



**PARAHYANGAN CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Accredited A

SK BAN - PT NO: 3095/SK/BAN-PT/Akred/S/VIII/2019

**Hostility vs. Reluctance: The Implication of Nuclear
Posture Adoption Towards India's Bilateral Relations
with Pakistan and China**

Undergraduate Thesis

By

Kinanti Aristawidya Putri

6091801150

Bandung

2021



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Advisor

Idil Syawfi, S.IP., M.Si.

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Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik
Jurusan Hubungan Internasional
Program Studi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional



Tanda Pengesahan Skripsi

Nama : Kinanti Aristawidya Putri
Nomor Pokok : 6091801150
Judul : Hostility vs. Reluctance: The Implication of Nuclear Posture
Adoption Towards India's Bilateral Relations with Pakistan and China

Telah diuji dalam Ujian Sidang jenjang Sarjana
Pada Senin, 10 Januari 2022
Dan dinyatakan **LULUS**

Tim Penguji

Ketua sidang merangkap anggota

Dr. I Nyoman Sudira, Drs., M.Si. : _____

Sekretaris

Idil Syawfi, S.IP., M.Si. : _____

Anggota

Adrianus Harsawaskita, S.IP., M.A. : _____

Mengesahkan,
Dekan Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik

Dr. Pius Sugeng Prasetyo, M.Si

STATEMENT LETTER

I, who signed below:

Name : Kinanti Aristawidya Putri
Student ID : 6091801150
Department : International Relations
Title : *Hostility vs. Reluctance: The Implication of Nuclear Posture Adoption Towards India's Bilateral Relations with Pakistan and China*

Hereby state that this undergraduate thesis is the product of my own work and has not been previously proposed by any other party(ies) to attain an academic degree. Any work or opinion from other parties are cited and will be written with a valid writing method.

This statement is made with full responsibility and I am fully willing to accept the consequences if this statement is proven to be untrue in the future.

Bandung, 25 December 2021



Kinanti Aristawidya Putri

ABSTRACT

Name : Kinanti Aristawidya Putri

NPM : 6091801150

Title : Hostility vs. Reluctance: The Implication of Nuclear Posture Adoption
Towards India's Bilateral Relations with Pakistan and China

With ongoing conflicts against two countries located directly to its borders, India developed nuclear weapons as a means to assure their survivability amidst the growing tension with Pakistan and China. However, India shows contradictory behaviour within its bilateral relations with both countries, whereas India has a highly hostile relations with Pakistan yet a rather cooperative relations with China. Ideally, accumulation of nuclear power will increase tension and lead to a more conflictual relationship. To answer this anomaly, this thesis will use the posture optimization theory to examine the factors that influence the state's final posture adoption. This thesis will compare two cases of India's nuclear conflicts with Pakistan and China to qualitatively see the implication of posture adoption to bilateral relationships. The analysis shows that India's adoption of assured retaliation posture against Pakistan aims to deter directly with their nuclear capabilities, while adopting the catalytic posture to shift China's focus to the U.S. as India's patron. As a result, India's tendency to be defensive yet assertive towards Pakistan raises the hostility among both of them. On the contrary, the existence of the U.S. deters disproportionate offensives from China against India, enabling them to have a degree of trust to establish cooperation.

Keywords: *Nuclear, India, Pakistan, China, posture, posture optimization theory, bilateral relations*

ABSTRAK

Nama : Kinanti Aristawidya Putri

NPM : 6091801150

*Judul : Permusuhan vs. Keengganan: Implikasi dari Adopsi Sikap Nuklir India
terhadap Hubungan Bilateralnya dengan Pakistan dan China*

