

**Democracy, Decentralization,  
Identity and Conflict in Indonesia**



**Studies in a Nutshell**

**CTS-Conflict Transformation Service**

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## Introduction

By Timo Kivimäki, Michael Jacobsen & Pius Suratman Kartasasmita

Conflict and competition for power and wealth continues regardless the setting of political economy. This is not to say that centralized and decentralized or democratic and authoritarian polities would be equally successful in avoiding violence in competition or that the patterns of violence in different polities would be the same. On the contrary, the level of centralism and the level of democracy greatly affect the intensity and patterns of violence.

This volume is a product of the first conference in Copenhagen, in August-September 2001, of the Indonesian Conflict Studies Network organized by Michael Jacobson and Timo Kivimäki. They have been selected and minimally edited and collected into a coherent volume by the mentioned and by Pius Suratman Kartasasmita. In addition to the papers presented there, this volume has added a chapter by Azhari Idris on Aceh, to complement the collection of chapters. The volume focuses on the causal relationship between Indonesia's democratization and decentralization on the one hand and conflict potential in the country on the other. However, instead of seeing competition and conflict as belonging to one type of polity only contributions in this volume try to look into the ways how various types of polities channel frustration and regulate opportunities to avoid violence. This focus makes contributions in this volume unique: instead of attributing violence to authoritarian centralism or free decentralism only, the conflict problem is here tackled from a more balanced point of view. Furthermore, this volume, aims at offering three perspectives that seem to be underrepresented in the study of Indonesian conflict.

- On the one hand this volume presents detailed analyses of the influence of democratisation and decentralization on conflicts in Indonesian conflict trouble spots, in peaceful areas and in areas that fall between the categories, "peaceful" and "conflict trouble spots".
- It presents several approaches to the study of Governance, identity and conflict in Indonesia. The important thing being the dialogue, on the one hand between micro and macro theories. Different approaches reveal and highlight different links in the causal chain between decentralization/democratisation and conflict.
- Finally the volume aims at a coherent theory of the causal chain between decentralization/democratisation and conflict, where identities play a role of an "intervening variable". Instead of building the whole chain of causal links all the way from decentralization/democratisation to conflicts in a single case study, different cases and different approaches only concentrate on a few linkages, leaving the build-up of different comprehensive theories to the



reader and to the forthcoming studies. A summary of the central links in the causal chain will, however, be revealed in this introductory chapter.

When studying the influence of decentralization and democratisation on Indonesian national unity and peace, it is necessary not to lose sight on the proportionality of violence in Indonesia. It is not enough if one studies the conflict trouble spots and makes pessimistic conclusions on the state of stability in Indonesia. Equally wrong would it be to study the areas where competition and conflict has been kept at bay. Pessimistic studies do not alert the scholars to the possibilities of managing, resolving and transforming conflict structures in a democratic decentralized manner. At the same time optimistic studies do not pin point the risks involved in the processes of democratisation of and decentralization. It seems that fair and balanced conclusions on Indonesian conflicts can only be achieved by focussing on successes and failures as well as experiences "in the middle". This volume tackles the problem of democratic decentralization and conflict in eight areas. Of these areas Aceh, Papua, West Kalimantan and the Moluccan Islands can easily be seen as unsuccessful cases, where a lot of lives have been lost. While observations in these areas have usually alerted people to the dangers and risks of political transitions, one should also pay attention to the fact that many things could have developed even more violent direction; there are no absolute cases in the study of conflict. Such cases as North Sumatra and Yogyakarta should be treated as successful cases. Here, despite the ethnic heterogeneity, relative deprivation of several groups and violent opportunities, the level of violence has been kept low. Yet many things could have triggered violence, and there is no reason to exaggerate the success of these apparently non-violent transitions. West Java, at the same time has not been entirely non-violent, but despite the potential, the intensity of violence has been limited.

In order to create a balanced explanation of the conflict process, one has to bridge the perspectives developed by macro theorists and micro theorists. The lessons from successful and unsuccessful cases have to be understood on various levels in order to understand the causal chains from decentralism or democracy to conflict and peace. The macro-level empirical generalizations on relative deprivation or decentralized political structures do not really make sense in absence of an understanding of how individual Indonesians relate to them, how they make use of decentralization, how they justify violence by pointing out to the diminishing chances of survival of their group. Yet the macro-level analysis is needed to make the generalizations that enable the utilization of standard conflict theory in the understanding of Indonesia, and to build the link that enables scholars of Indonesian conflict to contribute to the general theories of conflict. Combining micro and macro perspectives does not mean in our study of war in Indonesia, that all scholars should be involved on all levels. Instead, macro theorists try to share their perspectives with micro theorists and together they try to build more comprehensive understanding and explanations on violence in Indonesia. While this volume does not attempt to offer various perspectives on all of the conflicts examined, it does offer explanations and understanding of the Indonesian conflict on many levels, making it possible to complete the puzzle of the conflict processes from abstract macro-level changes to individual choices to abstain from or resort to violence.

In the tracking the processes from transition of politics from authoritarian centralism to democratic decentralism questions of identity have been found, in our



studies, as an important intervening variable, or a link in the causal chain. Establishing a monopoly of legitimate violence has been a difficult task for the Indonesian state, whenever the primacy of Indonesian security identity has been challenged locally in some of the conflict spots. Ethnic and religious groups have opted for organizing their own defence, creating a situation where different groups threaten each other. During the centralist authoritarianism, security organization was not given as many opportunities as during the more democratic decentralised administration. However, at the same time the seeds of problems were sowed as the centralized principles of unity in diversity were seen used in favor of some ethnic group, the Javanese, only. The contamination of the idea of unity in diversity has resulted in the discrediting of much of the nationalist system of norms for inter-ethnic/religious/regional coexistence. As a result, in absence of legitimate common Indonesian norms, ethnic/religious/regional identities have resulted in demands for ethnic/religious/regional rights, which eventually restructure the political life in accordance of ethnic/religious/regional divisions and lead into ethnic segregation, making it very difficult for the Indonesian state to reconcile the national political and security identity. This problem and the intervening variable of identity will be tackled in the various chapters of this volume from many different theoretical and regional perspectives revealing the complexity and multifaceted nature of the Indonesian politics of security identity.

The structure of this volume reflects the aim of allowing dialogue between micro and macro theories, as well as between successful and unsuccessful perspectives. The macro- and micro- perspectives will be introduced in the two chapters by Kivimäki and Jacobsen. These chapters introduce the main explanatory tools of the analysis and point to the main motivations in conflict processes. On the one hand, the problem of macro conditions is treated as twofold. Decentralized/centralized democratic/authoritarian polities are more exposed to violence if they are not able to address the problem of relative deprivation of groups of people and if they are not able to block the violent opportunities individuals and groups might have in politics. The other side of the conflict problem is presented in the "micro theory"-chapter by Jacobsen, which introduces a strategic perspective to complement the structural macro perspective. Instead of only focusing on the structures polities offer to the people and groups, from the point of view of violence, it is essential to understand how groups and people use these structures.

