



Parahyangan Catholic University
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Department of International Relations

Accredited Superior

SK BAN-PT NO: 2579/SK/BAN-PT/AK-ISK/S/IV/2022

**“Implementation of Republican Peace-building Measures in
Central African Republic under MINUSCA from 2014 to
2020”**

Undergraduate Thesis

By

Nadana Izzatur Rahman

2017330219

Bandung

2023



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Hereby declare that this research is an original work and not a work that was ever proposed previously by others to obtain an academic degree. All third-party idea and information used in this research are properly cited in accordance to formal academic writing guidelines.

I make this statement with full responsibility and I am willing to accept the academic consequences from the university party, should in the future it is proven that this statement is false.

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ABSTRACT (ENGLISH)

Name : Nadana Izzatur Rahman
Student ID : 2017330219
Title : Implementation of Republican Peace-building Measures in Central African Republic under MINUSCA from 2014 to 2020

The Central African Republic (CAR) has been in a state of internal conflict for the past 11 years, and the United Nations has been trying to restore peace and stability to this country for almost as long. However, the multilateral peacekeeping operation responsible for this duty – MINUSCA has not been successful in establishing a sustainable peace and stability. This research will attempt to explain this issue, by answering the question of “**why did MINUSCA fail to promote sustainable peace and prevent conflict resurgence in CAR during their deployment period?**” The research will focus on the timeframe of **2014 to 2020**, as numerous important events occurred in this period – from the official establishment of MINUSCA to the ratification of peace agreement that involve (most) of the rebel militia factions in the country. Michael Barnett’s Republican Democratic perspective on state-centered, legitimacy-based peacebuilding will be the main framework for this research. This research has discovered that MINUSCA’s unsuccessful attempt for peacebuilding was caused by lack of deliberation, representation, and constitutionalized policies on the national level, despite significant progress on the ground-level initiatives. Lack of national identity, limited government capacity, and general election amidst low public confidence was the compounding factor that leads to the resurgence of violence.

Keywords: *MINUSCA, CAR, deliberation, representation, constitutionalization*

ABSTRAK (BAHASA INDONESIA)

Nama : Nadana Izzatur Rahman
NPM : 2017330219
Judul : Pengimplementasian Tindakan Pembangunan Kedamaian dari Perspektif Republikanisme di Republik Afrika Tengah di masa MINUSCA tahun 2014 hingga 2020

Republik Afrika Tengah (RAT) telah berada dalam kondisi konflik internal selama 11 tahun terakhir, dan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (PBB) telah berusaha memulihkan perdamaian dan stabilitas di negara ini hampir sejak awal. Namun, operasi penjaga perdamaian multilateral yang bertanggung jawab atas tugas ini – MINUSCA belum berhasil membangun perdamaian dan stabilitas yang berkelanjutan. Penelitian ini akan mencoba untuk menjelaskan masalah ini, dengan menjawab pertanyaan "**mengapa MINUSCA gagal mempromosikan perdamaian yang berkelanjutan dan mencegah berulangnya konflik di RAT selama masa penugasan mereka?**" Penelitian ini akan berfokus pada rentang waktu **2014 hingga 2020**, karena banyak peristiwa penting yang terjadi pada periode ini – mulai dari pembentukan MINUSCA secara resmi hingga ratifikasi perjanjian perdamaian yang melibatkan (sebagian besar) faksi-faksi milisi pemberontak di negara tersebut. Perspektif Republik-Demokrat Michael Barnett tentang pembangunan perdamaian yang berpusat pada negara dan berbasis legitimasi akan menjadi kerangka pemikiran utama dalam penelitian ini. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa ketidakberhasilan MINUSCA dalam upaya pembangunan perdamaianya disebabkan oleh kurangnya kebijakan deliberatif, representatif, dan terkonstitusionalisasi di tingkat nasional, padahal mereka telah meraih kemajuan yang signifikan lewat inisiatifnya di tingkat lapangan. Kurangnya identitas nasional, terbatasnya kemampuan pemerintah, dan rendahnya kepercayaan publik merupakan faktor tambahan di balik berulangnya konflik di RAT.

Kata Kunci: MINUSCA, RAT, deliberasi, representasi, konstitusionalisasi

Preface

My utmost praises and gratitude are presented for Allah SWT since due to His grace and power, at last I have been able to finish this undergraduate thesis which titled, “*Implementation of Republican Peace-building Measures in Central African Republic under MINUSCA from 2014 to 2020.*” Writing this thesis has been such a long and arduous journey, but I’m glad to announce that the journey had finally reached its final chapter.

This thesis is made to explain, to the best of my ability, the peace-building process that had been – and currently still is on-going in the Central African Republic, and the role that the United Nations is taking in it. Particularly, it is a discussion about whether Republican nation-building principles had been a part of the United Nation’s peacebuilding operation in the country. I took this topic because it has been a personal interest of mine to learn and understand more about how this renowned multi-national organization is working to bring peace back to a turbulent society. And peacebuilding is becoming an increasingly important discussion as time goes on, considering the state of world politics of the past few years.

However, as the writer of this thesis, I humbly admit that this research is far from perfect. There are many rooms for improvement that can be made to this research. Therefore, I am very open for any criticism and/or recommendations about this research, and I hope that this research may give benefits for any future researches on peace-building and nation-building.

