

PARAHYANGAN CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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SK BAN - PT NO: 3095/SK/BAN-PT/Akred/S/VIII/2019

The Underlying Factors of China's Global-Reach Naval Development Amidst Its Commitment to Peaceful Development Policy

Undergraduate Thesis

By
Patricia
6091801010

Bandung

2021



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Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Jurusan Hubungan Internasional Program Studi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional



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Hereby state that this undergraduate thesis is the product of my own work and has not been previously proposed by any other party(ies) to attain an academic degree. Any work or opinion from other parties are cited and will be written with a valid writing method.

This statement is made with full responsibility and I am fully willing to accept the consequences if this statement is proven to be untrue in the future.

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ABSTRACT

Name: Patricia

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Title : The Underlying Factors of China's Global-Reach Naval Development

Amidst Commitment to Peaceful Development Policy

In response to the widespread global anxiety from China's emerging power, the Chinese government established the Peaceful Development Policy to emphasize its unswerving commitment in achieving national prosperity whilst maintaining world peace and stability. Conversely, standing upon the Chinese Dream of Great Rejuvenation, China aims to become a global-reach capable navy and thus undermining the security of other states as well as disrupting the geopolitical stability. The contradicting natures of foreign policies generate the need to analyze the underlying factors behind China's global-reach naval development. To unravel the growth of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as well as the underlying factors behind it, this research relies on the Maritime Power Theory by Harold J. Kearsley. As a qualitative process-tracing study, the research finds the entire examined variables to be impactful on China's naval development. Nevertheless, the global-reach naval development is strictly driven by China's vast maritime chokepoints, large merchant fleet size, rich maritime tradition, authoritarian government with militaristic traits, and extensive maritime threats arising from political-military interactions as underlying factors. Whereas factors such as China's growing GDP and massive population only took part in supporting the global-reach naval development. Inversely, the country's drastic sea climate, lengthy coastline, large area of land, and maritime domain are analyzed to have no grounds and/or supportive value in promoting China's naval development to the extent of global-reach level.

Keywords: China, People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Global-Reach

Capable Navy, Naval Development, Underlying Factors.

ABSTRAK

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Judul: Faktor – Faktor Dasar Dari Perkembangan Angkatan Laut Jangkauan

Global Tiongkok Di Balik Komitmen Terhadap Kebijakan Pembangunan Damai

Dalam menanggapi kekhawatiran global atas pesatnya pertumbuhan Tiongkok, pemerintahan Beijing mendeklarasikan kebijakan pembangunan damai sebagai bentuk komitmen terhadap perdamaian dan stabilitas dunia. Di sisi lain, melandasi pencapaian Chinese Dream untuk Great Rejuvenation, Tiongkok berambisi untuk mengembangkan angkatan lautnya hingga kapabilitas maritim jangkauan global dan kembali menimbulkan disrupsi terhadap stabilitas geopolitik. Kontradiksi dari kedua kebijakan luar negeri menimbulkan urgensi untuk menganalisa faktor faktor di balik perkembangan angkatan laut jangkauan global tersebut. Dalam menguraikan perkembangan serta mengkaji faktor – faktornya, tulisan ini berpaku pada teori Maritime Power oleh Harold J. Kearsley. Dengan metode riset kualitatif pelacakan proses, riset ini menemukan bahwa setiap faktor yang dikaji memiliki pengaruh dalam mendorong pembangunan angkatan laut Tiongkok. Walaupun demikian, perkembangan hingga jangkauan global hanya didorong oleh serangkaian faktor dasar meliputi chokepoint maritim, armada dagang yang besar, tradisi maritim yang kaya, pemerintahan otoriter, serta berbagai ancaman maritim sebagai hasil dari interaksi politik dan militer. Sedangkan PDB yang tinggi dan populasi besar hanya bertindak sebagai faktor pendukung dalam perkembangan angkatan laut global tersebut. Di sisi lain, faktor – faktor layaknya iklim laut yang drastis, garis pantai panjang, area lahan yang luas, dan domain maritim dikaji tidak mendasari ataupun mendukung perkembangan kapabilitas maritim Tiongkok hingga mencapai jangkauan global.

