



Parahyangan Catholic University
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Department of International Relations

Accredited A

SK BAN-PT NO:3095/SK/BAN-PT/Akred/S/VIII/2019

Thesis

By

Jasmine Feivel Ayuningroem

2017330113

Bandung

2020



Parahyangan Catholic University
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Department of International Relations

Accredited A

SK BAN-PT NO:3095/SK/BAN-PT/Akred/S/VIII/2019

**NATO's Burden-Sharing Goal in Europe: Alliance
Dilemma in Balancing Towards Russian Threat in
Eastern Europe (2014-2019)**

Thesis

By

Jasmine Feivel Ayuningroem

2017330113

Supervisor

Idil Syawfi S.IP., M.A.

Bandung

2020

Parahyangan Catholic University
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Department of International Relations



Thesis Approval

Name : Jasmine Feivel Ayuningroem
Student ID : 2017330113
Title : NATO's Burden-Sharing Goal in Europe: Alliance Dilemma in Balancing
Towards Russian Threat in Eastern Europe (2014-2019)

Approved to be filed to thesis defense on

Bandung, 6 January 2021


Supervisor,



Ida Syawfi, S.IP., M.A.

Approved by,

Head of International Relations Department



Ratih Indraswari, S.IP., M.A.

Faculty of Social and Political Science
Department of International Relations
International Relations Major



Thesis Validation

Name : Jasmine Feivel Ayuningroem
Student ID : 2012330039
Title : NATO's Burden-Sharing Goal in Europe: Alliance Dilemma in
Balancing Towards Russian Threat in Eastern Europe (2014-2019)

Has been examined in Final Examination
On Thursday, 28th of January 2021
And thereby declared **GRADUATED**

The Board of Examiners

Chairperson and Member of Examiners

Dr. I Nyoman Sudira

:

Advisor

Edil Syawfi, S.IP., M.Si

:

Member of Examiners

Adrianus Harsawaskita, S.IP., MA

:

Approved by,
Dean of Faculty of Social and Political Science

Dr. Pius Sugeng Prasetyo, M.Si

Statement

I, who sign below,

Name : Jasmine Feivel Ayuningorm

Student ID : 2017330113

Department : International Relations

Title : NATO's Burden-Sharing Goal in Europe: Alliance Dilemma in
Balancing Towards Russian Threat in Eastern Europe (2014-2019)

Hereby, it is asserted that this thesis is the result of my own effort, and that no other group has ever suggested it in order to receive an academic degree. Any thoughts and knowledge received from the other party shall be officially quoted in compliance with the valid method of scientific writing.

I declare this statement with complete accountability, and I am prepared to acknowledge the consequences of the existing laws if this statement is found to be untrue.

Bandung, 4 January 2021



Jasmine Feivel Ayuningroem

2017330113

ABSTRACT

Name : Jasmine Feivel Ayuningroem

Student ID : 2017330113

Title : NATO's Burden-Sharing Goal in Europe: Alliance Dilemma in
Balancing Towards Russian Threat in Eastern Europe (2014-2019)

This research aims to explain NATO's security dilemma thus lead to its unwillingness to comply with its military spending commitment. The dilemma finds itself in Europe's differ perception of threat these years. In Cold War, NATO held a strong milestone in fighting for Europe's security interests, by binding Europe's democracies, decreasing the chance of conflicts, and deterring Russia. After Cold War, the perception of threat has shifted into various concerns, be it the turbulence in Eastern part of Europe, migration, and terrorism. NATO's vigilance towards its threat has been decreasing, but increased after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Wales Summit in 2014 was conducted as the response to the crisis. It constitutes NATO's commitment that aims for a fair and balanced sharing of cost, to spend 2% of state's GDP on defense. However, as the United States continues to pressure European countries to spend more, only 8 of its 29 members that spend at 2% in 2019. This research will utilize the concept of Alliance Security Dilemma which provided by Glenn Snyder, and also Schweller's Under-balancing. Snyder's concept helps to explain that Western part of Europe seems to draw themselves in the dilemma, whether it is to sacrifice more for the alliance, which means put them in the spiral of high cost of insecurity. On the other side, Eastern Europe stands on the limited choice, facing their economic collapse while also dealing with Russian aggressive behaviour in the region. They tend to choose being entrapped into the interest of powerful state. The ultimate decision that tends under-balance will be explored in Schweller's concept. In explaining such issues, this research needs an interpretation to analyze the provided case. Therefore, interpretative analysis will explains the meaning and significance to understand the causes and effects of NATO's behaviour in responding the threat.

Keywords: NATO, defense, security dilemma, Russia, Europe, United States, threat perception.