Bandung, July 18th, 2023

Nadana Izzatur Rahman

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There are many people that have greatly helped me when I'm in the process of writing this thesis. So many, perhaps, that I have already lost count to how many of you guys there actually are. People that have been a part of my life for a considerable amount of time, and people that had been even though we may have parted ways right now. Nonetheless, I would like to give credits where its due, especially for those that are the most important part of my life as the time of writing this.

The first credit goes to the most significant person in my life, my Mother. Mom, you are the strongest and most kind-hearted person I've ever met in my life. You've raised me this whole time practically alone, yet I've never heard you complain about a single thing in your life. I have been walking my life on your footsteps this whole time, and I hope that one day I'd be able to become a parent that is as awesome as you are. Thank you for the world you've given me. I'm truly grateful to be your son.

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are always there for me no matter what. I feel lucky to have met someone like you in my life, and I hope we can still make more unremarkable memories together. Lop yu, beb.

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Next up are the dear friends that are here to help filling up my boring pandemic and post-pandemic days in Bogor. To Meilonia and Meggi. Thanks for putting up with all my nonsense these past few months, and to always keep me company in writing these paragraphs in those coffee shops and our friends’ living rooms. To Nisrina and Hoky, thanks for providing the previously mentioned living rooms. To Aldo and Gabriel, thanks for also being there when I’m running out of friends to bother. All of you are the best.

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my besties for our stupid misadventures in Bandung, for always be ready to call me out when I'm being especially stupid, and for always being supportive during the creation of this thesis. Even though a global pandemic forced us apart, thanks for all those virtual meetings we've had to keep each other away from isolation-induced insanity. For Wener, Mario, Iki, and the rest of Feket gangs. Thank you for those days of room-crashing, mobile gaming, and assignment making occasions together. You are all cool guys and girls, and I don't understand how we can all be friends for that long despite all being so different from each other. I'm sorry that I kinda disappear during the pandemic, but it was a really mentally-trying times for me. It is a miracle that Dzaky and his accomplices managed to break through my isolationist barrier during those days. I hope, now that I'm graduating, that we can hang out again in the near future. Love you all.

Last but not least, my gratitude towards my thesis supervisor, Mbak Vrameswari. Thank you, Mbak, for being extremely patient with me for the past two years. I must admit that I am not a good pupil; I've had my days of disappearances and I've been very slow with my writing progress. But despite all that, you are still care for my progress and give me advices and recommendations. I am very grateful to have you as my supervisor, and I hope the best fortune for you and your family.

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think I will be able to mention all of you. However, please know that for all of you, my friends and relatives, that I appreciate all the conversations we've had and all the things you've given me. Without all the people in my life, I will not be able to become who I am today. Thank you very much.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
APPR	<i>Accord Politique pour la Paix et la Réconciliation</i> (Political Agreement for Peace and Stability)
AU	African Union
BINUCA	<i>Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies pour la Consolidation de la Paix en République Centrafricaine</i> (United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic)
CAN	Community Alert Network
CAR	Central African Republic
CEMAC	<i>Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale</i> (economic and monetary community of central africa)
CEM-RCA	<i>Cadre d'Engagement Mutuel - République Centrafricaine</i> (Framework for Mutual Engagement - Central African Republic)
CLA	Community Liaison Assistant
COVID-19	Corona Virus Disease of 2019
CSSC	Community Security and Social Cohesion
CVR	Community Violence Reduction
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Repatriation
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EU	European Union
FACA	<i>Forces Armées Centrafricaines</i> (Central African Armed Forces)
FDC	<i>Front Démocratique de la République Centrafricaine</i> (Democratic Front of the Central African Republic)
FOMUC	<i>Force Multinationale en Centrafrique</i> (Multinational Force in Central African Republic)
GAPLC	<i>Groupe d'Action Patriotique pour la Libération de la République Centrafricaine</i> (Patriotic Action Group for the Liberation of the Central African Republic)
ICC	International Criminal Court

IRL	In-real-life
ISF	Internal Security Forces
LPC	Local Protection Committees
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MICOPAX	<i>Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en République Centrafricaine</i> (The Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic)
MINURCA	<i>Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine</i> (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic)
MINUSCA	<i>Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Centrafrique</i> (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic)
MINUSMA	<i>Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali</i> (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali)
MLCJ	<i>Mouvement des Libérateurs de la République Centrafricaine pour la Justice</i> (Movement of Central African Republic Liberators for Justice)
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NSP	National Security Policy
OIOS	Office for Internal Oversight Service
POC	Protection of Civilians
QIP	Quick Impact Projects
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCPCA	<i>Relèvement et de Consolidation Plan en Centrafricaine</i> (National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan)
S&D	Security and Development
SCC	Special Criminal Court
SSR	Security Sector Reform

UDFR	<i>Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement</i> (Union of Democratic Forces for Unity)
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Background

“Peacebuilding” is a concept that is generally being used to describe any type of measures aimed to prevent the emergence or resurgence of conflict. It was first described by Galtung in 1975 as any type of process to build a structure that “provides resources of peaceful settlements, remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur.”¹ Today, the concept has become one of the primary concerns among international policy-makers across the globe and it is done for a good reason. Recent study has shown that conflicts occurring after the Cold War ended have a significantly higher chance of returning to hostilities, despite lengthy efforts of peace initiatives.² While the concrete reasoning behind this phenomenon is still contextually varied and debatable per case, many scholars agree that cycles of conflict may be remedied through structural reformation within the affected states that provides better accommodation for daily human

¹ Johan Galtung, “Three Approaches in Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding,” *Impact of Science on Society* 25, no. 9 (1976), p. 298.

² Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown, eds., *Building Sustainable Peace: Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 2.

necessities, such as better economic prospects or better administration of justice.³

One recent case of the aforementioned lack of accommodation can be found in a nation of Central Africa, a republic that had recently relapsed into conflict. The conflict in Central African Republic (CAR) began September 2012, after an alliance of predominantly Muslim militia groups from the North known as Seleka began a rapid incursion across the country that left the CAR government paralyzed of all state functions.⁴ Francois Bozize, the president of CAR at the time, responded by inviting the leaders of Seleka to a political agreement in January 2013. This ceasefire agreement only halted the Seleka assault for a short moment, however, as the hostilities re-emerge a few weeks later after each party accused each other for breaching the agreement first.⁵ Following this resurgence of violence, many of the Christian civilians began to take up arms for themselves and formed a self-defense group known as Anti-Balaka to resist the Seleka forces entering Bangui, the nation's capital and largest city. This turn of events marked the shifting nature of the conflict. In the beginning, the conflict mostly fought between the Seleka and government security forces, the latter backed by international peacekeepers and French contingent forces. By the start of 2014

³ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴ Yannick Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic" (IPIS, November 21, 2014), <https://ipisresearch.be/publication/mapping-conflict-motives-central-african-republic-2/>, p. 21.

⁵ Ibid.

the conflict had become a series of reprisal attacks between the Muslim and Christian communities, followed by a rampant increase in criminal-related violence, food and medicine shortages, as well as other humanitarian crises.⁶

As the rate of violence and humanitarian crises continue to rise, so too does the attention of the international community towards Central Africa. The United Nations officially established the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA) on 10 April 2014, following the Security Council Resolution 2149 (2014).⁷ Prior to the establishment of MINUSCA, the United Nations' involvement in the security sector of CAR was limited at providing governance consultation through its political office in the country (United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic, shortened to BINUCA), leaving direct peacekeeping activities under the jurisdiction of Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the European Union (EU) under France's supervision, and the African Union (AU).⁸ The mission was originally mandated to operate until April 2015, but the period had been continually

⁶ International Crisis Group, "Central African Republic: The Roots of Violence," *African Report*, No. 230 (September 21, 2015), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-roots-violence>, pp. 16-18.

⁷ MINUSCA, "About | MINUSCA," MINUSCA, January 29, 2020, <https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/about>.

⁸ Martin Welz, "Briefing: Crisis in the Central African Republic and the International Response," *African Affairs* 113, no. 453 (November 2014): pp. 601-610, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adu048>, p. 604.

extended by the Security Council – recently the mission was re-extended to operate until 15 November 2023.⁹

MINUSCA was expected to be an improvement over previous iterations of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in CAR. While the mission carried with it the conventional priority actions in its mandate, it also brought new initiatives that were designed to compensate for the previous mission's deficiencies. For one, MINUSCA was tasked with consolidating and coordinating the resources from CEMAC, ECCAS, EU, and AU – along with its own resources – into a common framework to address the country's most critical needs.¹⁰ It was a one-step improvement compared to previous iterations of peacebuilding missions in the country, where unilateral political interests and regional rivalry were the predominant patterns in their conceptualizations.¹¹ Specifically, MINUSCA was tasked to: support the conceptualization for security sector reforms (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, and reintegration (DDRR) strategy; mediate all the political negotiation processes among the internal and external actors in CAR; extend the CAR government's authority from capital Bangui towards

⁹ United Nations, Security Council, "Resolution 2659 (2022)" (NY: United Nations, 2022), p.8.

¹⁰ "Mandate," MINUSCA, November 18, 2020, <https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/mandate>.

¹¹ Martin Welz (2014), p. 606.

the peripheral countrysides; and help establish a transitional rule of law under CAR's national judicial system.¹²

1.2 Problem Identification

1.2.1 Problem Description

Despite the establishment of MINUSCA, security conditions in CAR appear to have improved minimally. In 2020, Central African Republic ranked 41st of the 44 countries in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of general security and stability.¹³ Annual reports from Institute for Economics and Peace also revealed that the country has undergone a slow yet near-constant destabilization in terms of security and peace since 2013.¹⁴ The country's economic growth has been stalled, severe poverty is widespread, and a quarter of the population has been displaced as the result of this destabilization.¹⁵ This revelation proves to be an enigma when recalling the fact that MINUSCA

¹² MINUSCA, "About | MINUSCA," MINUSCA, January 29, 2020, <https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/about>.

¹³ Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Peace Index 2021: Measuring Peace in a Complex World* (Sydney, Australia, 2021), p.20.

¹⁴ "Central African Republic - Global Peace Index," countryeconomy.com, accessed November 17, 2021, <https://countryeconomy.com/demography/global-peace-index/central-african-republic>.

¹⁵ World Bank, "Central African Republic Overview: Development News, Research, Data," World Bank Official Website, 2021, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/centralafricanrepublic/overview#1>.

started to operate and peace negotiations were also starting to commence in the same period of time.