Kata Kunci: Tiongkok, Angkatan Laut, Kapabiltas Maritim Jangkauan Global,

Perkembangan Angkatan Laut, Faktor - Faktor

PREFACE

The world is full of uncertainties, mainly in the sphere of defense procurement, resulting in hardships for all countries to achieve peace. Nevertheless, an entirely transparent state of international affairs could only be an idealistic notion. Thereof, researches became of highly importance in contributing to insights and calculations, in which international relations academicians serve as citizens of the world to advocate the right steps for states to take.

The research titled 'The Underlying Factors of China's Global-Reach Naval Development Amidst Commitment To Peaceful Development Policy' seeks to play the aforementioned role as it sets out to paint a middle-ground perspective behind China's anomalous behavior. The author firstly addresses the contradicting ideas within the ambition to develop of a global-reach capable PLA navy and China's commitment to the Peaceful Development policy. Furthermore, the thesis continues to elaborate on the extent of China's naval growth and concludes with the underlying factors of said development.

This undergraduate thesis serves as the requirement of acquiring the Bachelor degree of International Relations Department, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Parahyangan Catholic University. Nonetheless, the formality of this research does not minimize the author's determination in contributing to the debate on China and its extensive growth. Regardless, the author acknowledges that this thesis is far from perfect and welcomes every input for further improvement.

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Throughout this rollercoaster of Uni life, the author finds it impossible to have gotten this far without the presence, support, and teachings of the people listed below.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD Anno Domini

BC Before Century

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIMSEC Center for International Maritime Security

CMC Central Military Commission

DWT Deadweight Tonnage

ECS East China Sea

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

FGD Focus Group Discussion

FONOP Freedom of Navigation Operations

GDP Gross Domestic Product

HQ Headquarters

NSA Non-State Actor

PLA People's Liberation Army

PLAN People's Liberation Army Navy

PRC People's Republic of China

SAR Special Autonomous Region

SCS South China Sea

SEA Southeast Asia

UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

US United States

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

The 1978 Chinese economic reform had led to the growth of the *China Threat Theory* which claims that China's rise as a regional power in East Asia is an economic and military threat towards neighboring states as well as the United States. With the purpose to better nation-brand the state in the western hemisphere, China adopted the *Peaceful Rise Policy* or the locally called 中国和平崛起 (*zhongguo heping jueqi*) constructed by Zheng BiJian. Nevertheless, China encountered yet another perception of threat as analysts discovered the ambiguous definition of the Chinese character '崛 (jue)' which can also be interpreted as 'earthquake'. The double-edged term, in turn, returned the indication of China's growth as a dangerous propaganda and anything but peaceful. Due to Zheng's unfulfilled intention, China altered its policy in 2004 into 中国和平发展 (*zhongguo heping fazhan*), which is generally defined as *Peaceful Development*. **

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¹ Chengqiu Wu, "Barking Up the Wrong Tree? The Master Narrative of 'China Threat Theory' Examined," in Sujian Guo and Baogang Guo, eds, Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), pp. 111-142.

² Joshua Cooper Ramo, "BRAND CHINA (淡色中国)," The Foreign Policy Centre, February 2007, https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/370659406.pdf.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ "White Paper: China's Peaceful Development," Embassy of The People's Republic of China in The Republic of India, accessed on March 22nd, 2021, http://in.chineseembassy.org/eng/zt/peaceful/t855717.htm.

Built upon intentions behind its economic reforms, the Peaceful Development policy was established as one of China's foreign policy strategies in coping with the trend of economic globalization, serving as a means to strengthen and ensure welfare, as well as contribute to world peace at once. Salient on China's white paper for its peaceful development, China strives to seek mutual benefit for common development with other countries. Therefore, it aims to undertake innovations without international isolation in order to learn from other states. Within the peaceful development policy, there are several development strategies consisting of scientific development, independent, open, cooperative, collective, and peace, which have led to considerable growth of economic output.

Converging on this research, the strategy emphasizes the main goal of China's policy namely to promote a national society of higher-level initial prosperity whilst creating a peaceful and stable international environment. That being said, as a contribution to world peace, the paper states that, "China would never conduct an act of aggression nor expansion as it will stay an unwavering strength to preserve regional and international peace stability". On those accounts, the peaceful development policy is known to be one of China's considerable foreign policy centered at its economic growth, built to brand China as an advocate of regional and international peace, order, and stability.

