

POVERTY, ETHNICITY AND RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN THE INCREASE OF TERRORISM (A CASE IN INDONESIA)

by Sukawarsini Djelantik

Submission date: 25-Feb-2020 03:20PM (UTC+0700)

Submission ID: 1263778070

File name: 008_poverty_ethnicity_and_religious_factor.docx (261.5K)

Word count: 10023

Character count: 57215

POVERTY, ETHNICITY AND RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN THE INCREASE OF TERRORISM (A CASE IN INDONESIA)

• Sukawarsini Djelantik*

SUMMARY

Since the end of the New Order Government in Indonesia, terrorism has become the most serious issue. Bomb explosions increased significantly from 1998 until recently, demonstrating that terrorism poses a continuous threat on national, regional and international community. Indonesia, the world's biggest archipelago, is characterized as a country of multiculturalism, multi-religion, and multi-language. The characteristics which challenge Indonesian government are how to effectively manage its diversity, terrorism and ethnic separatism. Security challenges increased significantly after the Sep, 11 WTC attacks, followed by George Bush's Global War on terror — the war against terrorism perceived by Indonesian radical Moslems groups as a war against them. They've called for solidarity from the "Islamic brotherhood" against the threat to Islamic world.

The majority of Indonesian terrorists and radical groups are mostly from Java Island. This paper makes clear the questions on why terrorists are mostly Javanese-Moslem. The author's hypothesis is that misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Islamic teachings is due to socio-economic problems in Java. Socially the position of informal-religious leaders is more prominent than formal leaders (government officers). Economically, the increase in poverty and government's policy failure to provide better life is related to the rise of security issues. Factually, terrorism and radicalism increased significantly after the Asian monetary crisis in 1998 that badly hit Indonesian economy, and repeated after the global economic crisis in 2008.

To answer the question, the author conducted field research in several villages, small towns, and major cities in Java, especially in places where the influence of Islamic Wahabian culture is prominent. Interviews and focus group discussion were conducted with respondents from students of Islamic boarding school (pesantren), the Da'is (religious preachers), and the Kyais (religious leaders). The Dais and Kvai are regarded as prominent-informal leaders and religious advisors in most places in Java. Their role served as sole interpreters of Islamic teachings, where the followers turned to answer questions related to almost all aspects of

Associate Prof. Dr., Parahyangnan Catholic University, Indonesia.

life. Further discussion is on Islamic teachings that are misinterpreted as a justification of its terrorist activities. The explanation that Islamic teachings provide aims to foster a better understanding of the true Islamic teachings. The purpose of this study is to analyze the role of culture and religion in the setting of terrorism and radicalism increase in Indonesia.

Introduction; Java and Indonesia Economic Crisis

Majority of Indonesian terrorists and radical groups are mostly from Java Island. This research will analyze the reason why they are mostly Javanese-Moslem. My first hypothesis is related to the increased poverty in Java, following the fall of New Order government in 1998, and the failure of reform government to implement economic policies. The increased of poverty and government's policy failures were related to the increase of security threat. Factually, terrorism and radicalism increased significantly after the Asian monetary crisis in 1998 that hit Indonesia's economy hardest in comparison to other Asian countries. The phenomena repeated after the global economic crisis in 2008 followed by European crisis in 2010. The second hypothesis related to the misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Islamic teachings. The social position of informal-religious leaders is more prominent than formal leaders (government officers). However, not all religious leaders are enriched by thorough understanding on global-political issues. My further argument would be related to the role of religious leaders to deliver true meaning of Islam to their followers.

Java is the most populous island in Indonesia with 136 million populations. (or 60% of Indonesia's population). Major Indonesia's cities located in Java, namely Jakarta (the capital city), Surabaya and Bandung. As a center of political, social and economic activities, any condition in Java significantly influence most parts of Indonesia. Administratively, the island divided into four provinces, namely West Java, Central Java, East Java, Banten, and two special

Territories, Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Java is the most developed island in Indonesia since the Dutch era until now, as well as the most industrialized as the center of business, trade and services. Industrialization primarily took place in northern coastal cities of Java, e.g. Cilegon, Tangerang, Bekasi, Karawang, Gresik and Sidoarjo.

The main religion in Java is Islam, which divided into three main cultural streams (*aliran*), namely the *santri*, *ahungan* and *priyayi*. Members of the *santri* class are more likely to be urban dwellers, and tend to be oriented to the mosque, the Qur'an, and perhaps to Islamic canon law (*Sharia*). In contrast, the *ahungan*, which tend to be from village backgrounds and absorb both Hindu and Muslim elements, forming a culture of animist and folk traditions. This particular class was originated from Sindhi sailors, who had settled in Java. The *priyayi* is the traditional bureaucratic elite and were strongly driven by hierarchical Hindu-Javanese tradition. Initially court officials in pre-colonial kingdoms, the stream moved into the colonial civil service and then on to administrators of the modern Indonesia. (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santri> - cite note-McDonald-0). Traditionally, students of Islam in Indonesia would study in a boarding school known as a *pesantren*. The leader of the school is called *kwai*, or an expert in Islam. The role of *Kyai* is central in *pesantren*, with remaining authority because people will listen to what they say. The *Kyai* would be the place where its *santri* (student of *pesantren*) would seek for the answer on almost any life issues.

Following the end of Suharto's era in May 1998, Indonesia went through transitional period. After 32 years living under authoritarian

1. Clifford Geertz, 1976, *The Religion of Java*, The University of Chicago Press. p. 121-215.

regime, Indonesia entered a new era, marked by democratization and political reforms. On the other end, the reform era also marked by a period of economic crisis. The economic crisis followed by a political, social and security crisis with spread of violence, demonstration and bomb explosions in several major cities. Terrorist does not only target major Indonesian cities in Java, also in small town outside Java like Palu in Southeastern Sulawesi, Aceh and Papua.

The economic crisis also marked by the decrease of IDR to USD. The report of NBER stated that since December 1996 and January 1998, the value of rupiah decreased sharply, from 2400 into 16.000. The prices of food in January 1998 have also increased, or equal to the increased of food prices in previous 6 months prior to crisis. At the end, almost all products also increased in prices.² The impact of crisis hit hardest the urban population. High inflation and the increased price of consumer goods led to the decrease of buying power. Between 1997 and 1998 the inflation increased from 6% into 78%, while the income decreased into about one-third of previous value. The condition led to the increase of poverty rate, from 17% in 1996 to 24% in 1999.³

Poverty and all its forms are the biggest threat and the sole threat to peace, security, democracy, human rights and environment.⁴ Poverty, together with corruption and repression are combination in many societies that led to the weak government and unable to implement the law or to protect national boundary. The conditions led to the terrorist threat and drug cartel.⁵

Poverty as a contributive factor to terrorism remains a controversial issue. The supporters to the arguments believed that poverty led to desperation and frustration. The poor marginal position, combined with political suppression led to the idea of revenge against their "enemies". The connection between poverty and terrorism had been studied by several experts using case studies in several countries. The author reflected the studies with Indonesian economic condition after the end of New Order period. The aim of this study is to investigate whether terrorism can be linked to economic desperation (measured through poverty on the individual's level and economic indicators on the societal level). The resulting evidence on the individual level suggests that a higher standard of living and those living in a transitional area between major cities and rural areas are more likely associated with participation in terrorist activities. With regard to the societal economic condition, no sustainable link between terrorism and poverty could be found, which mean that there is either no link or a very weak indirect link between them.