The lack of security stability in CAR can be attributed to the failure of current peace agreements to prevent conflicts. From 2013 to 2021, there have been 6 accords proposed to eliminate violence in CAR, all of which had full MINUSCA political, technical, and material supports.¹⁶ However, many militia leaders appeared to have been reluctant to fulfill their parts in these accords; some have even been suspected to have no full control over the actions of their own subordinates.¹⁷ This suggested that there may be some more underlying factors that drove the militia activities across CAR, some things that may have not been addressed by current peace agreements.

MINUSCA's attempts to support the SSR and DDRR process also seem to have little to no effect. Granted, SSR coordination had become one of the main focus of MINUSCA's strategy in recent years.¹⁸ But many

¹⁶ Various agreements, compiled from "Peace Agreement Database: Central African Republic," PA-X Peace Agreements Database (University of Edinburgh), accessed November 12, 2021, https://www.peaceagreements.org/search?SearchForm%5Bregion%5D=1&SearchForm%5Bcountry_entity%5D=26&SearchForm%5Bname%5D=&SearchForm%5Bcategory_mode%5D=any&SearchForm%5Bageement_text%5D=&SearchForm%5Bborder%5D=date_signed&s=Search+Database

¹⁷ Marie-Joelle Zahar and Delphine Mechoulan, "Peace by Pieces? Local Mediation and Sustainable Peace in the Central African Republic," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, November 2017, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3260848>, p. 8.

¹⁸ Adedeji Ebo, Christophe Pradier, and Christopher Sedgwick, "UN Support to SSR in Peacekeeping Context: A Case Study of the Central African Republic," in *The United Nations and Security Sector Reform: Policy and Practice* (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2020), pp. 119-120.

observers still question the capacity of CAR security forces to reliably protect its citizens in times of violence, especially after numerous allegations of CAR security forces committing human right violations and partialism especially against the Muslim communities.¹⁹ Moreover, DDRR plans in CAR had not been effectively implemented due to several reasons. First and foremost, resources provided by international donors were not sufficient to include all the active militias in the national DDRR initiative. Moreover, even among those militias already included in the initiative, there had been an observably low level of political willingness to abide by the DDRR protocols.²⁰ Some local militias on the ground had even claimed that their leaders in Bangui used the DDRR resources for their own personal and political gains instead.²¹ All these situations combined may indicate the ineffectiveness of the United Nations' program framework to stabilize the internal problems in CAR, and furthermore establish a sustainable peace in that country.

Promoting sustainable peace has always been a profound challenge in Central African Republic. In the previous internal conflict, peacebuilding mission under CEMAC and ECCAS proved incapable of empowering CAR's capacity of governance or even persuading the militia groups into negotiation. Conflicting powerplay between regional actors has been a prominent

¹⁹ Editor, "Central African Republic," Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, September 1, 2021, <https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/central-african-republic/>.

²⁰ Loc.cit., Zahar and Mechoulan (2017), pp. 9-10.

²¹ Ibid.

characteristic of previous peacebuilding efforts (as will be seen in the Literature Review section below), and fundamental socio-economic insecurities forces many local actors into a lifestyle of criminality and violence for generations even before 2013 (again, will be further explained in the Literature Review). Looking from this perspective, it may be easy to blame the failure of previous peacebuilding missions towards the regional actors in Central Africa alone. In truth, however, the United Nations also had a part in CAR's history of conflict. Back in 1998, the United Nations under MINURCA (French abbreviation for UN Mission in Central African Republic) launched a set of programs to ensure security in the country, strengthen the central government, and organize disarmament measures among the revolting militias.²² While the mission initially appeared to be successful, shortly after MINURCA's withdrawal Bozize (a National Army general at the time) took over the control of government through coup d'état supported by several groups of armed militia from the Northern countryside; the same militia groups that would later overthrow him in 2013.²³ The fact that political instability and violence immediately reemerged after their withdrawal suggested that the United Nations had failed to address the core issues in CAR long before the current iteration of conflict, and the fact that

²² Angela Meyer, "Regional Conflict Management in Central Africa: From FOMUC to MICOPAX," *African Security* 2, no. 2-3 (December 15, 2009): pp. 158-174, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19362200903362075>, p. 160.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

the UN has again failed to promote peace in the country suggested that an alternative approach may be required if the UN are hoping to implement a definite long-term solution for the issues within Central African Republic.

1.2.2 Scope Limitation

From the background of this issue and its identified problems, this research will focus on these factors as its main subject of analysis:

- 1) The historical contexts that drive the recurring conflict in CAR, ranging from its independence in 1960 until prior to the re-emergence of conflict in 2012
- 2) MINUSCA's operational framework and activities according to their mandate from 2014 to 2020

1.2.3 Research Question

According to the identified problem and scope limitation of this research, the question that this research will try to answer is: **“why did the UN Peacekeeping Missions in Central African Republic (MINUSCA) fail to promote sustainable peace and prevent conflict resurgence in CAR during their deployment from 2014 to 2020?”**

1.3 Objective and Usability

1.3.1 Research Objective

The objective of this research is to explore the problems and challenges faced by peacekeeping actors when operating in countries with culturally and ethnically plural societies engaged in prolonged sectarian conflicts. More specifically, this research can help explain the reason(s) behind the United Nations' failure to promote sustainable peace in Central African Republic.

1.3.2 Research Usability

After understanding the reasons behind United Nations' failure to promote sustainable peace in Central African Republic, this research can be used to formulate a better operational framework for peacebuilding organizations aiming to operate in countries with culturally and ethnically plural societies engaged in prolonged sectarian conflicts.