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⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

1.2. Problem Identification

In addition to the glorified peaceful development policy, China is also pursuing the Chinese Dream which is the Great Rejuvenation of The Chinese Nation. Contradictive to the overtaken Peaceful Development Road, however, China's ambitions to national rejuvenation relies on a strong military power as well. As repeatedly mentioned by Xi Jinping, the need to build a world-class military provides strategic support towards the achievement of the great rejuvenation. Moreover, a 'mighty' force of military power is considered as means of realizing the Chinese Dream. Further specified, Xi reiterates that a strong world-class force of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy is an essential pillar towards fulfilling the Great Rejuvenation of The Chinese Nation.

Building upon that fact, China is widely known (through its white paper and speech acts) to be in the midst of expanding its military capabilities within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) towards reaching Global-Reach level within Harold J. Kearsley's hierarchical classification. Similar to a Blue Water Navy, a global-reach level navy is defined as a maritime force capable of conducting long-term global operations exceeding patrols beyond its region. In

 $^{^{10}}$ "Xi Jinping Says Modernized Army Key to National Rejuvenation," CGTN, October 23, 2020, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-10-23/Xi-Jinping-modernized-army-key-to-national-rejuvenation--UOHd54iBQ4/index.html.

¹¹ The Governance of China, vol. III (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 2020).

¹² Huang Panyue, "Navy Strives to Be Modern, Strong as Commander Urged," Navy strives to be modern, strong as commander urged - China Military, May 24, 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-05/24/content_8040460.htm.

¹³ "Premier Li Keqiang Meets Senior Editors of Asia News Network Members," The State Council: The People's Republic of China, June 2, 2016,

http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2016/06/02/content 281475362814900.htm)

¹⁴ "Special Focus Area: Marine Sensors," Targeting U.S. Technologies - Special Focus Area: Marine Sensors, 2010,

 $https://web.archive.org/web/20120915162319/http://www.dss.mil/counterintel/DSS_UNCLASS_2010/specialFocusArea/special.html)\\$

military capabilities, a global-reach capable navy is identified by cutting-edge technology, extensive sea-based aircrafts, extensive amphibious operations, along with logistics and large power projection ability.¹⁵ Within Kearsley's naval hierarchical scale of 0-9 (which will further be elaborated in the theoretical framework of this research), the global-reach level stands on the 9th as the highest level.¹⁶ Though the current maritime force of China is still debated on whether it suffices as a global-reach capable navy or yet still within region-defense, there is no question that the People's Liberation Army Navy strives to be a global-reach capabilities as it aims to be a world-class force.

The importance of maritime capabilities for China has been often argued by Chinese political and military elites, such as naval captain, Xu Qi, who emphasized that a state's naval force serves as a benchmark for its entire power and security, thus considered significant for China to attain a strong naval force.¹⁷ Into a more legitimate statement, the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) quotes China's White Paper of Defense which states that the sea is of vital importance to China's future and therefore requires China to build a great maritime power.¹⁸ Aligned with its vocalized ambitions and white papers, China's

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¹⁵ Harold John Kearsley, Rethinking Maritime power theory, Comparative Strategy, 11:2, 1992 (published online on 2007), 195-211, DOI: 10.1080/01495939208402871

¹⁶ *Ibid*

¹⁷ William Pharis, "China's Pursuit of a Blue-Water Navy", Command and Staff College, 2009 ¹⁸ "Becoming a Great "Maritime Power": A Chinese Dream," Center for International Maritime Security, July 19, 2016, accessed March 23, 2021, https://cimsec.org/becoming-great-maritime-power-chinese-dream/)

development of naval capabilities have also exceeded the United States in becoming the largest naval force on earth.¹⁹

Recalling the Peaceful Development Policy, China's attempts in attaining a global-reach level navy upon the Chinese Dream have resulted in several red flags in international affairs as well as great power politics. Corresponding to the security dilemma concept, China's increase of military capabilities resulted into the undermining of security in other states, particularly Japan, Korea, Southeast Asian states, and the United States.²⁰ Therefore, in addition to the contrasting policies, the development of a global-reach capable navy becomes an anomaly as it contradicts the value of China's repeatedly promoted Peaceful Development Policy. Intrigued by China's inconsistent foreign policies, this paper questions the underlying factors of China's global-reach naval development.