Various efforts have been conducted by international community to eradicate poverty, especially by those who believe that is a direct and or indirect connection between the two. For Indonesia, poverty is related to economic development policies especially after the increase of oil prices since November 2005.⁶ The failure of economic policies led to the increase of unemployment and increased number of people live under poverty line.¹

2. Levinsohn, J, Friendman, J, dan Berry, S., *Impacts of the Indonesian Economic Crisis: Price Changes and the Poor*, Report of National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), see <http://www.nber.org/digest/dec99/w7194.html>, accessed on October 14th, 2006.

3. Indonesia, *Laporan Pembangunan Manusia 2001*, UNDP, see http://www.undp.orid/pubs/ldr2001/ringkasan_eksekutif.asp, accessed on October 14th, 2006.

4. The statement of WTO President, Michael Moore on the UN International Conference on Financing for Development, Mexico, 18-22 March 2002. See: <http://www.un.org/esa/>, accessed on October 14th, 2006.

5. Statement of U President George W. Bush on the 1st year commemoration of WTC terrorist bomb in New York. *New York Times*, September 11th, 2002.

6. Sukawarsini Diantik, et al, *Faktor-Faktor Pendukung Aksi Terorisme di Jawa Bagian Barat*, Research Report, Parahyangan Centre for International Studies (PACTS) Parahyangan Catholic University in cooperation with Coordinating Desk of Eradication of Terrorism^o DKPT), Republic of Indonesia's Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Legal and Security Affairs, 2006.

The UNDP report stated that another impacts of Asian crisis related to the decrease of Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a combination of the decreased of real income to the decreased access to health services.⁷ In comparison to other countries in Asia with similar crisis, e.g. Thailand, South Korea and Malaysia, Indonesia was in worse condition. As the crisis has been overcome in others Asian countries, Indonesia still struggle with its impacts, e.g. the decision to provide grant to Indonesian banks had led to liquidity crisis. As consequence, the government implemented higher taxes that followed by the decrease quality of public services.⁸ The crisis followed by factories closure after the increase prices of imported raw material (foreign exchange trade) and the products selling prices in IDR. The options for foreign investors forced to either to close the operation, to reduce production capacity, or to reduce the number of employees.

The economic crisis led to socio-political issues and demonstration throughout the country. In vast, rich diversity country like Indonesia, the potentially source of conflict are related to manpower, land ownership, or natural resources. Multiculturalism in negative terms also means inter-ethnicity or inter-religion conflict. The reform era led to re-emergence of previous unresolved conflict, includes decreasing faith to political institutions.

The Asian economic crisis followed by global financial crisis in 2008 which affected to the growth of Indonesian economy. Number of unemployment increased significantly after the closure of factories and manufacturing industries. The crisis that started in the US had directly affected Indonesian farmer, following

the decreasing prices of two agricultural products, especially palm oil and rubber. Indonesian farmers lost their US market, followed by indirect effect after the loss of their export markets in US trade partners (China, India, Japan, and European Union). The effects had once again increased urbanization and unemployment rate due to capital withdrawal of foreign investors to more politically stable countries. The value of rupiah (IDR) once again was depreciated against USD. The forecast of Indonesia economic growth in 2012 also decreased from 6,7% in 2011 into 6,3% in 2012. The ongoing European economic crisis would also influence Indonesia economic growth, due to the role of European Union as Indonesian exporting market.

The Economic Crisis and Terrorism Development

For Indonesia, a signal to political and security instability is the increasing number of bombs attacks. Since 2000, the capital city of Jakarta attacked by series of terrorist bombing, e.g. at the Philippines Embassy, Jakarta Stock Exchange building,⁹ and Atrium Plaza Shopping Mall.¹⁰ In 2001, churches in Jakarta and several major cities were attacked in Christmas Eve. In the same year, number of bombing attacks increased to 81 attacks (29 were exploded in Jakarta). The most devastating attack was the Bali Bombings in October 12th, 2002, after killed around 200 Indonesian and mostly foreigners. In August 2003, bomb attacked the Marriott Hotel and the front of Australian Embassy both in Jakarta.¹¹ In 2005, Bali was once again attacked by bomb in Jimbaran and Kuta, on October 1st. Undoubtedly, these attacks had decreased people trust in the government

7. <http://www.iraorgjexternalnp/pdr/FfD/2002/index.htm>-14k, also in Nadi Soesastro, The Economic Crisis in Indonesia, Lessons and Challenges for Governance and Sustainable Development, di <http://www.pacific.net.id/pakarihadisusastroieconomic.html>, accessed on October 14th, 2006.

8. Ibid.

9. Mohamad Ikhsan, Flexible Market will Solve Manpower Issues, The Jakarta Post, 16 October 2008, see: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/outlook/eco07b.asp>, diakses tanggal 16 Oktober 2006.

10. http://www.undp.orid/pubsiihdr2001/ringkasan_eksekutif.asp, diakses tanggal 14 Oktober 2006.

11. http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bom_Gedung_Bursa_Efek_Jakarta_2000, diakses tanggal 13 Oktober 2006.

12. http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daftar_serangan_teroris_di_Indonesia, diakses tanggal 13 Oktober 2006.

13. 396 http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bom_Kedubes_Australia_2004, diakses tanggal 13 Oktober 2006.

and police apparatuses as security provider. On 9th November 2008, three terrorists from the *Jamaah Islamiyah (JI)* group, namely Imam Samudra, Amrozi Nurhasyim and Huda bin Abdul Haq were executed by firing squad on the island prison of Nusakambangan.

After several years under a relatively calm episode marked by the absence of bomb attack, Indonesia once again became a target of terrorist bomb. A bomb exploded in Jakarta's Mega Kuningan District destroyed JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Hotels in July 17m 2009. This attack had turned the world attention again to the role of JI terrorist group. Analysis on bomb type, content, and operation mode, indicated that the bomb was engineered by JI members. On 9 March 2010, Dulmatin (nicknamed "the Genius"), the responsible terrorist for setting off one of the Bali bombs with a mobile phone — was killed in a shoot-out with Indonesian police in Jakarta. The captured and execution of four terrorists does not mean the end of terrorism in Indonesia, especially because the new generation of terrorists have re-emerge. In March 2010, Indonesian authorities have released the names of the top terrorists who died in a gun battle with police in Aceh province. They are Enceng Kurnia, also-known-as Jaia or Umar, and Pura Sudarna. Enceng Kurnia was closely linked to Rios, a terrorist involved in the attack against the Australian Embassy on 9 September 2004. He trained first in Afghanistan, then Mindanao in the Southern Philippines, he was the mentor to Imam Samudra. On April 15, 2011, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device in a mosque in a police compound in the city of Cirebon, in West Java. The blast killed at least 28 and some injured, while praying in the mosque. In April 28, 2011, The Special Detachment 88 anti-terror squad of the National Police arrested seven people suspected to be members of the Pepi Fernando-led terrorist network in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. One of the nabbed people identified as J (28) from Bogor, West Java. Pepi was suspected as a master

mind of a bomb plot found in a gas pipe line near Christian Cathedral in the Banten Province.

