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ABSTRACT

Advanced communication and information technologies are changing the nature of terrorism in Indonesia. The use of social media by the so-called Islamic State (IS) is changing its recruitment and communication processes. Islamic State is recruiting Indonesian Muslims to wage *jihad* (holy war or struggle) in Iraq and Syria through communication networks. IS previously used mainstream social media platforms such as *Facebook*, *Twitter* and *YouTube*, to achieve its political ends. After IS's social media accounts had been closed down by the authorities, communication shifted to the anonymous sharing portals. This article analyses the nature of IS's social media strategy and the impact it has had on radicalization and recruitment in Indonesia. The research method consist of analysing the themes and patterns of IS's social media presence. The IS seems to have developed an effective social media strategy given the number of Indonesian members undertaking the *hijrah* (jihad by emigration) to Syria and Iraq. The data from the Indonesian security estimated that numbers of Indonesian have increased since the emergence of IS in 2013 until the fall of Mosul in July 2017. The paper will answer a question on how the used of social media had effectively increased the members' *salafi-jihadist* movement and utopian views of the establishment of a State which implemented Syariah Law.

Keywords: Islamic State; terrorism; social media; anonymous sharing portals, communication; recruitment; radicalization.

Introduction

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State (IS) was established on 9 April 2013, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings, by the radical Syrian Salafist Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. IS is more than an terrorist group, as it owns a special region and support troops in Iraq and Syria for *jihad* purposes. Muslim-majority countries such as Indonesia are particularly affected by this security threat. One of its aims is to establish a global caliphate based on Islamic law (*sharia*), through violence and terrorists actions in the form of deadly bombs across the archipelago. Following the emergence of information and technology, IS communication activities widely use social media for, among other things, propaganda, increased radicalism, and recruitment. IS uses mainstream social media such as *Facebook*, *Twitter* and *YouTube*, as well as the anonymous sharing platforms, such as *Telegram*, *Signal* and *WhatsApp*. The result has been an increase in the number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) from Indonesia departing to Iraq, Syria and other IS strongholds. The number of Indonesian FTFs from 2013-2017 amounted to 671, with an additional 105 that have been prevented from further traveling to IS regions. Even though the number was relatively small in comparison to the overall Indonesian population they were

quite significant in creating instability and terror. This article will analyse the use of social media by Islamic State in Indonesia for making propaganda, spreading radical ideologies, and recruiting members.

Social media

Virtual communication using social media has become increasingly popular all over the world, especially among millennial age population. The effectiveness of social media enables only a small group of people with information technology expertise to disseminate information to a limitless audience. Social media also enable anyone to publish, access information, share, co-create, discuss, and modify contents, using mobile and web-based networks. The Social media enable information consumers to act as communicators as well, which promotes the creation of small, diffused sets of communicators and groups. Furthermore, it could change the role of the user; from a passive information receiver to active information provider. This informative era has been used effectively by IS to revolutionize its communication with individuals and groups globally. The 2018 data indicate that out of the 7.5 billion world population, 3.1 billion are active social media users. In Indonesia, with a population of 265 million, 132.7 million are

internet users, and 130 million are active social media users. This vast amount of social media users especially among the young population made the millennial generation an effective communication target. As much as 90 percent of IS communication conducted using social media, including discussions, question-and-answer session, and other *cyber jihad* activities. (Weimann, 2016: 1-3). Traditional media also remain used, mainly to strengthen the messages. With its advantages as communication devices, IS has significantly depended on social media.

IS had an estimated 46-70 thousand *Twitter* accounts each of which has a thousand followers. These accounts belong to fanatic groups that send messages repeatedly and know how to maximize their impact. Even though IS's accounts on *Twitter* were closed regularly, new accounts keep rearing their heads while maintaining a strong online presence. To maximize communication impact, IS established *The Al-Furqan Institute* which focused on producing CDs, DVDs, posters, pamphlets, and other web-propaganda products. In addition, *Ajnad Media Foundation* was launched to produce numerous jihadi *nasheed*. The main outlet of IS media is *Itisaam Media Foundation*, formed on March 2013. Products from this foundation were distributed through the *Global Islamic Media Front* (GIMF). On 2014, IS created the *Al Hayat Media Center*, targeting Western audiences and producing materials in English, German, Russian, and French. In the same year, IS had launched the *Ajnad Media Foundation* that produces jihadi *nasheed* (chants). The Indonesian audiences are mostly familiar with English languages contents, and this contributes significantly to the numbers of consumers. After IS accounts on the mainstream social media were closely watched and followed by closing down regularly by the authorities, IS turned to the anonymous sharing portals, such as *Telegram*. The Indonesian IS also shifted its communication devices to the new social media devices such as the anonymous sharing portals mentioned earlier.

