation of foreign policy making and
the conducting of Indonesia's foreign policy toward the Muslim World.

Chapter Four is concerned with the historical development of Indonesia's
foreign policy and its basic principles. It explores the evolution of
Indonesia's foreign policy from its 'birth', in 1948, to 1998. This chapter
also explains the structures and process of Indonesia's foreign policy
making and provides information obtained from Indonesia's official
institutions on the making of Indonesia's foreign policy, which is the main
focus of the study. It elucidates the interactions among the President, ABRI
(military), and Department of Foreign Affairs.
Chapter Five commences the set of case studies examining Indonesian relationships with the Muslim world. This chapter analyses Indonesia’s participation in Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) programs. It also covers the objective of Indonesia’s involvement in OIC, the significance of OIC in Indonesia’s foreign policy and Indonesia’s contribution to the political, economic and socio-cultural aspects of OIC. This chapter also discusses Indonesia’s involvement in the economic grouping of some Muslim countries of the D-8 (Developing Eight).

Chapter Six addresses the level of engagement of Indonesia in the regional conflicts in the Middle East. It explains Indonesia’s involvement in the Palestinian problem. This issue has not only been one of the crucial issues faced by the Muslim world, but it has also become a focus of attention of Indonesia’s Muslim community for more than five decades. The domestic resistance to the establishing of diplomatic relationship between Indonesia and Israel is also discussed. The last issue is the Gulf war. Here, the interaction between the State and Society on this issue, which some elements of the Muslim community perceived as part of a religious war between Islam and non-Islam, is examined in order to get a fuller picture of Indonesia’s responses to the Gulf war and generally, Indonesia’s attitude toward the Middle East.

Chapter Seven discusses Indonesia’s involvement in facilitating the peaceful settlement of the Moro problem between the government of the Republic of Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). This chapter analyses the internal dimension and the external factors of
the Moro problem and its impact on Indonesia's decision to get involved in helping to find a peaceful solution to the problem.

Chapter Eight analyses Indonesia's involvement in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This chapter explains two levels of engagement between Indonesia's Islamic society and the State. At the society level, Indonesia showed the utmost concern by providing financial support for the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and developing the 'Jihad' forces to help Bosnia-Herzegovina struggle against Serbia. At the state level, Indonesia proposed diplomatic efforts to end the war and actively participated in the UN peacekeeping forces of UNPROFOR. This chapter, then, analyses the dynamic interaction between the society level and the state level of Indonesia's engagement in the Islamic related issue of world affairs.

Chapter Nine, the concluding chapter, discusses the nuances of Islam and its position in Indonesia's foreign policy, the structures and patterns of foreign policy making and the level of Indonesia's involvement with the Muslim world. It also discusses the relation of the findings and the theoretical framework used in this study.