1.4 Literature Review

There have been numerous studies regarding the peace-building process in CAR, considering its long history of instability. For example,

Angela Meyer in 2009 discussed the issues of international peace-building missions in the CAR prior to 2012. During Bozize's early rise to power, a multinational task force was assembled by the leaders of CEMAC in order to suppress the resurging conflict in CAR. Named "*Force Multinationale en Centrafrique*" (FOMUC), the task force ended being deployed from 2002 to 2008 before eventually being replaced by a different mission in 2009.

During its period of operation, FOMUC faced several issues of its own. The first issue pertained FOMUC's original mandate, which was to secure Bangui and the government of then-President Ange-Felix Patasse against any attempts of coup.²⁴ FOMUC failed to protect both the central government and Bangui, which fell under Francois Bozize's control in 2003. Consequently, the mission's objective was changed to instead monitor and support the transition and reconciliation process, as well as to help establish a democratic government in CAR.²⁵ In this regard, FOMUC again unfortunately had limited success since the central government continued to have limited authority outside Bangui and the relationship between the government and rebel militias remained tense.²⁶ The next issue was FOMUC's failure to address the numerous military insecurities, proven by the proliferation of armed militia and bandit groups around the countryside.²⁷

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 162.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 162-164.

The last issue was FOMUC's failure to help the government address the severe humanitarian and socio-economic issues that had been threatening CAR's general population for decades, which in retrospect are the source of the nation's political instability.²⁸

Meyer argued that FOMUC's rather underwhelming performance during its deployment can be explained by two factors. First factor entails CEMAC's rather inexperience in security intervention. CEMAC was initially founded to develop a free-trade market for the Central African nations and to bolster their collective economic capacities. The need for common security forces, Meyer argued, only arose after a series of political instabilities ravaged the region in the 1990s, which hampered the free market development.²⁹ The after-thought nature of its conception meant that the proponent nations behind FOMUC are not sufficiently prepared to form an integrated regional security force, leading it to have had an underdeveloped and under-managed command structure in supranational level.³⁰ Moreover, FOMUC's initial mandate to preserve CAR's regime under Patasse can be perceived as an excuse to form a regional task force to preserve its member's own legitimacy at home, distracting it from a peacekeeper's conventional mandate of preserving lives.³¹

²⁸ Ibid., p. 164.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 165.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

The second explanation from Meyer is that FOMUC was not designed for promoting human security at their core, rather they were designed to provide security solely through hard power approaches. According to her, security issues in Central Africa were mainly defined from a military and state-centric perspective by their elites.³² This traditionalist approach unfortunately only addressed the direct manifestation of insecurities, while leaving its roots unresolved. Consequently, they failed to resolve the socio-political insecurities in the lower levels of CAR society, which allowed those issues to fester and resurface in the future.

More recent research from Kiven James Kewir and Sunjo Emile discussed the current conflict between Seleka and Anti-Balaka. Published in 2016, Kewir and Emile identified several issues that needed to be addressed by MINUSCA's deployment strategy. First issue laid in the lack of a legitimate national security force within CAR. During his ten-years reign, Francois Bozize has failed to maintain the military readiness of the army and police forces, largely attributed to budget corruption, bad structure of command, and lack of proper recruitment and training programs.³³ The lack of quality in the security forces was also arguably the reason behind rampant military entrepreneurship around the countryside that preceded the 2012

³² Ibid., p. 166.

³³ Kiven James Kewir and Sunjo Emile, "Building Peace in the Central African Republic," *Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities* 6, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): pp. 41-59, <https://doi.org/10.5958/2249-7315.2016.00005.8>, pp. 46-47.

uprising.³⁴ The second factor was the practice of bad governance that had plagued CAR for generations. Kewir and Emile's research revealed that CAR's political system has been long characterized with nepotistic power-sharing and manipulative decision-making process only beneficial for those in power.³⁵ Public representation is also claimed to be non-existent within CAR's political system.³⁶ Bozize, Seleka-appointed Djotodia, and even the interim government all share these traits of bad governance in certain ways.³⁷ Lastly, CAR's underdeveloped infrastructures had hampered socio-economic activities and the provision of public services in all levels of society, even to an extent of hindering MINUSCA's operations.³⁸

Kewir and Emile's claim on bad governance and public representation (or lack thereof) in CAR is also supported by Marie-Joëlle Zahar and Delphine Mechoulan. Their research in 2017 found that there had been a noticeable gap within CAR's then-implemented peace mediation strategies, in which there had been no initiatives that directly involved nor even benefit the country's general populations.³⁹ Most of the proposed initiatives from 2012 to 2017 had mostly come from foreign actors who, according to Zahar and Mechoulan, had "divergent agendas, institutional

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 48-49.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 51.