Beside a target, Indonesia is also a safe haven and recruitment center for new terrorist members. As stated earlier, poverty and political instability are two contributive factors to the emergence of terrorism. A study by Alberto Abadie in the Basque region (Spain-France border), Iraq and Russian Federation, confirmed the previous argument. Abadie mentioned that the level of political freedom is a source of violent conflict. He further stated if transition era, from authoritarian into democracy, would follow by the temporary increase of terrorist activities.⁴ Indonesia political condition after the fall of New Order also turned into a fertile ground to the growth of terrorism. People's discontent expressed through terror and other violence. The Indonesian experience also happened in countries under social conflict, political coup, and civil war in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. Because terrorism is related to political conflict, the research confirmed that poverty and the failure of government in development policy had played a significant role in the increase of terrorism.

Indonesia is a Terrorist Haven?

The fact that Indonesia is a terrorist safe havens confirmed by below report of the Council of Foreign Relations:

Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim county, is a vast archipelago with porous maritime borders, a weak central government, separatist movements, corrupt officials, a floundering economy, and a loosely regulated financial system—all characteristics which make it a fertile ground for terrorist groups.

While Indonesia is known as a secular, tolerant society that practices a moderate form of Islam, radical Islamists has gained momentum. Terrorism experts worry about al-Qaeda using Indonesia as a base for a Southeast Asian front in its campaign against "infidels," Jews, and the United States.¹⁵

The government's failure to respond to

14. 397 Alberto Abadie, 2004, *Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism*, NBER Working Paper No. 1085, Oktober 2004.op.cit. hal. 3.

political reform positively, unfairness of economic policies, and weak implementation of laws and orders were believed as causes of the emergence of militant youth of Islamic radicals. The economic policies that unresponsive to small income groups were leading to the increase of radicalism. The radical groups would use religious symbols to gain wider support. Further discussion would be focused on terrorism under religious teachings.

Democratization and greater political freedom in Indonesia in one hand, had led to the increase of terrorism. The current condition is in contrast to New Order era, when subversive law was implemented. The law is to justify the capture and punish of terrorist suspect without trial. The reform era had abolished this practice, after replaced by legal, transparent process with respect to human rights. The reform era had also provided greater freedom to the media to act as government's watchdog. Indonesia's slow response to combat terrorism was criticized by some elements of people that wanted as fast respond as apply in Malaysia and Singapore. The facts led to dilemma whether Indonesia should implement *Internal Security Act* (ISA) as Singapore and Malaysia. However, the implementation of above act would create greater rather than solving problem. Indonesia needs more effective intelligence unit to analyze whether freedom and democratization turned as source of problems or otherwise.⁶ The root problem is lack of government's ability and capability to administer its vast regions, especially the remotes islands in eastern parts of archipelago. Combat terrorism must be followed by efforts to increase government's efficiency and improvement of public services. Historically, the emergence of Moslems radical groups was inherited by the New Order's government, with its oppressive policies." A

strong political power of Indonesian Military Unit (TNI) during New Order was contributive to the development of radicalism, Counter terrorism policies in Indonesia have so far successfully balancing the idea of Indonesia to maintain security, to respect international anti-terror convention, as well as supporting democratization process. However, Indonesia remaining a favorite safe haven and terrorist's breeding ground.

The rise of terrorism is supported by society conditions, political pressure, social injustice, and the widening economic gap between the rich and the poor. Because terrorism is a political strategy of the powerless against the powerful, so the weak could only use minimum resources. Terrorism is identical to a radical political organization that conducting revolutionary actions.⁷ The weakness in implementing laws and orders in Indonesia was contributive factor to the increase terrorism. In addition, Indonesia still dealing with issues such as:

1. Weak borderline patrol in neighboring countries and immigration procedures. To some extent, was related to weaknesses in bureaucratic administration and corrupt government officers.
2. Trade cooperation between ASEAN and the Middle Eastern countries. Some cooperation conducted by private companies without government's involvement. The condition led to undetected fund transfer between radical groups in the Middle East and/or South Asia and to its Indonesian counterparts.
3. The increased of criminal activity, includes drug trafficking and trans- organized crimes in ASEAN. These activities at some points facilitated money laundering and transfer fund to terrorist's group.
4. The export of arms from Indonesian producer to other Southeast Asian nations.⁸ In comparison to Malaysia and Singapore

15. Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism Havens; Indonesia, see: <http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/terrorism-havens-indonesia/p9361>, accessed on April 25th, 2012.

16. Ramakrishna dan Tan, op.cit. p. 22.

17. Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and the Challenge of Radical Islam After October 12*, daian Kumar Ramakrishna dan See Seng Tan (Editors), dalam *After Bali, The Thre*.

18. Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and the Challenge of Radical Islam After October at of Terrorism*, World Scientific dan Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2003.

with its more effective public administration, Indonesian problem is comparable with Thailand and the Philippines. Thailand is still dealing with unresolved conflict in its Southern Provinces, and the Philippines with its Mindanao's problems.

Indonesia also confronted by coordination problem and bureaucratic rivalries amongst government's institutions. For instance, the Indonesian police (POLRI) is lacking of resources on an up to date bank data that provided the list of domestic radical groups and international network." Rivalry between Indonesian Army (TNI) and POLRI led to TNI's reluctance to share intelligent data. After the reform era, the POLRI is appreciated after its success to strengthen the law, effectiveness in decreasing bureaucracy, develop public administration services and counter-terrorism policies. After Bali Bombing I, Indonesian President Megawati introduced two emergency laws which focused on the investigation and the rights to arrest terrorists' suspects. The law proposal adopted as national law in March 6th, 2003, which legitimating and providing legal standing to POLRI to arrest terrorist suspects without prior trial. Its as well provide authorization to pass death sentence to the terrorists, using intelligent report as evidences.

Poverty vs Terrorism; Case Study of West Java

Further study would be focused on West Java Province. West Java with a population of over 43 million is the most populous and most densely populated province. Located on the island of Java, it is slightly smaller than Taiwan, but with nearly double of population. Its capital city is Bandung. The economy of the Sundanese people in West Java relied heavily on rice cultivation. West Java is the native homeland of Sundanese people which formed the largest ethnic group

in West Java, followed by Javanese that migrated into the province since centuries ago. Since Jakarta and surrounding areas including West Java is the business and political center of Indonesia, the province has attracted various people throughout Indonesia. West Java urban areas are also known with significant population of Chinese Indonesian.