Review of Literature

Gates and Podder (2015) have studied the IS's media group, known as *Al Hayat*, and find that video is their preferred medium. *Al Hayat* benefits from the linguistic skills of members

who are able to provide translations into European languages, and from a production team that can 'make good use of music' in order to appeal to western youth culture (Gates and Podder 2015: 109). Prucha (2016) and Shedabat (2018) suggested that mainstream social media like *Facebook* and *Twitter* have been degraded so IS cannot use them, and this has led to new innovations in the shape of anonymous sharing portals such as *Telegram*.

IS's uses of popular social media for communication have been indicated by several articles. For example, Klausen (2015) discusses the essential role of social media, particularly *Twitter*. The article is based on *Twitter* accounts of Western-origin fighters domiciled in Syria. Data obtained from the *Al Muhajiroun* account, the Europe-based organizational, particularly Anjem Choudary, a London-based preacher. Burger and Morgan (2015) further analysed the population of IS *Twitter* followers, focused on demographics social media metrics and examined the effects of accounts. Further articles by Weimann focused more on the use of *Facebook* and other social media for propaganda, psychological warfare, radicalization, weapon tutorials, and recruitment. The above articles have demonstrated the significance of social media to IS, as well as being used extensively to reach its political purposes. However, since none of the above article focused on Indonesia as a case study, my research would be beneficial to further understanding of the role of social media to the organization. This article will specify the use of social media for propaganda, radicalization and recruitment purposes.

Methodology

In order to analyse the usefulness of social media by the IS for propaganda, radicalization and recruitment purposes, a qualitative research method has been conducted since 2011-2017. A content analysis method was conducted for three mainstreamed social media (*Twitter*, *Facebook*, and *Youtube*), later followed by *Telegram*, to represent the recent development (since 2017) of using anonymous sharing portals. The contents of mainstream social media were obtained from online communication with the users, to complement data from the Indonesian media. The observation of both mainstream and the

anonymous sharing portals aims to analyse the effectiveness of IS to use social media for propaganda, recruitment, and radicalization purposes.

Research design

The first analysis was made of contents considered to be influential for IS propaganda to recruit populations to move to utopian states in the Iraqi and Syrian region. The second analysis will be of contents considered as radicalizing its followers. Radicalization includes Islamic thoughts on the concept of *jihād*, *hijrah* (religious migration) and *halal* (lawful), and *kāfir* (infidel). The third analysis will deal with content which has been successful in the recruitment of new members. The choice of content was conducted through searching three mainstreamed social media accounts (*Facebook*, *Twitter* and *Youtube*), by typing the keyword "IS in Indonesia". Using these search terms can assure the availability of searched data as well as discussion from followers. Upon careful examination, several groups and pages contained "IS in Indonesia", were taken into consideration. Mainstream social media could be accessed by being a friend, follower, or to "like" an IS page. However, after the closure of social media accounts by the Indonesian authorities, these accounts were no longer accessible to the general public. However, virtual communication continued through personal contact with IS members. The challenge of this last method is the password requirement, which will only be provided after personal contact with an IS member or after being recommended by a senior member. The survey was carried out from 2011 to 2017, with data extended until January 2018.

Results

The first purpose of IS communication through social media is to spread propaganda to establish a utopian Islamic State. IS Indonesia's official propaganda was initiated when Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi appeared in public on July 6th 2014 on the campus of Islamic University in Jakarta. (Assad, 2014: 185-6). Small groups started to pledge allegiance (*baiat*) to Abubakar Al-Baghdadi that marked the establishment of a *Daulah Islamiyah*, or the *Islamic State* (IS). Afterwards, the members generally migrate or "hijrah" or join the IS to region in Iraq and Syria. IS propaganda content focused on the

establishment of an Islamic state that fully implements Islamic law in its governance, social and economic systems. The propaganda method claimed it to be "brilliant, effective, and unconventional", with promises of wealth and well-being. Justice according to Islamic values is urgent to be implemented through the development of a *Khilafah* Caliphate. The propaganda contains of spread of ideology, often followed by threats and to scare the public, ranging from the dissemination of pictures of brutalization, e.g. hangings to beheadings, and mutilated corpses mixed with pictures of happy children in a seamless stream of terrorist messaging. The messages intended to intimidate the public in the near war zone (the Middle Eastern countries) as well as among "the far enemy, " or the Western public. Further propaganda stated that "fighting and dying will make life meaningful". (Kausen, 2015). These powerful messages have been spread widely in the social media and reach the Indonesian audiences. The increased number of foreigners recruited indicated that IS's communication through social media works well.