Part two of the volume offers several broad perspectives on the problem of Indonesian violence in general. It focuses on the political economic instruments – decentralization/centralization, democracy/centralism and the manipulation of identity – to tackle the problem of conflict in Indonesia. Mason Hoadley's chapter *Central vs. Region Power, the Lessons of History* offers a historical account of the problem of central vs. regional power by analysing the alternatives regional and national normative systems of conflict management. The current use of centralist and decentralist structure in conflict management is studied in Riwanto Tirtosudarmo's chapter *Demography, Decentralization and Disintegration: Indonesia at the crossroad of history*, which takes the question of the management of the population policies as a special case. From decentralization/centralism the analysis moves on to the question of degree of democracy as an instrument of conflict management. Robert Cribb analyses in his chapter *Democratization and the roots of conflict in Indonesia* the role of democracy and the rule of law in the management of conflict in Indonesia.




Finally, Rita Kipp looks in her chapter *The Religious Factor in Indonesian Regionalism* at the role of the intermediary variable, the manipulation of identities in centralized/decentralized and authoritarian/democratic Indonesia.

After the general analyses of the dependent (conflict) and independent variables (decentralization, democratisation and identity), the volume proceeds with case studies with varying, complementing theoretical perspectives mainly operating on the micro level of explanation. The unsuccessful cases of the Moluccan Islands, Aceh, Papua and West Kalimantan, will be analysed in chapters by Nils Buband (Moluccan Islands), Azhari Idris (Aceh), Kivimäki and Ruben Thorning (Papua) and Syarif Alqadrie (West Kalimantan). After the unsuccessful cases, the more optimistic conclusions of case of North Sumatra will be presented by Budi Agustono (Sumatra) and finally the sythetical cases of Yogyakarta, Nusa Tenggara Barat and West Java will be analysed in articles by Stein Kristiansen (Yogyakarta & Nusa Tenggara Barat) and Pius Suratman Kartasasmita (West Java).

### Democracy, Decentralization, Identity and Conflict

Definitions of democracy and authoritarianism often emphasise civil society's ability to express and mobilize popular preferences in the polity. One of the best known international comparative quantitative source, The Polity III dataset bases its assessment of the level of democracy and authoritarianism on information on executive recruitment regulation, competition and openness, monocratism, executive constraints, regulation of participation, competitiveness of participation and centralization of state authority. According to this dataset the development of the Indonesian polity has looked like this. Since the original data ends in 1994, this graph is completed to year 2002 by Kivimäki, by using the criteria defined by the Polity III methodological annexes.

Democracy & Authoritarianism, Polity III + 1995-2002 by TK






However, the Asian democracy debate has also emphasized the question of how well popular preferences are reflected, not only in decision-making, but also in their implementation. Free media, freedom of expression and assembly do not mean much for the ordinary people if nothing changes in the output of the polity, and bureaucratic practices continue to reflect the partial interests of the class of bureaucrats only. This is especially relevant for the question of conflict potential: whether democracy genuinely addresses the concerns of people and if it really offers channels for non-violent protest and change, depends, not only on what kind of preferences can be expressed towards the polity, but also whether the output of the state reflects truly popular preferences or not. From the point of view of the theory of democracy there is very little value for an ordinary citizen in the democratic channelling and collectivisation of popular interests and preferences if the implementation of these preferences is inefficient due to lack of resources, training and will in the units that implement democratic decisions (Schmitter & Karl 1993, 45-6). Democracy as an *"institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote"* (Schumpeter 1943, 269), in order to be meaningful, requires three components and without one of these components the nature of the political system becomes undemocratic. The first of these components is a free input of democratic demand and support, the process of popular voice - free expression, free assembly and regular elections. The second is a fair process of decision-making in which the power of alternative policy-lines is determined by the popularity of the line, as measured in the elections. Finally an efficient implementation of democratic decisions is needed in order to ensure that the free process and fair decision-making has some meaningfulness in the real output of the political system.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For the basis of an analysis of a political system along these lines refer to the classics of systems analysis, such as Easton 1965.



Illustration 1: Phases of Democratic Process



For the prevention of the emergence of violent mobilization it is necessary to develop the input part of the polity (in order to offer non-violent alternatives), while for the containment of grievance-motivated violence, the efficiency of the phase III is essential.

As will be defined by Ruben Thorning in Kivimäki's and Thorning's chapter on Papua in this volume, centralism and decentralism deals with differing levels of power distribution between the national and regional political systems. According to Ruth Lapidoth 'A territorial political autonomy is an arrangement aiming at granting to a group that differs from the majority of the population in the state, but that constitutes the majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its distinct identity'<sup>2</sup>. Lapidoth makes a distinction between decentralization and autonomy as '...decentralization involves solely a delegation of powers, (while) autonomy assumes a transfer of powers. Decentralization may include the limited participation of locally elected in the regional authorities, whereas in...autonomy it is the basic assumption that all the transferred functions are exercised by locally elected representatives'<sup>3</sup> Following these definitions, it would be difficult to judge how far Indonesia's decentralization is in various parts of the country. However, it has been emphasized by several specialists of decentralization and the legal reality defined by Indonesia's legislation (the Constitution and Laws 25 & 13/ 2000), Indonesia has moved from extreme centralism to extreme decentralism.

Definitions and perspectives on identities vary modestly between various articles. According to Kipp and Jacobson, ethnicity is as something that cannot be determined by simply noting the differences between people. Instead one has to concentrate on what differences matter to people and how these differences become culturally embedded (Kipp: 1993: 17-24, see also Jakobson, chapter 3). Ethnic, religious and national identities have often competed in the history of Indonesia, but it

<sup>2</sup> Ruth Lapidoth, *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 33.

<sup>3</sup> Lapidoth, *Autonomy...*, p.51.



increase of administrative chaos and institutional vacuum. The pace of change does not allow the balancing of resources and responsibilities creating situations where responsibilities and resources do not match. The same argument has been made about democratisation at least in the articles by Azhari Idris on Aceh and by Kivimäki and Thorning on Papua: freer mobilization has not only meant greater democracy but also increased opportunities for violent mobilization. The institutional vacuum is not only something that rebel groups and members of the civil society can utilize. Instead, very often the difficulties of control are also used by the military, which tends to act in an even greater impunity during the times of radical transition, as will be shown by Azhari Idris in his study of Aceh. Furthermore, the cases of North Sumatra and West Kalimantan, analysed by Budi Agustono and Syarif Alqadrie respectively, show how democracy has fuelled violent ethnic politics by making the use of ethnicity easier for opportunistic politicians.