ABSTRAK

Nama : Jasmine Feivel Ayuningroem

NPM : 2017330113

Judul : Burden Sharing NATO: Dilema Aliansi dalam Menyeimbangkan

Ancaman di Eropa Timur (2014-2019)

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan dilema keamanan NATO sehingga menyebabkan keenggannya untuk mematuhi komitmen pengeluaran militernya. Dilema tersebut menemukan dirinya dalam perbedaan persepsi Eropa tentang ancaman tahun ini. Dalam Perang Dingin, NATO memegang tonggak sejarah yang kuat dalam memperjuangkan kepentingan keamanan Eropa, dengan mengikat negara-negara demokrasi Eropa, mengurangi kemungkinan konflik, dan memberikan lawan yang setara kepada Rusia. Pasca Perang Dingin, persepsi tentang ancaman telah berubah; kekacauan di Eropa Timur, migrasi, dan terorisme. Kewaspadaan NATO terhadap ancamannya telah berkurang, meningkat setelah aneksasi Krimea pada tahun 2014. Pada tanggal 5 September 2014 di Wales Summit, NATO sepakat untuk memulai pembagian biaya yang adil dan seimbang, untuk membelanjakan 2% dari PDB negara untuk pertahanan. Selagi Amerika Serikat terus menekan negara-negara Eropa untuk membelanjakan lebih banyak, hanya 8 dari 29 anggotanya yang membelanjakan 2% pada tahun 2019. Penelitian ini akan memanfaatkan konsep Dilema Keamanan Aliansi yang diberikan oleh Glenn Snyder, dan juga Under-balancing dari Schweller's. Konsep Snyder membantu menjelaskan bahwa bagian Barat Eropa mengalami dilema, memilih berkorban lebih banyak untuk aliansi, yang berarti diri mereka dalam situasi tidak aman yang terlalu mahal. Di sisi lain, Eropa Timur memiliki pilihan yang terbatas, menghadapi keruntuhan ekonomi mereka sambil juga berurusan dengan perilaku agresif Rusia di wilayah tersebut. Mereka cenderung memilih terjebak dalam kepentingan negara kuat. Keputusan akhir yang cenderung kurang seimbang akan dieksplorasi dalam konsep Schweller. Dalam menjelaskan permasalahan tersebut, penelitian ini membutuhkan interpretasi untuk menganalisis kasus yang diberikan. Oleh karena itu, analisis interpretatif akan menjelaskan makna dan signifikansi untuk memahami sebab dan akibat dari perilaku NATO dalam menyikapi ancaman tersebut.

Kata kunci: NATO, dilema, pertahanan, keamanan, Rusia, Eropa, Amerika Serikat, persepsi ancaman.

PREFACE

NATO's role in securing Europe's security interest has been proven since the era of Cold War. The alliance endures to protect European continent from external threats, despite the shifting focus from Soviet's golden age until now, that threats are more than just a traditional war. NATO became more relaxed after the collapse of Soviet Union, until the annexation of Crimea took place, and eventually took the soul of NATO to act. Europe feels that the act of illegal annexation shall not be infect others, thus led the alliance to commit on 2% burden-sharing goal. Unfortunately, since the majority of the alliance does not seem to comply with the goal despite of their initial historic commitment, this inspires the author to explore the answer of their unwillingness. It is worth to understand how European perspective changed over time, and finally came up with the decision that tend to abandon the alliance's value in this uncertain world.

The author hopes that this research can contribute more to the study of International Relations in the future. Particularly, in understanding NATO's action and behavior in this multipolar world.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I thank Lord for His presence and guidance in enlightened me throughout the process of this thesis. It still feels surreal that I am able to finish the whole draft by my own head. It's only by His Grace.

I can live to finish the thesis without these amazing people, but I would never want to.

To my family: my Mom, Dad, and my brothers: Ko Heru, Ko Dike, and Axel. I don't think I can imagine how much I can be thankful for your support and presence. I know we've been into the greatest storm the past, and now paving our way into the warmth of a family. I am grateful to be surrounded by the flood of love everyday during my uni years.

To Mas Idil Syawfi. Thank you for your patience, knowledge, and energy that reflected throughout this thesis. Your kindness and knowledge will always be a treasure for every student's lifetime.

To all lecturers at HI Unpar: Mbak Vrames, Mbak Syl, Mbak Mirei, Mas Idil, Mas Sapta, Mas Giandi, Mas Aseng, Mas Marshall, Mas Nyoman, Mas Adri, Mas Nara, Mbak Jess. I was afraid that IR study will be a nightmare. But I am glad I was wrong. Thank you for your time and energy to guide me in learning IR. It was fun and I am glad to finish my study at HI Unpar.

To my numero uno support system throughout crazy uni world, Audi and Nana. I can't thank you enough for your weird energy that somehow connects perfectly with mine, and especially, for the endless support during my hardest time these years. I am proud and also grateful to watch us grow up (and glow up too, duh) and be a better person each day. I am certain that each one of us will make a happy, and happy, nothing but a happy lifetime ahead. Xx

To Ari, it's over. My rocky uni days are history. And, you, made it historic. I am losing my count of the list of your support and help throughout my journey. Maybe because it's endless?! Who knows? The thing is, I can't be more grateful and thankful for your presence. Your brain, your energy, and time. Not to mention your approach in understanding my weird behavior, it's priceless! Let this be our milestone to embrace the future ahead. Shall we?

Dear Yemenis: Efrem, Jepe, Audi, Nana, Sonia, Rahmuy, Rossy, and Chy. I know Prakdip is so yesterday, but I also know we always have each other for tomorrow. Thank you for your hard work, patience, and the spirit that always inspires me to do better. Thank you for filling the gossip box until it's overloaded. May God have mercy on our sins. Oh, and those late night deep talks and jokes? I guess 4 (or even more?) SKS will never paid those moments. I guess I'll see you when I see you, yeah?

