

## BAB IV

### KESIMPULAN DAN SARAN

#### 4.1 Kesimpulan

Dengan dijatuhkannya kebijakan pelarangan *hallyu* oleh Tiongkok, penelitian ini menganalisis upaya diplomasi publik yang dilakukan oleh Korea Selatan terkait kebijakan pelarangan *hallyu* yang dijatuhkan oleh Tiongkok hingga September 2021 untuk menjawab pertanyaan penelitian “Bagaimana upaya diplomasi publik antara Korea Selatan dengan Tiongkok terkait dengan adanya perkembangan hubungan dari kebijakan pelarangan *hallyu*?”. Untuk menjawab pertanyaan penelitian dan mengkaji upaya dan langkah Korea Selatan dalam menanggulangi kebijakan pelarangan *hallyu* yang dijatuhkan oleh Tiongkok pada tahun 2016 dan melihat perkembangan *hallyu* di Tiongkok yang dinilai semakin diperketat, maka telah diperoleh jawaban berdasarkan analisis yang telah dilakukan terhadap upaya dan langkah Korea Selatan yang dikaji menggunakan teori diplomasi publik milik Nicholas J. Cull beserta 3 instrumen diplomasi publik yaitu *cultural diplomacy*, *international broadcasting*, dan *advocacy* yang dipilih untuk mengkaji bagaimana Korea Selatan memperjuangkan *hallyu* yang merupakan *soft power* yang dipilih sebagai alat diplomasi publik Korea Selatan serta dengan melihat perkembangan *hallyu* di Tiongkok hingga September 2021. Dalam melihat upaya dan langkah pemerintah Korea Selatan sebagai aktor negara dalam menjalankan instrumen *cultural diplomacy* untuk memperkenalkan dan mengembangkan nilai ekspor kebudayaan *hallyu* ke negara lain, upaya Korea Selatan yang dipilih adalah kebijakan luar negeri dan kerjasama inisiatif *New Southern Policy*

(NSP) sebagai langkah pemenuhan kebijakan luar negeri Korea Selatan dalam mengembangkan *hallyu* .

*New Southern Policy* (NSP) merupakan inisiasi kerjasama milik Korea Selatan dibawah era kepresidenan Presiden Moon Jae In dimana melalui dicanangkannya kerjasama ini, Presiden Moon Jae In mengharapkan terjadinya pertukaran nilai - nilai ekonomi di bawah bidang ekonomi, sosial, dan budaya serta pariwisata, edukasi, dan peningkatan pelayanan publik dengan terus menjunjung tinggi perdamaian dan kemakmuran antara negara - negara anggota serta menjamin keuntungan kerjasama ekonomi yang dapat dirasakan oleh semua negara yang terlibat dalam kebijakan kerjasama ini. Kerjasama ini diikuti oleh 10 negara anggota ASEAN dan India. Langkah dari pembuatan kebijakan kerjasama ini juga dilakukan sebagai upaya Korea Selatan untuk mulai mengurangi tingkat dependensi ekonomi terhadap Tiongkok serta guna memisahkan diri dari kemungkinan munculnya ketegangan yang lebih tinggi antara Tiongkok dan Amerika Serikat. Dengan terciptanya pasar kebudayaan baru bagi *hallyu* untuk berkembang dan menyebarkan pengaruhnya di negara - negara yang berpartisipasi dalam kerjasama ini, maka peran negara sebagai aktor diplomasi publik yang berkewajiban untuk memperkenalkan dan mengembangkan nilai ekspor kebudayaan ke negara lain telah dipenuhi oleh Korea Selatan.

Dalam analisis upaya *international broadcasting*, langkah yang dipilih oleh sejumlah agensi hiburan di Korea Selatan sebagai aktor non negara dalam menjaga dan mengelola eksistensi *hallyu* di Tiongkok adalah dengan cara menyelenggarakan siaran langsung sambil bermain beberapa *game online* yang dilakukan melalui situs siaran

langsung asal Tiongkok yang bernama *Huya Live* yang dipilih oleh sejumlah agensi hiburan Korea Selatan seperti *SM Entertainment* dalam program “*SM Super Idol League*” yang dilakukan oleh sejumlah anggota dari grup *K-pop* yang dinaungi oleh *SM Entertainment* untuk menjaga eksistensi *hallyu* dan para penggemar sejumlah grup *K-pop* yang dinaungi oleh agensi ini. Selain melalui *Huya Live*, sejumlah agensi hiburan Korea Selatan lain seperti *YG Entertainment* juga melancarkannya langkahnya untuk tetap memelihara eksistensi artis - artis naungannya dalam pasar Tiongkok dengan mengirim anggota grup *Blackpink* yang berkewarganegaraan Thailand yaitu Lisa untuk menjadi *dance mentor* di acara *survival* pencarian bakat keluaran *iQIYI* selaku salah satu situs Tiongkok terbesar yang dikenal dalam menyiarkan sejumlah serial televisi asal Korea Selatan dan acara hiburan Korea Selatan. Upaya diplomasi publik pada elemen international broadcasting yang dipilih oleh *SM Entertainment* dan *YG Entertainment* juga mencerminkan langkah aktor non negara yang berperan sebagai perusahaan multinasional pada konsep *multi-stakeholders diplomacy*. Upaya *advocacy* yang dipilih oleh Korea Selatan dalam mengatasi kebijakan pelarangan *hallyu* oleh Tiongkok adalah dengan masalah sanksi ekonomi dan pelarangan *hallyu* oleh Tiongkok kepada *World Trade Organization (WTO)* yang dipicu dengan adanya kecemasan dan diskriminasi yang dialami oleh sejumlah perusahaan dan sektor hiburan termasuk tayangan *hallyu* di Tiongkok. Langkah *advocacy* yang dilakukan oleh Korea Selatan dalam menyampaikan keluhannya terhadap kebijakan yang dijatuhkan Tiongkok sebagai bentuk memperjuangkan *hallyu* dan sektor ekonominya

sebagai kepentingan dan urgensi negaranya menuai simpati dari beberapa negara lain yang juga mengetahui protes yang dilakukan oleh Korea Selatan ini.