While the macro-setting of democratisation and decentralization generally offer violent opportunities in the context of the institutional vacuum, in different areas people and groups have utilized these opportunities differently. Pius Suratman Kartasmita's chapter on West Java reveals some of the ways how political elites utilize the institutional vacuum for the mobilization of political support and how the followers utilize these opportunities for addressing their grievances. Mason Hoadley's chapter further elaborates the strategies of relating to the institutional vacuum in a historical light by presenting its logical alternative: resorting to the adat law, whenever official political regulation fails. Also the consequences of this alternative are elaborated in the discussion on Hoadley's chapter: when there are several adats to resort to, there is a problem that might have conflict implications. Kartasmita's chapter also traces the conflict processes in detail, but concludes that in addition to the links explained one necessary ingredient of conflict remains unexplained and that is the role of external instigators and provocateurs. Stein Kristiansen's chapter explains the main missing link of Pius' explanation by introducing a model of grievance-based (economic needs of the unemployed) and opportunity-based motivations (identity-opportunities in the business of violence) to act as instigators/provocateurs.

In addition to new opportunities to motivate violence, decentralized and democratic polities need to address the opportunities to fight wars that already have a motivation. Here the question of how decentralization and democratisation facilitates mobilization becomes central. Violence has to be mobilized and also this mobilization needs to be explained. Robert explains how rumours, terror and panic are used and how they enter the process of business of violence. Budi Agustono's chapter elaborate this further quite as do Pius Suratman Kartasmita's and Syarif Ibrahim Alkadrie's chapter. How mobilization helps fighters go around the everyday norms against violence is explained in Nils Buband's chapter and in the chapter by Kivimäki and Thorning. Especially the role of myths is explored in these two chapters. Finally, the role of identities (regional and national) are analysed in detail in Michael Jacobson's and Rita Kipp's chapters and in the chapter by Riwanto Tirtosudarmo.

Democratisation and decentralization are also related to conflict by offering non-violent opportunities and eventually addressing the grievances and relative deprivation of groups of people. Here the important aspect is what are the outputs of polity, can a decentralized, democratic polity produce efficiently outputs that reflect popular preferences. According to Robert Cribb, democratic participation itself does



not necessarily do much to address grievance-related sources of conflict in Indonesia. As Cribb shows, the rule of law rather than formal democracy, is what is needed to address the grievances and resolve the differences. The institutional vacuum associated both with decentralization and democratisation process often creates problems with efficient addressing of grievance-related roots of conflict. One of these problems is related with the difficulties associated with transition polities in alleviating poverty, as will be shown by Jakob Trane Ibsen. Furthermore, dramatic transitions and decentralisation of financial and political control after three decades of centralisation entails a significant shift in the parameters of hegemony — a shift towards which local political entrepreneurs in the regions are bound to react (Buband, chapter 7).

Even though the chapters in this volume represent different theoretical approaches, study different areas of Indonesia and have different micro- and macro perspectives to the problem of conflict, a rather consistent picture can be derived from the chapters in this volume, on the various links in the causal chain from decentralization and democratisation through the changing identities to conflict potential. Yet it would be too simplistic to conclude that democratisation and decentralization consistently reduce or increase conflict potential. Instead, same structures and mega-processes can be utilized by different people, groups and communities in very different ways, as can be seen in the detailed analyses of the less and more successful regions of Indonesia.



## Chapter 13

# The Pattern of Social and Political Unrest in West Java

By Pius Suratman Kartasasmita

### 1. Introduction

This paper deals with two questions. *First*, how do political and administrative decentralization lead to the consciousness of the West-Javanese social identity? *Second*, to what extent such consciousnesses contribute to the rise of social and political conflicts in public arena? Despite the fact that West Java is a relatively stable province during crisis and transition period compared to the most serious conflict spots in Indonesia, the region (with Bandung as the Capital) has been known as a home for numerous popular movements and community actions. These contradictory facts result in two major commonly shared explanations. On one side, the cultural based explanation holds that the stability is rooted in particularity assumption believing that West-Javanese (read: Sundanese) is a conflict avoidance and tolerance in nature. Such explanation suffers from neglecting so many recent significant social occurrences that far from reflecting peace culture. While on the other side, a more pessimistic global paradox explanation holds that West-Javanese, as others region elsewhere, is now experiencing what so called global paradox indicated by substantial religious and ethnic conflicts. Such explanation also suffers from neglecting the facts that most of conflicts in West Java were far beyond those two substantial issues.

This paper, in the first place, argues that decentralization is a political myth rather than a reality. The implementation of local autonomy is always highly problematic in nature. Secondly, as far as mass media exposure are concerned, there are at least seven critical issues that are potentially generating conflicts in public arena, both substantial and instrumental. Furthermore, thirdly, most of the conflicts brought about in West-Java hardly ever related to substantial nature of conflicts eventhough both ethnicity and religion sometimes are used for public selling. Finally, it is concluded that political and administrative decentralization did lead, to some extent, to the new consciousness of local identity, but it is not necessarily the most contributing accounts for the ongoing conflicts in the future. However, this paper should not be read primarily as a theoretical paper, rather as a compiling empirical evidence from where one might generate a plausible interpretation and explanation. The data are logically



structured in such a way that start with leading question and end at the tentative conclusion.

## 2. Decentralization as a Political Myth

Decentralization in this paper refers to commonly accepted meanings. Those are reversing the concentration of administration at a single center and conferring powers of local government. So, the decentralization can be regarded as a political phenomenon capturing delegation of power to lower level of government (Goodmaster and Ray, 2000:1). The demand for decentralization seems to be universal (B.C.Smith, 1985:1).

Since its independence, Indonesia has been known as one of the largest unitary nation state ruled by highly centralized ways of governance. Despite the fact that such a choice is politically debatable, the country has relatively been doing very well for decades. Until the needs of democratization and reform is currently inevitable and even greater than ever. The challenges come not only from the local people who sought for greater political freedom, but also from international communities who are undeliberately concern with the democratization processes.

Two years ago, the Government of Indonesia released two laws with regards to decentralization in order to face the demand; Law No.22/1999 relates to the devolution of governmental authority and Law No.25/1999 that involves fiscal decentralization. These two laws replaced Law No.5/1974 regarding local governance in Indonesia. At this point, for that reason, the execution of the respective new laws can be regarded as nothing, but an effort to bring government closer to the people and fulfill both political and administrative reform. So, the bottom line of this move is to make governments more responsive and accountable (Goodmaster and Ray, *ibid*).