Memiliki hubungan berkonflik dengan negara yang berbatasan langsung dengan teritorinya, India mengembangkan senjata nuklir sebagai sebuah instrumen untuk menjamin keberlangsungan negara mereka terhadap Pakistan dan China. Namun, India menunjukkan sikap yang kontradiktif di dalam hubungan bilateral dengan mereka, dimana India memiliki hubungan yang sangat berkonflik dengan Pakistan tapi dapat membangun kerjasama dengan China. Seharusnya, peningkatan kekuatan nuklir akan meningkatkan tensi yang membawa semakin banyak konflik dalam hubungan antar negara. Untuk menjawab anomali ini, skripsi ini akan menggunakan teori posture optimization untuk melihat faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi pengambilan sikap nuklir final suatu negara. Skripsi ini akan membandingkan dua kasus yang berhubungan dengan konflik nuklir India dengan Pakistan dan China untuk melihat implikasi adopsi sikap nuklir terhadap hubungan bilateral secara kualitatif. Analisa yang dihasilkan memperlihatkan bahwa adopsi postur assured retaliation India bertujuan untuk mengimbangi Pakistan secara langsung dengan kapabilitas nuklirnya, sedangkan postur catalytic diadopsi untuk mengalihkan fokus China ke AS sebagai negara patron India. Hasilnya, India cenderung lebih defensif namun tegas terhadap Pakistan yang berakhir pada agresifnya hubungan bilateral mereka. Di sisi lain, keberadaan AS membuat China enggan meningkatkan tensi terhadap India, memberikan mereka kesempatan untuk membangun kepercayaan dan menjaga kerjasama bilateral.

Kata kunci: Nuklir, India, Pakistan, China, postur, posture optimization theory, hubungan bilateral

PREFACE

Praise to the Almighty God for Your blessings, as the author is able to finish her journey in university by finishing this undergraduate thesis titled “Hostility vs. Reluctance: The Implication of Nuclear Posture Adoption Towards India’s Bilateral Relations with Pakistan and China”.

This research will explain the anomalous behaviour that India portrayed towards its main adversaries, namely Pakistan and China. This research then observes the implication of India’s nuclear posture adoption which differentiates their bilateral relations with Pakistan and China. The author hopes that the results of this thesis can contribute to the study of international politics and security studies within international relations.

This undergraduate thesis serves as the requirement of acquiring the Bachelor degree of International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Parahyangan Catholic University. The working process on this thesis is not without any obstacles, and the help of many parties have guided the author to get to this point. However, the author realizes that this thesis is far from perfect. Thus, the author is expecting every input and correction to further improve the quality of this thesis.

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Without any support or help from the people surrounding the author, this thesis would not be possible to be done within the limited six months time frame. Overwhelmed with deadlines, insecurity and anxiety for the quality of this thesis, and demotivation would be so hard to overcome without the presence of these people. On this opportunity, the author would like to express her gratitude for the warm company and constant validation from the people surrounding the author. Hereby I present;

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALBM	Air-launched ballistic missile
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCS	Cabinet Committee on Security
CMC	Central Military Commission
ETPC	Economic and Trade Planning Cooperation
JEG	India-China Joint Economic Group on Economic Relations and Trade, Science, and Technology
LAC	Line of Actual Control
LoC	Line of Control
MIRV/MRV	Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle
NCA	National Command Authority
NSAB	National Security Advisory Board
TIS	Service Trade Promotions
TSA	Trade Statistical Analysis
U.S.	United States of America

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

India, being the country located in between Pakistan and China with direct borders with each other, had long overshadowed tension in their relation with the aforementioned countries. Both India-Pakistan and India-China tensions are related to a territorial dispute and identity sentiments that are still ongoing until now. For India-Pakistan relations, hostility has been rooted since the Partition of India in 1947 that instigated the ongoing Kashmir territorial dispute which has just reached another climax in the 2019 Military Standoff.¹ On the contrary, India's main reason for insecurity against China was rooted in their border skirmishes in Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh, and Ladakh since 1962, which are now added with the tension coming from the recent Doklam Crisis in 2017.²

Another underlying factor of India's frequent hostility within their relations with Pakistan and China is the conflicting religious sentiments it had with aforementioned countries. India's religious sentiment towards Pakistan rooted from its partition in 1947 which is based on the Two Nations theory, separating the Muslims and Hindu in British India. As Pakistan's justification

¹ Paul J. Smith, "The Tilting Triangle: Geopolitics of the China–India–Pakistan Relationship," *Comparative Strategy* 32, no. 4 (2013): pp. 313-330, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2013.821850>.

