

## **Chapter 4**

### **CONCLUSION**

In this paper, we've discussed what were the problems behind the resurgence of violence and armed rebellions in CAR, and what were the actions MINUSCA took to try to address these problems and prevent further violence in the country. To identify the underlying societal issues, this paper used the concept of community security as many of its proposed factors behind a societal collapse appeared to have been present in CAR, both prior and after the civil war started in 2012. First off, local militia groups have become a common social aspect in the country, born out of the absence of governmental protection and social services in the hinterland. The Bozize government's absence imparted upon his people in two contrasting forms. In one hand, the Muslim people at the northern parts of the country took up arms since the government's neglects caused economic underdevelopment and political marginalization. And on the other hand, the Christian people at the south-western parts of the country took up arms because the government were incapable of providing protection against the encroaching Muslim rebels, and thus they were forced to take up arms themselves as a mean for survival. The proliferation of militia groups was compounded by the dysfunctional political culture in CAR, where armed insurgencies were the more preferable method used by political elites to gain prominence and governmental position in the country. Poor economic development was also a prominent aspect behind the conflict as lack of economic opportunity in the peripheral territories had

become both the reason and the result of the continued violence and proliferation of militia groups.

To address these issues, we've discovered that MINUSCA had been given several mandates that are as close as possible to the Community Security through Social Cohesion Guidelines, set by the UNDP. They prioritized the protection of civilian in their mandate, and attempted to promote social cohesion by supporting peace agreements and national reconciliation process. And from the perspective of Republican Peacebuilding theory, we found out that MINUSCA had mixed results in implementing their mandates in a sustainable, Republic-building manner. Respectively, these are how each mandates correlate to the Republican Peacebuilding theory:

- 1) **Protection of civilian:** deliberation process through local dispute settlement and early-warning threat detection mechanisms, but its effectiveness was limited to their own areas without contributing much for the security discourse on the national level. Representation is mostly concerned with providing local preventive activities according to the local population's input, but national representation for security policies is yet to be implemented. Constitutionalization is not the strong suit of this mandate, but it at least supported stronger constitutionalized political process as security promotes civil dispute settlement methods.

- 2) **Support for peace process and national reconciliation:** deliberation was conducted in cooperation with local mediation committees, who helped bridge communication between different ethnic and religious groups in their community. The local mediation committees can also be seen as the representative of local actors in peace process, as they were formed from different prominent figures of their communities. However, both deliberation and representation of the peace process at the national level were still insufficient to adequately address the people's interests. The mandate's effect on the constitutionalization process for peace and national reconciliation was even less direct since the mission only passively supported the government's own constitutionalization efforts instead of actively directing the process.
- 3) **Extend state authority:** MINUSCA has little contribution to the Republican peacebuilding aspects on this mandate, since the mission simply facilitate the government authorities to deploy their assets to the further parts of their territories.
- 4) **Support security sector reforms:** deliberation was conducted in the formulation process of the SSR strategies during the Bangui Forum. Representation was done by promoting political inclusivity in the implementation of SSR strategies, from increasing the diversity of recruitment pools for FACA to making sure a wide array of stakeholders was involved in the oversight of the security sector. However, at first implementation of support actions for this aspect was delayed due to

communication issues between the three parties. In term of constitutionalization, the mission lobbied the consolidation of SSR strategies into a national security policy, which were supported by a series of laws on the reformation of both military and internal security forces.

- 5) **Support DDRR process:** deliberation was less effective at the beginning of MINUSCA's deployment, as both the government and militia factions were unwilling to compromise on their terms and demands. But at least the mission managed to support ground-level deliberation process for disarmament and reintegration, by implementing several labor-intensive CVR and pre-DDRR programs. Representation was unsuccessful, since limited incorporation for the militia's demands had only been achieved in 2019, and even then, commitment had been hard to maintain. The mission had also supported the ratification of several DDRR agreements throughout the years, which correlates to constitutionalization of DDRR process since these agreements have legal binding effect. Yet besides these agreements, a robust rule of law that support DDRR process had yet to be found.
- 6) **Support of justice system and protection of human right:** the best attempt for deliberation was taken when the SCC chief prosecutor publicize their prosecutorial strategy in the future, as well as MINUSCA's sensitivity seminar against sexual and human rights abuses. Other than those, there were little attempts to further deliberate the justice

system process to the public. Representation was significantly more effective, with the establishment of SCC that combines both local and international aspects for transitional justice system. The constitutionalization of this mandate was robust as the SCC worked under constitutional duty alongside the national court.

From these results, we found that most of these mandates struggle to maintain the momentum required to make any significant changes on the national level. MINUSCA mostly made progress in the Republican point of view through grassroots initiatives, which were only temporary measures to help mitigate the struggles of localized communities and their peoples. Since MINUSCA struggled to make national-level changes, some critical issues emerged that had led to current instabilities in the CAR. **First, the government's limited capacity to govern and unite their people under one unitary political body had led to almost non-existent national identity.** The CAR is a historically diversified society, with many ethnics and cultures from across the Sahel region culminating into this land. The political history of the modern CAR was mired with bad governance and ethnic politics, which had made significant fissures in the society. And current problems between the Seleka and Anti-Balaka can be attributed to the government's inability to unite these people under one national ownership, even with modern trends of democratization. **Second, the government's limited resources had led to its limited power and capacity to control its own citizens, let alone to provide adequate public services across the country.** The CAR's people

had felt little to no results from their democratically legitimate government, and thus they felt no strong ownership to the political system itself. This had led to several groups of frustrated individuals to take up arms and seek better welfare through violence, which in turn led to even weaker government capacity. **Third, the international system's preference to expedient public election had led to imperfect democracy, where the people are sceptical towards their newly elected government due to history of bad governance.** This had led to the persistence of insurrection against the new government, who they deemed as illegitimate and were not representing their interests and beliefs. The combination of these three issues may have led to current persistence of instabilities, despite the lengthy involvement by MINUSCA and other international actors in the country.

In conclusion, this paper argues that MINUSCA had failed to promote sustainable peace and prevent conflict resurgence in CAR during their deployment from 2014 to 2020 due to their inability to successfully persuade the national government into focusing their limited resources into a solid nation-building programs, which in turn leads to the continuation of public grievances and bad political behaviors by the armed militia groups. Of course, this paper is limited to the numbers of available data regarding specific MINUSCA activities in the country, as well as the complexity of political and social relationship between the political actors in CAR – which would also involve the UN peacekeeping mission in its system. Future researches into the conflict in CAR would be benefitted from deeper and more

specific investigation into the societal aspects of the country, as social and ethnical background make the majority of political trends in the country. By understanding further into the motivations and behaviors of each specific groups of interests in the country, we may one day find the definitive solution to end the social conflict in CAR, and how we, as outside actors, may contribute for this solution.

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