In practice, the decentralization shows both positive and negative side. The positive side is commonly related to a wide range of economic, political and social advantages. Economically, it is related to the improvement of locally provided services and public goods provided (Shepard, 1975). Politically, it is related to strengthening accountability, political skill and national integration. It also brings decision-making process closer to the people (Maas, 1959; Hill, 1974). Socially, it is related to strengthen local institutions and identities. Those positive advantages are also expected when the Government of Indonesia exercised the pilot project in 26 kabupaten and kotamadya in 1993, six years before the execution of Law No.22/1999 and the Law No.25/1999. The most interesting problem would be how far the distance between the theoretical myth and the reality is.

## 3. Local Autonomy in Action

As far as mass Indonesian media exposures are concerned, the implementation of Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 is highly problematic. Problems, which are identified, are ranged from lacking of sufficient implementation



guides, like presidential and ministerial decrees, to the unpreparedness of local government in dealing with local concern. But the most vulnerable part of the game is to treat all interested parties such as central government, local political elites, NGOs and local people, in a proper manner by inviting them in decision making processes. Otherwise, this game will turn into a war game that perpetuates uncontrollable both vertical and horizontal conflicts. This section provides seven identified issues that are potential to generate conflicts in public arena including in West Java.

### 3.1. The Problem of Interpretation

In the first place, it is clearly stated, that the execution of law No.22/1999 and law No.25/1999, is to promote greater local autonomy. Article 7 (1) law No.22/1999 provides that "*Kewenangan Daerah mencakup kewenangan dalam seluruh bidang pemerintahan, kecuali kewenangan dalam bidang politik luar negeri, pertahanan dan keamanan, peradilan, moneter dan fiskal, agama serta kewenangan bidang lain.*" While Article 7 (2) provides that:

*"Kewenangan bidang lain, sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1), meliputi kebijakan tentang perencanaan nasional dan pengendalian pembangunan nasional secara makro, dana perimbangan keuangan, sistem administrasi negara dan lembaga perekonomian negara, pembinaan dan pemberdayaan sumber daya manusia, pendayagunaan sumber daya alam serta teknologi tinggi yang strategis, konservasi dan standarisasi nasional."*

Secondly, it is also clear that the law No.22/1999 promotes greater position, role and authority of Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD). Thirdly, a significant change is also provided by law No.25/1999. It is about shifting the proportion of fiscal between central and local government. However, as far as media exposures are concerned, there are some political controversies and disputes among actors, both regarding the laws as well as its implementation.

*Bisnis Indonesia* (January 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2001), in the first place, suspects the decree of People's Consultative Assembly (TAP MPR) stating that strategic decision-making should stop at presidential decree. It means that practical matters, like providing public services should be handled locally. At this point, therefore, the government of Indonesia should assume the minimum standard of services applied in the whole country, which is necessary for the protection of the common public.

*Suara Karya* (January 2<sup>nd</sup> 2001) argues that the implementation of local autonomy should not only mean giving-up the job by central to local government, but should primarily mean strengthening local authority and implementing democracy. According to *Suara Karya*, in order to successfully implement local autonomy, the Law No.22 needs 48 implementation guides, while the Law No.25/1999 as many as 26. The lack of such guides might put the central government of Indonesia under accusation that it hesitates to share its power, distribute its income and empowering local and regional administrations.



Consequently, it is plausible to suspect that central government reserves its privilege to intervene local administration. The media reminds, that local autonomy should not be regarded as technical administration—merely for the sake of economic reasons—but also as political processes amenable to the tension between central and local governments. It is warned that too much deconcentration as well as too much decentralization will in the same way jeopardized the unity of the nation.

In accordance to the above indications, Megawati Soekarnoputri (former vice Presiden who is currently becoming the President of Indonesia), concerns about the implementation guides and the successfulness of the respective laws. On January 18<sup>th</sup> 2001, for example, she mentioned that if within 3 to 6 months of the implementation period the government found any kind of unresolved problem, the laws should be ammended. She also indicated, that the implementation of the Laws No.22/1999 has eagerly been forced too far by local people and their representatives (*DPRD*), although local conditions were not ready yet especially with regards to the lack of local administrative capacity, sufficient funding and capable human resources. Illustration shows that 90% of Rp 60,516 trillion of general alocation fund (*Dana Alokasi Umum*) at central government goes to municipal and regional governments. These situations will significantly distabilize fiscal policy held by the central government. She also warned that voluntary migration of potential people to the resourcefull provinces and discriminative fiscal policy promoted by local authority should be considered as potential sources of implementation problems (*Bisnis Indonesia*, January 19<sup>th</sup> 2001).

On the contrary, Bambang Sudibyo as a former Minister of Finance, stated that the two laws should not be ammended at least until 2004. He argues the amandment will reduce the law enforcement of implementation. Meanwhile the IMF suggests that the laws should be immediately revised so that the implementations of these two laws will not jeopardizing financial condition of the central government (*Bisnis Indonesia*, March 3<sup>rd</sup> 2001). Although at the end, President Abdurrachman Wahid and Provincial Government Association of Indonesia (*Asosiasi Pemerintahan Provinsi Seluruh Indonesia*) agreed upon such amandment, political disputes among actors and stakeholders on the implementation of these two laws seem to be apparantly inevitable. Such condition will, in fact, flourish multidimensional conflict among political actors that might generate horizontal conflict among their followers.

### 3.2. Interregional Competition and Sustained Intervention

*Suara Karya* (January 2<sup>nd</sup> 2001) indicates only small number of kabupaten and kotamadya, which are really ready to implement the local autonomy laws. As far as local revenue (PAD) is concerned, there are only 10 % out of 300 kabupaten and kotamadya, were ready for implementing local autonomy. Take Bali Province, for example, 89% of its local revenue comes from three kabupaten/kotamadya only—Kabupaten Badung, Gianyar, and Kodya Denpasar— while six other kabupaten—Klungkung, Karangasem, Tabanan,



Jembrana, Buleleng and Bangli—only accounted for the rest of 11% (*Suara Karya*, January 4<sup>th</sup> 2001).

Another illustration, Kabupaten Lebak in Banten Province that formerly part of West Java, has many undeveloped villages subject to poverty alleviation programme (IDT). Although Lebak has a relatively abundant natural resources, gold mine and tourism, the region is geographically isolated, financially subsidized and suffer from lacking of capable local leaders (*Kompas*, January 12<sup>th</sup> 2001).

East Java, as an exemplary province, is considered as the most prepared province in term of many aspects. This province takes some inovative actions responsible for the positive results. Insufficient socialization and lack of implementations guides from central government, for example, trigger some inovative actions. Local government plays active roles in searching for adequate information, initiating seminars for inputs, socializing the matter both to the local representative council (DPRD) and the press (*Suara Karya*, January 2<sup>nd</sup> 2001). However, substantial implementation of local autonomy, should not deal with administrative matter only, but moreover include all interrelated matters involving interrelated organization network such as people's representative assembly, professional organizations, NGOs, and businesses. It is possible, at this point, to think a unique locally service provided (*Republika*, Januari 11<sup>th</sup> 2001). The main challenge, according to the governor of East Java, is not the autonomy itself, but rather how to bring services closer to the people. It seems that even for the most prepared region like East Java, the implementation of local autonomy is still highly problematic.