To Grace Nathania, my favorite sister. Thank you for the random calls in the middle of the night, I never know that I needed it to keep being sane. Most importantly, thank you for always be by my side, despite the long distance problem. I owe you a bunch, love.

To my WorldMUN fellas: Irena Putrika, Ari, Ka Indi, Ka Muti, Kezie, Albert, and Esterlita. Remember the moment we arrived in Madrid, astonished by the view of the city, and tried to process our mind of list of things we could do there? That is exactly what I feel right now. The excitement and fear burning in your chest. The mind that won't stop thinking and worrying of what your future holds. And I am grateful to share those feelings with you. With lots of laughter and fun days at BTI, Pares, and AirBnB. Time flies so fast, but my heart is always stays. I hope our paths will get crossed someday, cheers!

To my sassy high school friends: Dea, Nath, Noy, Audi, Celine, and Djuw. Thank you for being a good friend despite time and place constraints. I am a proud friend

to see each one of us grow up to be a happy and mature person. You know I'll always treasure your presence, jokes, and deep talks between every occasion in the future.

To PNMHII team: Lulu, Sulthin, Tibi, Kezie, Efrem, Cheryl, Kezu, and Gio. The exciting team that unexpectedly be one of the most precious journey of my uni life. Thank you for every knowledge, spirit, and conversations that always reminds me how fun an "academic" team could be. Cheers!

To Subs Tati Tati Affairs: Ste, Daniel, Iqbal, Lulu, and Tya. You already know. I am hooked. Thank you for being the warmest working-family I've ever known. Every support and late-night convo will always be my treasure.

To my MUN / weird-political-preference buddies: Laksmi, Pandu, and Akmal. MUNs are exhausting but you guys made it worth to fight. Thank you for your support and the endless meme supplies daily. And nugas time at Coop for hours. Time flies but don't get tired with me, yeah?

To Sharleen Lee. Thank you for always have my back. Even the darkest part of me, the troubled life I've ever been. Take care, like really. You know I'll always love you. And I'll see you soon!

To a website that gave me free access to academical stuff, you guys are dope. This degree is screaming thank you.

Last but not least, thank you, Jasmine. For your energy and time. And even tears. For your brain and muscle committed for this final step of your education. Or maybe not final, because you're a fighter for excellence. Thank you, for opening yourself to many adventurous possibilities that you could never imagine before. Here's to a greater, harder journey with your imperfections, forever will be a student to learn in any day of your life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	i
Abstrak	ii
Preface.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Table of Contents	vii
List of Tables.....	viii
List of Graph	ix
List of Figures	x
<i>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>1.1 Background of the Problem</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>1.2 Problem Identification</i>	<i>4</i>
1.2.1. Research Scope	9
1.2.2. Research Question.....	9
<i>1.3 Purpose of the Research.....</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>1.4 Literature Review.....</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>1.5 Theoretical Framework.....</i>	<i>12</i>
1.5.1. Alliance Theory & Security Dilemma	12
1.5.2. Balance of power and under-balancing.....	16
<i>1.6 Research Methods & Data Collection</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>1.7 Research Structure</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>CHAPTER II Digging deeper the new dynamic: NATO's Threat and Deterrence.</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>2.1. Russian threat in Europe: the case of Crimea and Russian propaganda</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>2.2.The Formulation of Wales Summit 2014.....</i>	<i>25</i>
2.2.1. NATO's internal polemic in burden-sharing commitment	27
<i>2.3. Eastern Europe as strategic security allies.....</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>2.4. The 2% Military Burden-Sharing Goal.....</i>	<i>34</i>
2.4.1. Countries comply with the 2% goal	36
2.4.2 Countries under 1% and smallest increase.....	37

<i>CHAPTER III Answering Europe's Unanswered Threat</i>	42
<i>3.1. A Shifting Perception</i>	42
3.1.1. Western European Perspective Towards Russian Threat.....	44
<i>3.2. Questioning the Relevance</i>	47
3.2.1. The Alliance's Security Dilemma.....	49
<i>3.3. The Alliance's Determinants of Choice</i>	54
<i>3.4. Under-balancing the Status Quo</i>	59
<i>Chapter IV CONCLUSION</i>	64
<i>BIBLIOGRAPHY</i>	69

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 NATO Defense Expenditure.....	5
Table 1.2 The Composite Security Dilemma in a Multipolar System	14
Table 3.1 “The Composite Security Dilemma of NATO and its Threat”.....	51

LIST OF GRAPH

Graph 2.1 NATO Europe's defense spending has fallen well below the agreed threshold.....	30
Graph 2.2 Defense Expenditure as a share of GDP and annual real change.....	35
Graph 2.3 NATO vs. Russian Spending 2010-2017	39

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1	The Process of Under-balancing	59
-------------------	--------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Problem