² John E. Peters et al., *War and Escalation in South Asia* (United States: Rand corp santa monica ca, 2006).

of its claim in Kashmir is based on religious identity and Muslim discrimination in India, it raises India's political concern of a territorial loss based on that accusation. On China's part, India's constant intervention in the issue of Tibet, as well as its provisions of the Dalai Lama and the Karmapa, has been the underlying cause of tension with China condemning the actions.³

With those underlying conflicts present, higher tensions are brought by the build-up of power through nuclear weapon possession by India, Pakistan, and China.⁴ As a result, a nuclear-power 'arms race' has been a domino effect from the security dilemma perceived by these countries' means of deterrence through nuclear power. Nuclear weapons proliferation between these countries has resulted in the constant threat of Southern Asia's regional instability.⁵ This emphasizes the threat of nuclear outbreak when any of these countries has growing tension with each other, considering their nuclear weapon capabilities.

The accumulation of power through nuclear weapons has been intensifying the tension between India, Pakistan, and China which all possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons proliferation increased the security dilemma in the region, having a looming threat of nuclearization overshadowing the dynamics in the region. A vicious cycle of insecurity is established within the region, which can be seen in how China increased their nuclear deterrence capabilities against the United States (U.S.) will antagonize India, and India's

³ John E. Peters et al., *War and Escalation in South Asia* (United States: Rand corp santa monica ca, 2006).

⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "10. World Nuclear Forces," in *SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (S.I.: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 325-393.

⁵ The region of India, Pakistan, and China will then be referred to as Southern Asia.

increase of nuclear power will antagonize Pakistan as the lesser power.⁶ Any security reassurance of a certain nuclear-power state increases the insecurity of other states, which could lead into a nuclear arms race. Possibilities of any nuclear retaliation against a conventional standoff will most likely be determined by the clarity of these countries' nuclear policy, especially India as the pivot state.

1.2. Problem Identification

Despite the similar series of events that have built upon India's relations with Pakistan and China, there is a significant difference between India's contemporary relation dynamics with the aforementioned countries. India-Pakistan bilateral relations tend to be very fragile and hostile with each other with political tension existing between both states.⁷ The ongoing territorial dispute in Kashmir has not been resolved yet with the implementation of Lahore Declaration halted due to ceasefire agreement violations by both parties. The involvement of Pakistan-based terrorist groups had continuously deteriorated India-Pakistan relations as it can be seen in the Mumbai Bombings that escalated the tension between both countries after an effort to rebuild diplomatic ties.⁸ Until the contemporary era, their relations showed a pattern of hostility and no signs of progressive diplomatic relations normalization.

⁶ Devin T. Hagerty, "India's Evolving Nuclear Posture," *The Nonproliferation Review* 21, no. 3-4 (February 2014): pp. 295-315, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2014.1072990>, 298.

⁷ Michael Kugelman et al., "Pakistan-India Trade: What Needs to Be Done? What Does It Matter?," in *Managing India-Pakistan Trade Relations* (Washington, D.C., US: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program, 2013), pp. 59-74.

⁸ Dipankar Banerjee, "Addressing Nuclear Dangers: Confidence-Building between India, China and Pakistan *," *India Review* 9, no. 3 (September 14, 2010): pp. 345-363, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2010.506352>.

The existence of nuclear weapons contributed to raising the tension between India and Pakistan, increasing suspicion and hostilities between both.⁹ Although Pakistan is perceived as a direct threat, India maintained its behaviour to refrain from deploying any form of nuclear weapon first. This is shown by India's strategy to only "answer aggression with aggression", adhering to its no-first-use policy against Pakistani threats as seen during the Kashmir conflict.¹⁰ To deter Pakistan as its proximate threat, India frequently reasserts their capability for retaliation over Pakistan's nuclear attacks.

On the contrary, India and China succeeded in rebuilding their good diplomatic ties back in 1988.¹¹ In 2008, China had also become India's main trading partner and they extended their cooperation to further strategic and military cooperation.¹² Not to mention, India and China have been conducting joint military training at the Umroi Military Station at Meghalaya in 2019 which shows a level of compromise that India and China are willing to do.¹³

Noting India's main purpose in developing nuclear weapons was the perceived increasing tension from China, India portrays a rather 'mild' behaviour towards China and their nuclear weapons development. Playing as a

⁹ Singh Sandeep, Kaur Amanpreet, and Singh Amandeep, "Changing Equations of India-Pakistan Relations: Unresolved Kashmir Dispute as a Decider Factor," *International Research Journal of Social Sciences* 4, no. 3 (February 22, 2015): pp. 88-95.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Shivshankar Menon, "India-China Ties: The Future Holds 'Antagonistic Cooperation', Not War," *The Wire*, accessed March 25, <https://thewire.in/external-affairs/india-china-ties-expect-antagonistic-cooperation-future-not-war>.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Manjeet Negi, "India-China Joint Military Exercise Concludes in Meghalaya," *India Today*, December 20, 2019, <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-china-joint-military-exercise-concludes-meghalaya-1630184-2019-12-20>.

