

BAB IV

KESIMPULAN

Pada tahun 2017, Kim Jong-Un secara resmi menyatakan bahwa uji coba ICBM RDRK yang bernama Hwasong-14 dan Hwasong-15 sudah dapat menjangkau seluruh wilayah Amerika Serikat, dan dengan adanya hal tersebut maka AS tidak dapat menekan RDRK lagi. Sebagai subjek yang berada dibawah ancaman nuklir RDRK, AS berusaha merespon ancaman tersebut dengan mengeluarkan kebijakan-kebijakan yang dianggap tidak konsisten. Pada tahun pertama pemerintahannya, Trump mengeluarkan kebijakan *maximum pressure* untuk menanggapi ancaman ICBM dari RDRK, kemudian dimulai pada awal 2018, Trump mengganti kebijakan tersebut ke arah *diplomacy engagement* yang ditandai dengan KTT Singapura pada tahun 2018. Namun setelah itu, AS menyatakan bahwa Trump sedang mengupayakan kedua kebijakan tersebut secara bersamaan.

Untuk menjawab rumusan masalah yaitu, mengapa respon Amerika Serikat tidak konsisten dalam menanggapi ancaman uji coba ICBM RDRK pada tahun 2017, penulis mengaplikasikan kerangka pemikiran dari Teori Persepsi Ancaman. Menurut teori Persepsi Ancaman, Stephen Walt berpendapat bahwa ancaman dapat ditentukan oleh empat faktor yaitu *aggregate power*, *geographic proximity*, *offensive capability*, dan *offensive intentions*. Dimana *aggregate power* berperan sebagai faktor utama dan berbanding lurus dengan *offensive capability*. Semakin besar suatu negara memiliki sumber daya total berarti

aggregate power yang dimiliki besar. Apabila *aggregate power*-nya besar maka *offensive capability*-nya juga besar, maka ancaman yang dapat ditimbulkan kepada negara lain juga semakin besar. Dengan besarnya ancaman yang dihasilkan akan menimbulkan kekhawatiran bagi keamanan dan stabilitas negara lain.

Pada hakikatnya, akar dari permasalahan dengan RDRK dengan AS adalah perkembangan senjata nuklir RDRK yang sudah tidak dapat dikendalikan hingga menargetkan AS sebagai tujuan akhir rudal antar benuanya dan AS tidak terima dengan keadaan tersebut. Trump memiliki kekhawatiran bahwa ancaman Kim Jong-Un akan benar-benar terjadi dilihat dari perkembangan rudal RDRK yang sangat pesat.¹⁵⁵ Untuk menanggapi ancaman tersebut, Trump memutar keadaan dengan mengancam balik RDRK lewat kebijakan *maximum pressure* berupa sanksi keras dan kekuatan militernya. Namun setelah mendapat undangan dari Kim, Trump setuju untuk melakukan negosiasi untuk membahas eskalasi konflik diantara kedua belah pihak.

Tetapi bila dikaji dari sudut pandang Persepsi Ancaman, ancaman serangan ICBM RDRK yang ditujukan untuk AS bukan merupakan tantangan yang seimbang bagi AS. Artinya, walau banyak pihak menyatakan bahwa ICBM RDRK dapat menjangkau wilayah AS, namun adanya ketimpangan *power* dan jarak yang jauh, juga kemampuan menyerang yang masih jauh dibawah standar AS menandakan bahwa seharusnya ICBM RDRK tidak

¹⁵⁵ Emma Chanlett-Avery, et.al., *North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation*, (Congressional Research Service: Washington, 2018): hal. 1.

mengancam stabilitas keamanan AS. Sehingga perubahan dalam kebijakan AS mengidentifikasi bahwa AS tidak konsisten dalam menanggapi ancaman RDRK. Ditambah kebijakan *diplomacy engagement* menunjukkan hasil yang kontradiktif dari kebijakan yang awalnya diterapkan oleh Trump.

Apabila memang dari awal RDRK dianggap sebagai ancaman, mengapa tidak konsisten menetapkan kebijakan *maximum pressure* untuk memberikan efek jera dan menekan RDRK hingga RDRK berpikir dengan sendirinya untuk mempertahankan rezim dan masa depan negaranya. Dengan melemahnya kebijakan AS kearah *soft diplomacy* dan membiarkan RDRK tetap meningkatkan kekuatan nuklir negaranya, sama saja menandakan bahwa AS tidak menganggap serius ancaman dari RDRK. Dan dengan diberlakukannya dua kebijakan AS secara sekaligus untuk menanggapi serangan ICBM RDRK, posisi AS dalam konflik nuklir dengan RDRK seperti tidak jelas ada di posisi menganggap RDRK sebagai ancaman atau tidak. Posisi seperti itu tidak mencerminkan bahwa AS adalah sebuah negara hegemon di dunia.

Di luar itu, penulis menegaskan bahwa ancaman ICBM RDRK tidak menutup kemungkinan adanya serangan tidak terduga bagi negara-negara aliansi AS di Asia Timur dan bagaimana AS juga berpikir untuk melindungi aliansinya dari ancaman RDRK. Dikarenakan adanya penyempitan bahasan yang terpaku pada hubungan AS dan RDRK, maka pada penelitian selanjutnya, penulis menyarankan untuk membahas persepsi ancaman aliansi AS di Asia Timur dan bagaimana tindakan AS dalam menanggapi hal tersebut.

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