1.2.1. Scope of Research

The research strictly focuses on China's naval development with no regard to the army and air force. Furthermore, it refers to the People's Republic of China as the main level of analysis as it considers the conduct of naval development as the action of China as a state. Moreover, the outcomes of this research will only entertain the underlying factors of China's global-reach naval development and will not encompass the impact of the development itself. As the hierarchy of global-reach is mainly identified by capabilities of

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¹⁹ Mallory Shelbourne, "China Has World's Largest Navy with 355 Ships and Counting, Says Pentagon," USNI News, November 3, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/11/03/china-has-worlds-largest-navy-with-355-ships-and-counting-says-pentagon.

²⁰ Thomas Diez, Ingvild Bode, and Aleksandra Fernandes Da Costa, "Security Dilema," Key Concepts in International Relations, 2011, pp. 205-208, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446288344.n37)

operations exceeding regional boundaries, the primary timeline of this research begins on 2015 as China shifts its naval strategy into Open Seas Protection from offshore operations. However, the research also acknowledges China's first far seas naval mission in 2008 where it conducted an escort mission to the Gulf of Aden. In sum, the accommodated data will reach the year 2020 (in some cases 2021) for comprehension in the account of data availability.

1.2.2. Research Question

This paper will be conducted as maintained by the research question written as "What are the underlying factors of China's Global-Reach naval development?"

1.3. The Purpose and Utility of The Research

1.3.1. Purpose of Research

This research aims to answer the proposed research question by attesting to the driving and/or supporting influence of physical, economic, and political factors on China's global-reach naval development. In advance, it also seeks to display the growth of China's naval hardware as well as the dynamics of its mission deployments to further portray the development of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy into global-reach level.

1.3.2. Utility of Research

Throughout its analysis, this paper contributes towards the variety of perspectives behind China's extensive naval development for a more middle-ground view of the rising power's intentions. As the anarchic nature of the international system fills global politics with uncertainty, this research provides

empiric evidence within scientific factors to broaden the views of the international community which tend to be constrained within the realism and liberalism bubble, of war or peace, as the only grounds of military enhancement.

1.4. Literature Review

China's ambitions in developing its naval capabilities into a global-reach extent have been highly debated within scholars, primarily in regards to the drivers behind it. This section will elaborate and review three of many researches within the subject to further academically support this paper.

James Douglas, a senior analyst in New Zealand's ministry of defense, argues the intentions behind China's military enhancement through the eyes of defensive realism in his dissertation titled *Defensive Realism and Chinese Military Strategy*. Douglas percepts China's strategy in developing its naval capabilities as an attempt to seek security towards its assets and properties, mainly its territorial sovereignty. Within his work, the Chinese strategy is viewed as a prevention of harm to its materialistic territorial claims as proven by multiple events in the South China Sea (SCS) and Taiwan. Douglas claims that China's operations are not of indication for a global role, instead portraits reactions toward specific circumstances. With a defensive realism point of view, China's strategy of accumulating its military capacity aims to defend its national claims and act as a

²¹ James Douglas, DEFENSIVE REALISM AND CHINESE MARITIME STRATEGY, Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2012

²² Douglas, 2012.

²³ *Ibid*.

²⁴ Ibid.

bargaining chip in international negotiations so as to direct the outcomes into China's relative interests in its own terms.²⁵

Utilizing yet another approach, Dr. Yves-Heng Lim analyzes China's high increase in maritime power through an offensive realism point of view within his work, namely China's Naval Power: An Offensive Realist Approach. 26 Lim explains what can be summarized as China's pursuit of naval superiority in the region alongside extensive evidence.²⁷ The research primarily argues, with offensive realism, that China's massive ongoing naval modernization is rooted in its need and ambition to secure the position of East Asia hegemony as it is the sole way to ensure the state's national security.²⁸ Through Lim's third and fourth chapter, China's naval strategy, doctrine, and modernization are presented as a major support towards the state's growing ambitions to control and dominate the seas of East Asia.²⁹ Lim also argues the significance of China's PLAN for its role in preventing US intervention and/or defeat US efforts in halting China's interests.³⁰ Lim justifies his arguments following the observation of China's relations with the region which he claims to be less 'socialized'. 31 The journal can be concluded as an offensive realist claim that the PLAN power and strategy is designed to undermine US capabilities at sea as well as its access to the region in order to fulfill China's ambitions in achieving regional hegemony.

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²⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁶ Yves-Heng Lim, China's Naval Power: an Offensive Realist Approach (Surrey: Routledge, 2016))

²⁷ *Ibid*.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ *Ibid*.