Connection between terrorism and poverty appeared in, for example, the recruitment process of terrorist member and suicide bomber. The candidate approached by economic assistance, and capital aid. After aid reception, the candidates would be offered a possibility to involve in military training and suicide bomber? This practice was found in Sukabumi, a border town between Jakarta and rural area. The town is characterized by rapid physical development in one hand, while practicing traditional way of life on the other. Industrialization and modernization process only prominence in physical development. The example is suicide bombers in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2003, Rois alias Irwan Darmawan, Hasan alias Purnomo alias Agung, dan Sogir alias Ansori, Heri Golun and Syamsul Bachri from the city of Sukabumi."

Further research was conducted in region where poverty is not a primary factor to the increase of terrorism. Research was conducted in interior region in West Java with characteristic of economic activities based on agricultural and small fishery. The condition of absolute poverty did not followed by the increased of violence. In contrary, the respondents dedicated themselves intensively into religious activities and practices. Religion is used as escapism mode from life hardship. To conduct terrorism or being suicide bomber that promised would go straight to heaven could not distract their faith."

International and national terrorist have

19. Richard Clutterbuck, 1987, *Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion*, Macmillan, hal. 6-8.

20. Kumar Ramakrishna dan See Seng Tan, "Is Southeast Asia a "Terrorist Haven?", in *After Bali, The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, Kumar Ramakrishna dan See Seng Tan (editor), World Scientific and Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 2003, p. 20.

21. Ramakrisna dan Tan, *op.cit.* p. 21.

22. Sukawarsini Djelantik, *op.cit.* p. 146-156.

demonstrated that generally the source of terrorism is more on repressive political system rather than poverty. In individual level, the higher level of economic and social status is preferable as terrorist target. Therefore, the middle class economy is the bigger source of terrorist. In the context of organization demand (which requires candidate with strong planning and management capabilities), recruitment would only goes to candidate with high discipline that ensure the biggest success possibility. Therefore, terrorist would not be recruited from low level economic background or low level of education. The preference would be the candidates with the experience of political suppression. The candidates would be trained to conduct terrorist activities in Western-industrial countries. In short, an economic factor is indirectly influential to the increased of terrorism. To be more specific, the actor is groups that politically repressed, and the target is institution or people with economic or political authority.

The above discussion demonstrated that poverty is only one contributive factor to terrorism. Moreover, the decreased of economic power in Indonesia does not directly connected to the increased of terrorism. Abadie's statement that terrorism is related to level of political - 'freedom was applicable in Indonesia case. Therefore, the strategy to form a more democratic political system, to develop economic development policy, are preferable as soft power approaches and more effective way to combat terrorism.

The JI, The Darul Islam (DI) and the Indonesian Islamic State (III)

The current condition of JI was originated from the establishment of Darul Islam (DI), and the proclamation of Indonesian Islamic State (Nil) in August 7th, 1949.²⁴ JI have been initiated in 1992 in Malaysia by *Jamaah Darul Islam (DI)* Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, and

officially founded in January 1993. The aim of JI is to establish an Indonesian Islamic State.

JI organizational structure defected after differences amongst its leaders, Abdullah Sungkar (Ustadz Abdul Halim) and Abu Bakar Baasyir (Ustadz Abu Somad). The two leaders conflicted with Ajengan Masduki's and his followers." The first conflict was related ideology; the second group prefers a struggle within the line of *Khittah Pedoman Unntni Perjuangan Jania'ah Islamiyah* (PUPJI) or "The general guidance of the *Jamaah Islamiyah's Struggle*" under Dakwah and Jihad formations. The struggle would be conducted in clandestine method. The second faction is considered as a moderate group; prefer to apply an open and legal organization structure, beside maintain its independence from any political party. Their struggles are to implement Islamic Syariah through general election. The movement is formatted through the establishment of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)*, with heterogenic membership (did not exclusively the veterans of *Mujahedeen* that trained in Afghanistan, Moro, Ambon or Poso). This faction is led by Abu Bakar Baasyir. Since Abu Bakar Baasyir becomes the Amir of MMI in year 2000, Abu Rushdan replaced as leader. The third group is unstructured, radical and extremist, under the command of Hambali and Zulkarnaen. This faction involved in several violent actions, e.g. terror bomb in front of the Philippines Embassy, Christmas bombings in several major cities churches in year 2000, Bali bombing I and II, and Hotel JW Marriott bombing. Since its establishment, JI had emerged into a most feared and infamous terrorist group in Indonesia. The main goal of JI is the establishment of pan-Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia, covered Indonesia, Malaysia, Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand, based on fundamentalist principle of *Sharia Law*.²⁶

23. *Terpidana Teroris Asal Sukabumi Bebas Bersyarat*, *Pas Kota Daily*, see: <http://poskotaco.id/berita-terkini/> 2011/04/19/terpidana-teroris-asal-sukabumi-bebas-bersyarat, accessed on 27 April 2012.

24. Op.cit. p. 146-156.

25. *Melacak Akar Kartosuwiryo*, *Majalah Tempo Online*, 26 November 1977, <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1977/11/26/NAS/mbm.19771126.NAS76022.id.html>, accessed on April 26, 2012.

Misinterpretation of Al-Qur'an and Islamic Teachings

The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics. The perverted commands were to kill non-Moslems anywhere in the world. The main target is America and its political and economic symbols, without distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children.

The first misinterpretation is on the context of "Jihad". The teaching of "jihad" was spread at *pesantren* or Islamic boarding school networks. Indonesia currently has about 14,000 *pesantrens*, but only small percentage committed on Jihads' teachings. The general nature of *pesantrens* that taught "jihad" is very exclusive, and they became the destination of terrorist members to send their children for education. The most famous is *Pesantren Al-Mukmin*, or more famous as "Pondok Ngruki", established by Ustadz Abu Bakar Baasyir. He is the Amir or the supreme leader of the JI between the ends of 1999 until 2002.

Disagreement was related to the focus of Jihad and the practices of *fa' i* or to snatch non-Muslim belonging to support funding for terrorists' operations." Jihad, as taught by terrorist practitioners was narrowly understood as "an act of violent that accepting the blood of non-Moslems as lawful (halal) to reach goal". For example is the following statement: "The infidels (Kafeer) are major Islamic enemy that we must destroy (in war)". This misunderstanding rejected the true meaning of Jihad that is very comprehensive and dignify. "Jihad that merely perceived as killing someone without any reason is clearly not the rightful Islamic teaching... Islam underlines that to kill one life is equal to kill many people".

