

KESIMPULAN

Konflik di perbatasan antara China dan India ini telah berdampak kepada hubungan ekonomi kedua negara. Letak geografis yang berdekatan antara kedua negara telah menimbulkan ancaman yang lebih besar daripada letak negara yang posisinya berjauhan. Agresifitas China di kawasan Asia dan niatan yang tidak jelas dalam konflik di perbatasan terhadap India juga telah memperburuk keadaan dan posisi China di mata India. Konflik yang kembali terjadi pada paruh pertama 2020 telah memakan korban jiwa, dimana sekitar 20 pasukan tentara India meninggal dunia sementara pasukan China cenderung tertutup dalam informasi ini. Kedua negara juga terus melakukan klaim dan pembangunan di wilayah sengketa khususnya Sektor Barat dan Sektor Timur. Selain itu, China dan India juga tidak menerapkan perjanjian terdahulu yang telah dibuat, sehingga sampai saat ini tidak ada kesepakatan bersama dan konflik menjadi terus berulang dan diperlukan intervensi politik yang lebih tinggi untuk meredakan situasi. Atas hal tersebut, penulis menemukan bahwa terdapat dampak yang muncul dari konflik China – India di perbatasan pada penjualan produk telekomunikasi dan penggunaan aplikasi China di India. Pada saat ketegangan kembali terjadi di paruh pertama tahun 2020 dan menghasilkan krisis yang cukup parah, penulis melihat bahwa penjualan produk telekomunikasi perusahaan China dan juga penggunaan aplikasi China di India mengalami penurunan yang signifikan.

Dampak ini datang karena permusuhan (*animosity*) antara China dan India telah mendatangkan sentimen anti-China yang berkembang di masyarakat India. Hal tersebut mengarah pada boikot produk dan *reluctant to buy* (RTB) dari masyarakat India. Selain itu, pemerintah India juga berusaha untuk bertindak tegas pada sektor ekonomi sebagai respon untuk masalah perbatasan dan keamanan untuk masyarakat India secara utuh. Sebelumnya, hubungan ekonomi antara China dan India ini sedang berkembang dan kerjasama juga terus dilakukan, terlebih dalam sektor teknologi tingkat tinggi. Huawei yang merupakan perusahaan penjual perangkat lunak telekomunikasi dan smartphone telah memiliki 1,18 milyar pelanggan jaringan nirkabel per Januari 2019 di India. Perusahaan ini juga siap membantu pemerintah India untuk bergabung dalam proyek 5G. Begitupun dengan produk *smartphone* Vivo, Oppo, hingga Realme yang dapat membuat pasar domestik India mengalami penurunan, seperti yang terjadi pada Lava, Micromax, hingga Honor. Selain itu, Xiaomi juga menjadi merek *smartphone* nomor 1 di India, mengalahkan produk ternama Samsung dan Apple.

Selain itu, aplikasi *smartphone* buatan China juga telah menguasai pasar domestik India untuk memanfaatkan pasar dengan pengguna telekomunikasi terbesar kedua di dunia. Pangsa pasar dari pengunduhan aplikasi China di India secara keseluruhan pada tahun 2019 berada pada angka 38% dari total persentase. Selain itu, aplikasi buatan China ini memiliki kualitas yang baik dan sangat populer baik di dunia maupun India. Misalnya, sekitar 40% dari unduhan aplikasi Tiktok di dunia ini berasal dari pasar India. Negara tersebut memang telah menjadi pasar luar negeri terbesar Tiktok dengan perkiraan basis pengguna lebih dari 200 juta.

Selain itu, terdapat pula aplikasi lainnya seperti SHAREit, UC Browser, WeChat, hingga PUBG yang menargetkan India sebagai pasar luar negeri terbesar China.

Namun, dengan sentimen anti-China yang menyebar luas di kawasan India, masyarakat melakukan boikot atas produk tersebut karena kekesalannya terhadap China. Pemerintah India juga melakukan pelarangan terhadap ratusan aplikasi China dengan alasan keamanan serta sebagai langkah tegas atas tindakan China di perbatasan. Atas hal tersebut, pada tahun 2021 secara resmi Departemen Telekomunikasi India tidak mengizinkan partisipasi Huawei dan ZTE pada proyek jaringan 5G. Selain itu, produk smartphone seperti Huawei, Xiaomi, hingga Realme telah mengalami penurunan pangsa pasar, dimana pangsa pasar Huawei telah turun dari 3,4% di tahun 2018 menjadi 1,46% di bulan September, 2021. Selain itu, merek dagang populer dari Xiaomi, Oppo, Vivo, hingga Realme mengalami penurunan pangsa pasar 9%, lebih tepatnya turun dari 81% ke 72% untuk pertama kalinya dalam 2 tahun. Begitupun dengan aplikasi asal perusahaan besar China, dimana hingga saat ini lebih dari 300 aplikasi buatan China telah dilarang beroperasi di India. Pangsa pasar dari pengunduhan aplikasi China di India ini mengalami penurunan yang besar hingga menyentuh angka 9%. Disisi lain, aplikasi buatan India dalam hal ini mencuri kesempatan dengan total pengunduhan yang mencapai kenaikan pangsa sebesar 39%.²⁵³ Bagi dilarangnya Tiktok, ByteDance telah kehilangan lebih dari 200 juta pengguna aktif dan Tiktok diperkirakan akan kehilangan lebih dari 6 miliar dolar AS,

bahkan sangat jauh diatas nominal tersebut. Begitupun dengan dengan PUBG yang mengeluarkan Tencent dari aplikasi game PUBG oleh Krafton, hingga WeChat, UC Browser, hingga SHAREit yang kehilangan lebih dari 400 juta pelanggannya.

Meskipun begitu, karena besarnya pengaruh produk telekomunikasi dan aplikasi China di India, tindakan yang dilakukan oleh India ini juga berdampak buruk terhadap negara tersebut. Pelarangan terhadap Huawei ini tentunya akan mengurangi persaingan dan membatasi operator untuk mendapatkan kesepakatan terbaik dari perusahaan 5G lainnya. Keputusan tersebut selanjutnya akan mengarah pada ketidakpastian kebijakan, menaikkan harga untuk pelanggan, dan semakin membahayakan kemitraan dengan China di masa depan. Padahal, tidak ada cukup penyedia layanan berkualitas tinggi sehingga diperlukan semakin banyak perusahaan yang memiliki kemampuan yang cukup untuk bergabung. Selain itu, dengan dilarangnya ratusan aplikasi China di India telah memperlambat aktivitas masyarakat India sendiri. Masyarakat India menjadi tidak dapat mengikuti trend global secara keseluruhan dan telah menimbulkan kerugian bagi masyarakat yang memang menghasilkan uang dari aplikasi - aplikasi yang dilarang beroperasi di India. Selain itu, adanya konflik di perbatasan dan sentimen anti-China telah menangguhkan beberapa investasi karena pelaku bisnis tidak ingin mempertaruhkan bisnis dan keuntungannya, serta mereka cenderung menjauhkan operasi perusahaan dari negara - negara yang berisiko tinggi dan tidak stabil secara politik.

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