


BAB IV

KESIMPULAN

Penelitian ini menggarisbawahi beberapa temuan penting terkait pengendalian senjata nuklir, secara spesifik membandingkan studi kasus INF dan NEW START dari segi pengaruh teknologi, tingkat percaya diri, dan lingkungan keamanan (Gambar 4.1). Pertama, meskipun INF dan NEW START sama-sama membatasi teknologi senjata yang bersifat inkremental, INF gagal karena sifatnya kualitatif atau membatasi AS sebagai negara untuk memodernisasi senjata nuklirnya. NEW START dapat berhasil dan bertahan karena memberikan AS keleluasaan untuk meningkatkan diversifikasi dan fleksibilitas triad nuklirnya yang sangat penting untuk merespon ancaman keamanan di tengah ketidakpastian multipolaritas nuklir.

Gambar 4.1 Ilustrasi Dinamika INF dan NEW START



Sumber: Diolah peneliti.

Kedua, terkait pentingnya verifikasi untuk memperkuat tingkat percaya diri negara dalam melanjutkan suatu perjanjian. Proses verifikasi INF yang akurat dengan melibatkan inspeksi di tempat tidak dilakukan secara berkelanjutan selepas

target eliminasi dicapai, berbeda dengan NEW START yang intensif melakukan inspeksi dan pertukaran notifikasi meskipun kedua pihak telah mencapai batas maksimum yang ditetapkan. Selain itu, gagalnya INF menyadarkan pembuat kebijakan akan pentingnya mekanisme verifikasi dalam krisis yang ditandai oleh indikasi-indikasi pelanggaran. Tanpa adanya mekanisme ini maka yang terjadi adalah tuduh-menuduh yang akan memperburuk hubungan antar pihak.

Ketiga, yakni lingkungan keamanan sebagai parameter tambahan yang dapat dilihat sebagai poin pengembangan teori MET. Peneliti menemukan bahwa kerjasama pengendalian senjata masih mungkin untuk terjadi di lingkungan yang tidak pasti (*uncertain*) yang mengarah ke jinak seperti pada masa NEW START disepakati. Lingkungan keamanan pada periode keruntuhan INF (2014 – 2019), bersifat tidak pasti dan cenderung mengarah ke mengancam karena tindakan Rusia yang ofensif, hubungan AS dan Rusia yang memburuk, dan laju modernisasi senjata nuklir dari NWS lainnya yang tidak dapat diimbangi AS dengan leluasa.

Dari beberapa temuan tersebut, penelitian ini telah menjawab pertanyaan terkait mengapa AS meratifikasi dan memperpanjang komitmen terhadap NEW START tetapi menarik diri dari INF. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa sikap AS menarik diri dari INF karena keterikatan pada perjanjian ini membatasi AS dalam mengembangkan teknologi senjata nuklir yang dibutuhkan untuk menjamin keamanan nasionalnya sedangkan NEW START memberikan AS keleluasaan untuk memodernisasi senjata nuklirnya demi menyesuaikan dengan persaingan strategis yang berkembang akibat kemunculan teknologi-teknologi senjata nuklir terbaru. Kebutuhan untuk mengembangkan teknologi ini juga disebabkan oleh

pengawasan INF yang melemah dan tidak transparan sehingga menurunkan kepercayaan diri AS disertai dengan lingkungan keamanan yang tidak pasti dan cenderung bergerak ke arah mengancam. Respon AS terhadap Rusia dengan mengembangkan teknologi tandingan pada gilirannya membentuk kondisi ini yang dipercaya MET sebagai perlombaan senjata yang tidak stabil.

Sedangkan dalam kasus NEW START, perjanjian ini bertahan di tengah kondisi stabilitas perlombaan senjata yang terbentuk karena yang dibatasi adalah jumlah senjata yang bersifat inkremental didukung dengan sistem verifikasi yang lebih kuat dalam menunjang tingkat percaya diri AS bahwa Rusia juga berkomitmen pada perjanjian serta lingkungan keamanan yang lebih kondusif dimana hubungan AS dengan Rusia lebih kooperatif dan ancaman yang muncul dari NWS lainnya mampu AS mitigasi dengan lebih tanggap dengan melakukan modernisasi triad nuklirnya.

Dari temuan-temuan ini, penelitian ini mendukung asumsi teori MET dimana pengendalian senjata yang bersifat kualitatif akan lebih sulit dicapai karena peran variabel seperti ekspektasi negara terhadap teknologi militer tertentu serta sarana negara untuk melakukan pengawasan ditambah dengan kondisi lingkungan keamanan yang senantiasa berubah. Gabungan ketiga variabel tersebut membentuk suatu kondisi ketidakstabilan perlombaan senjata pada masa keruntuhan INF (2014 - 2019) dan kondisi stabilitas perlombaan senjata pada masa NEW START.

Terdapat beberapa keterbatasan dalam penelitian ini yang harapannya dapat menjadi ruang pengembangan akademik bagi penelitian di masa mendatang. Pertama, variabel-variabel teori MET masih memerlukan elaborasi parameter yang

lebih terukur. Kedua, penelitian ini masih dapat dikembangkan lebih jauh menjadi rekomendasi bagi pembuat kebijakan atau formula dalam membuat perjanjian pengendalian senjata yang efektif dengan memperhatikan peran teknologi militer, sistem pengawasan, dan dinamika lingkungan keamanan. Dengan memperhatikan faktor-faktor tersebut, harapannya negara tidak hanya memperhatikan pentingnya investasi untuk terus melakukan pengembangan senjata nuklir tetapi juga melakukan pendekatan diplomatik dengan membangun hubungan internasional dan kebijakan luar negeri yang lebih konstruktif dan tidak menggantungkan perdamaian pada ancaman penggunaan nuklir.

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