

BAB IV

KESIMPULAN

Setelah dijelaskan dan dianalisa melalui sudut pandang sejarah dan teori *Threat Perception*, kita dapat melihat rangkaian aksi reaksi antara Rusia dan NATO terkait Negara Baltik dan Ukraina. Kebijakan sebuah aktor dapat dilihat sebagai reaksi terhadap ancaman yang diberikan oleh aktor lain baik secara sengaja maupun tidak. Ancaman dapat menjadi faktor pendorong yang substansial dari bagaimana negara bereaksi atas suatu kejadian dalam dinamika politik internasional. Persepsi ancaman sendiri merupakan sebuah proses bagi negara untuk bergerak dari posisi tidak terancam menjadi terancam dan memiliki sifat yang subjektif. Subjektifitas ini membuat negara dapat terancam dalam tingkatan ancaman yang berbeda walau dalam satu skenario yang sama. Tingkatan ancaman yang dihasilkan dari hasil persepsi ancaman juga dapat menentukan perbedaan reaksi negara apabila dihadapkan kepada suatu kondisi ancaman. Sehingga persepsi ancaman dapat dijadikan suatu kerangka analisa untuk menentukan bagaimana negara menjadi terancam dan tingkat reaksi negara tersebut terhadap ancaman.

Pembuktian subjektivitas dalam proses persepsi ancaman terbukti dari kasus antara Rusia-Ukraina dan Rusia-Baltik, dimana walau Rusia terancam akibat kedua aktor tersebut akan bergabung ke NATO namun reaksi dari Rusia berbanding terbalik. Rusia memiliki kepentingan geopolitis terhadap Negara Baltik yang ingin bergabung ke NATO terutama terkait Kaliningrad dan potensi penempatan instrumen militer NATO di wilayah tersebut. Namun, Negara Baltik sendiri secara

sejarah bukan merupakan bagian integral dari Uni Soviet mengingat daerah tersebut baru dianeksasi pada 1940 atas kepentingan Soviet yang menginginkan pemerintahan yang mampu mengakomodir kepentingan Soviet. Kepentingan politik juga melatarbelakangi keputusan Rusia untuk melakukan pendekatan diplomatik terkait isu Baltik, mengingat Rusia tidak memiliki modal politik yang cukup untuk mencegah masuknya Negara Baltik ke NATO dan tidak ingin mengambil resiko untuk melakukan invasi mengingat hubungan antara Rusia dan barat sedang berada di masa harmonis. Rusia juga menganggap dengan meningkatnya *trust* antara kedua belah pihak maka barat dapat mengakomodir kepentingan Rusia terkait postur militer NATO di Negara Baltik.

Sedangkan kondisi tersebut bertolak belakang dengan apa yang terjadi di Ukraina, Rusia menganggap Ukraina merupakan bagian integral pada masa Soviet dimana daerah tersebut direnakan sebagai daerah industri dan Ukraina memiliki signifikansi yang cukup besar terkait kepentingan ekonomi Rusia terutama dalam bidang energi. Bergabungnya Ukraina ke NATO juga menjadi ancaman dari segi strategis dimana akibat perbatasan dan teritori yang luas menjadikan presensi NATO di Ukraina dapat menjadi 'existential crisis' bagi Rusia. Berbeda dengan kasus di Baltik, Rusia tidak memiliki insentif untuk menyelesaikan konflik secara damai mengingat berkaca pada aneksasi Krimea pada 2014, Rusia mampu melakukan tindakan agresif ke Ukraina tanpa repercusi yang berarti. Secara strategis apabila Rusia berhasil menduduki Kyiv dalam waktu singkat kemungkinan keuntungan Rusia akan jauh lebih besar dengan mempersingkat jalannya perang dan membuat pemerintahan yang pro-Rusia.

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