³⁹ Zahar and Mechoulan (2017), p. 15.

rivalries, and even different cultures of mediation.”⁴⁰ The ruling and militant elites in CAR mainly act as recipients for these foreign initiatives, and only implement them as long as they personally benefit them in the short run.⁴¹ Mediation initiatives coming from local actors often had no way of being implemented at the national level because there had been no strong political unity between those actors, and even when they did, they often failed to push their aspirations to their higher-ups.⁴² Even when MINUSCA tried to offer their own mediation and consultation programs, they were mostly not involved in the national-level mediation efforts.⁴³ CAR’s national elites, regional powers, and the AU only grant MINUSCA an observer status on most of these initiatives, even though Zahar and Mechoulan found that MINUSCA were able to bridge the interests between these local and national actors.⁴⁴

But the most intriguing work regarding peace mission in CAR can be found from Louisa Lombard’s book “*State of Rebellion: Violence and Intervention in the Central African Republic*”. Social constructivist at heart, Lombard argued that the current state of CAR is the product of a complex entanglement process between the many political actors residing in the

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 31-32.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 26.

country, disregarding their foreign or domestic status.⁴⁵ This argument stems from her observation that the government of CAR has been long perceived to be absent, both in form and in function, by the general actors within the country, and thus these actors have formed a system of functions from their interactions with each other in daily activities.⁴⁶

On this note, Lombard argued that the cycle of conflict in CAR, in one version or another, had been ingrained into the people's social norm due to long history of communal violence in the country. The people had accepted severe capital punishment as a mean to inflict justice, and the use of inherited vengeance as a mean to prevent danger.⁴⁷ Moreover, militia had been seen as a regular profession in the society, with the limited number of ways to make a living during the conflict.⁴⁸ Therefore, Lombard also argued that capacity-building programs made during peace missions in the country often failed because they lacked the framework that address inherent violence in the culture of CAR and they also lacked sustainability, in the sense that they lacked the permanence aspect for it to become an established economic sector in the country.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Louisa Lombard, *State of Rebellion: Violence and Intervention in the Central African Republic* (London, UK: Zed Books Ltd, 2016), pp. 27-28.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-55.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

Another challenging factor in peacekeeping missions in the country, she argued, is the constant uncertainty that dominates CAR's local political stage. Just as Welz previously mentioned, competition between supplying actors of peacekeepers in CAR often led to inefficient implementation of programs at ground level. Lombard observed that often peacekeepers from different contingents have a certain level of mistrust with each other, to the point of sometimes accusing each other for partiality and biases.⁵⁰

In conclusion, preliminary findings of this research have suggested that currently existing peace-building initiatives in CAR have had limited success because there is a lack of political cohesion among the political actors in the country. Past peacebuilding missions had also failed to make sustainable peace conditions because they did not address the basic structural and socio-economic issues in the country, prolonging public insecurities. Moreover, Lombard's research in particular had given a clear insight that violence problems in CAR are not only due to political or religious interests, but are also linked to the socio-political culture that have long been established among CAR's many ethnic communities. This research will attempt to further the discussion by applying the values of Republican

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 196.

peacebuilding theory in CAR, specifically on how MINUSCA had or should have had applied these values on their operation.

On another note, there had been several books discussing MINUSCA's implementation throughout the years. In 2020, Lise M. Howard and her associates analyzed the mission's overall strategic-level effectiveness based on several factors, such as: the mission's political primacy; the rationality between its mandates and resources; its approach to promote bottom-up initiatives; its public legitimacy and credibility; its stance regarding the relation between women and peace and security; and its coordination with other stakeholders.⁵¹ Lotte Vermeij provided a follow-up on Howard's team's research in 2022, with a narrower perspective of how MINUSCA, alongside two other peacebuilding missions in Africa, had performed its PoC mandate in terms of methodology, effectiveness, and challenges.⁵² Alexander Gilder also wrote a separate study on MINUSCA, where he analyzed the development of UN's peacekeeping and peacebuilding doctrine that eventually lead to current UNDP human security doctrine.⁵³ While each of these books provide their own interesting ideas on how

⁵¹ Lise Morjé Howard, Gino Vlavonou, and Yvan Ilunga, *Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic* (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2020).

⁵² Lotte Vermeij et al., *UN Peacekeeping Operations at a Crossroads: The Implementation of Protection Mandates in Contested and Congested Spaces* (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2022).

⁵³ Alexander Gilder, *Stabilization and Human Security in UN Peace Operations* (New York, USA: Routledge, 2022).

MINUSCA had formulated and implemented their mandates, it is worth noting that each of these books depart from liberal-democratic thought framework on peacebuilding. Such perspective is understandable, since MINUSCA and other UN peacekeeping missions of post-modern times are founded on liberal democratic ideas. Yet this fact poses a gap in the field of peacebuilding research, where peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations are rarely considered from any other theoretical framework. Such is why, this research will try to use Republican democratic peacebuilding principles to assess the peacekeeping mission on CAR as an attempt to provide an alternative to the already well-known liberal democratic theory.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

1.1.1 Identifying Challenges in CAR: Community Security Concept

Community security is a concept first mentioned in 1994 *Human Development Report* by United Nations Development Program (UNDP), conceived as one of the seven dimensions of the then-equally new concept of human security. It was described as any means that “address the protection against the breakdown of (social) communities that provide members with a

reassuring sense of identity and a shared value system.”⁵⁴ Currently, community security under UNDP definition has been expanded to be the measures for establishing or protecting a group’s collective security from harmful threats (freedom from fear) and shortages of welfare resources (freedom from want).⁵⁵ According to Caballero-Anthony, community security cannot be defined only by the existence of threats against the group’s welfare. Threats against the group’s identities and social cohesion is also detrimental to the group’s existence, as she explained, “for societal security is the sustaining value ... that serves the people’s basic cognitive and emotional needs.”⁵⁶

