

BAB IV

KESIMPULAN

Negara berada dalam sistem internasional yang anarki dimana tidak adanya kekuatan terpusat yang sah. Kedaulatan tertinggi dipegang oleh negara dan setiap negara memiliki kedaulatan yang sama. Anarki menyebabkan struktur internasional bersifat kompetitif dan *self-help*. Negara bertindak sebagai *unitary actor* yang ingin mempertahankan keberadaannya dalam sistem internasional. Setiap negara dipaksa untuk menciptakan keamanan bagi negaranya masing-masing.

Korea Utara merupakan salah satu aktor dalam sistem internasional. Sesuai dengan ideologi *Juche* yang mereka anut, berkomitmen untuk membangun bangsa yang kuat, independen, dan tidak bergantung pada negara lain. Untuk mewujudkan keamanan, suatu negara perlu meningkatkan *power*. Korea Utara menggunakan militer sebagai kekuatan dalam usahanya untuk menjaga keamanan negaranya. Melalui kebijakan *Son'gun Chongji*, Korea Utara mendedikasikan seluruh upaya maksimal untuk perkembangan KPA demi terciptanya rasa aman. Korea Utara menempatkan militer sebagai prioritas dalam kehidupan berpolitiknya. Untuk mencapai *power* sebesar-besarnya,

Korea Utara terus melakukan upaya untuk mengembangkan kapasitas militer mereka. Mereka mengadopsi strategi asimetris untuk menutupi kelemahannya dalam kepemilikan senjata konvensional. Korea Utara berfokus pada perkembangan WMD,

SOF, rudal balistik, dan *electronic information warfare*. Perkembangan teknologi persenjataan ini sangat cepat dan konsisten dalam tiga dekade belakangan. Mereka menghasilkan progres yang positif, pertumbuhan yang cepat, dan ekspansi kapabilitas yang luas.

Sayangnya, peningkatan *power* untuk mencapai keamanan ini justru menimbulkan permasalahan baru. Peningkatan kekuatan militer Korea Utara ternyata dipersepsikan sebagai ancaman oleh Korea Selatan. Persepsi ini dapat muncul karena adanya ambiguitas dari militer. Sektor militer memiliki dinamika naik-turunnya sendiri yang terpisah dari hubungan politik antar negara. Proses naik-turunnya kekuatan militer suatu negara menyebabkan *power security dilemma*.

Peneliti menggunakan pendekatan *Nature of Weapon and Military Balance*. Ambiguitas pertama disebabkan karena Korea Selatan kesulitan dalam membedakan postur militer ofensif atau defensif Korea Utara. Jika dikategorikan dalam empat keadaan *power security dilemma* menurut Robert Jervis maka kapabilitas Korea Utara berada pada keadaan pertama dimana senjata ofensif dominan dan tidak dapat dibedakan dari senjata defensif. Hal ini mengakibatkan situasi tidak stabil dan *power security dilemma* tinggi. Dinamika persenjataan tersebut bersifat ambigu sehingga mempersulit pemisahan antara tindakan yang mengancam atau tidak.

Tujuan dari perkembangan militer juga menimbulkan ambiguitas. Perkembangan teknologi mengakibatkan sulitnya membedakan apakah modernisasi persenjataan bertujuan mempertahankan kekuatan atau meningkatkan kekuatan. Karenanya perkembangan teknologi Korea Utara menimbulkan sinyal-sinyal yang bersifat

ambigu sehingga timbullah kebingungan dalam membaca tujuan sebenarnya dari peningkatan militer Korea Utara. Hal ini juga dikarenakan tindakan-tindakan peningkatan keamanan sebuah negara diartikan sebagai tindakan mengecilkan kekuatan negara lain.

Pada dasarnya rasa terancam dapat muncul karena adanya kerentanan dalam negara itu sendiri dan potensi ancaman yang dapat datang dari luar negaranya. Korea Selatan memiliki kerentanan karena tidak memiliki senjata nuklir dan bahkan sistem pertahanan mereka tidak mampu untuk menangkal senjata nuklir Korea Utara. Ancaman sendiri juga bersifat ambigu karena tersusun dari dua unsur yaitu kapabilitas dan intensi. Kapabilitas dapat diukur, namun intensi tidak. Hal inilah yang menyebabkan ambiguitas. Secara kapabilitas Korea Utara memiliki kemampuan untuk melakukan serangan terhadap Korea Selatan, namun intensi mereka tidak dapat diukur.

Semua ambiguitas tersebut dipadukan dengan kecenderungan suatu negara untuk memikirkan scenario terburuk yang mungkin terjadi. Begitu pula Korea Selatan memiliki kekhawatiran mengenai tidak adanya jaminan bahwa Korea Utara tidak akan menggunakan nuklirnya di kemudian hari. hal inilah yang mengakibatkan Korea Selatan mempersepsikan keberadaan kekuatan militer Korea Utara sebagai ancaman terhadap keamanan nasional mereka.

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