³⁰ Lim, 2016.

³¹ *Ibid*.

The third literature is presented by Daniel Connolly through his research titled The Rise of the Chinese Navy: A Tirpitzian Perspective of Sea Power and International Relations.³² Connolly approaches the issue through the lens of Non-Hegemonic Naval Theory, also called the Tirpitzian perspective, argued by Alfred Von Tirpitz known as the Secretary of State of the Kaiserliche Marine (1887-1916).³³ Connolly claims China's rapid rise in naval capabilities as an attempt to ensure its access to market as well as increase the state's alliance value.³⁴ Seeing the PLAN as an instrument of economic policy, the objective of Chinese naval modernization act as a prevention and resistance toward maritime trade interruptions.³⁵ As China is considered by Connolly as a newly industrialized country, the development of naval capacity is examined as a reasonable and rational defensive act.³⁶ Furthermore, the research also identifies China's the development as a power projection effort, as argued by Tirpitz, to invite alliances.³⁷ With both ambitions, market access and alliance value, Connoly concludes the drive of China's PLAN development as an attempt to minimize influence from US global hegemony, be it economically and/or politically.³⁸

The three aforementioned literatures show significant differences of the potential drivers behind China's PLAN extensive development. Nonetheless, the elaborated researches have shown high subjectivity arguments as there are found

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³² Daniel Connolly, "The Rise of the Chinese Navy: A Tirpitzian Perspective of Sea Power and International Relations," Pacific Focus 32, no. 2 (August 2017): pp. 182-207, https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12093)

³³ *Ibid*.

³⁴ *Ibid*.

³⁵ *Ibid*.

³⁶ *Ibid*.

³⁷ *Ibid*.

³⁸ *Ibid*.

resistance towards the US in every literature, be it to defend or defeat against. That being said, this research offers a new scientific approach in regards to the drivers behind China's naval development which is Harold John Kearsley's rethought Maritime Power Theory. Thus, the research argues that the global-reach development of the Chinese navy is a result of driving and/or supporting influence by an empirical series of physical, economic, and political factors.

1.5. Theoretical Framework: Maritime Power Theory³⁹

The Maritime Power theory is proposed by Harold J. Kearsley, a former officer of the US navy and an academic specializing in Strategic Studies and Defense Analysis, in the year of 1992. The establishment of the theory itself is rooted in a critic concerning previous theories of maritime power which Kearsley finds having limited application solely suitable for superpowers and their alliances. Realizing the imbalance, Kearsley addresses over 80 distinctive physically capable navies with similarities in terms of concepts that act as drivers of states towards the sea, notwithstanding their variety of sizes. Kearsley then identifies these drivers as the underlying principles that influence and guide a state's maritime power.

With the Maritime Power Theory, Kearsley attempts to build a more universally applicable, empirical, and scientific approach towards a state's naval power. A set of basic principles are defined as the main drivers influencing the extent of maritime power development. Kearsley mainly argues that each state is given the option in managing its naval capabilities based on *inputs* from physical,

³⁹ Harold John Kearsley, Rethinking Maritime power theory, Comparative Strategy, 11:2, 1992 (published online on 2007), 195-211, DOI: 10.1080/01495939208402871

economical, and political aspects. Set forth by each indicator within the aforementioned aspects, a state may choose between one of the following actions: (1) construct a new maritime power; (2) rearrange existing power; or (3) reduce considerably excessive power. As the Maritime Power Theory is portrayed with a model, Kearsley describes a model as a orderly set of corresponding concepts that indicate how foundational naval missions, force structure, and nautical elements interact with one another. Each component of the maritime power model then show the measurement of a state's reaction towards its dependence of the sea through the following diagram of input, process, and output.




Figure (1) Maritime Power Theory Model

Source: Harold John Kearsley, *Rethinking Maritime power theory*, Comparative Strategy, 11:2, 1992 (published online on 2007), 195-211, DOI: 10.1080/01495939208402871

This section will continue to elaborate each aspect as well as its indicators within the input and output of the model to obtain a comprehensive understanding for the purpose of the analysis.

A. INPUT

The input factors within the Maritime Power theory consists of subjective and objective characteristics. The physical aspects which are projected as objective inputs shows tangible elements with measurable characteristics. The economic aspect, though similarly quantifiable, is less tangible in effect to naval development. The political aspect, on the other hand, is included as a subjective input composing of issues relying on considerations, interpretations, alignments, belief systems, culture and traditions, and social patterns. The table below elaborates each input factors along with its indicators.

