

## **BAB IV**

### **Kesimpulan**

Berdasarkan analisis dan penjelasan yang sudah penulis paparkan, penulis menyimpulkan bahwa penggunaan kontraktor militer Wagner Group merupakan cara Putin untuk mengurangi keterlibatannya dalam Perang Sipil Libya yang Kedua.

Flinders dan Buller berasumsi bahwa delegasi suatu kebijakan kepada institusi maupun lembaga independen lainnya merupakan pengalihan tanggung jawab karena dapat meminimalisir kontrol politisi terhadap kebijakan tersebut. Maka, mengubah persepsi masyarakat dunia mengenai siapa yang bertanggung jawab atas suatu isu. Delegasi intervensi di Libya kepada Wagner Group menjadi alat Putin untuk meminimalisir kontrol nya karena struktur Wagner Group yang bersifat ambigu. Seperti yang telah penulis paparkan sebelumnya, Wagner Group dibentuk melalui kerja sama antara militer Rusia dan Prigozhin. Melalui kerja sama dengan Prigozhin, Wagner Group memiliki status sebagai perusahaan swasta dan bukan struktur resmi dari pemerintahan maupun militer Rusia. Hal ini membantu Putin untuk meminimalisir keterlibatannya di Libya.

Asumsi kedua Flinders dan Buller dalam konsep depolitisasi adalah delegasi kebijakan kepada Wagner Group memberikan Putin kemampuan untuk menghindari resiko politik. Status Wagner Group sebagai perusahaan swasta memberikan Putin “pasukan pribadi” yang dapat ditugaskan dimanapun tanpa meninggalkan jejak politik. Dengan kata lain, Putin adalah individu yang bekerja “di balik layar”, sedangkan Wagner Group menjadi ujung tombak dari kebijakan

luar negeri nya. Hal ini memberikan keuntungan strategis bagi Putin: mengintervensi Libya tanpa mengorbankan hubungan diplomatik dengan negara lain dan tanpa mendapatkan sanksi.

Selain itu, adanya koneksi pribadi antara Putin dengan Prigozhin memudahkan Putin untuk menggunakan Wagner Group sesuai dengan keinginannya. Prigozhin menerima kontrak untuk beroperasi dari Putin, dengan imbalan akses terhadap sumber daya alam di kawasan yang dieksploitasi. Oleh karena itu, Wagner Group menjadi instrumen bagi Putin dan bagi Prigozhin demi kepentingan Kremlin dan keuntungan finansial.

Penggunaan kontraktor militer dari Wagner Group di Libya dapat dijelaskan dengan pepatah *“killing two birds with one stone”*. Pertama, memberikan Putin pasukan yang efektif dalam meraih kepentingannya di Libya. Kedua, tidak meninggalkan jejak politik dan meminimalisir keterlibatan Putin secara langsung. Namun, penelitian ini hanya berfokus kepada penggunaan Wagner Group di Libya pada Perang Sipil Libya yang Kedua. Sehingga, penelitian ini tidak merefleksikan penggunaan Wagner Group di negara-negara lain. Fleksibilitas yang ditawarkan oleh perusahaan militer swasta memungkinkan penggunaan kontraktor militer Wagner Group untuk tujuan yang berbeda di masa depan. Untuk itu, dibutuhkan penelitian secara lebih lanjut.

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