Only few people could find tiny Montenegro on map. Most people couldn't explain the differences between Slovenia and Slovakia. However, for those who lived through the Cold War, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held a milestone in collective security strategies in Europe. NATO binds Europe's democracies, decreases the chance of bloody conflicts between the continent, provides equal opponent to Russia, and defeats communism without starting a deadly shot. NATO's Article V was activated. Article V of the NATO Treaty commits each member to defend the others when under attack after the event of 9/11 took place. For America's NATO partners, the attacks on Washington and New York were just the same as an attack on London, Rome, or Oslo. NATO also began conducting counterterrorism and antipiracy campaigns in Iraq, Libya, the Horn of Africa and Syria. NATO is important for Europe, in deterring an aggressive rival and keeping the West strong and free.¹

As one of the prominent members of NATO, U.S. has the best single asset on the world stage, which is the network of alliances, partners and associates. The network is under deliberate pressure: from China, with its competitive "One Belt, One Road" strategy, and from Russia, with its constant attacks on coalition unity. Strong NATO means not only having allies in the fight, but also a powerful

¹ James Stavridis, "Why NATO is Essential for World Peace", *Time Magazine*, accessed 8 September 2020. <https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-world-peace/>

deterrent to the aggression of ambitious adversaries.² Thus, the US spends about 3.4% of its GDP on defense, and comprises roughly 69% of overall defense spending by NATO member states. This huge spending on NATO's military had led President Trump to be more critical towards NATO's members. Trump wants other NATO member states to increase defense spending — and soon.³

On September 5, 2014, the heads of state and government of the NATO issued a declaration in the Wales Summit. The document constitutes NATO's highest-level commitment to the crisis that has been unfolding since the 2014 annexation of Russia in Ukraine. On the summit, the speech stated that the goal is aimed for a fair and balanced sharing of cost and responsibilities, and within the guideline spending 2% of GDP on defense which will further provide required capabilities such as deploying forces.⁴ As the crisis led to worsening relations between the West and Russia, Wales Summit widely seen as marking a fundamental shift in Europe's security strategy.

Eastern Europe, which lies between Russia and NATO, has become the epicenter of this emerging security crisis, which has led to an increasingly dangerous militarisation. Besides annexation, Russian exercises in the Baltic Sea,

² Lindsay Lloyd, "NATO: Still Relevant in a Dangerous World", *Bush Center Issue 15* (2019) <https://www.bushcenter.org/catalyst/global-challenges/lloyd-nato-still-relevant-in-a-dangerous-world.html>

³ John Haltiwanger, "How NATO Budget is Funded", *Business Insider*, 13 July 2018. <https://www.businessinsider.com/how-nato-budget-is-funded-2018-7?r=US&IR=T#:~:text=Meanwhile%2C%20the%20US%20spends%20about,billion%20in%20fiscal%202019%20alone.>

⁴ NATO, "The Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond", accessed 13 February 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112985.htm

such as near the Karlskron Naval Base in Sweden, are a sign of Moscow 's intention to extend its control over the states of the former Soviet Union.⁵

According to Sławomir Dębski, the director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the defense budget is a high priority for obvious reason, that is, close proximity of Russia, which considered as aggressive in Eastern Europe.⁶ In October 2018, Ukraine joined the US and seven other countries of NATO in a series of large-scale air exercises in Western Ukraine. The exercises followed Russia's annual military exercise in September 2018, the largest since the fall of the Soviet Union.⁷ The response in 2018 was in line with NATO's interest to protect Eastern Europe from Russia's influence, due to the crisis back in 2014. The Wales Summit composed a shared threat by European countries and the U.S., the belligerent Russia in Eastern Europe, the commitment to increase GDP-military burden sharing is needed, in which often galvanized by President Trump to be implemented as soon as possible.

⁵ Vitali Shkliarov, "Belarus May Be The Key to Solving NATO's Problems with Russia", *Foreign Policy*, 3 December 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/03/tensions-russia-nato-eastern-europe-militarized-belarus/>.

⁶ Dov Zakheim, "NATO's budget virus: How the pandemic could slash military spending", accessed 1 April 2020. <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/487434-natos-budget-virus-how-the-pandemic-could-slash-military-spending>

⁷ Council of Foreign Relations, "Conflict in Ukraine", accessed 2 April 2020. <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine>

1.2 Problem Identification

The Wales Summit contemplated the fundamental shift of Europe security strategy in countering their external threat. Despite their collective threat, European NATO members have shown little enthusiasm for significantly increase their defense spending goal since the Wales summit. Regardless of the increased number of assorted armaments projects, the goal is still distant.⁸ As of June 2019, NATO data estimated that only 8 of its 29 members — including the United States— are to spend 2% or more of their annual GDP on defense.^{9,10} The countries are United States, Bulgaria, Greece, United Kingdom, Estonia, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland as shown below in Table 1.1.