Table (1) The Input Factors of Maritime Power Theory

| INPUT | | | | |
|---|--|---|--|--|
| Physical | | | | |
| Indicator | Description | Argument | | |
| Geographic Locale | Considers the relations of three geographic circumstances including environmental, topographical and positional which analyzes a state's location against world trade routes, climate, chokepoints, maritime assets, coastal lines, and seaports | The more vulnerable (by environmental, position, or topography), the greater naval capabilities needed. | | |
| Area of Land | Ensues the impact of a state's capability deemed necessary to defend land area. | The broader the area, the greater naval capabilities needed | | |
| Area of Maritime Domain | Ensues the impact of a state's capability deemed necessary to defend maritime area. The utilization of capabilities tend to be concentrated in specific maritime areas. | The broader the area, the greater naval capabilities needed. | | |
| Sea Wealth | Measured from living and non-living resources. | The more sea wealth the area possesses, the more interest to protect. | | |
| GDP/sq.nm of Maritime Domain The income acquired from each square nautical mile | | The higher the income, the more maritime protection can be provided | | |
| Economic | | | | |
| Indicator | Description | Argument | | |

| GDP | A measure for the ability to pay for naval hardware. | The bigger the GDP, the more ability to provide financial resources for naval development | | |
|--|---|---|--|--|
| % GDP in industry | The amount of funds people are willing to invest in the sea which show size, complexity, and technology level of a state | The bigger funds, more complex, and higher technology level, then the higher ability to support a high-tech military infrastructure | | |
| Merchant Fleet Size Of diminishing importance due to open-registry and flag of convenience merchant-ships, therefore must refer to flags of registration. Large merchant fleets are now in the hands of the nautically weak but protection can only be provided by few dominant states. | | Many national interests may be involved even in a single cargo, thus the bigger the size of state's merchant fleet, the more it requires protection. | | |
| Shipbuilding | Of diminishing importance due to no direct link between major maritime powers and shipbuilding states. A clearer measurement would be warship building. | The larger amount of shipbuilding, the more maritime power. | | |
| Seaport Usage | The measurement of a state's seaborne trade (which state owns what trade at sea) as it legally enters the seaport. | The larger degree of seaport usage increases dependency on seaborne trade thus motivating states to acquire naval forces to lessen the vulnerability due to that dependence. | | |
| Population Size | Refers to the size of population, education level, number of engineers, etc. | Larger population size, although with individuals in poverty, gives a state better position to support its naval forces (subject to qualities such as education levels, engineers, etc) | | |
| Political | | | | |
| Indicator | Description | Argument | | |
| Maritime Tradition | An examination of nautical heritage and history of a state | The higher the 'maritimeness' from a state's maritime tradition, the more it influences naval development | | |

| Type of Government | Certain types of governments have more effect on a state's desire in acquiring and maintaining naval forces | The more authoritarian, the more it will divert funds into armed forces. The ability is stronger if the authoritarian leadership is military in nature. Democratic governments are too busy debating in decision making. | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|--|
| East/West Alignment | The result of cold war effects and superpower alliance system are felt worldwide. The ideological rivalry has not diminished. | Although there may be withdrawal from a superpower within a certain camp, there is always some rising power that would fill the regional alignment vacuum as the ideological struggle is an eternal cycle. One of the means in filling the regional alignment position is by naval development. | |
| Political/Military Interaction | A state's local security issues with respect to the rise of importance in nautical domain. | The more threats experienced by a state within its nautical domain rises the urgency to develop naval capabilities | |

Source: Harold John Kearsley, *Rethinking Maritime power theory*, Comparative Strategy, 11:2, 1992 (published online on 2007), 195-211, DOI: 10.1080/01495939208402871


Due to data availability and time-constraint, this research will only entertain physical factors including the geographic locale, area of land and maritime domain; economic factors including GDP, merchant fleet size, and population size; and political factors including government type, maritime tradition, and political/military interaction.