Regarding Jihad, Nasir Abbas, an ex JI leader stated:

"The misperception of JI struggle in understanding would unable to prevent slandering ("Fitnah"), but their struggle is leading to slandering, their struggle led to labeling the Moslems. I would ask all friends and anyone who still intended to conduct terror bomb attack targeted anything or anybody, to stop and soon ask forgiveness from Allah SWT"²⁸

Abbas explained facts that conflicting with terrorists' understanding and believes that is not legitimate by any religion. The use of violent as a legal instrument to reach purpose is incorrect Islamic teaching. He intolerate the use any act of violent, in whatever form, as its not only degrade human social life in short terms, but in long terms effected to socio-psychological trauma on terrorist victims. Therefore, terrorist attacks in several places in Indonesia are intolerable, even if intended to die as martyr (*syahid*). When a good purpose is conducted in wrong way, still considered as wrong"²⁹

Nasir Abbas also condemned the involvement of JI members in several terrorists actions, said that: "... it is sad and dangerous when Islam is identical with the religion of violent because of wrong understanding, even if suicidal bomber was conducted under the name of *jihad fie sabillillah?*"

Abbas further quotation as follows:

"... My other intention is to remind my fellow Moslems, hoping that my friends that involved in terrorists bomb attacks outside war zone to stop the action. According to me, (terrorist actions) are considers as doing destruction in our planet..."

26. Nasir Abas, 2005, "Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah :Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI", Grafindo Khazanah Jakarta, hal. 85 dan 92.

27. Bruce Vaughn et al, *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, Congressional Research Service, February 2005, p. 1-34, http://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/terror/R1_34194.pdf, accessed on April 26, 2012.

28. International Crisis Group report, Agustus 26", 2003, see:

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1452&I=1>, accessed on July 28th, 2009.

29. Nasir Abas, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI, Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu*, pp. 315 and 317.

NII regarded the Indonesian government as kafeer and enemy, includes all government officials from presidential level down to the invest bureaucracy. The government officials, the police and the army apparatuses are *kafeer* simply because working for the *kafeer* government. The mission to establish Islamic state in Indonesia continues, followed by the sending of NII members for the first time to Afghanistan in 1985 as a preparation for military struggle in Indonesia. A mission to establish an Islamic State was transferred continuously to new generations that attended military training. The JI's long term goal in Indonesia had been protected by JI members that fight in Mujahedeens' side against the Soviet Union survive during Afghanistan war and continue to die "syahid" in Indonesia. The first wave of NII fighters started in 1987. In Indonesia, the returnees waited the orders or guidances from NII leader to conduct military action to the Indonesian government. After the defection of the new faction emerged under the leadership of Ustadz Abdullah Sungkar (1993-1999), namely *Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah* or the *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI). Both JI and NII share similar mission to establish an Islamic State, with the difference JI did not specify certain region or state as target.

Labeling "Kafeer/disbeliever" to non -JI Moslems

NII/JI members maintain deep hatred towards non-JI Moslems without strong basis except ideological differences in implementing Islamic Syariah. These differences led to the labeling non-JI members as "kafeer", or disbeliever that could all be killed. This labeling

to non-Moslems also happened during Prophet Mohammad's life in the early stage of Islamic period. The Prophet stated that a Moslem is forbid to label "Kafeer" to another Moslems, as "Kafeer" literally means "someone have quit from Islam".

According to radical Moslem activist, the blood and belonging of kafeers are "permissible" (*halal*). If someone quit from Islam, the punishment is killing and permissible to seize their belonging. The Nil division and the formation of JI, followed by threatened to kill quitted members. The quitters are considered as betraying the organization and disloyal (as stated during *baiat*), and being *murtad* (quitting from Islam).³⁰

The nature of JI members who share a similar understanding on the meaning of *kafeer* is similar to the group in Prophet Muhammad SAW (after he died). This group called themselves *Khawarij*", means a separation group from Islamic government. They claimed the government as sinful and did not implement Islamic Syariah. Moslems that continuously doing sinful activities was labeled, and they were allowed to kill, detained their offsprings, and snatched their belongings."

The uelamas during Prophet Muhammad's era agreed if "*Khawarif* group was outsider, and did not follow the *aqidah*. Nowadays, no group would like to be labeled as *Khawarij* and would strongly protest if being compared. Principle of labeling *kafeer* today is similar to *Khawarij* period during the prophet's era. For example, to label *Kafeer* to the President, police officers, army, etc, and called them "satan" or "Thoghut"."

34. Daru Harb is a state where the orders of a non-Muslim ruler are promulgated and he rules the state. See ili.aleemkhanfalaki.com/chaptersidarukharbdefinition/, accessed on April 26, 2012.

35. *Fa'i* means "belonging that snatched from the kafeer(s) without war struggle", see: <http://an-nuur.org/2011/Para-harta-rampokan-dan-fail>, accessed on April 26th, 2012.

36. Ghanimah, in the early Islamic community (7th century 'ad), booty taken in battle in the form of weapons, prisoners, and movable goods. See: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/232451/ghanimah>, accessed April 26th 2012.

37. *Beat* explicitly meaning "Promise to oblige", as a promise to his/her "Amir" (leader) to accept his view to Islam. He/she also promise will not confront Amir in any circumstances, always faithful to obey his words to do duties that given to him/her. See: <http://dida.vbaitullah.or.id/islam/buku/baiat/node4.html>, accessed on 31st, 2009.

The War against *Kafeer*

Strong hatred to the "outsider" was based on misunderstanding on the context of Al-Qur'an teachings. The terrorists have incomplete understanding which allowed to use violent to non-Moslems civilian. The example of Qur'an version that repeatedly used by radical Moslems activists related to the order to kill and to fight non-Moslems, as follows: "... Kill the *musyri kin* wherever they are..." (At-Taubah: 5). Moreover, a similar version (At-Taubah: 14) stated: "Fight in war against them, Allah would torture them using your hands". In addition, At-Taubah version 29 means: "Fight those disbeliever if to Allah (as well) as unfaithful to the end of the world". Another version (At-Taubah: 36) stated: "And go to war against all non-Moslem (*musjrikin*), as they against you all, and note that Allah will be with the faithful".

Another version was An-Anfal (39) stated: "Go on war against them, so they would not be slander (*fitnah*) and so the religion is only for Allah". In addition is Al-Baqarah version (118) stated: "Kill wherever you meet them".

Parts of above Al-Qur'an versions implemented by Imam Samudra, as written in his book entitled: "I am Against the Terrorists". If Al-Qur'an versions were read part by part, would be easy to understand the order to kill the non-Moslems ("*kafeers*") wherever and whoever they are, without any differentiation on gender and age. If Al-Qur'an orders were not implemented, would be called "sinful", similar to someone's who did not perform five times a day prayers ("*shalat*").

Basically, almost all Al-Qur'an versions introduced to Prophet Mohammad SAW was related to certain situation with historical context. The versions were introduced as a solution to problem, delivered in above versions. In its context, it is imperfect to implement the words of God without understanding the historical context. One version should be

understood in comprehensive understanding of other versions that mostly related to previous story or after a certain condition. In conclusion, the above mentioned versions related and applicable in war zone, to guide the Moslems fighters if confronted by enemy with fully equipped weapon. Obviously the above versions are not order to kill any civilian non-Moslems in general context.