“middle ground” state, India maintains good relations with the U.S. while keeping its distance close to China. China is aware that any nuclear hostility towards India as the U.S. close ally might push further U.S. influence in the region.¹⁴ Hence, nuclear tensions are often dismissed and frictions between India-China tend to have a rather diplomatic approach rather than direct confrontations.

Similar backgrounds of tension are supposed to result in a similar tendency of behaviour in responding to nuclear weapon development between India-Pakistan relations and India-China relations. However, positive developments on India-China relations contradicts the ideal situation of growing insecurity amidst build of power. Especially noting the asymmetric nuclear capabilities between India and China with 150 and 320 nuclear warheads respectively, it is odd to see India is more threatened with Pakistan with only 160 warheads.¹⁵ Ideally speaking, India’s main concern should’ve been focused to deter China’s nuclear power as its existential threat.

1.2.1. Scope of the Research

To narrow down the scope of analysis for the research, this thesis is limited to the issue of nuclear proliferation and nuclear postures of regional nuclear power states. The actors involved are limited to India

¹⁴ Toby Dalton and Tong Zhao, “At a Crossroads? China-India Nuclear Relations after the Border Clash,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 19, 2020, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/19/at-crossroads-china-india-nuclear-relations-after-border-clash-pub-82489>.

¹⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “10. World Nuclear Forces,” in *SIPRI Yearbook 2020: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (S.I.: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 325-393.

as the central actor, supported by Pakistan and China as the comparative actors. The time period of the research is limited from 2014 to 2019 to limit the case to focus under Narendra Modi's leadership. This research will also utilize study cases to observe the difference between India-Pakistan and India-China bilateral relations, which are the 2019 Military standoff and the Doklam Crisis.

1.2.2. Research Question

After focusing the thesis with background, problem identification, and scope of the research, this thesis will answer the research question of **“Why did India display a different behaviour towards their bilateral relations with Pakistan and China despite similar series of tension from nuclear weapon proliferation?”**.

1.3. The Purpose and Utility of the Research

1.3.1. Purpose of the Research

This thesis' main purpose is to answer the proposed research question that was brought by this research, which is to prove that nuclear posture adoption affects the different outcome of bilateral relations that India displayed towards Pakistan and China. Other than that, this research is also done to see the implementation of the posture optimization theory in mapping the behaviour of regional nuclear power states and the categorization of the bilateral relations of India-Pakistan and India-China in the offense-defense theory.

1.3.2. Utility of the Research

This thesis is aimed to contribute to the posture optimization studies, especially within the nuclear proliferation in Southern Asia. The writer hopes that this research will be beneficial for any individual interested in researching the effect of India's nuclear posture towards its bilateral behaviour to Pakistan and China.

1.4. Literature Review

The literature that the writer used for this thesis revolves around the dynamics of India's bilateral relations with Pakistan and China and the factors affecting it. As no literature fulfills the general debate comparing the nature of India-Pakistan and India-China relations, the literature review takes cases as a comparison for each bilateral relation. From these literatures, it can be segmented that the debates have been going around the possibility of India-Pakistan and India-China relations to either maintain cooperation or its likelihood to engage in conflicts. It debates whether or not it is possible for India and both countries, bilaterally, to establish cooperation despite all tension between both countries.