Until April 2014, there were 46, 000 Twitter accounts with a certain IS affiliation (Berger and Morgan, 2015: 2). The Twitter messages contents mostly dehumanized other Muslims, particularly the *Syiah*, combined with the bravery of the righteous fighters. (Klausen, 2015). Twitter messages publicised executions and crucifixions carried out in Aleppo and Deir Hafer, turning it into a tool of offensive psychological warfare and battlefield tactics, as indicated by the pictures of staggering brutality that accompanied Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's declaration of the formation of IS in June 2014. The use of *Twitter* has proven highly effective in spreading messages, intimidating local populations and provoking fear. (berger and Morgan, 2016).

In Indonesia, the *Twitter* account of @isiskalimantan which was supported by the *Daulah Islamiyah* posted pictures of someone wearing a face cover in the October 2015 edition, adding to massive war victories. IS's *Facebook* link provided various applications, including community and group discussions which accommodate members having similar interests. *Facebook* also used to publish pictures, supportive words, and information to join the organization. (Stern and Berger, 2015).

A Facebook account called *Risalah-Risalah* posted on its timeline: "The Indonesian government should learn from Russia on how to handle IS. Let us go to Syam to fight, so you will be free from our threat, as you judged us terrorists". IS has also threatened the Indonesian government by saying: "To BNPT (anti-terrorism government body) and *Densus 88* (anti-terrorism police detachment), if you wanted to prevent the development of IS in Indonesia, do not prevent us from *hijrah* to Syam, otherwise do not blame if terrors frequently happen. The account was supported by news from the conflict area in Syria and Iraq, combined by supporting invitations to join the *hijrah* to the IS region and justification of IS violent actions. An anonymous hacker had leaked information of thousands of *Twitter* accounts with IS affiliation. The anonymous hacker was supported by two other hackers' groups, such as *Ghost Sec* and *Crtlsec*. This collaboration had uncovered 9200 *Twitter* accounts that propagandized IS.

Youtube is another favourite social medium for IS. A channel published an eight-minute video of Abu Muhammad al-Indonesie entitled "Join the Ranks", urging Indonesian Muslims to *hijrah* to IS. In the video, Abu Muhammad stated: "For *Hijrah* today is obligatory... It is an obligation decreed by Allah the Exalted". Another video account depicted the IS supporter Abu Jandal who threatened to return to Indonesia to terrorise and conduct violent actions addressed to the Indonesian security apparatuses, the national military (TNI), the *Densus 88*, and the *Nahdlatul Ulama's* multi-purpose front (*Banser*). Another video series consisting of 50 items entitled: "Islamic Lights Series," partly said: "we are fighting in the battlefield with the conviction to win. The series mainly depicted the rise of Islam and the Caliphate calls to fight against non-Moslems. Most video published supportive comments on the rise of *Khilafah* while justifying IS violent actions. The average viewers of IS video amount 100, 000, mostly consisting of supports, threats, and calls to join IS.

Other propaganda messages read: "Want to fight? Not satisfied? Ready to do something different with your life?", or "How about joining this great organization?" The hashtag #*JihadOfOne* provides further propaganda

messages. During a *Telegram* conversation with the author, an IS recruiter (initial DS) responded to the author's hesitation to depart to the IS region, as follows:

" ..Dont hesitant, Allah will show His might. If we are not part of Allah's selected troops, Allah might have prepared something else for us in Indonesia. Moreover, the *Syiah* had developed and planed a revolution in 2018-2010. So, you don't need to go to a foreign land to do *jihad*.

The above conversation clearly indicated DS support to the establishment of an Islamic State with the implementation of *Syariah* Law in Indonesia. However, DS realized the IS struggle would be challenges by *Pancasila* as Indonesia's state philosophy. Instead of fighting against the government, he offered to fight against the *Syiah*, which would be projected in 2018-2020. He suggested that rather than going to Syria, the projected war between the *Sunni* and the *Syiah* would become a perfect *jihad* arena.