A community’s insecurities can come from myriads of factors. UNDP in their 2009 *Community Security and Social Cohesion* handbook identified seven of those factors, which are: unaccountable security sector and lack of rule of law; organized crime, corruption, and war economies; breakdown of governance; youth unemployment; population movement; economic inequality; and cultural issues.⁵⁷ These issues often happen simultaneously in vulnerable societies where UNDP operates, mainly due to said issues being the cause and/or effect of the others. Caballero-Anthony

⁵⁴ Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Community Security: Human Security at 21,” *Contemporary Politics* 21, no.1 (2015), p. 55.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 56

⁵⁷ UNDP, *Community Security and Social Cohesion: Towards a UNDP Approach* (2009), pp. 9-11.

identified similar causes to community insecurity; where horizontal and vertical competition, alongside clash between capitalistic and traditional culture within a society is the primary drive to conflict. Large population movement in countries with culturally endemic communities is seen as creating tension between the ‘locals’ and ‘newcomers’ which can lead to political and economic discriminations.⁵⁸

While the sources of insecurities may vary, the international system has also grown to adapt for this rising trend in insecurities. Caballero-Anthony identifies several of the measures to promote community security, which had been formally adopted by the United Nations. These measures are: responsibilities to protect (R2P); international criminal court (ICC); protection of civilians (PoC); community security through social cohesion (CSSC); and security and development (S&D).⁵⁹ R2P was designed to act as guiding principles when responding to crimes against humanity, and the basis of humanitarian intervention when a state is incapable of protecting its own population from harm. ICC was established by the international community as a mean to bring the implementation of fair justice and rule of law in instances where a state’s domestic judicial institution is unable or unwilling to do so. PoC is a concept that fundamentally derived from the Hague Convention’s distinction between combatant and non-combatant, where it is

⁵⁸ Loc. cit., Caballero-Anthony (2015), p. 56.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 57-61.

designed to minimize collateral casualties and to address the socio-political insecurities that are caused by conflict. CSSC is the extension of PoC, a concept where community security can be achieved by decreasing the social inequalities and discriminating factors and increasing social capital between communities in horizontal conflict. Lastly, S&D is a concept that links violence and social conflict with development inequalities that resulted in practices of survival economy.

Caballero-Anthony also argued that, despite the growing number of initiatives made by the international community, community security is still fairly vulnerable in the 21st century. States are still reluctant to impose humanitarian intervention due to sovereignty issues, and they often chose to impose a more passive approach when responding to humanitarian violations by other states.⁶⁰ And while the ICC is an important aspect of international justice, the institution is being suspected to be primarily driven by great powers' interests and are questionable in its capacity to provide impartial judgement for large-scale and/or controversial humanitarian violations.⁶¹ The initiatives mentioned by PoC, CSSC, and S&D are indeed an improvement for creating community securities framework in conflicting societies, but they are not exactly new initiatives and many implementation attempts done by UNDP and Peacekeeping Missions had failed to prevent civilians from being

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

involved in conflict, promote social cohesion, or reducing the development gaps in those societies.⁶²

1.1.2 Addressing Challenges in CAR: Barnett's Republican Peacebuilding

Michael Barnett in 2006 proposed a concept for building a government in post-conflict society. He argued that thus far, peacebuilding projects had failed because the international apparatus, both national and organizational actors, in charge of managing the projects are prone to impose their own version of liberal democratic values into those post-conflict societies, while the people are still struggling for security and legitimacy.⁶³ According to him, countries that had just emerged from conflict do not have the public nor the social institutions that are necessary for political and economic competition.⁶⁴ Imposing arbitrary systems in these struggling countries would only further destabilize the social structure, implanting the seeds for future conflicts. Instead of liberal democratic values, Barnett proposed that peacebuilders begin the nation-building process by installing stability and legitimacy in the newly-reformed body politics. This goal can be

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War," *International Security* 30, no. 4 (2006), pp. 88-89.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

achieved through the use of deliberation, representation, and constitutionalism principles, which are the main tenets of republicanism.⁶⁵

The first principle of deliberation entails the use of public political discussion in the policy-making process. Barnett argued that in reforming a government, public deliberation becomes important for several reasons. First, it instills confidence from the general public in regards to the policy-making process, giving a sense of public security. Second, political stakeholders are less likely to formulate self-centered policies when the public is strictly observing the deliberation process, thus pressuring the stakeholders into good governorship. And lastly, it helps build a sense of nationality and cohesion between stakeholders with different ethnicities and beliefs, since through their discourse they are forced to pursue common interests and reconsider each other's motives.⁶⁶ The combination of these factors would bring legitimacy into the nation's policy-making process, both from the grass-root and elite level, and conflict will less likely to reoccur. In this regard, there are three crucial sectors that require immediate public deliberation. First and foremost is the public security sector since it also entails demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration issues. Second is the public finance and economic management sector. This sector would be most likely broadcasted between international donors and the local government, to promote accountability and

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 97-99.

further investment in the country. Third is transitional justice, which is crucial to enforce accountable rules of law and help the reconciliation process among the victims.