India and Pakistan's fragile relationship could be seen in Dr. Adil Sultan's journal, "*India's Nuclear Doctrine: A Case of Strategic Dissonance or Deliberate Ambiguity*". Seeing contradictions in India's 2003 nuclear doctrine and its current behaviour for developing nuclear weapons, it raises the insecurity of Pakistan as a conflicting neighbour country. It argues that potential

shifts in India's nuclear posture and deliberate ambiguity will affect Pakistan's decision to take measures that will cause instability in South Asia.¹⁶

On the other hand, Subrata K. Mitra's "*War and peace in South Asia: A revisionist view of India and Pakistan relations*" challenged the dichotomous implication of India-Pakistan nature of relations as adversaries. Instead, Mitra argues that with revisionist perspective, neighbouring states that are prone to conflicts are still capable of cooperation. The article proposes that the involvement of citizens and the use of democracy will offer a higher degree of tolerance, accommodation, and dialogue for India-Pakistani peaceful conflict resolution.¹⁷

Meanwhile, India and China's contentious relations are portrayed by Sumit Ganguly & Andrew Scobell's journal, "*The Himalayan Impasse: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Wake of Doklam*". It argues that India and China's 'long-term hostility' manifests itself in the form of disputes, contestation, and coercion through use of force. Both countries' strong projection of interest maintains the tension in India and China's interactions with each other, especially with China's rather superior power and its expansion against India. This leaves their relations to be highly hostile.¹⁸

¹⁶ Adil Sultan, "India's Nuclear Doctrine: A Case of Strategic Dissonance or Deliberate Ambiguity," *IPRI Journal* VIII, no. 2 (2018): pp. 26-52, <https://doi.org/10.31945/iprij.180202>.

¹⁷ Subrata K. Mitra, "War and Peace in South Asia: A Revisionist View of India-Pakistan Relations," *Contemporary South Asia* 10, no. 3 (2001): pp. 361-379, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09584930120109568>.

¹⁸ Sumit Ganguly and Andrew Scobell, "The Himalayan Impasse: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Wake of Doklam," *The Washington Quarterly* 41, no. 3 (March 2018): pp. 177-190, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2018.1519369>.

On the contrary, Rajesh Basrur's journal, "*India and China: A Managed Nuclear Rivalry?*" have shown that although the nuclear modernization has put their relations into a rivalry as India and China strengthen their military presence, the bilateral relations between both can still be maintained with communication and confidence-building measures (CBM). Political arrangements are deemed enough to manage the hostility, although an underlying tension between both still exists. Basrur argues that a comparative nuclear rivalry, even if confrontation and crisis still persist, cooperation is still possible to prevent any nuclear outbreak.¹⁹

Additionally, Mohan Malik's journal, "*The China Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict*", shows the impact of China's position as a bigger country against the India-Pakistan rivalry and its driving force in the India-Pakistan-China trilateral relations. It argues the significance of China in driving the political issues in South Asia, with Pakistan as China's strategic investment partner and India as the U.S.' counterweight against China. China utilizes the tension to contain India from growing its power further and pushes the U.S.' influence in the region, especially with Pakistan's bargainable position.²⁰

Having the debates revolving around the different nature of India-Pakistan and India-China relations, this research positions itself in examining the peculiarity of India's behaviour, in which it tends to be more hostile towards Pakistan while maintaining cooperation with China despite their asymmetrical

¹⁹ Rajesh Basrur, "India and China: A Managed Nuclear Rivalry?," *The Washington Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (March 2019): pp. 151-170, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660x.2019.1666354>.

²⁰ Mohan Malik, "The China Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict," *Parameters*, 2003, pp. 35-50.

possession of nuclear weapons. This research argues that a series of structural factors affects the adopted nuclear posture of India towards Pakistan and China, which influences the contradicting nature of India's relations with both.

1.5. Theoretical Framework

To analyze the implication of India's nuclear posture towards their bilateral relationship with Pakistan and China, this thesis utilized the Posture Optimization theory. With this theory, the writer aims to analyze the implication of adopted nuclear posture by India, Pakistan, and China.

Posture Optimization Theory by Vipin Narang

Vipin Narang in "*Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict*" argues that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is not enough to assure effective deterrence. He argued that nuclear posture is rather more significant in posing a deterrence effect towards an emerging nuclear power.²¹ Unlike great powers whose nuclear capabilities are capable of exercising first use of nuclear weapons, retaliation strikes, or assuring survivability and destruction of opposing parties, regional nuclear powers are limited with systemic and domestic constraints such as capabilities, management procedures, and transparency.²² Narang distinguished the three possible nuclear postures that could be adopted by regional nuclear powers, which are the catalytic posture, the assured retaliation posture, and the

²¹ Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 35.