Moreover, a research conducted by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences University of Gajah Mada in cooperation with Home Affairs Department supports the unpreparedness of the implementation above. It is concluded that only 44,6 % out of 100 *kabupaten* and *kotamadya* in the country have sufficient capacity to manage their domestic affairs. Unsurprisingly, from that figure 45% has capacity to run local autonomy below 43%. So that in general the capacity of *kabupaten* and *kotamadya* is apparently low. Furthermore, it is indicated that main contributing factors to the problem are the low capacity of local government and sectors, especially in dealing with strategic policy formulation, program monitoring and policy evaluation (*Suara Karya*, January 2<sup>nd</sup> 2001).

The most possible conflicts generated from the existing problems above are two folds. *First*, the emergence of inter-regional competition that leads to inter-regional conflicts. *Second*, there will be inevitable interventional actions by central government to the unprepared *kabupaten* and *kotamadya* leading to a sustained dependency.

### 3.3. Excessive Taxes and Public Dissatisfaction

Local autonomy, according to Dr. Wijoyo Santoso—a senior economist, should prevent excessive tax collection in order to control inflation. It has to generate local economic by utilizing local resources (*Media Indonesia*, January 13<sup>th</sup>



2001). As a result, in order to raise their income, local governments apply various, not to mention excessive, local tax. This is not always benefits local people especially who are poor and it does not necessarily related to a better services. In Palu as an example, *Perda No. 10/2000 tentang Retribusi Kebersihan Kota*, provides that each household should pay Rp 2.000—Rp 5.000 for trash retribution that is included in electricity without being served (*Suara Pembaruan*, January, 13<sup>th</sup> 2001). As political reform introduced, Lampung has introduced not less than 60 new retributions and taxes (*Media Indonesia*, January, 19<sup>th</sup> 2001).

Imbalance services provided by local government will result in public dissatisfaction leading to public frustration flourishing social unrest as shown in many important cases in West Java and yet theoretically plausible.

### **3.4. Barriers on Trade and Discriminative Local Policies**

It is indicated that the implementation of local autonomy does have significant impacts on economic activities especially trade. Sofyan Wanandi, a prominent business actor, states that investors are now waiting to act until local autonomy has been clearly implemented both by central and local government. Furthermore, he states for business actors, according to him, local autonomy is an X factor, which cannot be economically calculated. It is nothing, but additional cost and taxes (*Bisnis Indonesia*, January 12<sup>th</sup> 2001). Accordingly, the former minister of industries and trades Luhut B. Panjaitan accused local government who expands taxes to increase their local income as miss-conduct. According to him, it is important for local government to provide attractive economic incentive in a competitive ways. (*Kompas*, January 24<sup>th</sup> 2001).

Such situation also calls attention of foreign institution like the US-AID who concerns with developing democracy, building strong economic system, and protecting environment in order to promote a sustainable development are become its concerns. The institution warns that the implementation of local autonomy, set new barriers both for within and inter-regional trades resulting in high-cost economy. Given as an example, a truck carrying orange from North Sumatera to Java should pay as much as Rp 100.000 for weight bridges and some other checkpoints. A similar case in South Sulawesi is also shown by Darma (1999). On the other side, IMF worries that the implementation of local autonomy will raise budget of central government (*Bussiness News*, April 6<sup>th</sup> 2001).

### **3.5. Environmental Abuse**

The implementation of local autonomy opens a greater chance to excessive exploitation of natural resources leading to environmental damage. In early days almost all environmental damages around the country were related to the policy or at least under concent of Jakarta. The implementation of local autonomy, these days, open new canopy of fixing and recovering damages. However, such



great chances should be enforced by strong social control and law enforcement. It has to be noted that natural resources should have not subject to business management (*Kompas*, February 6<sup>th</sup> 2001).

Officially, the former Minister of Environment Sonny Keraf also believes that the implementation of local autonomy provides some chances to fix the situation. He suggested that government should, firstly, include local people in doing environmental impact assessment and, secondly, empowering local people in overcoming environmental problems. He assures that local government should apply *good environmental governance* allow *check and ballance mechanism* (*Kompas*, January 18<sup>th</sup> 2001). Surprisingly, he also suggests that local government should insist central government to refund reboisation and mine reclamation funds. (*Kompas*, January 13<sup>th</sup> 2001). On the other side, local autonomy put all local governments under pressure and competition to increase their genuine local income (PAD). Therefore, natural resources are now becoming subject to excessive exploitation as the means of fulfilling immediate economic aims. It is reminded, in fact, that natural resources should not merely be considered economically, but primarily ecologically (*Kompas*, January 12<sup>th</sup> 2001).

It is indicated, infact, that the implementation of the laws was generated competition among those who are involving in forest management. Formerly, Indonesian forest was centrally managed and so its economic benefits. Policies were set up by central government. The role of local governments only as an executor, maintainer dan controller of central guidances. Forest with selective or clear-cut forest system has made a variety of problems. Now, with Law No. 22/1999 article 10, local governments have a right to manage natural recourses in their area and have a responsibility to the enviromental reservation as the laws ordered. However, the management policies are the central government authority and the local governments act only as a manager or an executor. Actually, there are some misimplementations, such as, Kalimantan local government who gave a forest management rights or forest use rights to several people each with 1000 ha square area that overlap with existed HPH. Therefore, there will be more new players in forest field that intensified a competition. The results of local autonomy and forest bussines are: (1) Legal phenomenon, the local leaders who interpreted autonomy as absolute rights tranfers where local rules are being used aggresively by bussinesman. (2) Culture phenomenon, a desire to used "forest for people" or "forest belongs to people". There are conflicts among people and bussinesman, ilegal logging, forest destruction, forest burning, bussines asset destruction and variety of destructiond in natural resources. (*Bisnis Indonesia*, January, 12<sup>th</sup> 2001).

Besides, there is also possibility of local migration. People move from an area with no natural resources to a natural resources surplus area. According to H. Mahmud Hamundu—the Rector of University of Haluoleo, Kendari, North Sulawesi—uneven movement and succesfull newcomers will cause social conflicts between migrant and local people (*Suara Pembaruan*, January, 11<sup>th</sup> 2001). It is also a connection of Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional (BPPN) who will sell forest sector assets. There are 128 companies who badly in debts



and will be undertaken by BPPN with possibility to be sold. Afterward, actors including foreign actors will have an opportunity to have those strategic assets. (*Suara Pembaruan*, March 14<sup>th</sup>, 2001). In short, it seems to be a more competitive situation is taking place in Indonesian forest management.