Upaya dan langkah pemerintah Korea Selatan dalam memperjuangkan *hallyu* sejak pelarangan *hallyu* dijatuhkan oleh Tiongkok pada tahun 2016 masih harus menempuh dan menunggu proses dari perkembangan hubungan Korea Selatan dan Tiongkok yang dapat dikatakan cukup jauh. *Hallyu* yang pada Desember 2020 diperkirakan dapat secara perlahan berkembang kembali di Tiongkok lewat pemutaran lagu “*Dynamite*” milik grup *K-pop* BTS di radio lokal Beijing dan masuknya kembali 7 serial televisi eksklusif untuk diputar di aplikasi *streaming* acara hiburan dan serial televisi asal milik Tiongkok, hingga September 2021 masih belum dapat beroperasi kembali di pasar hiburan Tiongkok. Pembatalan penayangan film layar lebar “*Catman*”, kebijakan pembatasan pembelian album dan lagu digital di aplikasi musik Tiongkok, hingga penangguhan sejumlah akun sosial media *Weibo* milik penggemar anggota grup *K-pop* di Tiongkok pada September 2021 menjadi beberapa alasan mengapa pelonggaran maupun penghapusan kebijakan pelarangan *hallyu* di Tiongkok belum dapat dilakukan di masa yang akan datang.

Pengetatan yang justru ditempuh oleh pemerintah Tiongkok terhadap *hallyu* secara perlahan mulai melemahkan dan secara perlahan menghapuskan pasar *hallyu* di Tiongkok. Melemahnya pasar *hallyu* di Tiongkok membuat agenda pemerintah Tiongkok yang ingin mengembangkan *soft power* kebudayaan negaranya sendiri secara tidak langsung menjadi terpenuhi mengingat Tiongkok juga melihat *hallyu* asal Korea Selatan sebagai kompetitornya dalam melaksanakan agenda *soft power*

Tiongkok. Selain itu, langkah pemerintah Tiongkok yang menyebarkan sentimen Anti-Korea dalam masyarakat Tiongkok juga berhasil menurunkan minat masyarakat Tiongkok terhadap *hallyu*. Penurunan minat masyarakat Tiongkok juga berdampak pada penjualan album *K-pop* di Tiongkok yang menurun. Korea Selatan dengan upaya *cultural diplomacy* nya yang mulai mengembangkan pasar ASEAN untuk *hallyu* juga sudah mulai menganggap Tiongkok sebagai pasar utama pengeksport *hallyu*.

Dengan rentan waktu yang cukup lama sejak tahun 2016 - 2021 juga membuat Korea Selatan mulai mengembangkan beberapa pasar *hallyu* baru di negara lain sehingga interdependensi ekonomi yang dimiliki terhadap Tiongkok yang dulu merupakan pasar perdagangan terbesar bagi *hallyu* perlahan menurun. Walaupun dilonggarkan dan dihapuskannya kebijakan pelarangan *hallyu* masih dibutuhkan guna memberantas *illegal streaming* dan pembajakan sejumlah konten Korea Selatan serta dengan dilihatnya perkembangan *hallyu* yang ditandai dengan mulai diputar kembali lagu – lagu *K-pop* di radio lokal Tiongkok dan konten serial televisi Korea Selatan dibawah aplikasi *streaming* milik Tiongkok, namun bukan berarti Tiongkok akan tetap menjadi pasar ekspor *hallyu* terbesar bagi Korea Selatan. Dengan Tiongkok yang bukan lagi menjadi fokus utama bagi Korea Selatan dalam mengembangkan *hallyu*, maka sejumlah kebijakan limitasi dan menurunnya penjualan album di Tiongkok tidak terlalu berdampak besar pada Korea Selatan bahkan membuat Korea Selatan mulai meninggalkan Tiongkok sebagai rekan dan pasar perdagangan ekspor - impor kebudayaan. Pada akhirnya, *hallyu* sebagai *soft power* diplomasi publik Korea Selatan

akan terus dikembangkan dengan atau tanpa Tiongkok sebagai pasar ekspor – impor terbesarnya.

#### **4.2 Saran**

Penelitian ini telah menyoroti sejumlah upaya dan langkah diplomasi publik Korea Selatan terkait pelarangan *hallyu* dengan adanya perkembangan *hallyu* di Tiongkok hingga September 2021, namun terdapat beberapa area yang masih belum disorot untuk dapat diteliti lebih lanjut di masa depan. Berikut beberapa saran fokus penelitian bagi para peneliti yang ingin meneliti topik ini dimasa depan:

- a. Melanjutkan penelitian ini dengan periode waktu perkembangan kebijakan pelarangan *hallyu* di Tiongkok setelah September 2021
- b. Memilih upaya dan langkah diplomasi publik Korea Selatan lain untuk diteliti lebih dalam dengan instrumen diplomasi publik selain yang sudah digunakan dalam penelitian ini
- c. Melakukan penelitian terhadap aktor diplomasi publik lain yang terlibat dalam upaya diplomasi publik Korea Selatan terhadap kebijakan pelarangan *hallyu*

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