²² *Ibid.*

asymmetric escalation posture.²³ The aforementioned postures are determined by the nuclear primary envisioned employment, capabilities, command-and-control structure or architectures, and the degree of transparency in nuclear usage.²⁴ This is caused by how regional nuclear powers need to make decisions under their related constraints to achieve their deterrent ends.

Every regional nuclear power, regardless of a minor variation in their posture adoption, will adopt either one of these three categories. States that adopted a catalytic posture would have a third party that provides military and diplomatic assistance if their vital interest is threatened, whereas the third party serves to stall the client state from any nuclear breakout.²⁵ This posture relied on portraying a high degree of ambiguity about their nuclear capabilities and conditions for use of nuclear weapons.²⁶ The deployment of nuclear weapons will be the last resort of a state if they are threatened and the nuclear weapons are not intended to be directly used.²⁷ States who adopt assured retaliation relies on a direct nuclear deterrence and coercion, which leads to its key characteristics in the presence of survivable retaliation-strike against its adversary.²⁸ A greater transparency of capabilities and a nuclear force structure that are capable of surviving a nuclear attack is needed to ensure their capabilities in retaliating against nuclear forces.²⁹ Lastly, states who adopt an

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 36.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 37.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

asymmetric escalation posture have the option to conduct first nuclear offense against any conventional attack. Therefore, states who adopt this posture must possess the adequate capabilities to ensure their employment of nuclear assets against any adversary's immediate conventional attacks or war-production capacity.³⁰ The ability to enable a credible, asymmetric first use of nuclear weapons is vital to deter a nuclear outbreak.³¹ Hence, this categorization gives a broader view to analyze the pattern of behaviour of regional nuclear states.

Narang's theory consists of four related and derivable variables to determine the nuclear posture of a state. In regards to the security environment, there are two structural variables that influence a state's assessment to adopt a nuclear posture, which are the availability of a third-party patron and the existence of an immediate security environment.³² Firstly, a third-party patron provides a regional nuclear power to secure the regional nuclear power's protection under a greater power as their external balancer in a crisis.³³ The availability of a third-party patron will lead to the adoption of a catalytic nuclear posture.³⁴ Should there be no third-party patron to provide protection, the state needs to provide security on its own and its further calculation will be determined by the intensity of their security environment.³⁵ If they are facing a conventionally-superior proximate offensive threat capable of crossing

³⁰ *Ibid*, 38.

³¹ *Ibid*, 38.

³² Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 52-53.


³³ *Ibid*, 53.

³⁴ *Ibid*, 56.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 57.

geographies and generating an existential threat, a state will adopt an asymmetric escalation nuclear posture to directly deter the threat.³⁶ If there is no severe immediate security threat, it will be determined by other unit-level intervening variables.

Figure 1.1. The posture optimization theory of nuclear posture.



Source: Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 56.

Unit-level variables affect the calculation of nuclear posture adoption as a structural constraint, in which it is affected in a systematic, testable and falsifiable, and in a non-ad hoc manner.³⁷ This variable includes the civil-military arrangement and the state's resources constraints. Civil-military arrangement concerns the authority that holds control of the deployment of nuclear weapons, whether if it's the civilian government with

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 60.

their assertive control over military or if the substantial and nuclear operationalization are delegated to the related military institutions.³⁸ States adopting assertive civil-military structures will centralize the command authority to civilian authorities to avoid any nuclear assets deployments and favour negative control over them to prevent possible accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, hence adopting assured retaliation posture.³⁹ However, states with delegative civil-military structures will favour positive control that assure nuclear use if necessary in consideration with the resource constraints they have.⁴⁰ If the state has advantages in resources compared to their adversaries and does not have any relative resource constraints, the state will opt to an asymmetric nuclear posture.⁴¹ However, if a state faces significant resource constraints, it will adopt an assured escalation posture.⁴² These variables are used to examine the adoption of postures by the actors involved within this thesis.