JI members and radical activists also used "*Qisas*" version (revenge) to justify revenge or action to non-Moslems/*kafeers*, such as below:

الْشَّهْرُ الْحَرَامُ بِالشَّهْرِ الْحَرَامِ
وَالْحُرْمَتُ قِصَاصٌ فَمَنِ اعْتَدَى عَلَيْكُمْ
فَاعْتَدُوا عَلَيْهِ بِمِثْلِ مَا اعْتَدَى عَلَيْكُمْ
وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ وَاعْلَمُوا أَنَّ اللَّهَ مَعَ الْمُتَّقِينَ ﴿١٩٤﴾

"The month of haram with the month of haram", and to everything that deserved to be respected", (2) applied the *qisas* law. Therefore, whoever that attack you, revenge according to his amount of attack towards you". Be faithful to Allah, as Allah is always be with those who faithful to Him", (Al-Baqarah : 194)

عُوقِبْتُمْ مَّا بِمِثْلِ فَعَاقِبُوا عَاقِبْتُمْ وَإِنْ
خَيْرٌ لَّهُمْ صَبَرْتُمْ وَلَنْ يَنْصُرَهُ
الْمُصَلِّينَ

"And if you do revenge, attack with similar attack and torture as they tortured you. But if you are being patient, is better for you to be patient" (An-Nahl: 126).

The above verses also implemented by Imam Samudra when he justifies his terrorist action in Bali: "to kill non-Muslim civilians". He also

38. Translated from book: "Terrorism as a result of labelling *kafeer*'.

39. *Thoghut* meaning *syaitan* or other than Islam.

40. The actor of Bali Bombing, October 12th, 2002.

41. If the Moslem were attacked in the month of Harem, which is the month that is forbid to go to war, so the Moslems were allowed to attack back on the same month.

said that: "Our target is the person, the individual, not the place"⁴². This verse clearly did not limit the place to fight the "kafers". Other statements of Imam Samudra are:

- "The Bali Bombing operation is aimed as Jihad, an offensive type of jihad."⁴³
- "In this period, all of Musyrikin are attacked, except if they are repentance, converted to Islam, doing five times prayer and pay *zakat*"⁴⁴
- "Civilian attacks revenge by the civilians! That is balance"... therefore, Bali bombing jihad operation did not conduct without careful calculation or perfunctorily."⁴⁵

Imam Samudera acknowledged if the first Bali bombing operation 12th, 2002 conducted as revenge to the US and its allies. The involvement of Imam Samudera was not the first in terrorist action. In 2000, he involved in the churches bombing on Christmas Eve in Batam and Pekan Baru and in criminal action such as ransacking a Christian owned jewelry shop in Serang (Banten Province) in 2002.

Another example of strong hatred towards non-JI the Moslems that considers as apostated ("Murtad"), expressed by Noordin M. Top in his statement of responsibility of Bali second bombing of October 1st, as follows:

"We also declares that our enemy are those supporters of the alliance of Christian-Jewish (Salibi-Yahudi) that colonized the Moslem land, they are Thoghut, and the Indonesian government officers that replace the Allah Hudud with Infidel Laws (democracy and secular laws) that all the time intimidating, chasing, jailing and killing Islamic uelama and muj aheedeen".

The above statements implied share sentiments and revenged of Imam Samudera and Noordin M. Top. They hate all non-Moslems ("*kafeer*") and Moslems that considered as

disbeliever and turned as *kafeer*, not only the US citizens. Other Islamic radical activists also share similar sentiment.

According to Qurtubiy interpretation, Al-Baqarah version nomor 194 and An-Nahl version number 126 are *Qisos* verses, that must be implemented before the court, not by revenge of own will. The revenge to other people's wrongdoing should be conducted by the victims or the victims' guardian, and the target should limited only to the actor, using similar weapon, same method, and to similar parts of body.

Terrorism and the Osama bin Laden's Fatwa

According to Al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, to kill American citizen anywhere they could be found is the most honorable act. To implement Allah's order bin Laden said: "Remember that to kill American and Jewish anywhere is considered as the most honorable duty and the primary devotion to Allah..."⁴⁷

Osama bin Laden's statements were implemented by his followers as a religious advice ("*Fatwa*") in 1998. The "fatwa" disseminate amongs JI members around 1999. This "fatwa" had changed the direction of JI group's moder of struggle, as its quite influential to JI leaders and followed Osama bin Laden to revenge against American civilians and its allies. The mission to establish an Islamic state no more become the first priority of Hambali (as the Leader of Mantiqi I). Following bin Laden's Fatwa, Hambali provoked other JI members under his leadership, including Ali Gufron and Mukhlas that previously replaced Hambali as the Leader of Mantiqi I (around the year of 2001). Ali Gufron also acts as the Supreme Leader of the first Bali bombing terrorists operation in October 12th, 2002.

42. The meaning that in the month of haram (Zulkaidah, Zulhijah, Muharam and Rajab), the haram land (Mecca) and Ihram.

43. Imam Samudra, "I am against Terrorists" ("Aku Melawan Teroris"), Jazera Publisher, Kartasura, 2004, p. 120.

44. Imam Samudra, *ibid.* p. 163.

45. Imam Samudra, p. 130.

46. Imam Samudra, p. 116.

47. This document snatched by the police from a disk belongs to Noordin M. Top in Semarang, Central Java, in November 2005.

Osama bin Laden's statement led to major turbulence in JI structure and organization defection. Military training that mean to implement against Moslems fighters in conflicting zones were used to attack civilians under the name of Islam. Actually, they are no basic explanation from Al-Qur'an and Haditz⁴⁸ to justify Osama bin Laden's statement. Osama bin Laden states further:

"The order to kill all Americans and its allies-civilians and military officers-is the duty of all Moslems that could be implemented anywhere, whenever possible to conduct, in order to rescue Al-Aqsa Mosque and Masjidil Haram from their colonization. Another aim is to expel their troops from all Islamic land, to defeat them and no longer to threat Moslems anywhere."⁴⁹

Osama bin Laden, a leader that regarded as a Mujahed, have a strong influence, despite having no support from uelama related to the above "fatwa". All terrorists bombers in Indonesia, from the first Bali bombing, JW Marriott, Kuningan/Australian Embassy, or the second Bali bombing, confirmed their support to Osama bin Laden. They were proud to join Noordin M.Top and Dr. Azahari, because the two were considered as a true followers of Osama bin Laden."

Jl and Acceptance of Lying

None of JI members would openly acknowledge as the member of the Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah Organization. This is due to the main principle of JI, to operate in disguise, or *Tanzim Sirri*⁵¹.