Despite the upward appearance of increase in the budget, United States President Trump has repeatedly said the U.S. provides “too much cash for NATO”, spending so much on maintaining missile defense systems within Europe and positioning 65,000 troops within the continent. Last December on 70th annual celebration of NATO, Trump stated criticism against other members, due to their failure in defense spending, coming up late to meetings, and finally arguing that


⁸ Jan Techau, “The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe“, accessed 15 Feb. 20, <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/09/02/politics-of-2-percent-nato-and-security-vacuum-in-europe-pub-61139>

⁹ David Reid, “Three charts that show why Trump thinks NATO is a bad deal”, World Politics, *CNBC*, December 2019. <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/03/three-charts-that-show-why-trump-thinks-nato-is-a-bad-deal.html>

¹⁰ Ramon Marks, “Reality Check: NATO’s Defense Budget Woes Won’t Disappear”, accessed 2 April 2020. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/reality-check-natos-defense-budget-woes-wont-disappear-30582?page=0%2C1>

European leaders had stooped to their requests to increase their spending, in which they later denied.¹¹

Table 1.1
“NATO Defense Expenditure”



Source: Forbes.com

Over the last few years, Russia and NATO have been trapped in a security dilemma where each other's trusts and motives seeks to build up more military strength to deter its competitor. While both perceive their actions to be defensive,

¹¹ Niall McCarthy, “NATO Summit: The Countries with 2% Threshold”, *Forbes*, 3 December 2019. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2019/12/03/nato-summit-the-countries-meeting-the-2-threshold-infographic/#396af36d1f2c>

their opponent sees only aggression — and the cycle dangerously repeats itself. Russian invasion of Crimea in March 2014, accompanied by unlawful annexation, violated the basic values of the Final Act. These principles include the commitment of the participating States to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, and to refrain from threatening or using force against the territorial integrity or independence of any State. However, The Kremlin did not stop the cycle at Crimea. Eastern Ukraine, particularly in Donbas region has been experiencing the involvement of Russia's military and security personnel since April 2014, took more than 10,000 lives. This included the provision of leadership, financing, ammunition, heavy weapons, supplies and, regular units of the Russian army, supported the separatist group against Ukrainian legitimate government.¹²

As the talk efforts by Germany and France didn't generate any sign of peace, the European states including the United States consequently required a proposal to stabilize Eastern Europe, which later composed The Wales Summit. They cannot let these tactics that has been implemented against Ukraine could be applied elsewhere against other European countries.

Inside the NATO 70th Celebration in London, there was an ongoing tension that fractured the collective goal of NATO, whereas Turkey claimed to veto NATO's decision in the near future. Last November, Turkey has already refused to support a NATO defense plan for the Baltics and Poland. As an exchange for their further approval, Ankara expect the alliance offers more political support for its

¹² "The Growing Russian Military Threat in Europe". *Brookings*, accessed 1 September 2020. <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-growing-russian-military-threat-in-europe/>

fight against Kurdish YPG militia in northern Syria. The plan was drawn up at the request after Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. NATO was seeking formal approval by all 29 member states for the military plan to defend Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the event of a Russian attack. Nevertheless it has no direct bearing on Turkey's strategy in Syria, however, without Turkey's approval, it could be harder for NATO to step up its defenses in the Baltics and Poland quickly.¹³ The unwillingness of Turkey's support in NATO's plan would fracture the decision-making process and raises issues about security on the alliance.

As President Trump implied that the country sacrificed too much money for NATO, European countries agreed to shift the status quo, to sacrifice more for NATO, especially to involve in Eastern Europe security to push back Russian influence from Western Europe region. However, in order to meet NATO goals, members must significantly increase expenditures for defense because Europe cannot hide forever behind the military skirts of the United States.¹⁴ Unfortunately, members are still hesitated to spend more, despite of U.S.' impetus and their "shared threats" as agreed on the Wales Summit in 2014. In fact, years after Russian annexation in Ukraine, as the crisis has been loosening. As a matter of fact, as stated above, countries that increased their military spending significantly are countries that affected by proximity with Russia. Most of them are Bulgaria, Latvia,

¹³ Robin Emmott, "Exclusive: Turkey holds up NATO military plans over Syria dispute – sources", accessed 7 February 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-turkey-exclusive/exclusive-turkey-holds-up-nato-military-plans-over-syria-dispute-sources-idUSKBN1Y01W0>

¹⁴Ibid.

Lithuania, Romania, Poland, and Estonia, whom have a great increase after the annexation of Crimea.¹⁵ The rest of the countries, which geographically far away from Russia seemed unbothered as they have less enthusiasm in increasing their budget. For example, Germany and other states, if they have increased spending, the percentage change is minor due to simultaneous economic growth. Another case, country such as Luxemburg, with the highest GDP but less military interest towards Russia nor Eastern Europe, and also geographically away from the threat, would sense an imbalance proportions between their interest and their over-capacity.¹⁶

Too much of NATO's public profile is now focused on fighting over burden-sharing goals that could be counterproductive. If the initial response of the goal is Russia's aggression, experts stated that `goals are questionable towards the actual level of NATO resources relative to key Russian threat. They assumed the solution is spending more, rather than wisely, whereas a report stated that NATO Europe accounted for 17.9% of total global military spending and Russia only accounted for 3.7%.¹⁷ As a result of constant pressure from the current Administration in the U.S., NATO focuses on progress in meeting these percentage objectives — regardless of whether this is the right priority for a given country or will strengthen the Alliance.