B. OUTPUT

Alongside the aforementioned input aspects, Kearsley sets out its influence for the accumulation of the maritime power of a state described as a form of output. Similar to the input, the output also consists of subjective and objective characteristics, whereas subjective elements are called missions and

objective elements are called naval force/navy hardware. The binding relations of both elements are depicted with a wheel below:

Figure (2) The Naval Output Wheel of Maritime Power Theory



Source: Harold John Kearsley, *Rethinking Maritime power theory*, Comparative Strategy, 11:2, 1992 (published online on 2007), 195-211, DOI: 10.1080/01495939208402871

The missions pictured on the outward spokes of the wheel consists of operations, tactics, strategies which reflect the physical, economic, and political reality. The rolling of the wheel then also depends on the conformable actual power structure such as ships, ports, personnel, and so on.

1) Naval Missions (Subjective)

The objective of naval missions is to provide an interrelated continuum guide in order to manage the state's maritime interests. Consequently, it is notable to include potential violence levels in the maritime arena.

Maritime Diplomacy Identified as the core function of a naval force and is the mission itself. Despite the size of the capabilities, all states are equal within this mission.

• Domain maintenance

Domain maintenance is defined as an activity solely done without the purpose of defeating an adversary, but only refers to the management of the domain although yet to be owned.

• Maritime Presence

In establishing maritime presence, a state projects its maritime authority with non-aggressive activities by utilizing its naval force. Although usually conducted in its domain, maritime presence missions may also exceed a state's maritime boundaries.

Sea Control and Denial

In certain circumstances, it is also necessary for states to show control in specific waters, be it positively or negatively. This theory combines control and denial as both are deeply related within the flow of the entire mission. Generally, the mission aims to establish control in an area and deny entry for adversaries by conducting aggressive actions.

• Sea Tripwire

In the case of asymmetric warfare, the smaller navy can halt aggression by projecting a high cost if the adversary were to attack. If it fails, however, the smaller navy is still able to provide a physical barrier needed to be traversed. With the existence of a sea tripwire, the adversary cannot enter for free. Although this strategy may not succeed, a long-term effect in the form of global sympathy and high ground moral can be achieved as substantial benefits. Nonetheless, the analysis of this naval mission will be excluded in the research as it is not applicable in the context of China.

Nautical Deterrence

Nautical Deterrence promotes the aggressive projection of weaponry and military capabilities (not limited to nuclear) at sea with purpose to deter aggression from other entities. The Maritime Power framework broadens the concept of Nautical Deterrence to be universally applicable as all states are able to project their weaponry and military capabilities.

• Sea Power Projection

Though the mission has an offensive connotation, sea power projection is defensive in nature similar to deterrence and sea control/denial which attempts to prevent threats to state interests. This mission is able to enhance the physical and psychological aspects of the other missions, and therefore is seen as the ends of maritime diplomacy.

Thus, these missions act as interrelated spokes within the maritime output wheel. The wheel itself provides the framework of how both missions and hardware correlate in terms of an entire output of maritime power. Consequently, it can be concluded that the missions do not only relate to one another but also act as a unity with its operations depending on naval force/hardware.

2) Naval Hardware (Objective)

As objective components are composed of physical characteristics of a state's navy, the naval hardware output includes ships, aircrafts, personnel, equipment, and bases. Nevertheless, Kearsley argues that within a conflict at sea, a state's naval capabilities cannot solely be relied on the amount of ships in its navy, but also other aspects that influence the navy's operational activities such as transparency and technology. Therefore, Kearsley critics the beancounting method due to the uncertain number of ships within the ownership of state. Yet if the leader conducts a land conflict strategy at sea, the bean-count may be beneficial. On the other hand, the quality of technology and weaponry possessed by a navy is also a significant aspect in measuring naval hardware. Though identification using ship labels namely the destroyer, carrier, frigate, and so on is commonly used, Kearsley claims that different interpretations of those identifications between states' navies inventory still frequently happens.

C. DECISION PROCESS

The Maritime Power theory percepts the Decision-Making Process as based on individuals and/or groups and therefore considered as highly subjective and does not complement the interpretation of the theoretical system as this theory aims to be universal. That being said, Kearsley carries out the DMP as a Blackbox and simply filters. The purpose of this simplification is to introduce an international model by placing a complex topic such as maritime power into a framework that is capable of helping the identification and further comprehension of that power.