IS propaganda was also conducted through t-shirts and other merchandise-related sales. A t-shirt slogan read: "Mujahidin All Across the World Unite", "Fight for Freedom to Death", and "We Support IS". These online sales were closed down almost immediately by the Indonesian government. After these mainstream social media accounts were blocked, IS shifted its communication using anonymous sharing portals and *Telegram*.

The Radicalization Process

Radicalization is a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo. (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010). IS members and supporters strongly believe that to joining IS and conducting terrorism and other violent actions are part of *jihad*. The word *Jihad* in broader sense means "struggling or fighting against the enemies of Islam", or in narrow term understood as "a spiritual struggle within oneself against sin". For IS and other radical group, *Jihad* interpreted as an "act of violent that accepting the blood of non-Moslems as lawful (*halal*) to reach goal". *Jihad* further interpreted as "killing non-members/infidel without any reason" and to conduct terrorist actions. To the

Mujahideen (the person who is waging *jihad*), to snatch non-Muslim belonging to support funding for terrorists' operations is lawful (*halal*), (Djelantik and Akbar, 2016: 30-35). The IS members considered non-members as their enemies, or the infidels (*Kafeer*), which are major Islamic enemies that must be destroyed (in war) ". To spread *jihad*, IS posted videos on *Youtube* containing radical materials, like: "The Media Jihad of ISIS". Other videos include "The Peak of Islam Jihad" and "Children of ISIS" and "Children of Islamic State", as well as "Grooming Children for Jihad: The Islamic State (Part 2)." All of these videos demonstrated that the radicalization process within IS is started from an early age. Its *Facebook* page is used to deliver the desire to die as a *syahid* (a martyr, or die to defend Islam) under IS. The IS members believe that fighting to death for IS, one would die as *syahid*", which brings one directly to heaven. Another radical perspective is obedience to an IS leader like Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi. In his 46-minute audio, he announced a *Fatwa* (point of Islamic law) and appealed to his followers to continue attacking the West and not only in Iraq and Syria". Baghdadi further calls to his followers to be martyrs with the rewards of having 72 wives in heaven. Its *Facebook* account has helped introduce thousands of IS's extremists to one another via its 'suggested friends' feature. IS are able to exploit the site to contact and communicate with sympathisers and supporters.

IS members believe that living in a secular state like Indonesia is considered as living under a "Darul Harb" or "war zone" condition. This condition justified IS to ransack the government's belongings, steal, seize, or else not returning debt (*fa'i*). Due to the Indonesian government's failure to implement Islamic Law, turned its officials, ranging from the presidential level down to the lowest bureaucratic staffs into *kafeer* (infidels) and Islamic enemies. To purify IS from dirty elements, IS further threatened to kill its former members, labelling them as traitors, being disloyal (against the oath during *baiat*), or calling them *murtad* (quitter of Islam). (Djelantik and Akbar, 2016:30-35). IS justified the killing of non-Moslems regardless of nationality, gender and age, or else would labelled "sinful", which is similar to violate the five times daily prayers ("*shalat*"). IS member also believes in "*qisas*"

(revenge), to justify killing others, including its fellow members. As published by the 6-minute *Youtube* channel, IS executed eight Dutch jihadists in Ma'dan, Syria in March 2016. They are members of a group of 70 Dutch recruits that had been imprisoned and accused of dissension.

IS believes in "*hijrah*", or moving from the present (bad) to a good condition. *Hijrah* is interpreted radically, including forgetting to live in the world, leaving the family, parents, children, wife, and family responsibility (e.g. providing financial support). IS members would leave their parents and family that refuse to follow in their footsteps, and considered them as sinful or *syubuhah* ("haram"). *Hijrah* on IS terms is moving from the living world to the world of death, with a promise to go directly to heaven. IS further assured that IS fighters would have the best place in heaven if they sacrifice their lives, or when someone dies while fighting in the name of Islam. As part of *hijrah*, IS members would exclude themselves from the government's programmes, such as the refusal to pay *zakat* to the government's administrator (*amil zakat*). The exclusion includes the refusal to pay taxes and send their children to public schools or to cooperate with the government's officers. An IS member would also refuse to work for the government or obtained income from the government's activities. Being a civil servant or holding a government position is considered illicit ("*haram*"). (Djelantik, 2010: 125-127). Consequently, IS members would prefer to work as traders. They also refused to join group prayers, led by a non-IS *Imamat* a non-IS mosque, calling them "faith damaging" mosque or "*masjid dhirar*". IS members resigned from University after "*baiat*" (pledge of allegiance), and refuse to be educated at the "*Toghut*" or the government's (state) universities (Djelantik, 2010:125-127).