¹⁵ NATO, "Press Release on Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries 2013-2019", *Public Diplomacy Division*, accessed 2 September 2020.

https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_11/20191129_pr-2019-123-en.pdf

¹⁶ "Europe's NATO members failing to meet spending targets", News, *DW*, accessed 2 April 2020.

<https://www.dw.com/en/europes-nato-members-failing-to-meet-spending-targets/a-42989818>

¹⁷ Anthony Cordesman, "'Burden-sharing' and the 2% of GDP Solution: A Study in Military Absurdity", *CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy* p. 2-4.

1.2.1. Research Scope

This research limits the timeframe from 2014 until 2019. Started in 2014 because it was the initial Wales Summit that delivered the GDP-military-spending commitment. Furthermore, 2019 was the year that NATO celebrated its 70th birthday, sparked the peak of the internal polemic for rest of the members. The actors that relevant for this research are the NATO members and Russia. The decision from regional security organization like NATO would impact not only the members of NATO but also global security. Many publications examine the relevancy of NATO as an organization itself. However, in this research the author seeks to avoid the discussion as such, which thus put focus on the commitment within the alliance. This research aimed to know the evaluation of NATO's GDP-military goal. Thus, this research shall examine why NATO's European countries are seemingly unwilling to increase GDP- military burden sharing under Wales Summit in 2014.

1.2.2. Research Question

Why NATO's European country members are unwilling to increase their GDP military spending based on the initial commitment to counter the Russian threat in Europe?

1.3 Purpose of the Research

This research is aimed to describe a deep understanding of the reason why European countries are unwilling to appease the commitment of the NATO GDP-military burden sharing in countering Russia's threat in Europe by applying conceptual framework that already learned. Moreover, this research can be fruitful for mankind in political science and international relations studies.

1.4 Literature Review

Many recent studies have focused on the problem of NATO's 2% goal, NATO's military spending, and the study of collective defense. Cordesman provides a strong point of view in criticizing NATO's goal on GDP spending. He argues that these goals do not present the military needs and effectiveness. The calling for 2% simply only call for spending 2% of GDP on total defense spending levels, and at least 20% of annual defense expenditure on major new equipment. In the other hand, NATO Europe accounted for 17.9% of total global military spending and Russia only accounted for 3.7%. This gap seen as a proof that NATO has no longer urgency to increase the spending. The strength of Cordesman is that he also provides statistics to amplify his argument on NATO and the identification of the problem is clear.¹⁸ Rowlands reviews the literature on military spending in the context of alliances. The focus on the likely effects of fiscal restraint which suggests that while NATO membership may influence how cuts to military budgets

¹⁸ Anthony Cordesman, "'Burden-sharing' and the 2% of GDP Solution: A Study in Military Absurdity", CSIS *Burke Chair in Strategy* p. 2-39.

will be implemented, national security and domestic political considerations will be the dominant factor. There are many obstacles to reach out for the actual commitment, by taking the domestic political into account. These policies inevitably require closer collaboration amongst alliance members at the strategic and tactical levels. Alliance members need to be very cautious about seeking defense budget savings through the adoption of untested mechanisms of tactical interdependence. The strength of this paper is how Rowlands provide variable of domestic political considerations can affect NATO's military budget. The patterns of interaction and indicators of political constraints are important for the study of this thesis.¹⁹

On the other hand, Sloan suggests that the alliance should neither "fade" into the background nor enlarge into an expanded military alliance based on external threats. This way, NATO would be best able to resolve the sort of security problems expected to emerge in the post-Cold War environment if it revitalizes itself and works on a larger spectrum of security issues and modifies its systems to address them. The discussed issues ranging from the point of view that NATO is a multilateral instrument of security. Sloan has provided prescriptions that resolve older issues and bring some new ones into the debate. The strength of this literature for this paper is the way Sloan indicates NATO's characteristics within the frame of collective security while adapting itself into a new dynamics of security. The

¹⁹ Dane Rowlands and Decky Kabongi, "Military Expenditures, Alliance Membership, and Fiscal Restraint", *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations* 9(2), 2017 pp. 55–79, doi:10.22381/GHIR9220173.

pattern of NATO's action within 1990s can be relevant to explain current interaction that will be useful for the research scope (2014-2019).²⁰

The three literatures are visible to make it into a **research tool**, which not opposing to each other, but rather stands for various context in this research. However, the author stands for evaluating the goal in terms of NATO's external threat. Rowlands' view and Sloan's book are viable to be studied for analyzing NATO's motives on the goal and its interaction and Cordesman's paper is excellent to provide the contextual thoughts on the study case.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

Theoretical framework will help to sharpen the argument of analysis in the next chapters. This research adopts several concepts such as under-balancing and alliance security dilemma. Alliance security dilemma and under-balancing will provide a guideline in determining variables to measure and the relationship between social meaning.

1.5.1. Alliance Theory & Security Dilemma

Under the realm of anarchy, security dilemma defined as "spiral model" of actions by a state in increasing its security, in military aspect such as the use of weapons and alliances. The action could invite other states to respond with the similar actions and produce the tensions that could create undesirable conflict.²¹

²⁰ Stanley Sloan, "NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense" *Number 46*. 82. (1995).