D. NAVAL HIERARCHY

In understanding a maritime power output, Kearsley provided a structure of naval hierarchy along with the incorporated qualifiers as an attempt to mirror the military reality. The table of naval hierarchy is presented below,

Table (2) The Naval Hierarchy of Maritime Power Theory

| NAVAL HIERARCHY | | | |
|-----------------|--------------------|---|--|
| Scale | Title | Description | |
| 0 | Coastal Patrol | Low Tech Patrol Craft only | |
| 1 | Coastal Reach | Low Tech Forward Patrol Craft, Immediate vicinity power projection | |
| 2 | Coastal Defense | Medium tech missile craft, limited local power projection | |
| 3 | Forward Reach | EEZ seagoing medium tech ships, no logistic support, patrol air, local power projection | |
| 4 | Forward Defense | Bluewater medium tech ships, shore-based combat air, no logistic support, limited regional power projection | |
| 5 | Region Patrol | High-tech ships, shore-based combat air, minor logistic support, limited regional power projection | |
| 6 | Region Reach | High-tech, sea-based nonfixed wing air, modest logistic support, moderate power projection | |

| 7 | Region Defense | High-tech, sea-based air, limited amphibious, modest logistic support, air regional power projection |
|---|-------------------|---|
| 8 | Global Patrol | Cutting edge tech, substantial sea-based air, moderated amphibious and logistics support, limited global power projection |
| 9 | Global Reach | Cutting edge tech, extensive sea-based air, extensive amphibious, logistics and power projection ability |

Source: Harold John Kearsley, *Rethinking Maritime power theory*, Comparative Strategy, 11:2, 1992 (published online on 2007), 195-211, DOI: 10.1080/01495939208402871

Within the table above, Kearsley measures the naval hierarchy of states through the qualifiers of reach and relative capabilities. Additionally, as the technological level of a military unit is considered to be an commonly accepted indicator, it is also included within the qualifier for naval capabilities.

1.6. Research Methods

This research will be conducted using qualitative methodology focusing on data collection, analysis, and writing. As elaborated by Creswell, the researcher plays a key instrument in qualitative analysis as one collects the data themselves without instruments. ⁴⁰ The purpose of qualitative research itself is to interpret social interactions with particularized findings which are less generalizable compared to quantitative analysis. ⁴¹ Specifically, this research is conducted with the Process Tracing method in which it attempts to identify a causal correlation between independent variables and the outcome of the dependent variables. ⁴² Through this

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⁴⁰ John W. Creswell, Research Design Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2014)

⁴¹ Umar Suryadi Bakry, Metode Penelitian Hubungan Internasional (Sleman: Pustaka Pelajar, 2016)

⁴² Luigi Curini and Robert J. Franzese, The Sage Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations (London: SAGE Publications, 2020).

method, a process of an event is established prior to analyzing potential grounds to the changes to find causal explanations.⁴³ Furthermore, with the question mainly asking 'what', this research is identified as exploratory as it is an attempt to examine the underlying factors of China's global-reach naval development. The exploratory research will also portrait a more bottom-up review within the aforementioned theoretical framework.

Fulfilling the data necessary to complement the theoretical analysis, this research will collect multiple forms of secondary data in the form of journals, reports, articles. books, state documents, political elite speeches, news media, so on and so forth. Although the research utilizes secondary data, the data analysis (to some extent) will use a method of coding embedded in the grounded theory data analysis following the components of the theory. This method is used to provide a larger picture to improve the inclusivity of research. Thus, the coding method results in the quantification of qualitative data which can be found within chapter 2 and frequently referred to along the lines of the research. In the attempt to subdue subjectivity within the collection of naval mission data (found in Chapter 2), this research underwent a focus group discussion (FGD) with researchers from the Laboratorium Indonesia 2045 research institution in identifying data points into the aforementioned coding. The analysis, however, will use a method of secondary analysis as the entire factors comes to a qualitative conclusion.

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⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

1.7. Thesis Structure

This paper attempts to elaborate the underlying factors of China's global-reach naval development through Kearsley's Maritime Power Theory.

- Chapter one examines the research background, problem identification,
 scope of research, literature review, theoretical framework, research
 method, along with the thesis structure.
- Chapter two elaborates China's global-reach naval development amidst its commitment towards the Peaceful Development Policy through the framework of Kearsley's Maritime Power Output. The objective measurement of naval development will rely on warships, naval aircraft, personnel, and naval bases. Whereas the subjective measurement will utilize a dataset of naval missions with exception to sea tripwire.
- Chapter four will conclude the result of this research as well as provide limitations from its outcomes.