

BAB V

KESIMPULAN

Berdasarkan pertanyaan penelitian mengenai bagaimana respon Politik Luar Negeri Federasi Rusia dalam menghadapi implementasi *economic warfare* dari Amerika Serikat berkaitan dengan *stateness level*, dengan menggunakan konsep *stateness* dan teori politik dari *economic statecraft*, memperhatikan data-data yang telah disusun pada bab sebelumnya mengenai *stateness* federasi Rusia dan *economic warfare* Amerika Serikat. Hasil dari analisis penulis mendeskripsikan bahwa *significant stateness* Pemerintah Federasi Rusia berkontribusi terhadap kebijakan-kebijakan yang memperlihatkan resistensi Federasi Rusia terhadap *economic warfare* yang diberikan Amerika Serikat. Meskipun beberapa kebijakan yang diambil cenderung kontroversial dan tidak lazim dibandingkan kebijakan *countermeasures* pada umumnya seperti yang dilakukan Presiden Putin dalam privatisasi Rosneft, merubah nilai tukar rubel menjadi *free-float currency* dari yang sebelumnya *fixed currency* dan mengklaim Krimea sebagai bagian yang sudah terintegrasi dengan Federasi Rusia hal ini tidak akan menjadi masalah bagi Pemerintah Federasi Rusia. Sebab, *significant stateness* dapat memberi jaminan bahwa tidak akan terjadi guncangan terhadap stabilitas politik domestik yang kelak dapat merubah keputusan yang telah dibuat (inakurasi keputusan) oleh Pemerintah Federasi Rusia. Elemen terpenting yang memberikan jaminan ini adalah legitimasi serta otonomi pengambilan keputusan yang ada sebagai salah satu komponen yang ada di dalam pengukuran level *stateness* Federasi Rusia. Tingkatan *stateness* yang tinggi di dua komponen ini memberikan

Rusia *significant stateness*, kemudian memberi konsistensi terhadap situasi politik domestik di Rusia. Sehingga, tidak akan terjadi disintegrasi diantara kelompok-kelompok kepentingan yang kemudian akan mendorong *economic statecraft/sanksi* dari Amerika Serikat tersebut untuk masuk dan mengintervensi output kebijakan yang dibuat oleh Vladimir Putin. Faktor lain yang mendorong sikap resistensi dan konsistensi *significant stateness* Federasi Rusia adalah kurangnya tekanan yang diberikan Amerika Serikat pada stimulus awal (*raw economic stimuli*) di dalam EO 13660-13661. Hal ini memberikan kesempatan bagi Federasi Rusia untuk melakukan tindakan antisipasi terhadap sanksi susulan setelahnya. Sama halnya dengan stimulus lanjutan (*modified economic stimuli*) yang di kirim oleh negara-negara Barat mengalami kegagalan karena adanya dependensi dari negara-negara tersebut terhadap suplai energi minyak dan gas Federasi Rusia. Adapun beberapa stimulus lanjutan sukses di implementasikan oleh Amerika Serikat dan negara-negara Barat, contohnya tekanan terhadap FDI Rusia yang menyebabkan *capital outflow* meningkat namun sayangnya momentum stimulus lanjutan tersebut terlewatkan karena inefisiensi dari stimulus awal. Selain itu, kesetiaan para *inner circle* Pemerintah Federasi Rusia di tambah dengan kemampuan Vladimir Putin untuk menjaga solidaritas tersebut mendorong kooptasi terhadap *economic warfare* Amerika Serikat berlanjut.

Significant stateness juga memberikan Rusia kemampuan untuk menjalankan kebijakan-kebijakan ekonomi dan politik secara tegas ditengah situasi internasional yang mendukung atau tidak mendukung Federasi Rusia. Dalam kondisi bersahabat atau tidaknya situasi internasional pada saat *economic warfare* dikirim, selama *significant stateness* tidak mengalami penurunan kualitas dan

dapat menahan konsekuensi domestik akibat dari resistensi tersebut, dapat dipastikan bahwa resistensi tersebut akan terus berjalan. Sebaliknya, apabila level *stateness* menurun akibat ketidakmampuan pemerintah untuk menanggung konsekuensi domestik dan menyebabkan penurunan nilai otonomi, kapasitas maupun legitimasi yang berdampak kepada turunnya level *stateness* kedalam level insignifikan maka dapat dipastikan sanksi/ *economic warfare* akan berhasil menekan pemerintah Rusia untuk menyesuaikan dengan permintaan negara pengirim. Pada tahun 2014, situasi internasional sedang dalam kondisi yang kurang bersahabat atau malah semakin menekan posisi politik Rusia pada saat dikenakan sanksi oleh Amerika Serikat. Ditambah dengan stimulus ekonomi maupun politik susulan yang dikirim oleh negara-negara Barat pro Amerika Serikat terhadap Rusia yang semakin menyulitkan kapasitas ekonomi Federasi Rusia. Di dalam kasus Federasi Rusia, meskipun kapasitas ekonomi menurun ke level insignifikan, secara total *stateness* Federasi Rusia masih berada di level signifikan. *Significant stateness* ini akan menunjukkan kapabilitas negara untuk kokoh terhadap pendirian dan juga keputusannya untuk meresistensi akan menjadi sebuah potensi yang kemudian menjadi sebuah poin untuk mendapatkan kepercayaan, pembelaan maupun pembenaran dari negara-negara lain. Contohnya, Federasi Rusia meskipun tengah di isolasi oleh negara-negara Barat yang notabenehnya merupakan lingkaran pusat kekuatan dunia. Namun, Federasi Rusia berhasil meyakinkan aktor lain diluar lingkaran tersebut yang merupakan *new economic power* juga seperti negara-negara BRICS. Terlebih, ISIS dan juga harga minyak dunia yang menurun sebagai akibat dari eksistensi organisasi teroris tersebut memberikan peluang untuk Rusia sebagai aktor besar dalam memerangi