²¹ John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", *World Politics vol. 2, no. 2*, p. 157. (1950)

The use of alliances, also could create internal security dilemma in deciding the state's own fate in responding to the alliance's threat. This research will use the security dilemma within the politics of an alliance by Glenn Snyder. Snyder argues that in the anarchic system, the establishment of alliance is to preserve balance of power, in the case whether the members are not satisfied with moderate security, or they are afraid to be isolated, to the point where others are partnering to ally against them. Alliance formed an "alignment". Alignment has a set of mutual expectation between two or more states, in order to reach other's support in disputes or wards with other states. Expectation composes perceived common interest; in which they could be strong or weak. Formal alliances strengthen their alignment by creating legal and normative obligation of their public responsibility.

Alignments are always changing; strengthening, or even weakening, together with states' interest, unstable domestic politics, and perception of other states' behavior. This means that alliances are a security against their own adversaries.²² However, alliances are never absolutely firm, even they have the text of written agreement. Their political reality lies not in the formal contract, but in the expectation they support or create. The cost of alliance will be minimized when allies have the same adversary. Therefore, the fundamental focus of the behavior is ought to be alignment rather than alliance. Especially the expectations of states' likelihood to support each another. The changing expectation between the alliance brings a new interaction which could possess a dilemma.

²² Glenn Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist Cut", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 1, *Theory, Values and Practice in International Relations*, p. 103-123. (Summer 1990).

Table 1.1.
“The Composite Security Dilemma in a Multipolar System”

Strategies	Alliance Game	Adversary Game
Withhold support, weaken commitment.	The “goods” 1. Restrain ally, reduce risk of entrapment. 2. Increase bargaining power over ally. 3. Preserve realignment option. 4. Divide adversary’s alliance.	The “goods” 1. Resolve conflict, reduce tension.
	The “bads” 1. Increase risk of abandonment. 2. Reduce reputation for loyalty.	The “bads” 1. Encourage adversary to stand firmer. 2. Reduce reputation for resolve.

Source: Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 1, *Theory, Values and Practice in International Relations*, p. 469.

Countries are either perform a “strong commitment” or “weak commitment”. Two of them have a significant effect toward the alliance alignment. They are juggling between the fear of “entrapment” and the fear of “abandonment” based on their determinants of choice.²³ The table above helps to map the alliance

²³ Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 1, *Theory, Values and Practice in International Relations*, p. 466-470.

game and adversary game toward the action taken countries. By withholding their support, a weak commitment would help countries to reduce its risk of entrapment. In general, abandonment may take form of; taking side with the opponent, failing to make the “goods” on their specific commitments, or failing to provide the support needed. On the other side, “entrapment” means being dragged into a conflict that only shares its interest partially within the alliance. Everyone has a different degree to their collective interest. Entrapment happens when one member values the preservation of the alliance rather than its own ally’s interest. The risk of entrapment increases when one member has greater dependence and confidence on another member in the Alliance.²⁴

In the “bads” side, countries facing the possibility of abandonment. Eventually, the action could trigger the adversary to stand even firmer, but it could increase the hope to resolve the conflict by lower the tension.²⁵ However, this development might be a bad sign since it affects alliance’s reputation for loyalty. In the “bads” of Alliance Game, the cohesion of NATO has challenged. This theory will help to analyze NATO’s behavior in appeasing their commitment to burden sharing goals, and how their expectation and interest are gradually changing each year.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

1.5.2. Balance of power and under-balancing

Departing from states' pessimistic view on human nature, the only way to achieve security in the international system, according to realism, is by creating a **Balance of Power** among the most powerful states of the system.²⁶ Balance of power has been treated as “*a gigantic mechanism, a machine or clockwork, created and kept in motion by divine watchmaker*”.²⁷ According to Morgenthau, balance of power is “*the aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to politics that aim at preserving it*”.²⁸

Rather than balancing, states band-wagoned, buck-passed, appeased, or adopted ineffective measures as their response toward the threat.²⁹ Instead of balancing the power, states could respond, or in contrary not respond to the threat and opportunities, determined by both internal and external considerations of policy elites.³⁰ The term “balancing” is the creation or aggregation of military power by mobilizing alliances to prevent or deter political and military domination of foreign power. However, balancing is not merely defined as fighting back, but rather involves a situation in which that a state is not directly sense harm by a predatory state, but decides to balance against it anyway, in order to protect its long-term

²⁶ Mareike Oldemeinen, “The Political Realism of Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes” (2010) accessed 21 February 2020, <https://www.e-ir.info/2010/02/15/the-political-realism-of-thucydides-and-thomas-hobbes/>

²⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, “Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”, 4th ed. p. 197, (1966).

²⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, “Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”, 4th ed. p. 197, (1966), p. 187-189.