Members of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah implemented a doctrine "to help each other", to care for, to defend, to protect their Moslems brothers, that known in Islam as *Al-Walas*. Other obligations is to defend and to protect its fellow members, as well as to defend and to protect the

Jamaah's Amir. This "baiat" statement actually limited according to the "lafaz" during the "baiat" ceremony stated by Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah's members when they accepted as new member. Parts of statement during "baiat" said: *You should help each other based on good will and faith. Dont help each other for the purpose of sinful activities and violence"*

However, the above limitation were excluded or refused because of its paradox with Ns limited obligations. Any criminal act by JI members, would not be processed to the police officer in any country, due to JI refusal to the implementation of secular law. B members prefer to protect than to send their fellow friends to non-Islamic Syariah (or "Thoghut" Law). Rather, the members would be protected in its community and would be guided for not doing similar crimes."

The above statement explains the reason of JI members to lie to protect its organization activities to public. Lying by giving different explanation to their family applied by majority members that leaving their family. Most of Nil or JI members did not tell the truth of their whereabouts when they went to Afghanistan. They lied to parents or wives, saying to work in Malaysia or Singapore, or studying in Saudi Arabia. Most of JI members disappeared without sending news to their family for years. It explains their strong motivation to study Arabic while attended military training, or did not immediately returned to Indonesia after the completion of training. Some members then worked in Malaysia to proof to their family of previous lies. Not surprising if most family of JI member only knew their whereabouts after the media broadcasted their criminal actions. After years of disappearance, (some more than ten years), the family knew the truth after they

48. Osama bin Laden, 2004, „Nasehat dan Wasiat kepada Umat Islam dari Syaikh Mujahid Usamah Bin Laden", translated by Team Study Ilmu Syar'i Bitisa, Granada Mediatama, Solo, p. 172.

49. Traditional collection of stories relating words or deeds of Muhammad, the chief source of guidance for understanding of Islamic questions.

50. Osama bin Laden, *ibid*, p. 226

51. Abas, Nasir, 2007, *Melawan Pemikiran Aksi Bom Imam Samudra dan Noordin M. Top*, Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, Jakarta.

52. Disguised organization.

captured by POLRI. They left family for years only to defend their disguised struggle. They forgot to their family responsibility (parents, wives and children), that was neglected during their absence. JI members under Noordin M. Top leadership also lied to their parents or wife to defend their struggle and faith. They choose to leave their family obligation as son, husband, father, that also considered as religious devotion to chase their imaginative promise to live an eternal life in heaven.

Another reason of activists' lies to the government or public is a motive if the government is an enemy, while the country is a *Darul Harb* (war zone). Against the government or the enemy means to defend Islam. JI members believe if lying is acceptable, because "war is deceiving". Misinterpretation to assess the condition and failure to understand the complexity of issue, and to assess war/peace zones led to justification of violent actions in peaceful zone. Radical Moslems activists considered that now is not necessary to implement a conventional war, only to apply psychological war, by violent actions that aimed to defeat the enemy's morale. The lie aimed to deceive police, to form public opinion with misleading information if they were not terrorists. The JI activists wanted to build public outraged to the government as their enemy after disseminating "fitnah" against Moslems activists.

The Hijrah Teachings

Hijrah is an Arabic word that literally means "moving". The word of Hijrah had turned into religious context since Prophet Mohammad hijrah to Madinah. The first Hijrah in Islam is to go to Habsyah (Ethiopia), a country under a leadership of Christian King. Eighty followers of Prophet Mohammad SAW that hijrah to Habsyah" before the victory of Makkah with the purpose to refrain from tortures of Quraish, asking for asylum, and to be able to express their religious faith freely. The followers of Prophet Mohammad SAW were obliged to leave their

country, belonging, job, and family, to protect their religious faith. The second Hijrah that considered most important in Islam was the hijrah of Prophet Mohammad to Madinah. This hijrah prolonged by many of his best friends, and eventually become a significant development of, and the victory of Islam.

Due to psychological oppression, intimidation, physical abuses, and offences. killing and the trial to kill Prophet Mohammad by the Quraish, Mohammad ordered to look for asylum outside Mekkah. Under the guidance of Allah, Prophet Mohammad went with Abu Bakar As-Siddiq. For the Moslems, the success of hijrah meaning the will to leave their beloved country, belonging and home, families, and willing to experience hardship to protect their faith and to conduct their religious practices.

The word of *Hijrah* also means to move from bad to good, without forgetting the world. After arrival in Madinah, the prophets' best friends immediately seek for job to provide financial support to the family that accompanied their move. Obligation to family is remain as a priority in new place.

They are group of people Hijrah by being excluded from others that considered as *ahlul bid'ah* or doing *Bid'ah*; something that never practice by the Prophet. Besides being exclusive, they also cut-off involvement with the government, refuse to go to public school, to implement Hijrah concept, while refuse to be contaminated with something illicit/"haram". Some of Hijrah attitudes in form of public exclusion are:

1. Refuse group prayer behind Imam or in a mosque with different ideology. They avoided mosques built by the government, considered it as the "faith damaging" mosque or "*ma.sjid dhirar*".
2. Refuse to give "zakat" to the government's administrator (anvil zakat).
3. Refuse to send their children in public school. Some JI members resigned from University after their "*ba'at*", as a form to refuse education from a "Toghut university".

53. Nasir Abbas, op.cit.

54. Hadis Nabi Muhammad SAW.

55. Dr.M.Said Ramadhan Al-Buthy, Sirah Nabawiyah, Robbani Press, Jakarta, ha1.99

4. Refuse to work for the government. Having income from being government's staff or civil servant, or holding a government position is considered illicit ("haram").

5. Prefer to work as trader like the Prophet's era; refuse to work with people from different ideology.

6. Leaving home and parents, because they considered their parents and brothers/sisters did not have similar vision (moreover, if other family members against their vision).

7. Believe if their family are still sinful and *syubuhah* (whether "haram" or "halal" according to Islam is still questionable). For example a family that did not wear headcover or *jilbab*.

8. Prioritizing of religious devotion by leaving for long period of time with their friends which share similar ideology, rather than working to support family.

The above explanation not only applied by men, also women with similar ideology. They would also join for hijrah as explain above.

The group of Noordin M. Top taught the meaning of Hijrah to his followers to forget the world, to forget the family, to leave parents, children and wives, without providing financial support. Moreover, Noordin M. Top required his followers to hijrah from the living world to the world of death (not the akhirat, because only God to know when is the akhirat come), giving hope they would be in heaven, and would receive the best in heaven if they sacrifice as suicide bomber, or if they die while being with Noordin M. Top).

The indoctrination on the meaning of *Hijrah* led to frustration to live on earth, longing to die to imagine the prize and enjoy God's gift in heaven. Factually only God know who would be living in heaven. What is implemented by terrorist actors by killing women, children, and other civilians were certainly not part of Jihad struggle according to God.

Conclusion

The conclusion will be answer in two parts, the first is related to the connection of poverty and terrorism, the second is related to justification of JI's terrorists and other violent

actions. To implement economic development policy that more pro-people. Social empowerment program should be implemented, along with economic strategy that considering the characteristics or natural resources of a certain area. Uniform policy in a multicultural and multi ethnic society as implemented by the government should be reconsidered. Last but not least is the implementation of law and order. Clean government, free from corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN). Give subsidy to the education sector and greater possibility to further education.