### 3.6. Foreign Policy

The implementation of local autonomy will also influence in the central government ways of makes and implements foreign policy. Once again, there will be conflicts between central and local government interests. New dimensions that become a focus in central government diplomacy are (1). Local government will become the new focus from local activities scale level—relations between areas and cities—to contact and cooperate in international scale; and (2). There are also already some cooperations of country (donor) with several provinces in Indonesia. Therefore, local autonomy should assume certain level of nationality when it is applied in a global context. The worst possibility of local autonomy and globalization, on other side, is local government who will merely take local interest into their accounts. However, local government should be realized that local autonomy existed within the context of a unitary nation (*Kompas*, February 6<sup>th</sup> 2001).

### 3.7. Local Identity and National Disintegration

Although the implementation of local autonomy initially is meant to be a solution to prevent national disintegration, actually it caused a potential chaos in society, such as self-belonging of natural resources, unhealthy competition between regions resulting in regional arrogance and disappearance of regional solidarities. Local autonomy has only been understood by local government as limited to “a freedom to manage local concern outside the unitary nation.” Then, autonomy is being used as a tool to create “self-contained” attitude—anything outside region are presumed as threat and anything inside region should be highly protected. Separation of Banten from West Java could make Banten people as “the other” of Sundanese and Javanese is potentially become “alliance” to Aceh people (*Kompas*, January 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2001).

Local autonomy has given a new spirit and energy to local political forces to reconstruct a fight toward the central government to be independent from Indonesia. In local regions, there are also phyco-social-political situations with a tendency of local ethnic spirit increasement, which generally compose with religious sentiment. Local autonomy is also has a possibility to make horizontal conflicts that in the first place was an elite conflict—a conflict of power or position or economic resources in local level—and it enlarge into horizontal conflict at society level (*Suara Karya*, January, 3<sup>rd</sup> 2001).

Cornelis Lay also stressed about an ethnic factor in local autonomy implementation. There are reactive attitudes in some political processes in local leaders or DPRD members' elections. In elections, ethnic considerations are by pass a party, local people chosed “*putra daerah*”, and meritocracy is potentialy



being sacrificed by ethnic sentiment. (*Bisnis Indonesia*, Maret, 29<sup>th</sup> 2001). Those matters are already proved, such as, in East Nusa Tenggara, Kabupaten Lembata refused civil officer candidate who come from outside Lembata. Bupati Ende Drs. Paulinus Domi hesitated to have an officer from outside his region (*Kompas*, 19 January, 19<sup>th</sup> 2001).

On the other side, local autonomy—according to Ryaas Rasyid—in first place was not meant to answer political problems in local areas, but specifically was meant to strengthen the central government to handle national economic crisis. With local autonomy, central government could concentrate in handling problems that threaten the national economic crisis. The works separations and political authority hopefully will make the central government concentrated in global issues, become a protector of outside world and have a legitimation from the people, then local governments were eventually expected to be more independent. (*Kompas*, Januari, 29<sup>th</sup> 2001).

#### 4. Local Autonomy and Conflict in West Java

The central question in this paper is to what extent does the implementation of Law No.22/1999 and Law No.25/1999 lead to the rise of social and political conflict in West Java? First of all, taking the pessimistic accounts of argument holds that all problematic issues accompanying the implementation of the laws does apply to West Javanese context. The striking separation of Banten to be a new province was undebatable and seems to be very convincing proof of negative impact of local autonomy, not to mention the issue of separation of Kotamadya Cirebon and "putera daerah" yet.

With regards to inter-regional inequalities, West Java suffers from serious uneven structure of income. Take PAD for examples, six kabupaten—Ciamis, Majalengka, Kuningan, Subang, Sukabumi and Sumedang—are considered as economically vulnerable due to their low annual local revenues which are only less than Rp 15 billion, far below the minimum survival standard ranged between Rp 25-Rp 30 billion per year (*Kompas*, January, 5<sup>th</sup> 2001). In the contrary, *Kabupaten Bogor* has mounted annual income as much as Rp 596,06 billion (*Kompas*, January, 23<sup>rd</sup> 2001). Such condition was suspected as a potential inter-regional competition and conflict. This type of conflict can best be described by the case of people in Kabupaten Majalengka who blocked the Citarum River flowing to the rice-field in Indramayu. Although the case was resolved by providing coordination between 8 Kabupaten and Kotamadya organized by Provincial government, as mentioned in the law No.22/1999, more similar cases are expected to happen. The pessimistic proponents believe that the rise of new consciousness of Sundanese identity will at the end result in refusal of outside cultural traits amenable to more substantial conflicts. According to them, the riot of Bandung 2001 was related to the implementation of local autonomy.

The second explanation is a more optimistic based on cultural account which argues that West Javanese has a strong conflict avoidance attitudes and relatively tolerance in nature, as commonly believed both by scientists and



general public. This explains why does West Java become relatively a stable province during the most turbulence period of transition. West Javanese Bureaucrats, according to Dudung Sumadumin as a Chief of Local Planning Bureau of West Java (Bappeda), are strongly committed to peace and open culture. Take the vision and mission of local development 2003, for example, provides to be a developed province as an equal partner of the Capital City and yet locally based province (*menjadi mitra sejajar ibukota dan menjadi provinsi yang maju sesuai dengan jati diri*).

Strickingly, Dudung mentions that 60% of members of People's Representative Council (DPRD) are not West Javanese. However, for him, this fact become an advantages instead a constrain. The most important thing is they should represent local concerns and interests rather than individuals. Conflicts generated from the implementation of the autonomy laws, according to him, are very trivial. Even the tension between central and local government resulting from both financial and political disputes are only occuring within governmental bureaucracy, not influential to the general public. Governor Nuriana, accordingly, mentions nothing substantial related to the implementation of these two laws, but perenial administrative issues such as governor's authority, placement and carries of the public officials, and general alocation fund (*Bisnis Indonesia*, April 4<sup>th</sup> 2001).

Those two explanations commonly and widely shared by local politicians, bureaucrats, academics and general public. This paper, on the other path, is looking for the new possibilities of explaining the potential influential impacts of the laws to the rise of conflicts in public arena by examining the pattern of extensive conflicts sceme taken place in West Java both before and after the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998. There are four considerable cases before 1998 i.e. the case of Tasikmalaya, Rengasdengklok, Pelabuhan Ratu, and Pameungpeuk. Some extensive interviews were conducted in order to understand the pattern of conflicts occurred in West Java after 1998, however for the closer look the case of Bandung 2001 will be specially exposed.