terorisme dunia untuk terus berkomunikasi dengan negara-negara yang mengirim sanksi ke negaranya, salah satunya adalah Amerika Serikat yang tidak bisa menghiraukan keberadaan Rusia. Karena, terorisme sama-sama merupakan kepentingan yang utama bagi kedua negara. Federasi Rusia beruntung dapat menemukan momentum untuk meraih dukungan ditengah-tengah isolasi negara-negara Barat, hal ini menambah kapabilitas Pemerintah Federasi Rusia untuk terus mengimplementasikan kebijakan luar negerinya secara leluasa.

Stateness memberikan jawaban menyeluruh dengan mempertimbangkan sisi sosial-ideologis pada politik domestik dalam kaitannya dengan situasi internasional. Meminimalisir jangkauan penelitian yang kaku terhadap satu elemen saja. Sering sekali perspektif lain seperti ekonomi liberalis maupun ekonomi realis memberi jawaban semata-mata dari pandangan naif akan sebuah kekuatan yang dimiliki sebuah negara tanpa mempertimbangkan faktor sosial seperti nilai, ideologi dan juga *collective norms* yang dibangun dari intersubjektivitas antar individu. *Stateness* kemudian mengendapkan faktor-faktor tersebut menjadi satu kesatuan dalam menentukan sikap Federasi Rusia terhadap *economic statecraft* Amerika Serikat bahwa, yang terpenting bukan sejauh mana keterpurukan ekonomi yang diderita oleh Rusia ataupun sesignifikan apa kepentingan politik yang dimiliki Rusia dalam menganeksasi Krimea pada tahun 2014. Namun, sejauh apa yang dilakukan memenuhi logika yang sepatutnya/ *logic of appropriateness* dan direfleksikan melalui level *stateness* yang dimiliki oleh Rusia akan memberikan tingkat keberhasilan maupun kegagalan yang sesuai secara sejajar. Apabila menggunakan pandangan dari ekonomi liberalis, sikap resistensi Rusia tidak akan bisa dijelaskan dalam hitungan *cost* dan *benefit* secara

ekonomis. Selain itu, dengan pandangan ekonomi nasionalis meskipun resistensi Rusia dapat dilihat dari kapabilitas koersi yang dimilikinya, namun tidak bisa menjelaskan apakah kapabilitas koersi ini akan tetap valid apabila digunakan hanya untuk kebijakan strategis, karena meskipun Sevastopol dan Tartus sama-sama merupakan markas angkatan laut yang penting, namun Rusia memberikan reaksi yang lebih agresif ke Sevastopol yang ada di Krimea, dibandingkan Tartus yang berada di Syria. *Eroding dependency* terhadap Rusia juga tidak bisa menciptakan hubungan ketergantungan seperti yang disarankan oleh ekonomi nasionalis, membutuhkan alasan yang lebih dari itu untuk menjelaskan resistensi Rusia terhadap *economic statecraft* Amerika Serikat. Yakni, identitas dan status Federasi Rusia sebagai Great Power di Asia Pasifik sesuai dengan ide yang disetujui secara kolektif dan diakui oleh rakyat Federasi Rusia.

Konsistensi Pemerintah Federasi Rusia dalam merespon *economic statecraft* Amerika Serikat tampak baik dari segi ideologis maupun dari segi implementasinya. Dari segi ideologis, Pemerintah Federasi Rusia terus menerapkan kebijakan yang tidak menyalahi identitas dan ide kolektif mayoritas masyarakat Federasi Rusia sesuai dengan apa yang sepatutnya (*appropriate*) dilakukan oleh Federasi Rusia di dalam pemenuhan ekspektasi terhadap jati diri/ identitas yang telah terbentuk. Dari segi implementasi, Federasi Rusia terus mengeluarkan kebijakan-kebijakan yang bersifat melawan tekanan dari *economic statecraft* Amerika Serikat dan tidak sekalipun mencoba untuk mengambil sikap yang menunjukkan bahwa Federasi Rusia tunduk terhadap tuntutan *economic statecraft* dari Amerika Serikat.

Jadi, penulis menemukan bahwa politik luar negeri Federasi Rusia sebagai respon dari sanksi ekonomi yang di berikan Amerika Serikat bersifat resisten, konsisten, tegas dan menyeluruh berkat *stateness level* yang dimilikinya.

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