

## **BAB IV**

### **KESIMPULAN**

Sesuai dengan rumusan masalah penelitian serta temuan dan pembahasan menggunakan pendekatan teori *national interests and foreign policy*, analisis kepentingan Rusia dalam konflik Nagorno-Karabakh menghasilkan kesimpulan yang akan dipaparkan pada bagian ini.

Dalam isu *major*, konflik yang terjadi di wilayah Nagorno-Karabakh merupakan konflik yang terjadi luar dari wilayah pertahanan Rusia, sehingga tidak mengancam secara langsung kepada pertahanan Rusia. Namun hasil dari sebuah konflik akan menghasilkan sebuah dampak tidak langsung yaitu korban perang yang akan diungsikan ke wilayah aman dan terdekat. Hal tersebut yang menjadi gangguan secara tidak langsung karena dapat mempengaruhi stabilitas kawasan.

Dalam segi ekonomi, preferensi ekonomi Rusia dalam konflik Nagorno- Karabakh sebagai *survival issues* namun juga beririsan dengan *vital issues*. Konflik yang terjadi mempengaruhi jalur ekonomi Rusia karena jalur tersebut menjadi risikan terhadap ancaman keamanan, namun disisi lain hal tersebut juga yang menjadi kesempatan Rusia dalam mencari keuntungan dari konflik yang terjadi, termasuk penggunaan kekuatan militer konvensional dengan cara memasok atau menjual senjata kepada dua negara yang sedang konflik. Rusia memiliki kesempatan untuk mengambil keuntungan dengan menjadikan penjualan senjata sebagai pendapatan besar yang vital bagi Rusia.

Tidak ada hal-hal yang mengancam serangkaian nilai-nilai yang dianut oleh masyarakat Rusia atau mengganggu kesejahteraan negara Rusia atau dapat diartikan bahwa tidak ada permasalahan dari ideologi dalam konflik Nagorno- Karabakh yang mempengaruhi ideologi Rusia.

Sebagai negara yang kuat secara militer dan ekonomi, Rusia diharapkan menjadi mediator yang baik untuk menyelesaikan permasalahan konflik Nagorno- Karabakh. Kepentingan Rusia dalam menjaga ketertiban dunia dalam konflik Nagorno-Karabakh ditujukan untuk menjaga ketertiban internasional Rusia, yang memberikan rasa aman bagi negara-negara dan memungkinkan warga negara dan perdagangan untuk beroperasi secara damai di luar perbatasan mereka yang bertujuan menjaga citra Rusia di Internasional.

Walaupun memiliki posisi sebagai pihak yang netral pada konflik tersebut, kenyataan yang dilakukan Rusia adalah menjadi pemasok senjata terbesar bagi Armenia dan Azerbaijan. Dari segi kebijakan dan langkah kepentingan yang dilakukan Rusia, mereka mementingkan kepentingan ekonomi daripada menyelesaikan konflik.

Ekonomi untuk mendapatkan keuntungan dari konflik ini menjadi motif paling besar yang terlihat dari gerak gerik perlakuan Rusia. Pasokan senjata yang dikirim kepada dua negara yang sedang konflik menjadi faktor krusial Rusia terlihat mencari keuntungan secara ekonomi.

Hasil penelitian yang telah dipaparkan, penulis menyadari bahwa terdapat beberapa hal yang menjadi kurang dalamnya penelitian ini dalam mengungkap motif-motif Rusia dalam memainkan peran sebagai mediator dan pemasok senjata tertinggi bagi Armenia

dan Azerbaijan. Penelitian ini belum secara jelas menggambarkan pasokan senjata yang dikirim Rusia setiap tahunnya kepada Armenia dan Azerbaijan. Penelitian ini juga terbatas pada kepentingan ekonomi dalam pemasokan senjata saja tidak secara mendalam pada aktivitas ekonomi atau perdagangan di bidang lainnya. Selain itu perlunya ada pandangan dari sisi Armenia dan Azerbaijan, mengapa kedua negara tersebut membeli senjata dari Rusia yang memiliki posisi sebagai negara mediator yang seharusnya mendamaikan.

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