Following the closure of social media application that was previously used by IS, the group shifted to *Telegram*. **Telegram provides more security and privacy than any other messenger applications.** The application using encryption technique would provide an extreme fast messaging service. (Heba Soffar, 2015). With other advantages compared to mainstream social media, IS terrorists that were captured in December 2016 also used *Telegram* for communication and created bomb

tutorial. The infamous IS Bahrum Naim ever since used *Telegram* to design several terrorist actions and one was targeted at The Presidential palace in December 2016. During May 2018 trial, the January 2016 Jakarta terrorist bomber, Aman Abdurrahman confessed of using *Telegram* to communicate and prepare for terrorist action. With many advantages provided by *Telegram*, the application has become IS's Indonesian members' choices.

Membership Recruitment Process

The social media's essential purpose was to proselytize and recruit of IS members, and this confirmed Klausens's finding. Klausen further argued that social media also used to firm up the resolve of believers by engaging them in the distribution of propaganda and educating their dogma. (Klausens, 2015: 1-22). Klausen's findings were confirmed by the Indonesian data showing that in 2015, the BNPT reported that 600 Indonesians went to Syria to join IS. The biggest motivation is ideological, to live in a country that fully implement Syariah law, combined by motivation to obtain economic advantages. IS had offered a monthly salary of up to USD 2000 per month. The children and other family members were also promised to receive USD 200 a month plus other allowances such as education, health, and so on. During recruitment, the ideological spread was conducted all the time along with economic advantages. The IS development also coincided with the economic downturn in Indonesia, following the global economic crisis in 2010, significantly supporting the increase of IS members among the lower-middle income groups. The high unemployment and poverty rate met with an employment promise with full economic support, which was appealing to attract members.

IS members that previously connected to radical networks turned to IS to compensate with the struggle to establish an Islamic Caliphate. Being an IS member is creating solidarity amongst radical groups, with the common perception of the Indonesian secular government as common enemy. Since IS realized its position as an illegal organization, it assesses its potential recruits carefully. The group admin required a strong reference and passwords from senior members for further communication and new admission. New members were recommended by internal

circles or family connections. Another form of recruitment is through religious studies and discussion between religious teachers (*ustadz*) and his pupils (*santris*). The method would commonly be followed by promises to solve social and/or economic problems that were left behind by the government.

For the Indonesian context, Aman Abdurrahman is the most responsible person for deploying IS members. He had initiated an Islamic study group with radical views. JAT members who successfully arrived in Syria subsequently encouraged other family members, close friends, and local communities to join. Information and communication to potential members were conducted through mainstream social media networks such as *Facebook* and *Twitter*, and later by *Whatsapp* groups, *Google Plus*, and *Telegram*.

The success of recruitment was also supported by the significant role of an online Malay-speaking publication, the "Al-Fatihin". This medium played a significant role to report news to Malay-speaking citizens in Southeast Asia, especially in Malaysia and Indonesia. New recruits would be assisted to travel to Syria, mostly through Istanbul in Turkey using tourist visas. Other Indonesian nationals departed to the IS region from neighbouring countries as temporary immigrants (students, workers) before the establishment of IS. Indonesians became the first contributor of IS members during its early establishment (514 persons), which is significant compared to Indonesian Mujahideen that fight during the Afghan war (1985-1994), whose total numbered a maximum of 300. Another factor of the significant numbers of Indonesian IS is Indonesia's traditional freedom of speech and democracy. In Malaysia and Singapore, under the *Internal Security Act (ISA)*, IS supporters or sympathizers could be arrested once they depart to the IS region. Under human rights acts, such practices could not be implemented in Indonesia unless supported by strong evidence, such as carrying guns or planning attacks.

Following the decreasing forces after the fall of Raqqa as the nominal IS capital in October 2017, IS members called to continue struggle in other countries as Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). The FTFs are more dangerous as they would be equipped with ability and

experience in battle fields, tactics, weaponry, deeper commitment towards the ideology, and a stronger international network. Although in terms of number is relatively small, FTFs radicalism would challenge global security.