²⁹ Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing.” *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004): pp. 160-163. Accessed February 21, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/4137589

³⁰ Ibid, 164.

security interest.³¹ In contrary, band-wagoning, buck-passing, and appeasement are the form of under-balancing. States avoiding the cost of war is rational and prudent. Thus, states take actions by satisfying the legitimate grievances of revisionist state, or by allowing to do so, or by letting the others defeat the aggressor, while being sideliners. Band-wagoning is also the case of a state that crave for profiting from other state's success in overturning the established order.³² In another case, there is one state that has too much power, that in the future is capable to become peer competitors or join together to balance against another predominant power. Meanwhile, the other state that choose not to balance is because they are too weak to do so, or has being tied up with the wellbeing of the hegemon. Thus, states are benefiting from the status quo, and reasonably will seek to preserve it.³³ "Buck-passing" is a form of underreaction to threats by "free-riding" activities in order to balance their power with others. According to Schristensen and Snyder, buck-passing occurs when the great powers under multipolarity will pass the "balancing buck" when they gain security benefits from other great powers. Furthermore, Mearsheimer argues that buck-passing exists due to balanced multipolar systems, particularly among great powers that are geographically insulated from the aggressor.³⁴ Balancing behavior becomes vital when the external threat has a direct impact, for example the seizure of territory, either one's homeland or another

³¹ Ibid, 160-163.

³² Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1994, pp. 72–107, accessed 21 February 2020. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/2539149.

³³ William Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World", *International Security*, Vol. 24 No. 1 pp. 5-41 (1999).

³⁴ Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 271-273.

external vital interests. Thus, balancing does need military hardware at each other's preparation for potential war.

In order to come up with considerations to balance or not to balance, state needs to uphold its willingness and ability. State needs to accumulate cost and risk, which is not simply any particular geostrategic risks and opportunities, but also the objective of material factors at the structural level of analysis.³⁵³⁶

1.6 Research Methods & Data Collection

According to Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln, qualitative research encompasses both interpretive and naturalistic approaches to an issue. This means that researchers study issues in natural settings, and try to understand and interpret phenomena in the context of the meaning that humans bring to these phenomena.³⁷ This research will be conducted in qualitative method, to give focus to the meanings and processes in international relations issue. Based on research question, to answer burden-sharing relevance in countering the threats, in depth analysis by interpreting the threat perception in Europe, which is needed to understand the meaning behind, and the process that finally produce a decision to increase the budget. Moreover, the data that obtained in this research is qualitative data, not a numerical data.

³⁵ Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing" *International Security* 29, no. 2 (2004): pp. 168-169. Accessed February 21, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/4137589.

³⁶ However, the author is limiting the scope of this theory into a wider spectrum in order to grasp the dynamics in European countries' behavior. Thus, the analysis will avoid the issues of domestic policymaking.

³⁷ Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln, *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, (1994), p.1.

Qualitative methods will help to answer the research question by having a deep normative analysis within the research.³⁸ The data will be sourced from scientific studies and literatures that have relevance to this study, such as news, journal articles, book, and official documents.³⁹ After gathering data, this paper will elaborate the data that already gathered, then elaborate with the theory and measurement.

Interpretive analysis focuses on meaning-making practices, as well as shows how the practice configures to gain the output. According to Joseph Gusfield, interpretive analysis has the attention to empirical world, understanding on behaviour in particular form.⁴⁰ The aim of interpretive analysis is to gain an understanding between the object and the researcher. Therefore, the characteristic of interpretive analysis is the focus of standard, norms, customs, and how those affect human interaction. It uses ontology puzzle, which involves case study and individual representative of particular issue. In this research, interpretive analysis is being utilized to explain the meaning and significance to understand the causes and effects of NATO's behaviour in responding the threat.⁴¹ Interpretive analysis also would help to observe the pattern of anomalies, whereas the commitment of NATO produce its own anomaly, and the research needs the understanding of social meaning that underlies international relations practices.⁴²

³⁸ Christopher Lamont, "Research Methods in International Relations", p. 78 (2015).

³⁹ Kenneth D. Bailey, *Methods of Social Research* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 294.

⁴⁰ Joseph Gusfield, *The Second Chicago School*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) p. vii.

⁴¹ Lamont, *Research Methods in International Relations*, p. 39.

⁴² Umar Suryadi Bakry, *Metode Penelitian Hubungan Internasional* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2017), p. 259-266.

1.7 Research Structure

Chapter I: Research design

This chapter consists of Background of the Problem, Problem Identification, Research Scope, Research Question, Purpose of the research, Literature Review, Theoretical Framework, Research Method & Data Collection, and Research Structure.

Chapter II: Digging deeper the new dynamic: NATO's Threat and Deterrence.

Chapter II will enhance data exploration regarding the Russian aggression as a threat to European security, that formulated burden-sharing policy in 2014. Following the burden-sharing it is worth to explore further the polemic inside the commitment itself to gain more understanding in European's position in this matter.

Chapter III: Answering Europe's Unanswered Threat.

In this chapter, we will further examine on the variables that explain the behavior of the U.S., Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. In this case, the author will analyze using Snyder and Schweller's concept. The variables are their external threat, political pressures between NATO's members, balancing strategy of NATO's members, which lead to the ultimate decision: their tendency of unwillingness to comply with the commitment.

Chapter IV: Conclusion

Conclusion explains the recollection of key findings and the answer for the research question: "why NATO's European country members are unwilling to

increase their GDP military spending based on the initial commitment to counter the Russian threat in Europe?" in a concise paragraph.