Ji network is strongly related to the previous DI/TII movement aimed to establish an Islamic state based in Indonesia. JI's struggle continued after some members were send for military training in Afghanistan and Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. The second conclusion is related to justification of violent actions. The JI members justify that their actions were based on their interpretation of Islamic teaching e.g. is permissible to kill non-Muslims or to ransack their belonging, even though they were not fighting in war zone. Another misinterpretation is acceptable to lie to other family members to assure JI's disguised operation. JI also labeled other non-JI members as disbeliever of "Kafeer" or "Thoghut", and refusal to cooperate with the government that did not implement Islamic Syariah. The justification was due to misunderstanding of Al-Qur'an verses, as the verses were understood partially and did not analyse comprehensively. These could explain why JI members focused on war and violent actions, while other obligations were left behind. The concept of "Jihad" also misinterpreted and discourages Moslems to fights and overcome live problems. Instead the teachings led to frustration, longing to die as an Islamic defender to reach an everlasting happiness in heaven. JI aim to establish an Islamic state that manifested through several terrorist and other form of violent actions, made JI as the most threatening organized crime in Southeast Asia.

REFERENCES

1. Abadie, Alberto, 2004, *Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism*, NBER Working Paper No 1085, October 2004.
2. Abas, Nasir, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI, rafindo Khazanah Ilmu*, 2005.
3. Abas, Nasir, 2007, *Melawan Pemikiran Aksi Bom Imam Samudra dan Noordin M. Top*, Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, Jakarta.
4. Asy-Syaikh Muhammad Nashiruddin Al-Albani, 2005, *Terorisme Buah Hasil Faham Pengkafiran*, Pustaka Ar-Rayyan, Solo.
5. Al-Buthy, 1999, *Said Ramadhan, the translation of Sirah Nabawiyah*, Robbani Press, Jakarta.
6. Bin Laden, Usamah, 2004, *Nasehat dan Wasiat kepada Umat Islam dari Syaikh Mujahid Usamah Bin Laden*, translated by Team Study Ilmu Syar'i Bifisa, Granada Mediatama, Solo.
7. Samudra, Imam, 2004, *"Aku Melawan Teroris"*, Jazera, Kartasura
8. Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel, 1996, *Political Instability and Economic Growth*, Journal of Economic Growth Vol. I.
9. Berebi, Claude, 2003, *Evidence about the Link between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians*, mimeo, Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Working Paper No. 477 Princeton University.
10. Buena de Masquita, Ethan, 2003, *The Quality of Terror*, mimeo, Department of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis, MO.
11. Clutterbuck, Richard, 1987, *Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion*, Macmillan.
12. Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, Oxford Economic Paper, Vol. 56.
13. Djelantik, Sukawarsini, *et al.* 2006, *Faktor-faktor Pendukung Aksi Terorisme di Jawa Bagian Barat*, 2006, Laporan Penelitian, Parahyangan Centre for International Studies (PAM) Universitas Katolik Parahyangan dengan Desk Koordinasi Pemberantasan Terorisme (DKPT), Menkopolkam Republik Indonesia, Bandung.
14. Fair, Christine C dan Bryan Shepherd, 2006, *Who Support Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries*, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Routledge,
15. Hassan, Nasra Hassan, 2001, *An Arsenal of Believers*, The New Yorker, 19 November 2001,
16. Krueger, Alan B. dan David D. Latin, 2003, *Kto Kogo?: A Cross Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism*, Princeton University and NBER, dan Stanford University.
17. Levinsohn, J, Friendman, J, dan Berry S., 2002, *Impacts of the Indonesian Economic Crisis: Price Changes and the Poor*.
18. Maslow, Abraham, 1970, *Motivation and Personality*, 2nd ed., Harper & Row, New York.
19. Miguel, Stayrath and Sargent, 2004, *Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach*, Journal of Political Economy.
20. Ramakrishna, Kumar dan See Seng Tan, 2003, *41s Southeast Asia a "Terrorist Haven?"*, In After Bali, The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Kumar Ramakrishna dan See Seng Tan (editor), World Scientific and Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore.
21. Sukma, Rizal, 2003, *Indonesia and the Challenge of Radical Islam After October 12*, In Kumar Ramakrishna dan See Seng Tan (Editors), in After Bali, The Threat of Terrorism, World Scientific and Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore.

Printed Media

22. Christian Science Monitor, 10 Desember 2001.
23. The New York Times, 11 September 2002.

Website

24. <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/>
25. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/IFD/2002/index.htm>
26. <http://www.pacific.net.id/pakar/hadisusastroeconomic.htm>
27. <http://www.nber.org/digest/dec99/w7194.html>
28. http://www.undp.oridipubs/ihdr20011.ringkasan_eksekutif.asp,
29. http://www.undp.orid/pubs/ihdr2001/ringkasan_eksekutif.asp
30. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/outlook/eco07b.asp>
31. http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bom_Galung_Bursa_Efek_Jakarta_2000
32. http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daftar_serangan_teroris_di_Indonesia

33. http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bom_Kedubes_Australia_2004
34. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020322-1.html>
35. http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=487467
36. http://www.gatra.com/2003-08-22/versi_cetak.php?id=30748
37. http://images.google.co.id/imgres?imgurl=http://patdollard.com/wp-content/uploads/ajemahh500.jpg&imgrefurl=http://gracieb.instablogs.com/entry/hate-not-a-meme-to-trust-or-why-armed-jihad-in-southeast-asia-will-not-prosperausg=__60BW17Rmpkx9RPNKHODwwWMhM.&h.332&w=500&sz=146&h=hid&start=2&um=1&tbnid=SzbetfAh_1-ia81M:&tbnh=86&tbnw=130&prev=1images°/03Fq°/3Dal°/2Bciaede/02Bin°/02Bsoutheasr/02Basie/026hr/o3Die026se/03DX°/26um°/03D1
38. International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1452&l=1>
39. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4792&l=1>
40. http://swaramuslim.net/more.php?id=886_0_1_15_M, <http://3bp.blogspot.com/C5s7GrieYoSB82ca4MUbiAAAAAABY8C7SHpDKvo0s200MEMBONGKAR-KJAMAAH+ISLAM.JPG>
41. <http://ibnismaililes.wordpress.com/2008/11/balijpg>
42. <http://dida.vbaitullah.orid/islam/buku/baiat/node4.html>

POVERTY, ETHNICITY AND RELIGIOUS FACTORS IN THE INCREASE OF TERRORISM (A CASE IN INDONESIA)

ORIGINALITY REPORT

0%

SIMILARITY INDEX

0%

INTERNET SOURCES

0%

PUBLICATIONS

%

STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

Exclude quotes Off

Exclude bibliography On

Exclude matches < 3%