Offense-Defense Theory by Robert Jervis

As an extension of the concept of security dilemma, Robert Jervis improved his conception into the offense-defense theory that explained the implication of growing intensity of security dilemma between states. Jervis stated in the “*Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma*” that there are two

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 60.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 61-63.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 64

⁴² *Ibid.*, 63.

variables that needs to be examined to see the possible scenarios of relations between two states, which are (1) whether the offense or defense capabilities has the advantage and (2) whether offensive postures can be distinguished from defensive ones.⁴³ Identifying if the offense or defense has the advantage can be seen from the technology and geography of the state, where it affects a state's vulnerability.⁴⁴ In addition to that, diplomatic efforts and intelligence could be considered to determine its defensive or offensiveness.⁴⁵ This thesis would not consider this variable thoroughly.

Jervis identified four possible worlds from the variables. If offensive posture is not distinguishable from defensive ones but offensive capabilities have advantage, then the environment would be double dangerous with a very intense security dilemma as both states will behave like aggressors and arms race are likely.⁴⁶ If posture is still not distinguishable but defensive capabilities have advantage, then a state will be able to increase their power without threatening other states although the security dilemma might be intense.⁴⁷ On the other hand, if offensive posture is distinguishable from defensive one with advantageous offensive capabilities, there would not be any security dilemma but aggression and security problems are still possible.⁴⁸ The last world with distinguishable offensive posture from defensive one with advantageous

⁴³ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978): pp. 167-214, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958>.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 196.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 211.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 212

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

defensive capabilities will result in a doubly stable environment, in which there are no security issues and presents the possibility to establish cooperation.⁴⁹ In this thesis, the categorization of worlds will be utilized as a supplementary theory to explain the implication of nuclear posture towards a state's bilateral relations.

1.6. Research Methodology

This thesis is done based on a qualitative research method. This research strategy emphasizes words and an inductive approach to see the generation of theory to see the relations between theory and research.⁵⁰ The research method chosen is specifically a comparative design using two contrasting case studies.⁵¹ This method is chosen under the consideration that this research aims to find explanations regarding differences between two cases with similar social situations.⁵² By using two case studies, it enables the writer to examine the causal mechanism in contrasting context.⁵³

As this thesis uses a qualitative research method, data collection relies on non-numeric data to acquire better understanding regarding the phenomena.⁵⁴ All data in this thesis is secondary data that are acquired from literature and documents. This thesis collects data from various sources, such as

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Umar Suryadi Bakry. *Metode Penelitian Hubungan Internasional*. Pustaka Pelajar: Yogyakarta, 2016.

state-released official documents, private official documents, mass media outputs especially news, and virtual documents including online journals and books.⁵⁵ The acquired data takes form as words and numeric information that will serve to give context to the phenomena.⁵⁶

This thesis uses a comparative politics method for analyzing the data to discover empirical relationships among variables.⁵⁷ The analysis will be done in comparing two similar cases and see which variable differs that results in a different behavior. Specifically, the analysis would use the deviant case analysis to see why a certain case is not happening as it should be and uncover additional contributing variables.⁵⁸

1.7. Structure of the Research

Chapter I serves as the introduction of the thesis, which includes a short background explanation regarding the research, the related identification and limitation of the research, research question, purpose and utility of research, literature review, theoretical framework, and research methodology of this thesis.

Chapter II is titled *Ongoing Conflicts Between India, Pakistan, China and Their Growing Tension of Nuclear Proliferation*, which provides an overview of India-Pakistan and India-China dynamics of relations and empirical

⁵⁵ Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁵⁶ Umar Suryadi Bakry. *Metode Penelitian Hubungan Internasional*. Pustaka Pelajar: Yogyakarta, 2016.

⁵⁷ Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971): pp. 682-693, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1955513>.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

data regarding the India-Pakistan-China nuclear development, capabilities, and nuclear doctrine.

Chapter III is titled *Analysis of Posture Adoption by India and its Impacts towards Their Bilateral Relationship with Pakistan and China*, which focuses on analyzing the difference of India's behaviour towards Pakistan and China as an emerging nuclear state. This chapter will provide a comparison of factors that influence India's behaviour and perception of threat towards Pakistan and China. This chapter will also analyze the effects of nuclear posture adoption towards India's bilateral relations with Pakistan and China.

Chapter IV provides the conclusion of this thesis. This chapter answers the research questions that are proposed in the thesis and fulfills the purpose of the research to analyze India's nuclear posture implications towards its bilateral relations.