The second principle of representation might seem familiar and obvious among liberal democratic advocates. Yet, republicanism's view on representation differs quite distinctly from contemporary democracy. Barnett's version of representation does not immediately call for general public election, because he argued that the nature of post-conflict society means that elections are more likely to be flawed and unsatisfying for those directly affected.⁶⁷ Instead, he argued that representation should be achieved through consultative bodies and transitional governments that are both inclusive to the parties in power and transparent for public oversight. Under Republican perspective, there are two factors that determine the representativeness of a transitional government. First is the inclusivity – the amount and depth the local interest groups and stakeholders are incorporated in the government; and the second is the transparency and accountability of the government.⁶⁸ This type of transitional government is believed to be sufficiently inclusive and accountable for the public interests, while maintaining efficiency and stability until constitutional democracy can be organically established in the country.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 102.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

The last but not least, constitutionalism principle entails the way in which peacebuilding actors should direct the local actors in their constitution-making process. According to Barnett, an ideal constitutional system should have: an agreement of rules and principles for interplay between the apparatus of body politics; rules and institutions that prevent power abuse; and hard-to-amend basic rules.⁶⁹ These aspects are important for a strong Republican constitution because it clearly maintains the balance of power between government elites, while giving compromises that may satisfy each party's interests. This is especially important in post-conflict countries because local actors are especially prone to be discouraged from political participation should the new system allows for a "zero-sum" result, which could potentially lead to another series of conflict.⁷⁰ Peacebuilders could contribute in this process not only as guidance and mediator, but also to help broadcast the process, provide interim security forces, encourage grass-root participation, and provide resources for the process.⁷¹

1.1.3 Implementation of Concepts

Caballero-Anthony's concept of community security is useful for identifying the issues that caused the conflict in CAR. It can be deduced that

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.105.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 106.

⁷¹ Ibid.

in a society with recurring conflict, there must be a flaw(s) in the country's political and economic system that caused horizontal and vertical competition in the country. Moreover, there must be cultural background in the society that caused tension between the conflicting parties, be it historical discrimination or trend of mismanagement when electing the ruling parties. Meanwhile, Barnett's concept of republican peacebuilding is applicable to hypothesize the solution for CAR's recurring conflict for several reasons. First, the political field within the country fits Barnett's description of a post-conflict society. The Bangui government's vacuum during the limited period was ideal for government restructuralization, and there were numerous factions suitable to be brought into the deliberation process. The behavior of MINUSCA peacekeeping forces can be analyzed according to these principles, to predict whether their failure to cease the violence in CAR had any correlation to their methods of peacebuilding.

1.6 Technique of Analysis and Data Collection

1.6.1 Technique of Analysis

This research will use qualitative analysis as its main research technique. Qualitative analysis is one of the two methods in social science study besides quantitative analysis. Qualitative analysis utilizes the researcher's personal creativity and contextual understanding to create an

informed judgment regarding a phenomenon.⁷² This type of research usually aimed to provide a causal understanding in their conclusion, rather than a descriptive or predictive conclusion.⁷³

Qualitative analysis research relies heavily on the researcher's capacity to make an objective and logical inference as part of the research process. In this regard, the writer of this research will use the method of deductive inference for this research's analytical approach. In logical term, deductive inference is defined as the act of creating a new knowledge from a particular subject, by combining it with a universal knowledge in a causal manner – in other word, the universal knowledge implies the particular one.⁷⁴ One of the uses of deductive inference in methodological science takes form in hypothetico-deductive analysis, a process that uses available data and suitable theoretical framework to formulate and test a new hypothesis.⁷⁵ In this context, this research will use the theory of republican peacebuilding to make the hypothesis that: “the United Nations fails to promote sustainable peace in Central African Republic because they do not use the principles of deliberation, representation, and constitutionalism in their operational

⁷² Anol Bhattacharjee, *Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices* (Tampa, Florida: University of South Florida, 2012), p. 113.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Raymond J. McCall, *Basic Logic: The Fundamental Principles of Formal Deductive Reasoning* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1952), pp. 132-143.

⁷⁵ Jan Sprenger, “Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation,” *Philosophy Compass* 6, no. 7 (2011): pp. 497-508, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00409.x>, pp. 497-498.

framework”; which will then be tested with available empirical data relevant with the hypothesis.

1.6.2 Technique of Data Collection

This research will primarily use literature study as its technique of data collection. The types of literature used in this research will be third-party journal articles, books, official reports, and non-scholarly literatures such as news articles and documentaries. The data will be gathered from accredited, accountable, and public sources such as governmental organizations, research organizations, and sanctioned news outlets. The data-gathering process will be done primarily through the use of the internet, but in-real-life (IRL) sources will also be utilized if the relevancy and availability is presented.

1.7 Sequence of Discourse

The sequence of discourse for this research will be divided in chapters as follow:

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

This chapter will discuss the: background; problem identification; objective and usability; literature review; theoretical framework; method of analysis; and discourse sequence of this research.

CHAPTER II: CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND, MANDATE, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MINUSCA

This chapter will discuss the characteristics of the main subject of this research, MINUSCA. The discussion will include: the contextual information regarding the conflict in CAR that eventually necessitates the deployment of MINUSCA; essence of the mission's mandates; and the implementation of the mission's mandate on the field from 2014 to 2020.

CHAPTER III: IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLICAN PEACE-BUILDING AND SUSTAINABILITY FAILURE OF MINUSCA

This chapter will discuss the implementation of MINUSCA's mandate from the perspective of Barnett's republican peace-building theory. This chapter will also explain why MINUSCA fails to promote sustainable peace in CAR based on the assumption of the republican theory.

CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION

This chapter will discuss the conclusion from all the findings of this research, along with the implication and recommendation of its findings.