## 5. From Tasikmalaya to Pameungpeuk

The pattern of conflicts in West Java before 1998 can be described from four cases shown in Table 5.1. In general, the cases have similar pattern neither from substantial religious nor ethnic conflicts. *Firstly*, the four cases started with a very unique and spesific cases nothing to do with primordial accounts and directly handled by the respected authority. *Secondly*, the information of the initial insident spreaded within particular groups that always different from that of the officially released. *Third*, there were some level of public distrust and dissatisfaction utilized by the unknown third parties. *Finally*, the riots occurred involving the general public.

Table 5.1. The Pattern of Conflict Before 1998

	Tasikmalaya (1)	Rengasdengklok (2)	Pelabuhanratu (3)	Pameungpeuk (4)
Initial Causes	<p>A punishment by <i>ustadz</i> Habib to his student <i>santri</i> Rizal in Pondok Pesantren Condong. (December, 19<sup>th</sup> 1996)</p> <p>Habib came to <i>Polres</i> to fulfill the invitation by local police.</p> <p>Suprisingly, Habib was beaten up by Koprak Nursamsi dan several officers. (December, 23<sup>rd</sup> 1996)</p>	<p>An activity of waking up people in early morning by making some noises on fasting month by local young people in Kampung Doyong.</p> <p>Kim Tjai and his family protested the activity. He also reported the accident to the local police. However, kampung leaders and police officers settled the misunderstanding between local young people and Kim Tjai. (January, 30<sup>th</sup> 1997)</p>	<p>The death of Ujib—a teacher of Elementary School or SD Cipicung Pelabuhanratu.</p> <p>PGRI as teacher's organization made an investigation regarding the death of Ujib. Afterward, a suspect that was presumed by PGRI—Dayat—was brought to the local police station.</p>	<p>The death of Chief Corporal Jojo Juhana.</p> <p>Jojo was a mediator in several conflicts between <i>Polsek</i> and Mancagahar people. Those people were often involved in stole timber activities.</p> <p>Actually, Jojo Juhana was dead by an accident in a regular gun practice. (August, 27<sup>th</sup> 1997)</p>
Unclear Rumours	<p>Rumours that KH. Makmun and <i>Ustadz</i> Mahmud were killed by policemen and also a rumour regarding insultment toward <i>ulama</i> as religious leader were spread to people.</p>	<p>Several unclearly rumours were spread and circulated among people.</p>	<p>Police released Dayat from the accusation because a lack of evidence.</p> <p>The release made people angry mainly because Dayat was "the guilty one".</p>	<p>A rumour that Jojo's death was caused by <i>Polsek</i> officer and he was beaten up to death.</p>



<p style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg);">Mass Riot</p>	<p>A gathering of thousands people to pray and discuss the matter.</p> <p><i>Korem</i> 062 Tarumanegara Commander— Colonel M. Yasin was there and also Mimih Khaeruman as people's representative.</p> <p>The mass was moved to <i>Mapolres</i> demanded <i>Kapolres</i>' apology.</p> <p>Some people was made a destruction and burned 2 <i>departement store</i>— Matahari dan Yogya, Katolik Salib Suci, Church and another churches and also some properties belonged to <i>nonpribumi</i>. (December, 26<sup>th</sup> 1996)</p>	<p>A group of masses came to Kim Tjai house in Kampung Doyong.</p> <p>A destruction of Kim Tjai's house that was already has been abandoned by him and his family.</p> <p>The mass made destruction along Jalan Rengasdengklok.</p> <p>There, they rolled over some cars; burned 3 churches and a Vihara.</p> <p>The destruction continued to others places in that <i>Kecamatan</i>. (January, 30<sup>th</sup> 1997)</p>	<p>A mass destroyed some vehicles, <i>Mapolsek</i> Pelabuhanratu building, and released 4 criminals from the building. Burning up the building continued the destruction. (August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1997)</p>	<p>A mass in hundreds were attacked <i>Polsek</i> Pameungpeuk by thrown stones and molotov bomb until the building was in fire. (August 27<sup>th</sup>, 1997)</p>
<p style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; transform: rotate(180deg);">Resolution Efforts</p>	<p>- Mobilization of security officers: <i>Batalyon</i> 330 Bandung, <i>Batalyon</i> 323 Majalengka, <i>Batalyon</i> 301 Sumedang and also <i>Kostrad</i> &amp; <i>Arhanud</i>.</p> <p>- Radio announcement by KH Makmun to clarify the situation to the people.</p>	<p>- Mobilization of security officers: 200 personnel of <i>Polres</i> dan <i>Kodim</i> Rengasdengklok, <i>Satuan Setingkat Kompi (SSK)</i> of <i>Batalyon</i> 305, and 2 <i>SSK</i> of <i>Armed</i> 9 <i>Pasopati</i> and also <i>Brimob</i> <i>Polri</i>.</p> <p>- A meeting and an understanding between religious leaders and government officers to help each other.</p>	<p>- Mobilization of security officers.</p>	<p>- Mobilization of security officers: <i>Batalyon</i> 303 <i>Kostrad</i>, <i>Kodim</i> Garut, <i>Polwil</i> Priangan and <i>Polda</i> Jabar.</p>



Third Actors	89 people with 2 women among them became suspects.	-	-	60 people were interrogated for informations with 38 among them became suspects.
Invisible Actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unknown people who spread the rumours and provoked the mass.</li> <li>- Unknown person who provided money and paid the mass.</li> <li>- Unknown people who came in trucks before the riot.</li> <li>- Unknown 100 motorcycles riders who asked people to make anarchys action.</li> <li>- "Mimih Khaeruman" who disappeared afterward.</li> </ul>	- Unknown people who spread rumours to people	-	- Unknown people who spread rumours to the people
Casualties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Kio Wie (60) who trapped in fire and Eli Santoso (34) who got a heart attack both were dead.</li> <li>- 8 churches were damaged</li> <li>- 14 sector police stations, 89 stores, 4 pabrik factories, 6 bank, 3 hotels, 107 cars dan 22 motorcycles were burned</li> <li>- (The loss was estimated worth 85 billion rupiah)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No human victim.</li> <li>- 3 churches, 1 vihara, several vehicles, 3 factories, tens stores, and 1 school were damaged. Mostly those properties were belonged to <i>nonpribumi</i>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No human victim.</li> <li>- <i>Mapolsek</i> Pelabuhanratu building and several vehicles were damaged and burned.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No human victim.</li> <li>- <i>Mapolsek</i> Pameungpeuk building was burned.</li> </ul>

## 6. From Soccer to Labor Strike

Some extensive interviews were conducted with peoples who involved in one or more riots, student's demo, and other social mobs. All responden were chosen purposively from different social categories such as students, police officers, labors, military, street traders, taxi drivers, public officials and lay person. Interview were conducted in three months of the first half of year 2000 and three months in the second half of the same year. The main conclusions are highlighted as the following:

1. Most of riots, according to the respondents, involved one or more controlling actors known as *provocators* who are committed with particular interest. A provocative actions to the people who involved would change a demonstration into a riot. However, only few respondents could openly identified the respective actors. *PSZ, male, age group 20 – 29, police, developing economic condition*; he stated that in Tasikmalaya riot on December 26<sup>th</sup> 1996, was began by Tasikmalaya young people, santri, college and students, who were provoked by unknown mass group. *NN, male, age group 20-29, police, declining economic condition*; he said that when he assigned to handle a riot in Karawang West Java, there was a provocation military member. That actor was made people, especially *tukang ojeg* and *tukang becak*, to displace Chinese with burned action. According to NN, the same pattern also happened in Majalengka.
2. Some respondents, mostly students, believe that riot is the most effective way to express their aspiration when the authorities do not responsive to public demands.
3. Law enforcement authorities, like police, are expected to play an important roles such as mediator between conflicting parties, protector of public properties and helping demonstrators to accomplish their goals. However, in action, most of the time police and military use violence both for protecting themselves from the angry mass or for controlling the ongoing occurrences. When facing the violence situation, the participating parties in the riots will spontaneously do the same thing for protection, solidarity or just unpurposefully.
4. Economic factor became a main influencing factor of someone involvement in a demonstration or even his or her willingness to initiate riot. It is articulated by *NN, male, age group 30-39, employee, declining economic condition*: as textile company employee in Bandung. NN with his partners were involved in a demonstration to demand a welfare improvement and 5% share of income in stockholder. Or by other responden, *NN, male, age group 30-39, police, stable economic condition*: as police in field, he often assigned in handling mass riot. One of them is bank employees' demonstration in Bandung whom lost their jobs because the bank was being liquidated. Or by another responden, *NN, female, age group 20-29, unemployed, declining economic*



*condition*: she was involved in mass riot of street vendors in Jalan Ahmad Yan Cicadas Bandung. Her involvement was mainly related in order to have food. In other words, riot and violent to her was a survival matter problem. Or a more ethnical colored of *NN, male, age group 20-29, unemployed, declining economic condition*: he was paid to burn and throw stores in a riot. Although he believed that the riot was a conflict between Moeslim and Tionghoa despite that, money was his prime motivation.

5. The structure of riot in Bandung on June 13<sup>th</sup> 2001 can be simplified as summarized on Table 5.2.

Table 5.2. The structure of Bandung's riot 2001

<b>Initial Cause</b>	A demand for an implementation of <i>Kepmen No. KEP-150/MEN/2000</i> . Therefore, labours were demonstrated to get their aim.
<b>Trigger</b>	A rumour that Local Government and DPRD could not met the demonstrators because they have already go abroad.
<b>Mass Riot</b>	<p>June 12<sup>th</sup>2001, 2000-5000 flocked to the street with three main target, Gedung Sate (Local Government Office) dan DPRD building and local TVRI for direct coverage. The mass insists for: (1) cancellation of Keputusan Menteri Tenaga Kerja No. 78/2001 and Kepmen No. 112/2001, (2) reimplement Kepmen No.150/2000 and (3) resignation of Menaker Alhilal Hamdi.</p> <p>Later on, 44 vehicles were burned and DPRD building was damaged. (July 13<sup>th</sup>, 2001).</p>
<b>Resolution Efforts</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mobilization of security officers.</li> <li>- West Java DPD FSPSI Chief Hussein Alwi read a Governor Statement to the people. That statement said that <i>Kepmen No. KEP-150/MEN/2000</i> will be reimplemented.</li> <li>- A call from society leaders for a restoration.</li> </ul>
<b>Third Actors</b>	89 people were captured and 9 people from them were became suspects. There was also an indication of PRD involvement.
<b>Invisible actors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unknown people who forced labors to join the demonstration by stopped labours' bus or came to factories to get the labors.</li> <li>- Unknown people who paid labours to demonstrate. The payment was about Rp 20.000-Rp100.000 and paid indicated by "Ipong" from Jakarta.</li> </ul>
<b>Casualties</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No human life casualties</li> <li>- Trade activities were halted for days</li> <li>- Damages and stolen DPRD building properties were estimated worth 2 billion rupiah</li> </ul>

## Notes on Controversies:

The aftermath of the riots was only damages, strike of public transportation and political controversies left. On June 14<sup>th</sup> 2001, the situation was perfectly handled by the authority. June 15<sup>th</sup> 2001 at 1 a.m. central government raised the national gas price leading to mass strike of public transportation. Public transportation users suffered most from this strike. In addition it was calculated that about Rp 12 billion of goods were idle that day. Government compromised by raising the gas price at 20%-25% only.

The strike, then, was soon followed by controversies among political actors, business actors and academics. Yudi Widiana, member of Komisi B DPRD Jabar, reminded that the labor cost of companies not more than 20% compare to the bigger amount for bribing public officials, security, NGOs and other social costs. He reminded that the labors that are accounted for one third of 5 million labors in Indonesia should appropriately be treated. Reimplementation Kepmen No.150/2000 by Governor of West Java invited other controversies. Prof Dr Ahmad Ali argued that such kind of action should also be regarded sociologically. Revisond Baswir, professor from Gajah Mada University, said that Indonesia does not have constitutional policies on labors, and also lots of important public matters such as electricity, telephone, drinking water etc., were trapped into *power games*.

At higher level of politics, Abdurrahman Wahid believed that the implementation of Kepmen No.150/2000 would restrict foreign investment. His statement was also supported by foreign investors soufnd. Donal Rumokoy from Sam Ratulangi University claimed that the minister Bomer Pasaribu too much consideration for labor without considering companies. On the other edge, 65 institutions including labor union, DPRD, Governor and Bupati refused Kepmen No. 78/2001 and No. 112/2001 or supported reimplementation of Kepmen No. 150/2000. (*Depnarkertrans note*).

## 6. Tentative Conclusions

1. The implementation of Law No.22/1999 and Law No.25/999 is highly problematic in nature. It provides political and administrative controversies between central and local actors. In addition, it also provides some critical issues related to new ways of governance both on geographical and social issues. These problems might generate both instrumental and substantial conflicts. These might also apply in West-Javanese context.

2. Extensive empirical evidence shows, that all conflicts under study in West Java are instrumental in nature. This fact provides two inferences. First, the mentioned critical issues above more likely to generate instrumental



conflicts. Second, cultural-based explanation of conflicts do not hold in West-Javanese context.

3. The extent to which such instrumental conflicts turn into substantial ethnic or religious conflicts depends on how are '*the third and the invisible actors*' taking advantage of the situation as either political or economical means.

4. It is concluded that political and administrative decentralization did lead, to some extent, to the new consciousness of local identity, but it is not necessarily the most contributing accounts for the ongoing conflicts in the future.

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