Most of the recruitment process has been conducted through social media communication. Recruitment generally started from developing lists of potentials or sympathizers using *Telegram* and *WhatsApp* groups. IS recruiters view potential profiles before approaching an individual. Social networking sites allow terrorists to use a targeting strategy of *narrowcasting* or detecting specific segments by values, preferences, demographic attributes, or subscription. An online page, video, or chat's name, images, appeals, and information are tailored to match the profile of a particular social group. These methods enable terrorists to specified youngsters as potential targets.

A personal conversation during research with an IS recruiter using social media has demonstrated the group's vigilant efforts, words of conviction, and cautiousness. DS, an IS recruiter stated: "waging *Jihad* is in accordance to Allah's will and Islamic teachings". When asked about the necessity to *hijrah* to IS, he was convinced that: "because for now *Daulah Islamiyah* is a legal khilafah, as they implemented Islamic Law in the *kaffah* (total adherence) way. DS's reason for supporting IS is: "In Indonesia, we cannot establish a *Syariah* state, except when *Daulah Islamiyah* could spread its wings". DS further convinced the necessity to have firm intention (*niat*), since not everyone having *hidayah* (God's guidance) to join the *hijrah*. IS has many recruiters like DS, who had the ability to convince potential members to join IS through intensive communications using *Telegram*. An example of successful recruitment was the IS terrorist that intended to bomb the Presidential Palace in Jakarta in December 2016. Even though for some reasons the terrorist action was unsuccessful, the communication process has indicated the intensive social media communication amongst IS members.

Discussion; Anti-propaganda and De-radicalization Efforts

Part from fighting on the battlefield, the social media have become a new war zone for

terrorist organization like IS. A new form of training is needed to fight against terrorists like IS with its propaganda activities. To confront IS propaganda, virtual soldiers and weapons are needed to overcome online threats. The new challenge is to repossess the virtual territory previously been occupied by IS. The de-radicalization program and prevention act were a call-out for everybody involved in using social media. Because the police has not adequately equipped with devices to conduct a de-radicalization program; they would need societal cooperation. Government and other law enforcement agencies do not have enough resources so they also need societal assistance and cooperation. Prevention techniques need to be adapted by individual, society, and those are considered to be IS's potential candidates. By way of pre-emptive measure, the government needs to empower its citizens, and spread as much information regarding the existence, organization system, source of funding, and IS effort to gain public sympathy from society at large. The most important thing is to increase the ability of wisely using the social media which could filter any information that leads to the desire to join IS.

The social media also provide excellent channels to monitor, to analyse, and estimate the security risk of terrorist actions. To prevent the ideology growth, it should also be conducted against IS returnees as FTFs. Since the growth of IS would be supported by religious and others sectarian tensions and instability, the government should also prevent the conflict from happening. The government needs to be proactive in promoting and inculcating tolerance of religious practice since an early age. Religious conflict should be avoided at the earliest stage, as a way to prevent IS's growth. The conflict in the Middle East in general, or the anti-Syiah and anti-Christian conflicts at national level are inseparable parts of this growth. The biggest enemy to IS development consists of cultural Muslim groups that desire to practise religion peacefully such as the *Nahdatul Ulama* (NU), *The Muhammadiyah* and *The Islamic Unity* (Persis). These majorities of traditional Muslims should be able to practise a peaceful Islam and should not be tempted by the sectarian propaganda of the Salafies who feet they represent the purest Islam. Moreover, a strong legal basis is needed to be implemented

against hate statements that are widely spread by religious extremists in vulgar ways.

Conclusion

The above discussion suggests that the success of IS in propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment has been strongly supported by the effective use of both mainstream social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, and autonomous sharing portals. Considering the importance of the current digital environment, the security apparatuses in Indonesia should implement a more comprehensive strategy for countering and preventing violent extremists online. The government needs to leverage information technology to empower community resilience. Indonesia as a democratic country should not be denied freedom of speech and freedom of expression, as is considered to be against the state's constitution. Moreover, internet content removal is also the least desirable and least effective measure against IS. To fight against IS radicalization, propaganda, and recruitment processes, a political internet campaign should be conducted. The government should furthermore play a more energetic role in reducing the demand for radicalization and violent extremist messages. Combating terrorism, the government needs to employ the best tools to counter radicalizing messages and to build bridges to the vulnerable. Narratives can inspire people to commit acts of violence, or to push back against the extremist voice.

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